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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="kbe_to_html.xml"?>

<root xmlns="http://bogusnamespace.com/inference_pilot_evaluation/annotation">

<inference id="cns-0001" task="">
  <question>
    Who was Anwar Sadat? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1970s Egyptian President Anwar Sadat validates that Egypt has a BW stockpile. No specific agents are mentioned. [Note: Varying reports offer different dates as to when these comments were made by Sadat. Some sources claim that these comments were made in 1970, whereas others list the date to be around 1972.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0002" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt first admit to having biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1970s Egyptian President Anwar Sadat validates that Egypt has a BW stockpile. No specific agents are mentioned. [Note: Varying reports offer different dates as to when these comments were made by Sadat. Some sources claim that these comments were made in 1970, whereas others list the date to be around 1972.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0003" task="">
  <question>
    When does the US believe that Egypt first began developing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1972 According to a 1996 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report, Egypt began developing biological weapons in 1972. There is no evidence indicating the program has been eliminated. There is no specific mention of whether the weapons are developed for an offensive or defensive strategic purpose. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0004" task="">
  <question>
    How would Egypt respond to a biological weapons attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    17 February 1972 At the Arab Socialist Union National Congress, when asked to comment on Egyptian response to a possible Israeli BW attack, President Anwar Sadat stated, &quot;The only reply to biological warfare is that we too should use biological warfare. I believe that the density of the Israeli population confined in a small area would provide the opportunity to reply with the same weapon if they should begin using it. Briefly, we have the instruments of biological warfare in the refrigerators and we will not use them unless they begin to use them.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0005" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt sign the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 April 1972 Egypt signs the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0006" task="">
  <question>
    Why didn't Egypt ratify the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is concerned that the BWC does not explicitly ban the use of biological weapons and must have a better verification component; it does not ratify the convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0007" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt view the possession of biological weapons as a deterrent? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 June 1972 Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior Mamduh Salim states that Egypt's enemies would never use BW because they are aware that the Egyptians have &quot;adequate means of retaliating without delay.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0008" task="">
  <question>
    How could Egypt's bioweapons serve as a deterrent to countries with nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 June 1972 Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Interior Mamduh Salim states that Egypt's enemies would never use BW because they are aware that the Egyptians have &quot;adequate means of retaliating without delay.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0009" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt created biological agents that could be used offensively? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt has a program of &quot;military-applied research&quot; for biological weapons but no known data exists on the creation of biological agents in the interests of military offensive programs. The military BW program began in the 1960s and in the 1970s, and President Saddat confirmed the storage of biological agents in refrigerating plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0010" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt have biological weapons that could be used to attack targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt has a program of &quot;military-applied research&quot; for biological weapons but no known data exists on the creation of biological agents in the interests of military offensive programs. The military BW program began in the 1960s and in the 1970s, and President Saddat confirmed the storage of biological agents in refrigerating plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0011" task="">
  <question>
    From which country did Egypt recruit bioweapons experts during the 1960s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the 1960s, Egypt apparently recruited German scientists for its biological weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0012" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Egypt's first bioweapons experts come from? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the 1960s, Egypt apparently recruited German scientists for its biological weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0013" task="">
  <question>
    Do Arab states other than Egypt possess biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1994 Egypt is thought to be among several Arab states possessing chemical and/or biological capabilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0014" task="">
  <question>
    Which Middle East countries have biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1994 Egypt is thought to be among several Arab states possessing chemical and/or biological capabilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0015" task="">
  <question>
    Is Egypt still stockpiling biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1996 There exists no evidence that Egypt holds or is producing biological weapons. August 1997 Egypt has provided no evidence demonstrating the elimination of its biological warfare ability, which has existed since at least 1972. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0016" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt still have biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1996 There exists no evidence that Egypt holds or is producing biological weapons. August 1997 Egypt has provided no evidence demonstrating the elimination of its biological warfare ability, which has existed since at least 1972. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0017" task="">
  <question>
    Is Egypt still producing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1996 There exists no evidence that Egypt holds or is producing biological weapons. August 1997 Egypt has provided no evidence demonstrating the elimination of its biological warfare ability, which has existed since at least 1972. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0018" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt still make biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1996 There exists no evidence that Egypt holds or is producing biological weapons. August 1997 Egypt has provided no evidence demonstrating the elimination of its biological warfare ability, which has existed since at least 1972. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0019" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence that Egypt still maintains a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1996 There exists no evidence that Egypt holds or is producing biological weapons. August 1997 Egypt has provided no evidence demonstrating the elimination of its biological warfare ability, which has existed since at least 1972. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0020" task="">
  <question>
    Is Egypt believed to have the potential to produce biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 2000 Egypt reportedly has the potential to produce biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0021" task="">
  <question>
    Can Egypt produce biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 2000 Egypt reportedly has the potential to produce biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0022" task="">
  <question>
    Which biological weapons agents is Egypt believed to possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 2001 Egypt is thought to have supplies of the causative agents for anthrax, cholera, plague, and botulism. Though it is not clear from the article whether Egypt has weaponized these agents, they can all be delivered as an aerosol. In addition, Egypt has also developed the causative agent for smallpox, which may be delivered via missile (but again, it is not clearly stated whether Egypt has weaponized the agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0023" task="">
  <question>
    Which biological weapons is Egypt suspected of having? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 2001 Egypt is thought to have supplies of the causative agents for anthrax, cholera, plague, and botulism. Though it is not clear from the article whether Egypt has weaponized these agents, they can all be delivered as an aerosol. In addition, Egypt has also developed the causative agent for smallpox, which may be delivered via missile (but again, it is not clearly stated whether Egypt has weaponized the agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0024" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt can deliver biological weapons with missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 2001 Egypt is thought to have supplies of the causative agents for anthrax, cholera, plague, and botulism. Though it is not clear from the article whether Egypt has weaponized these agents, they can all be delivered as an aerosol. In addition, Egypt has also developed the causative agent for smallpox, which may be delivered via missile (but again, it is not clearly stated whether Egypt has weaponized the agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0025" task="">
  <question>
    How could Egypt deliver its biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 2001 Egypt is thought to have supplies of the causative agents for anthrax, cholera, plague, and botulism. Though it is not clear from the article whether Egypt has weaponized these agents, they can all be delivered as an aerosol. In addition, Egypt has also developed the causative agent for smallpox, which may be delivered via missile (but again, it is not clearly stated whether Egypt has weaponized the agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0026" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt has weaponized its biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 2001 Egypt is thought to have supplies of the causative agents for anthrax, cholera, plague, and botulism. Though it is not clear from the article whether Egypt has weaponized these agents, they can all be delivered as an aerosol. In addition, Egypt has also developed the causative agent for smallpox, which may be delivered via missile (but again, it is not clearly stated whether Egypt has weaponized the agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0027" task="">
  <question>
    Can Egypt weaponize its biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 2001 Egypt is thought to have supplies of the causative agents for anthrax, cholera, plague, and botulism. Though it is not clear from the article whether Egypt has weaponized these agents, they can all be delivered as an aerosol. In addition, Egypt has also developed the causative agent for smallpox, which may be delivered via missile (but again, it is not clearly stated whether Egypt has weaponized the agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0028" task="">
  <question>
    Was the United States' refusal to sign the BWC verification protocol affected by the presence of biological weapons programs in other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 2001 The US decision not to sign the BWC verification protocol may have been affected by the presence of biological weapons programs in other countries, including Egypt, though the United States has not publicly named Egypt as a biological weapons ready state. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0029" task="">
  <question>
    What is the known extent of Egypt's biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 2001 In a list of &quot;who has what&quot; regarding biological weapons, Egypt is listed as having &quot;known research and development.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0030" task="">
  <question>
    How large is Egypt's biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 2001 In a list of &quot;who has what&quot; regarding biological weapons, Egypt is listed as having &quot;known research and development.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0031" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt has destroyed its biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    He claims that the United States believes that Egypt possessed biological weapons in 1972 and has not provided evidence of their disposal, suggesting the material might still be active. However, Cordesman writes that Israeli reports indicate different findings in support of an active program. The Israelis point to comments made by former President Anwar Sadat, who in 1970 stated that Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators ready to use against Israel if need be. The program might include &quot;plague, botulism toxin, encephalitis virus, anthrax, Rift Valley fever and mycotoxicosis.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0032" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt destroy its biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    He claims that the United States believes that Egypt possessed biological weapons in 1972 and has not provided evidence of their disposal, suggesting the material might still be active. However, Cordesman writes that Israeli reports indicate different findings in support of an active program. The Israelis point to comments made by former President Anwar Sadat, who in 1970 stated that Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators ready to use against Israel if need be. The program might include &quot;plague, botulism toxin, encephalitis virus, anthrax, Rift Valley fever and mycotoxicosis.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0033" task="">
  <question>
    What biological weapons agents may be included in Egypt's BW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Israelis point to comments made by former President Anwar Sadat, who in 1970 stated that Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators ready to use against Israel if need be. The program might include &quot;plague, botulism toxin, encephalitis virus, anthrax, Rift Valley fever and mycotoxicosis.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0034" task="">
  <question>
    What biological weapons is Egypt storing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Israelis point to comments made by former President Anwar Sadat, who in 1970 stated that Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators ready to use against Israel if need be. The program might include &quot;plague, botulism toxin, encephalitis virus, anthrax, Rift Valley fever and mycotoxicosis.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0035" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt traditionally sought to develop WMD capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Writing for Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst, reporter Al Venter notes that too few Middle East experts know that Egypt likely possesses a biological weapons program and vigorously pursues new unconventional systems. Recent comments by US Undersecretary of State John Bolton did not address Egypt's WMD programs, likely in deference to Egypt's important role in backing the United States in an anticipated invasion of Iraq. Egypt is strongly suspected of developing its own biowarfare facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0036" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt used chemical weapons in war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Being one of the few countries that has employed chemical warfare (CW) agents in the battlefield, Egypt often figures prominently in chemical weapons discussions. There is strong evidence that Egyptian military forces employed bombs and artillery shells filled with phosgene and mustard agents in northern Yemen during the Yemen Civil War (1963-1967) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0037" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Egypt use in the Yemen Civil War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is strong evidence that Egyptian military forces employed bombs and artillery shells filled with phosgene and mustard agents in northern Yemen during the Yemen Civil War (1963-1967).[1] Egyptian involvement with CW dates back to the World War II era, when Egypt reportedly inherited stocks of mustard agent abandoned following the end of the British occupation in 1954.[2] The British troops maintained CW stockpiles in Egypt but never used these agents for fear of retaliation in kind. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0038" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Egypt obtain its first stockpiles of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt reportedly inherited stocks of mustard agent abandoned following the end of the British occupation in 1954.[2] The British troops maintained CW stockpiles in Egypt but never used these agents for fear of retaliation in kind. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0039" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Egypt first get chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt reportedly inherited stocks of mustard agent abandoned following the end of the British occupation in 1954.[2] The British troops maintained CW stockpiles in Egypt but never used these agents for fear of retaliation in kind. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0040" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt has developed nerve or blood agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is accused of further developing its CW capability to include nerve and blood agents. The main Egyptian facilities involved in producing CW are believed to be the Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides and the Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0041" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt manufacture nerve agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is accused of further developing its CW capability to include nerve and blood agents. The main Egyptian facilities involved in producing CW are believed to be the Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides and the Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0042" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt manufacture blood agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is accused of further developing its CW capability to include nerve and blood agents. The main Egyptian facilities involved in producing CW are believed to be the Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides and the Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0043" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Egypt produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The main Egyptian facilities involved in producing CW are believed to be the Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides and the Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0044" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt signed the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Egypt acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 6 December 1928, it is one of the few states that refuses to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0045" task="">
  <question>
    Why hasn't Egypt signed the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt has repeatedly refused to sign the CWC because of Israel's assumed nuclear weapons arsenal. Egyptian authorities have often claimed that Egypt would sign the CWC if Israel joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0046" task="">
  <question>
    What conditions must be met before Egypt will sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt has repeatedly refused to sign the CWC because of Israel's assumed nuclear weapons arsenal. Egyptian authorities have often claimed that Egypt would sign the CWC if Israel joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0047" task="">
  <question>
    What does Egypt's refusal to sign the CWC say about the strategic importance of its CBW weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Egypt acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 6 December 1928, it is one of the few states that refuses to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Egypt has repeatedly refused to sign the CWC because of Israel's assumed nuclear weapons arsenal. Egyptian authorities have often claimed that Egypt would sign the CWC if Israel joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[4] However, it must be noted that in 1990, Egypt and Iran were the only two Middle Eastern countries to participate in national trial inspections prior to the CWC's entry into force.[5] Although, under President Anwar al-Sadat in the 1970s, Egyptian officials talked about reciprocal retaliation to any attack, Egypt has never publicly maintained a first or second strike military doctrine with regards to CBW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0048" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egypt start its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is a widely held belief among security experts that Egypt initiated its chemical weapons program in response to Israel's tacit pursuit of a nuclear capability. Egypt was also the first Arab state to employ CW agents in the Middle East during its war against the royalist troops of North Yemen (1963-67). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0049" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egypt use chemical weapons in the Yemen Civil War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are varying explanations as to why Egypt chose to employ CW agents in Yemen, including the suggestion that it was considered an effective weapon against tribesmen hiding in caves, as well as the fact that it proved to be a good testing ground for such weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0050" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Egypt use against Yemen? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Among the agents it employed, there is strong consensus about the use of phosgene and mustard, but there are also references to the use of a crude organophosphate nerve agent.[6] Casualty estimates vary widely;[7] a conservative assumption is that the mustard- and phosgene-filled aerial bombs caused approximately 1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0051" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons has Egypt used? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Among the agents it employed, there is strong consensus about the use of phosgene and mustard, but there are also references to the use of a crude organophosphate nerve agent.[6] Casualty estimates vary widely;[7] a conservative assumption is that the mustard- and phosgene-filled aerial bombs caused approximately 1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0052" task="">
  <question>
    What information is known about Egypt's use of chemical weapons against Yemen? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June/July 1963 Eight gas attacks on villages south of Sadah Unknown Unknown Villages targeted included al Darb, al Jaraishi, Hasan Bini Awair, al Ashash, and al Kawma. 8 June 1963 Al Kawna Eight bombs dropped containing an agent causing eye and lung injuries 28 (including 6 fatalities) January 1965 Beit Marran Agent caused &quot;eye injuries&quot; 80 January 1965 Jabal Urush region Unknown Unknown Spring 1965 Sharazeih Unknown Unknown March and July 1965 Unknown Mustard/ phosgene Unknown Independent journalists state that this was the first time mustard and phosgene were employed. Fall 1966 Unknown Agent causing &quot;eye and skin injuries&quot; At least 20 casualties 11 December 1966 Halhal Agent causing &quot;eye, skin, and injuries&quot; 35 injured; 2 dead Delivery method: 15 bombs dropped from a military aircraft. 27-29 December 1966 Habal Iyal Yazid region Agent causing &quot;eye and skin injuries&quot; &quot;scores of victims&quot; Delivery method: 15 -20 bombs dropped from a military aircraft. 5 January 1967 Hadda Nerve agent A US and Dutch journalist separately report of this incident. No further details are provided. 5 January 1967 Kitaf Agents causing &quot;lung injuries&quot; 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities 27 bombs were used for delivery; another source?a newspaper from Washington, DC?claims a V-series nerve agent was used. No corroborative evidence. 6 January 1967 Beith Michlaf Doran and Beit Beni Salamah Unknown Livestock killed 85 gas and incendiary bombs were used as delivery. 7 January 1967 Katar Agents causing &quot;eye and lung injuries&quot; Over 225 injures, 125 dead 12 aerial bombs used. 17 January 1967 Jabal Iyal Yazid Unknown None Four 100lb and four 500lb bombs were dropped, which failed to explode because of strong winds. 9 February 1967 Beni Salamah Unknown 70 dead 3 May 1967 Bassi Nerve agent Unknown Claims made by a Dutch journalist. 7 May 1967 Arhab tribal region Unknown 200 killed 10 May 1967 Gadafa Agents causing &quot;eye and skin injuries&quot; 24 killed Aerial bombs used for delivery. 10 May 1967 Gahar Agents causing &quot;eye, skin and lung injuries&quot; 74 dead and 200 livestock killed May 1967 Narjan and Oizan (in Saudi Arabia, close to the Yemen border) Unknown Unknown Casing from the &quot;gas bomb&quot; received was stamped in Cyrillic alphabet. Scientists reportedly tested the agent to determine whether it was a new nerve agent. No results were announced. 17 May 1967 Gadafa Unknown 100 killed 4 bombs used. 23 May 1967 Beit Gadr, Beit Gabas, and Nofal Unknown 143 dead 23 May 1967 Sirwah Unknown 50 killed 28 May 1967 Sirwah Unknown &quot;large number of casualties&quot;; 72 killed 30 of the injured were taken to Saudi Arabia for treatment. 29 May 1967 Beni Hushaysh region Unknown 50 dead 15 &quot;napalm bombs&quot; dropped; it is possible this might be the same as the 23 May incident in Sirwah. June 1967 Beni Sahin Unknown 45 dead 5-6 June 1967 Boa and Immed Unknown Unknown 2 July 1967 Beni Saham Unknown 45 dead and several livestock 4 July 1967 Darb Ascar Unknown 52 killed 15 Junly 1967 Hajjah Agents causing &quot;eye and lung injuries&quot; 425-520 casualties (including 50-150 dead) 60 bombs dropped from bomber aircraft. 16 July 1967 Mabian and Nejra Unknown 217 dead 23 July 1967 Unknown Unknown 18 dead 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0053" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Egypt conduct chemical weapons research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    gypt actively pursued scientific research and development for the production and improvement of chemical weapons through a host of institutions. The Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army researched sulphur and nitrogen mustard blister agents, organophosphorous nerve agents such as sarin and VX-related compounds.[8] Other laboratories conducting related research with Egyptian affiliates included the Egyptian National Research Center, Ain-Shams University, and the Technical University of Budapest, Hungary. During the time frame of the mid-to-late 1970s, Egypt also conducted significant research on psychotomimetic glycolates such as BZ and EA-3443.[9] In the 1980s, scientists at the National Research Center in Cairo studied organophosphates, including nerve-agent-like pesticides and the effects of seawater on organophosphates, perhaps to study the effects of sea dumping older CW inventories. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0054" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between Egypt's Central Military Chemical Laboratories and the production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army researched sulphur and nitrogen mustard blister agents, organophosphorous nerve agents such as sarin and VX-related compounds. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0055" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons are made at Egypt's Central Military Chemical Laboratory? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army researched sulphur and nitrogen mustard blister agents, organophosphorous nerve agents such as sarin and VX-related compounds. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0056" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons were produced at Egypt's Central Military Chemical Laboratories? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army researched sulphur and nitrogen mustard blister agents, organophosphorous nerve agents such as sarin and VX-related compounds. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0057" task="">
  <question>
    What foreign assistance did Egypt receive in developing its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egyptian chemists worked closely with their Danish and West German counterparts, and Major General Hussein Ades of the Egyptian Army received training at the University of Columbus in the United States on organophosphate compounds.[10] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0058" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Egypt build its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egyptian chemists worked closely with their Danish and West German counterparts, and Major General Hussein Ades of the Egyptian Army received training at the University of Columbus in the United States on organophosphate compounds.[10] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0059" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt help Iraq obtain chemical weapons precursors in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the early 1980s, Egypt allegedly leveraged its relationships to help Iraq with its chemical weapons program. Egypt used a branch of the German company Walter Thosti Boswau (WTB) International to facilitate aid programs and helped Iraq acquire 26 tons of hydrogen fluoride from the United Kingdom in 1986.[11] A few years later, Egypt successfully imported an additional 34 tons of hydrogen fluoride from the United Kingdom, which was allegedly channeled to Iraq.[12] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0060" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Egypt produces chemical weapons at a plant in Abu Za'abal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1989, US and Swiss officials stated that the Swiss company Krebs A.G. delivered parts to Egypt to be installed in a plant &quot;intended to make poison gas&quot; at Abu Za'abal, 25 miles north of Cairo. A Swiss foreign ministry official, however, stated that there is &quot;reason to believe&quot; Egypt has intentions to produce chemical weapons, which might include the nerve agent sarin. The Swiss government did, however, take action after Egypt refused to provide assurances that the plant would be used for civilian purposes, prompting a demand that Krebs sever its relationship with the project.[13] It is not clear if the plant is used for military purposes, but Western allegations claim that it illicitly develops CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0061" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Egypt chemical weapons plant at Abu Za'abal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1989, US and Swiss officials stated that the Swiss company Krebs A.G. delivered parts to Egypt to be installed in a plant &quot;intended to make poison gas&quot; at Abu Za'abal, 25 miles north of Cairo. A Swiss foreign ministry official, however, stated that there is &quot;reason to believe&quot; Egypt has intentions to produce chemical weapons, which might include the nerve agent sarin. The Swiss government did, however, take action after Egypt refused to provide assurances that the plant would be used for civilian purposes, prompting a demand that Krebs sever its relationship with the project.[13] It is not clear if the plant is used for military purposes, but Western allegations claim that it illicitly develops CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0062" task="">
  <question>
    What was the alleged connection between the Swiss company Krebs A.G. and Egypt's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    When writing about dubious shipments to Egypt, the Krebs incident requires a notable mention. In 1989, US and Swiss officials stated that the Swiss company Krebs A.G. delivered parts to Egypt to be installed in a plant &quot;intended to make poison gas&quot; at Abu Za'abal, 25 miles north of Cairo. A Swiss foreign ministry official, however, stated that there is &quot;reason to believe&quot; Egypt has intentions to produce chemical weapons, which might include the nerve agent sarin. The Swiss government did, however, take action after Egypt refused to provide assurances that the plant would be used for civilian purposes, prompting a demand that Krebs sever its relationship with the project. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0063" task="">
  <question>
    What does Egypt claim it manufactures at the suspected chemical weapons plant at Abu Za'abal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mohammed Wahby, Egypt's spokesman in Washington, denied plans to build a chemical weapons plant. &quot;We are not involved in the manufacturing of chemical weapons,&quot; he said. The plant is part of a military industrial complex that is also expected to include a joint Egyptian-American plant for M-1 tank assembly.[14] Krebs is a reputed Swiss chemical company that works with a several foreign countries in research that in a host of subjects related to chemical processes. Whether it knowingly assisted Egypt in developing a covert CW capability is speculative. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0064" task="">
  <question>
    What does Egypt supposedly make at the chemical weapons plant at Abu Za'abal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mohammed Wahby, Egypt's spokesman in Washington, denied plans to build a chemical weapons plant. &quot;We are not involved in the manufacturing of chemical weapons,&quot; he said. The plant is part of a military industrial complex that is also expected to include a joint Egyptian-American plant for M-1 tank assembly.[14] Krebs is a reputed Swiss chemical company that works with a several foreign countries in research that in a host of subjects related to chemical processes. Whether it knowingly assisted Egypt in developing a covert CW capability is speculative. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0065" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence linking Krebs A.G. to Egypt's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Krebs is a reputed Swiss chemical company that works with a several foreign countries in research that in a host of subjects related to chemical processes. Whether it knowingly assisted Egypt in developing a covert CW capability is speculative. According to a New York Times report, Krebs had also provided equipment to build a chemical plant for the Egyptian El Nasr Pharmaceutical Company to make phosphorous trichloride, a chemical found in pesticides and the export of which is controlled. Designs for the chemical plant were purchased by Krebs from Stauffer Chemicals, a US enterprise.[15] This particular Krebs incident is somewhat ambiguous. Although credible news sources reported about the shipment and US officials acknowledged the incident, it has never been explicitly stated what exactly was the &quot;equipment&quot; involved. The New York Times is the only source that mentions the El Nasr-Krebs-Stauffer connection, and the information surrounding these allegations appear to be based on intelligence sources that were never made publicly available. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0066" task="">
  <question>
    What is Krebs A.G.? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Krebs is a reputed Swiss chemical company that works with a several foreign countries in research that in a host of subjects related to chemical processes. Whether it knowingly assisted Egypt in developing a covert CW capability is speculative. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0067" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between the El Nasr Pharmaceutical Company and Egypt's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a New York Times report, Krebs had also provided equipment to build a chemical plant for the Egyptian El Nasr Pharmaceutical Company to make phosphorous trichloride, a chemical found in pesticides and the export of which is controlled. Designs for the chemical plant were purchased by Krebs from Stauffer Chemicals, a US enterprise.[15] This particular Krebs incident is somewhat ambiguous. Although credible news sources reported about the shipment and US officials acknowledged the incident, it has never been explicitly stated what exactly was the &quot;equipment&quot; involved. The New York Times is the only source that mentions the El Nasr-Krebs-Stauffer connection, and the information surrounding these allegations appear to be based on intelligence sources that were never made publicly available. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that Krebs?a chemical engineering company?continues to retain ties to foreign enterprises, including several in Egypt. Their cooperation with El Nasr and Abu Za'abal deals primarily with cholorinization-related work.[16] However, it must be noted that this information came directly from Krebs, which may not find it in its best interest to report of any illicit complicity to help build Egypt's CW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0068" task="">
  <question>
    How is Egypt's defense industry organized? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt's defense industry is largely split between two groups. First, is the National Organization for Military Production (NOMP), which is run by the Ministry for Defense Production. NOMP operates under the Ministry of Military Production, possibly a division of the Ministry for Defense Production.[17] In the early 1980s, the commercial names were changed to indicate general location and goods produced. The NOMP oversees 16 factories that fall under four groups: chemical industries, engineering industries, mining industries, and electronic industries.[18] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0069" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Arab Organization for Industrialization? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of Egypt's defense production also falls under the umbrella of the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), based in Cairo. This collaborative entity was formed in 1975 by the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The AOI operates as an independent entity exempt from Egyptian taxes, and its primary mandate was to form a mutual defense collaboration between the governments of the founding countries. Before the AOI could establish itself as a strong player in the defense community, it suffered strong setbacks when Egypt lost the support of several Arab governments for initiating peace talks with Israel. It regained some of its military contacts by the late 1980s but is believed to be primarily run by Egypt.[19] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0070" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt supported chemical and biological arms control measures in the past? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is no strategic plan for the use of CW by Egypt in the unclassified realm. Egypt has openly denied the production of any weapon of mass destruction but maintains that it will keep all options open to counter the Israeli threat. In the 1990s, Egypt was a strong proponent of regional arms control initiatives and stated that it would sign the CWC if Israel signed the NPT. Neither country chose to follow this option. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0071" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egypt not use biological or chemical weapons in its 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For instance, if allegations that Egypt already had certain CW agents before the Yom Kippur War of 1973, why did it refrain from using them? Some analysts believe that the Egyptians feared a nuclear retaliation from Israel, whereas others maintain that Egyptian CW capability, at the time, was exaggerated. Today, the Egyptian military is believed to be very well trained in chemical defense exercises and has conducted war games in the past that included the threat of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and chemical) agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0072" task="">
  <question>
    Has the Egyptian army trained in defensive procedures against the use of chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Today, the Egyptian military is believed to be very well trained in chemical defense exercises and has conducted war games in the past that included the threat of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and chemical) agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0073" task="">
  <question>
    What is Egypt's strategic plan regarding the use of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is no strategic plan for the use of CW by Egypt in the unclassified realm. Egypt has openly denied the production of any weapon of mass destruction but maintains that it will keep all options open to counter the Israeli threat. In the 1990s, Egypt was a strong proponent of regional arms control initiatives and stated that it would sign the CWC if Israel signed the NPT. Neither country chose to follow this option. From a military perspective, it is unclear whether there is an organizational plan to employ CW. The question that begs to be asked is: Will it be employed in an offensive role or has it been reserved for a defensive strategy? 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0074" task="">
  <question>
    How would Egypt use its biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt was a strong proponent of regional arms control initiatives and stated that it would sign the CWC if Israel signed the NPT. Neither country chose to follow this option. From a military perspective, it is unclear whether there is an organizational plan to employ CW. The question that begs to be asked is: Will it be employed in an offensive role or has it been reserved for a defensive strategy? 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0075" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that would suggest that Egypt would use chemical or biological weapons offensively? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    From a military perspective, it is unclear whether there is an organizational plan to employ CW. The question that begs to be asked is: Will it be employed in an offensive role or has it been reserved for a defensive strategy? 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0076" task="">
  <question>
    Would Egypt attack targets using CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it is unclear whether there is an organizational plan to employ CW. The question that begs to be asked is: Will it be employed in an offensive role or has it been reserved for a defensive strategy? 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0077" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt possess the industrial infrastructure necessary to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Being a developing country, Egypt has a significant industrial base that includes factories producing pesticides, dyes, inks, and other materials that employ dual-use chemicals and technologies. Western intelligence reports, nevertheless, assert that Egypt retains a significant CW program that includes blister, blood, nerve and incapacitating agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0078" task="">
  <question>
    Could Egypt produce CW or chemical weapons precursors domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt has a significant industrial base that includes factories producing pesticides, dyes, inks, and other materials that employ dual-use chemicals and technologies. Western intelligence reports, nevertheless, assert that Egypt retains a significant CW program that includes blister, blood, nerve and incapacitating agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0079" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have shipped Egypt dual-use chemicals that could have been used in the production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As noted previously, there have been several key incidents involving shipments of dual-use chemicals into Egypt from countries such as India and the United Kingdom. Although it was never fully clarified what the intent for these chemicals was, Egypt always maintained that they were imported for legitimate purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0080" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Egypt get dual-use chemicals for CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    there have been several key incidents involving shipments of dual-use chemicals into Egypt from countries such as India and the United Kingdom. Although it was never fully clarified what the intent for these chemicals was, Egypt always maintained that they were imported for legitimate purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0081" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries has Egypt supplied with chemical weapons assistance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are strong allegations that Egypt has collaborated with other countries such as Iraq and Syria to boost their respective CW programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0082" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt maintain a ballistic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For a long-range delivery, a missile or a plane are considered optimal whereas mines and other munitions can be used in a more tactical scenario. Egypt does have a missile program and various other delivery systems such as bombs, fighter planes, mines, and other munitions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0083" task="">
  <question>
    Can Egypt equip missiles with chemical or biological weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Israeli reports claim that the Egyptian Army has the capability to fit its missiles with chemical warheads, but there is no clear indication whether it has done so. In the past, during the Yemeni attacks, bombers were the primary delivery method for dispersing aerial bombs filled with chemical agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0084" task="">
  <question>
    What delivery methods did Egypt use in its past chemical weapons attacks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the past, during the Yemeni attacks, bombers were the primary delivery method for dispersing aerial bombs filled with chemical agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0085" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt use CW in the past? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the past, during the Yemeni attacks, bombers were the primary delivery method for dispersing aerial bombs filled with chemical agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0086" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Egyptian Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Egypt is rumored to have an extensive CW capability, only one facility is cited in reports as being involved in such a program: Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides (also known as Factory 18). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0087" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Egypt's main CW facility located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is rumored to have an extensive CW capability, only one facility is cited in reports as being involved in such a program: Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides (also known as Factory 18). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0088" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the only known Egyptian chemical weapons production facility located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Egypt is rumored to have an extensive CW capability, only one facility is cited in reports as being involved in such a program: Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides (also known as Factory 18). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0089" task="">
  <question>
    What information is available on the Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army are also identified in the open source sources as facilities associated with CW development. Information on these laboratories is scarce. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0090" task="">
  <question>
    Is there definitive evidence that Egyptian chemical weapons have been transferred to other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There have been dubious transactions between Egypt and other countries dealing with dual-use precursor chemicals, but their final destination is not easily determined. If Egypt is indeed producing offensive chemical weapons, it is doing so under the guise of legitimate research institutions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0091" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt sent chemical weapons to other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There have been dubious transactions between Egypt and other countries dealing with dual-use precursor chemicals, but their final destination is not easily determined. If Egypt is indeed producing offensive chemical weapons, it is doing so under the guise of legitimate research institutions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0092" task="">
  <question>
    How experienced is the Egyptian army with the use of chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is worth noting again that the Egyptian Army is fully trained in CW defenses and has conducted military exercises simulating a CW attack. Given their use of CW agents in Yemen during the 1960s, it can be deduced that Egypt has familiarity with this weapon type. However, the extent to which it is producing chemical agents in an offensive manner remains to be determined. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0093" task="">
  <question>
    Does the Egyptian military train in the use of CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is worth noting again that the Egyptian Army is fully trained in CW defenses and has conducted military exercises simulating a CW attack. Given their use of CW agents in Yemen during the 1960s, it can be deduced that Egypt has familiarity with this weapon type. However, the extent to which it is producing chemical agents in an offensive manner remains to be determined. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0094" task="">
  <question>
    What is Egypt's current production capacity for chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Given their use of CW agents in Yemen during the 1960s, it can be deduced that Egypt has familiarity with this weapon type. However, the extent to which it is producing chemical agents in an offensive manner remains to be determined. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0095" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons are most likely produced at the Central Military Chemical Laboratories of the Egyptian Army? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Primary Function: Conducts studies on various chemical agents. History: Following the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the laboratory reportedly began studies on sulfur and nitrogen mustard, along with organophosphorous nerve agents like sarin and VX. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3444.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3444.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0096" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between Egypt's Ains Shams University and its chemical and biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An article in the Spring-Summer 1998 Non-Proliferation Review mentions that Aim-Shams University began studying sulfur and nitrogen mustard and organophosphorous nerve agents such as sarin and VX-related compounds after the 1973 Yom Kippur war. The University houses the Center for Genetic Engineering and Bio-technology, which supports all research projects dealing with genetic engineering and biotechnology within the faculties and different research units located at the university. The university also oversees the Research and Training Center on Vectors of Diseases, which was established in 1980 and works with specialized medical institutions throughout Egypt to increase awareness of disease prevention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3445.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3445.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0097" task="">
  <question>
    What were among the first products of Egypt's Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    When it was founded in 1950, the company's primary functions were propellant and explosives production. One of Abu Za'abal's major projects was the Aswan High Dam Project, for which the company reportedly supplied 12,000 tons of dynamite. Egypt reportedly opened its first chemical weapons production facility in 1963, and named it Abu Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides, in the Abu Za'abal military industrial complex, located 10 kilometers north of Cairo. Unofficially, this facility is reportedly called Military Plant No. 801. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0098" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Egypt's Abu Za'abal Company for Specialty Chemicals reportedly produce in the 1970s and 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the 1970s, Abu Za'abal likely produced sarin, VX, and a glycolate hallucinogen. In the 1980s, the facility underwent a reorganization in order to improve the plant's capabilities, much of which occurred with the help of Western European companies. The updates included improving production lines for nerve agent precursors such as phosphorous trichloride and expanding the nerve agent production facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0099" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt draw attention away from its chemical weapons programs at Abu Za'abal (Military Plant 801)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To mitigate any suspicions, the improvements were noted as renovations to the neighboring El-Nasr Pharmaceutical Company, when in fact they occurred at Military Plant No. 801. In 1987, the Swiss chemical company Krebs A.G. began helping Egypt build a facility capable of producing phosphorous trichloride. Egyptian officials claimed the facility would be a pesticide manufacturing plant. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0100" task="">
  <question>
    How has Egypt tried to hide its CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the improvements were noted as renovations to the neighboring El-Nasr Pharmaceutical Company, when in fact they occurred at Military Plant No. 801. In 1987, the Swiss chemical company Krebs A.G. began helping Egypt build a facility capable of producing phosphorous trichloride. Egyptian officials claimed the facility would be a pesticide manufacturing plant. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0101" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt's Abu Za'abal Company been linked to WMD programs in other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Abu Za'abal Company also reportedly helped Iraq build the Taj al-Ma'arik solid fuel propellant plant in Latifiyah (al Hillah). Although this is not directly CW related, it goes to demonstrate the scientific capability at Abu-Za'abal as well as ties with other countries' weapons programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0102" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the main chemical weapons facility in Egypt located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Federation of American Scientists reported in 1999 that the Abu Za'abal Company houses the main chemical weapons production facility in Egypt, known as, TA'AS 801.  This same report indicates that nearby manufacturers of pest control products assist the Abu Za'abal Company in chemical weapons production. One such manufacturer is the Abu Za'abal Company for Pest Control Materials and Chemicals. This is a civilian plant that supports Factory 18 chemical weapons production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0103" task="">
  <question>
    What is TA'AS 801? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Federation of American Scientists reported in 1999 that the Abu Za'abal Company houses the main chemical weapons production facility in Egypt, known as, TA'AS 801. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3426_3446.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0104" task="">
  <question>
    What is the scope of Egypt's biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Very little, if any, data exists that compellingly indicates the presence of an offensive biological warfare (BW) program in Egypt. Most of the data pertaining to its alleged involvement in a BW program is highly speculative and uncorroborated. Most allegations point toward comments made by then-president Anwar Sadat in February 1972, stating Egypt possessed some BW capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0105" task="">
  <question>
    What was the impact of Anwar Sadat's 1972 comments on Egypt's biological weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Most allegations point toward comments made by then-president Anwar Sadat in February 1972, stating Egypt possessed some BW capability. The comments were never published widely outside Egypt and two months later, in April 1972, Egypt signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). It has yet to ratify the treaty. Israeli nuclear capability and the fact that Israel has not signed the BWC are possible explanations offered for the lack of an Egyptian ratification. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0106" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any supporting evidence that Egypt has been actively producing biological weapons since 1972? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Western and Israeli reports often claim that Egypt is developing an illicit BW program and has worked extensively on defensive BW efforts. These reports, however, are often vague and do not provide any supporting evidence. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0107" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt have the infrastructure necessary to produce biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt does have the basic biotechnical infrastructure that could serve as a potential base for a covert BW program. Being a developing nation with a strong agricultural and health services sector, Egypt legitimately conducts research on a host of diseases and pathogens that affect both humans and crops. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0108" task="">
  <question>
    Is Egypt capable of producing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt does have the basic biotechnical infrastructure that could serve as a potential base for a covert BW program. Being a developing nation with a strong agricultural and health services sector, Egypt legitimately conducts research on a host of diseases and pathogens that affect both humans and crops. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0109" task="">
  <question>
    How much biotechnology-related equipment did Egypt import in 1997? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1997, Egypt imported $48 million worth of biotechnology-related lab equipment, though it cannot be determined if any of it was used for research on BW-related agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0110" task="">
  <question>
    What bioweapons equipment has Egypt imported? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1997, Egypt imported $48 million worth of biotechnology-related lab equipment, though it cannot be determined if any of it was used for research on BW-related agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0111" task="">
  <question>
    Has the Egyptian government invested significantly in biotechnology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Egyptian government anticipates this field to grow significantly in the next few years, and its current five-year plan (1998-2003) highlights the significance of scientific development and has allocated approximately $7 billion to upgrade scientific research facilities across the country. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0112" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt possess dual-use facilities that could be used to support an illicit biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is rumored to operate large scale dual-use facilities outside Cairo that support its alleged covert BW program. According to some experts, Egypt conducts research on various bacteria, viruses, and toxins including pathogens causing Rift Valley fever, encephalitis, and mycotoxicosis. There is no specific evidence to support these claims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0113" task="">
  <question>
    What dual-use facilities could Egypt use to produce BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is rumored to operate large scale dual-use facilities outside Cairo that support its alleged covert BW program. According to some experts, Egypt conducts research on various bacteria, viruses, and toxins including pathogens causing Rift Valley fever, encephalitis, and mycotoxicosis. There is no specific evidence to support these claims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0114" task="">
  <question>
    What biological pathogens does Egypt conduct research on? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to some experts, Egypt conducts research on various bacteria, viruses, and toxins including pathogens causing Rift Valley fever, encephalitis, and mycotoxicosis. There is no specific evidence to support these claims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0115" task="">
  <question>
    What biological agents could Egypt weaponize into BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to some experts, Egypt conducts research on various bacteria, viruses, and toxins including pathogens causing Rift Valley fever, encephalitis, and mycotoxicosis. There is no specific evidence to support these claims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0116" task="">
  <question>
    Who assisted Egypt in building El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics at Abu-Za'abal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1950s, the Soviets assisted Egypt in building a large pharmaceutical complex called the El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics at Abu-Za'abal, which was near the Military Plant No. 801 (see Egypt's chemical overview for more information on this facility). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0117" task="">
  <question>
    What was the primary function of the Egyptian El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics at Abu-Za'abal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1950s, the Soviets assisted Egypt in building a large pharmaceutical complex called the El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics at Abu-Za'abal, which was near the Military Plant No. 801 (see Egypt's chemical overview for more information on this facility). The facility was reportedly split into two divisions, one for fermentation and the other for chemical synthesis. The fermentation division developed large volumes of culture media for developing bacteria and fungi. Again it is not clear if this culture was developed for pharmaceutical purposes or for a covert BW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0118" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence linking the Egyptian El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics at Abu-Za'abal to an illicit biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The facility was reportedly split into two divisions, one for fermentation and the other for chemical synthesis. The fermentation division developed large volumes of culture media for developing bacteria and fungi. Again it is not clear if this culture was developed for pharmaceutical purposes or for a covert BW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0119" task="">
  <question>
    How has Egypt participated in UN-sponsored investigations into biological weapons programs in other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Major-General Ezz, the head of the Egyptian Chemical Corps, led a UN investigation into the use of similar weapons by the Soviet Union, including Fusarium trichothecenes, or &quot;yellow rain.&quot; Though this incident does not clearly demonstrate any ties to a BW program, it does give some indication as to the scientific knowledge base in Egypt. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0120" task="">
  <question>
    What research has Egyptian scientists conducted on mycotoxins? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    # Egyptian scientists, supported by the US Army, researched trichothecene mycotoxins such as T-2 toxin, vomitoxin, and fusariotoxin, which are derivatives of the fungal mold Fusarium. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0121" task="">
  <question>
    What are some known biological agents produced at the Egyptian El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics at Abu-Za'abal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    # The El-Nasr Pharmaceutical Company regularly produces Gibberella fujikuori, a fungal mold closely related to Fusarium, which is used for industrial fermentation. Fusarium is a mold that can be used for the production of the T-2 mycotoxin.  [a2_]# The El-Nasr Pharmaceutical plant cultivated, in &quot;industrial&quot; quantities, the non-pathogenic Bacillus subtilis to produce an enzyme. B. subtilis is related to the anthrax-causing Bacillius anthracis (which is endemic to Egypt) and has been used as a simulant for B. anthracis. Nevertheless, the bacteria has legitimate applications. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0122" task="">
  <question>
    What biological agents does Egypt produce domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    # The El-Nasr Pharmaceutical plant cultivated, in &quot;industrial&quot; quantities, the non-pathogenic Bacillus subtilis to produce an enzyme. B. subtilis is related to the anthrax-causing Bacillius anthracis (which is endemic to Egypt) and has been used as a simulant for B. anthracis. Nevertheless, the bacteria has legitimate applications. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0123" task="">
  <question>
    Who has helped Egypt produce biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * The Public Health Institute of Bilthoven in the Netherlands helped Egypt improve production ability of toxins closely related to Botulinum toxin, including tetanus toxin and various veterinary Clostridial toxins. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0124" task="">
  <question>
    How have foreign intelligence sources assessed Egypt's biological and chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1993, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service released a report stating that Egypt has a biological weapons program but that &quot;no data have been obtained to indicate the creation of biological agents in support of military offensive programs.&quot; A general lack of open source material supports the Russian supposition. Furthermore, Middle East Defense News states, &quot;Egypt has a program of military-applied research in the sphere of biological weapons, but no data has been obtained on the creation of biological agents in the interests of military offensive program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0125" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt conduct research into BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Middle East Defense News states, &quot;Egypt has a program of military-applied research in the sphere of biological weapons, but no data has been obtained on the creation of biological agents in the interests of military offensive program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0126" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt plan to use BW offensively? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Furthermore, Middle East Defense News states, &quot;Egypt has a program of military-applied research in the sphere of biological weapons, but no data has been obtained on the creation of biological agents in the interests of military offensive program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0127" task="">
  <question>
    What biological agents is Egypt suspected of producing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mycotoxins, unspecified Toxin Unknown Suspected Rift Valley fever virus Virus Unknown Suspected Tentanus toxin (from Clostridium tetani) Toxin Unknown Suspected Encephalitis viruses, unspecified Virus Unknown Suspected 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3441.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3441.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0128" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt acknowledged that it helped Iraq develop chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the mid-1990s, the Egyptian Minister of Military Industries denied Egyptian cooperation with Iraq on CBW development programs. The country does have extensive conventional armaments and a strong missile program that could serve as potential delivery mechanisms for BW agents. There is, however, no evidence that Egypt has conducted experiments for fitting biological warheads on its missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3441.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3441.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0129" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt help Iraq develop CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the mid-1990s, the Egyptian Minister of Military Industries denied Egyptian cooperation with Iraq on CBW development programs. The country does have extensive conventional armaments and a strong missile program that could serve as potential delivery mechanisms for BW agents. There is, however, no evidence that Egypt has conducted experiments for fitting biological warheads on its missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3441.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3441.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0130" task="">
  <question>
    What Egyptian facilities are suspected of producing CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The El-Nasr Company for Medicinals and Antibiotics is the only name identified in most open sources as being connected to an alleged Egyptian BW program. Other universities and facilities profiled in this section do not prove a direct link to any BW activities, but they serve to demonstrate an understanding of the current scientific capabilities in Egypt. As pharmaceuticals and biotechnology-related facilities are believed to be used as legitimate &quot;covers&quot; for illicit activities, some institutions demonstrating Egyptian capabilities are reviewed. Furthermore, the dual-nature resources (scientific knowledge, equipment, cultures used) involved in pharmaceutical/biotechnology research and BW activities are often noted by experts. However, it must be strongly reiterated that these facilities do not prove any direct linkages to a military program but demonstrate the scientific capability Egypt currently possess. If Egypt indeed does have a covert BW program, it is well hidden behind a maze of legitimate institutions conducting work on pharmaceuticals, academic research, and health services. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3453.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3453.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0131" task="">
  <question>
    How could Egypt hide its biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, it must be strongly reiterated that these facilities do not prove any direct linkages to a military program but demonstrate the scientific capability Egypt currently possess. If Egypt indeed does have a covert BW program, it is well hidden behind a maze of legitimate institutions conducting work on pharmaceuticals, academic research, and health services. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3453.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3453.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0132" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence linking Egypt's El-Nasr Company for Medicines and Antibiotics to a military program to produce biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, it must be strongly reiterated that these facilities do not prove any direct linkages to a military program but demonstrate the scientific capability Egypt currently possess. If Egypt indeed does have a covert BW program, it is well hidden behind a maze of legitimate institutions conducting work on pharmaceuticals, academic research, and health services. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3453.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3453.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0133" task="">
  <question>
    What was Project Izlis? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By the early 1960s, it had begun a project--code-name &quot;Izlis&quot;--that eventually produced weaponized agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0134" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt produce CBW under Project Izlis? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By the early 1960s, it had begun a project--code-name &quot;Izlis&quot;--that eventually produced weaponized agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0135" task="">
  <question>
    Who was the first Arab state to use chemical weapons in war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2 Egypt was the first Arab state to employ chemical weapons (CW) during the civil war in Yemen in 1963 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0136" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt first use chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2 Egypt was the first Arab state to employ chemical weapons (CW) during the civil war in Yemen in 1963 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0137" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt has dismantled its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since then, Egypt has refused to dismantle these systems and is believed to maintain a current stockpile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0138" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt get rid of its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since then, Egypt has refused to dismantle these systems and is believed to maintain a current stockpile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0139" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt destroyed any CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since then, Egypt has refused to dismantle these systems and is believed to maintain a current stockpile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0140" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Egypt's chemical weapons program originate? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1963, Egypt opened its first CW production facility at AbuZa'abal, an industrial zone some 10 kilometers northeast of the city of Cairo, bordering the desert. This facility, called the Abu-Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides, was secretly known as Military Plant No. 801 and was run by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense under the cover of a commercial factory. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0141" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied Egypt with chemical weapons precursors in the early 1960s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Precursor chemicals for CW agent production may have been furnished by the Soviet Union, which provided extensive military assistance to Egypt at the time 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0142" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt deliver chemical weapons bombs in the Yemen Civil War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The outbreak of the Yemen War in 1963 affected Egyptian and Soviet interests directly, since both countries hoped to preserve the republican regime in Yemen. For five years (1963-67), the Egyptian Air Force employed CW in Yemen, delivering them mainly with Sovietmade Ilyushin-28 aircraft 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0143" task="">
  <question>
    Who were the targets of the chemical weapon attacks launched by Egypt on Yemen in the 1960s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The chemical attacks were targeted primarily at royalists who had found shelter in the caves of Yemen's mountains, where conventional warfare was ineffective 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0144" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of targets did Egypt use chemical weapons against? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The chemical attacks were targeted primarily at royalists who had found shelter in the caves of Yemen's mountains, where conventional warfare was ineffective 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0145" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of chemical munitions did Egypt use to deliver chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt's chemical munitions included Sovietmade KHAB-200 R5 aerial bombs (filled with mustard) and AOKh-25 aerial bombs (filled with phosgene).6 Cairo also possessed, but did not employ in Yemen, a large quantity 48 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1998 Dany Shoham of mustard-filled artillery shells, which had been abandoned by the British military in Egypt's Western Desert at the end of World War I 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0146" task="">
  <question>
    What factors encouraged Egypt to expand its chemical weapons arsenal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The relative ease with which Egypt manufactured and employed CW repeatedly during the conflict, its success in targeting unprotected civilians, and the moderate response of the international community all spurred Egypt to expand its CW stockpile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0147" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egypt expand its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The relative ease with which Egypt manufactured and employed CW repeatedly during the conflict, its success in targeting unprotected civilians, and the moderate response of the international community all spurred Egypt to expand its CW stockpile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0148" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt's success in using chemical weapons encourage other Arab states to develop their own chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Other Arab states, specifically Iraq and Syria, were positively impressed by Egypt's experience and sought to emulate it 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0149" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt deny using chemical weapons against Yemeni targets in the Yemen Civil War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser presumably authorized the use of CW in Yemen, he denied Egypt's use of such agents. It was not until 1990 that a senior Egyptian military intelligence official finally admitted that Egypt had employed CW during the Yemen civil war 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0150" task="">
  <question>
    Who trained Egypt in the use of CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Throughout the 1960s, high-ranking Egyptian military officers were trained in the Soviet Union at the Red Army's Academy of Chemical Defense in Moscow,10 where they presumably acquired technical knowledge relevant to offensive CW use. In addition, West German specialists in missiles and CBW provided assistance to Egypt. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0151" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons technologies did Egypt import from Germany during the 1960s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In particular, two remarkably toxic compounds developed in Germany--fluoroacetate (a lethal substance) and an oxazepine compound (a psychotropic substance)--were studied by Egyptian scientists at Abu-Za'abal during the 1960s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0152" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt use chemical or biological weapons against Israel in the Six Days War (1967)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Contrary to its frequent use of CW in the Yemen civil war, however, Cairo made no attempt to launch chemical attacks during the 1967 Six Day War, when Israeli forces occupied the Sinai Peninsula and destroyed a large portion of the Egyptian Army and Air Force. Cairo probably did not resort to chemical warfare because it feared Israeli retaliation in-kind. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0153" task="">
  <question>
    Why didn't Egypt use chemical or biological weapons against Israel in the Six Days War (1967)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Cairo probably did not resort to chemical warfare because it feared Israeli retaliation in-kind. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0154" task="">
  <question>
    Why hasn't Egypt used CW or BW against Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Cairo probably did not resort to chemical warfare because it feared Israeli retaliation in-kind. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0155" task="">
  <question>
    How did the 1967 Six Days War affect Egypt's production of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After the 1967 war, however, Egypt expanded its chemical arsenal, particularly in the period leading up to what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War in 1973. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0156" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt view its stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons to be an effective deterrent against Israel's nuclear arsenal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is reasonable to assume that when Egypt made the decision to attack Israel in the Yom Kippur War, Cairo viewed CBW as key components of its military strategy, particularly in the absence of a nuclear capability. Thus, a considerable build-up of these weapons preceded the 1973 war. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0157" task="">
  <question>
    How does Egypt's CW arsenal protect it from an attack by Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is reasonable to assume that when Egypt made the decision to attack Israel in the Yom Kippur War, Cairo viewed CBW as key components of its military strategy, particularly in the absence of a nuclear capability. Thus, a considerable build-up of these weapons preceded the 1973 war. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0158" task="">
  <question>
    What were the most likely chemical weapons products produced by Egypt in the 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the 1970s, based on this accumulating technical knowledge, Military Plant No. 801 manufactured new CW agents to expand and improve Egypt's chemical arsenal.16 It appears likely that the first nerve agent produced was sarin. At a later stage, Egypt began manufacturing the persistent nerve agent VX and a military hallucinogen in the glycolate family. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0159" task="">
  <question>
    What conventional weapon munitions does Egypt use to deliver chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These new additions to Egypt's chemical arsenal supplemented its existing supplies of mustard gas and phosgene. The agents were filled into aerial bombs, artillery shells, rockets, mortar bombs, and mines. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0160" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons assistance did Egypt supply to Syria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Before the Yom Kippur War, strategic cooperation between Egypt and Syria expanded into the CW area. At that time, Syria did not have a CW capability, and Egypt initially supplied its ally with technical knowhow and small quantities of CW agents for research purposes.18 In 1972, however, Egypt agreed to supply an entire CW arsenal to Syria for the sum of $6 million 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0161" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt sent CW to Syria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Before the Yom Kippur War, strategic cooperation between Egypt and Syria expanded into the CW area. At that time, Syria did not have a CW capability, and Egypt initially supplied its ally with technical knowhow and small quantities of CW agents for research purposes.18 In 1972, however, Egypt agreed to supply an entire CW arsenal to Syria for the sum of $6 million 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0162" task="">
  <question>
    How much did Syria pay Egypt for chemical weapons in 1972? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At that time, Syria did not have a CW capability, and Egypt initially supplied its ally with technical knowhow and small quantities of CW agents for research purposes.18 In 1972, however, Egypt agreed to supply an entire CW arsenal to Syria for the sum of $6 million 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0163" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egypt assist Syria with its chemical weapons program in 1972? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Such an agreement between two Arab states was unprecedented and was probably part of the two countries' joint reorganization plan (the formation of the United Arab Republic), carried out prior to their joint surprise attack on Israel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0164" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Egypt transfer to Syria in the early 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The CW that Egypt shipped to Syria included sarin20 and mustard gas21 filled artillery shells22 and aerial bombs.23 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0165" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Egypt give Syria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The CW that Egypt shipped to Syria included sarin20 and mustard gas21 filled artillery shells22 and aerial bombs.23 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0166" task="">
  <question>
    What was the impact of Egypt's transfer of chemical weapons to Syria in the early 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This transfer gave the Syrians a strategic offensive CW capability of the first order, should they require it. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0167" task="">
  <question>
    Was the Egyptian Air Force prepared to employ chemical weapons during the 1973 Yom Kippur War with Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the Yom Kippur War, at least one unit of the Egyptian Air Force was on alert in case a decision was taken to employ nerve gas,24 but no use occurred. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0168" task="">
  <question>
    Could Egypt have used CW against Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the Yom Kippur War, at least one unit of the Egyptian Air Force was on alert in case a decision was taken to employ nerve gas,24 but no use occurred. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0169" task="">
  <question>
    According to Egyptian officials, what would have caused Egypt to use chemical or biological weapons against Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After the war, however, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Defense Minister Mahmoud Abd El-Rany Gamasi hinted that if Israel launched a military offensive in the hope of reversing Egypt's achievements during the war, Cairo would seriously consider the use of nonconventional weapons.25 In July 1975, General Gamasi, then Egyptian Chief of Staff, declared that Egypt would employ WMD if Israel resorted to the nuclear option. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0170" task="">
  <question>
    What would have caused Egypt to use CW or BW against Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After the war, however, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Defense Minister Mahmoud Abd El-Rany Gamasi hinted that if Israel launched a military offensive in the hope of reversing Egypt's achievements during the war, Cairo would seriously consider the use of nonconventional weapons.25 In July 1975, General Gamasi, then Egyptian Chief of Staff, declared that Egypt would employ WMD if Israel resorted to the nuclear option. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0171" task="">
  <question>
    Who supported Egypt's development of chemical and biological weapons during the late 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shortly after the signing of the 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Cairo began secretly to cooperate with Iraq. Baghdad offered considerable financial support to increase Egypt's output of CW agents and chemical munitions, in the hope of reaping some of the rewards.27 Egypt also felt impelled to enhance its strategic-technological cooperation with Iraq through the joint development of a ballistic missile designed to carry, among other payloads, CBW warheads 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0172" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egypt work with Iraq on development of CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shortly after the signing of the 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Cairo began secretly to cooperate with Iraq. Baghdad offered considerable financial support to increase Egypt's output of CW agents and chemical munitions, in the hope of reaping some of the rewards.27 Egypt also felt impelled to enhance its strategic-technological cooperation with Iraq through the joint development of a ballistic missile designed to carry, among other payloads, CBW warheads 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0173" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Egypt build ballistic missiles for CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt also felt impelled to enhance its strategic-technological cooperation with Iraq through the joint development of a ballistic missile designed to carry, among other payloads, CBW warheads 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0174" task="">
  <question>
    Who has worked with Egypt to develop sophisticated CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The secret joint development program was designed to equalize, at least in part, what Egypt and Iraq perceived as a considerable imbalance in their strategic capabilities vis-a-vis Israel.29 Egypt may have viewed this collaboration as a hedge against the possibility that peace with Israel would unravel, and Iraq clearly had the Iranian threat in mind. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0175" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons research has Egypt conducted? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Scientific research on most aspects of organophosphorus substances, including nerve-gas-like pesticides, took place at the National Research Center in Cairo 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0176" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt conducted CW research on nerve gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Scientific research on most aspects of organophosphorus substances, including nerve-gas-like pesticides, took place at the National Research Center in Cairo 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0177" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egyptian scientists study the effects of sea water on chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Scientists at the Egyptian National Research Center studied the effect of sea water on organophosphates,33 presumably to assess the feasibility of sea dumping as a means of disposing of old nerve agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0178" task="">
  <question>
    What studies on the physiological effects of chemical weapons were conducted by Egyptian research facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Military Technical College in Cairo studied the physiological effects of nerve-gaslike pesticides.34 In addition, at an Egyptian facility for formulating pesticides, scientists studied the delayed effects of nerve-gas-like pesticides on the neurological functions of 230 exposed plant workers, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0179" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt studied the effects of CW on humans? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Military Technical College in Cairo studied the physiological effects of nerve-gaslike pesticides.34 In addition, at an Egyptian facility for formulating pesticides, scientists studied the delayed effects of nerve-gas-like pesticides on the neurological functions of 230 exposed plant workers, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0180" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt expand its chemical weapons production capacity in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Egyptians went to great lengths to carry out this two-stage plan. They established renewed production lines for key nerve-agent precursors, particularly phosphorus trichloride, and then built an enlarged manufacturing facility for nerve gas. This plan, whose official &quot;customer&quot; was the El-Nasr Pharmaceutical Company at Abu-Za'abal,38 used the construction of raw material production lines at the pharmaceutical company as a cover for building an improved CW manufacturing facility at the neighboring Military Plant No. 801. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0181" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons assistance did the Swiss company Krebs AG provide to Egypt in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Despite a warning from Swiss authorities,39 the Swiss chemical company Krebs AG supplied Egypt in 1987 with a complete facility for producing phosphorus trichloride 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0182" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt acquire the capacity to produce the chemical weapon sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1988, Egypt also acquired the main components for a sarin manufacturing facility.40 A short time earlier, the Iraqis had concluded a similar deal with the aid of several West German companies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0183" task="">
  <question>
    Can Egypt produce sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1988, Egypt also acquired the main components for a sarin manufacturing facility.40 A short time earlier, the Iraqis had concluded a similar deal with the aid of several West German companies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0184" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the Swiss company Krebs AG stop supplying Egypt with chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 1989, the EgyptianKrebs connection came to public attention. After U.S. pressure on the Swiss government to cancel the project, and Egypt's refusal to specify what chemicals would be manufactured at the facility, Krebs abandoned the final stages of the plant, which had nearly been completed. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0185" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt try to convince the United States that it was not producing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To persuade Senator Inouye that Egypt was not manufacturing CW, the Egyptian government gave him a tour of Abu-Za'abal. The tour focused on a tank manufacturing plant and created a misleading eyewitness account by Senator Inouye that ostensibly disproved the allegations 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0186" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons facilities does Egypt have at Bani-Sueff? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, a CW plant near the Egyptian Air Force base in Bani-Sueff, some 60 kilometers south of Cairo, placed an order with Canadian suppliers for chemicals for the production of nerve agents,45 but the request was denied. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0187" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt receive chemical weapons assistance from Canada? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, a CW plant near the Egyptian Air Force base in Bani-Sueff, some 60 kilometers south of Cairo, placed an order with Canadian suppliers for chemicals for the production of nerve agents,45 but the request was denied. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0188" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Egypt's government sought to reorganize its chemical industry to better produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although the reorganization of the Egyptian chemical industry appeared to be entirely civilian in character, it was actually intended to improve Egypt's CW production capabilities. Strong evidence for this conclusion can be found in the doctoral dissertation submitted in 1985 by the head of Egypt's Chemical Warfare Directorate, General Mamdouh Hamed Ateya. His dissertation dealt with the future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and one of its central themes was that CW could constitute an important deterrent for the 1980s and beyond 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0189" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egypt reorganize its chemical industry? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although the reorganization of the Egyptian chemical industry appeared to be entirely civilian in character, it was actually intended to improve Egypt's CW production capabilities. Strong evidence for this conclusion can be found in the doctoral dissertation submitted in 1985 by the head of Egypt's Chemical Warfare Directorate, General Mamdouh Hamed Ateya. His dissertation dealt with the future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and one of its central themes was that CW could constitute an important deterrent for the 1980s and beyond 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0190" task="">
  <question>
    How much money did Iraq invest in Egypt's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Strategic Cooperation with Iraq Cairo's growing cooperation with Baghdad resulted in a secret agreement in 1981 in which Iraq gave Egypt $12 million to expand its CW capabilities.48 In return, Egypt assisted Iraq in the production and storage of CW agents,49 the establishment of chemical manufacturing facilities in Iraq through the Egyptian branch of the German company Walter Thosti Boswau (WTB) International,50 and the purchase of raw materials for the production of CW agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0191" task="">
  <question>
    How much money did Iraq give Egypt for CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Strategic Cooperation with Iraq Cairo's growing cooperation with Baghdad resulted in a secret agreement in 1981 in which Iraq gave Egypt $12 million to expand its CW capabilities.48 In return, Egypt assisted Iraq in the production and storage of CW agents,49 the establishment of chemical manufacturing facilities in Iraq through the Egyptian branch of the German company Walter Thosti Boswau (WTB) International,50 and the purchase of raw materials for the production of CW agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0192" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Egyptian General Mamdouh Hamed Ateya? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Strong evidence for this conclusion can be found in the doctoral dissertation submitted in 1985 by the head of Egypt's Chemical Warfare Directorate, General Mamdouh Hamed Ateya. His dissertation dealt with the future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and one of its central themes was that CW could constitute an important deterrent for the 1980s and beyond 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0193" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between Egyptian General Mamdouh Hamed Ateya and the Egyptian chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Strong evidence for this conclusion can be found in the doctoral dissertation submitted in 1985 by the head of Egypt's Chemical Warfare Directorate, General Mamdouh Hamed Ateya. His dissertation dealt with the future of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and one of its central themes was that CW could constitute an important deterrent for the 1980s and beyond 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0194" task="">
  <question>
    What role did the Egyptian-German company Walter Thosti Boswau (WTB) play in the development of chemical weapons programs in Egypt and Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In return, Egypt assisted Iraq in the production and storage of CW agents,49 the establishment of chemical manufacturing facilities in Iraq through the Egyptian branch of the German company Walter Thosti Boswau (WTB) International,50 and the purchase of raw materials for the production of CW agents.51 For example, 26 tons of hydrogen fluoride were shipped to Egypt from the United Kingdom in 1986. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0195" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt send CW precursors to Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In return, Egypt assisted Iraq in the production and storage of CW agents,49 the establishment of chemical manufacturing facilities in Iraq through the Egyptian branch of the German company Walter Thosti Boswau (WTB) International,50 and the purchase of raw materials for the production of CW agents.51 For example, 26 tons of hydrogen fluoride were shipped to Egypt from the United Kingdom in 1986. In fact, Egypt was merely a waystation, and the final destination was an Iraqi CW production facility where the hydrogen fluoride was used to produce the nerve agent sarin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0196" task="">
  <question>
    What CW did Egypt help Iraq to produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, 26 tons of hydrogen fluoride were shipped to Egypt from the United Kingdom in 1986. In fact, Egypt was merely a waystation, and the final destination was an Iraqi CW production facility where the hydrogen fluoride was used to produce the nerve agent sarin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0197" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precurors did Egypt ship to Iraq to assist in Iraq's production of sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, 26 tons of hydrogen fluoride were shipped to Egypt from the United Kingdom in 1986. In fact, Egypt was merely a waystation, and the final destination was an Iraqi CW production facility where the hydrogen fluoride was used to produce the nerve agent sarin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0198" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt help Iraq produce sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, 26 tons of hydrogen fluoride were shipped to Egypt from the United Kingdom in 1986. In fact, Egypt was merely a waystation, and the final destination was an Iraqi CW production facility where the hydrogen fluoride was used to produce the nerve agent sarin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0199" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt and Iraq collaborate on the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Another important collaborative effort between Egypt and Iraq was a joint ballistic missile development project. In the late 1970s, as relations between the two countries improved, they decided to co-develop a longrange ballistic missile capable of delivering conventional warheads as well as CBW, with an approximate range of 950 kilometers for a warhead weighing 450 kilograms 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0200" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Egyptian missile project Condor-2? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A trilateral agreement concerning the missile project (named Condor-2 or Badr-2000 in Iraq) was signed in 1984. The goal was to equip Egypt and Iraq each with 200 missiles and to construct the facilities to produce them in both countries.53 With this in mind, Egypt built a missile plant near its CW production facility at Abu-Za'abal. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0201" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Egypt acquire ballistic missiles to deliver chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Argentina was selected as a country that could provide the necessary technologies, and it also had the virtue of being located far from the eyes of foreign intelligence services focusing on the Middle East. A trilateral agreement concerning the missile project (named Condor-2 or Badr-2000 in Iraq) was signed in 1984. The goal was to equip Egypt and Iraq each with 200 missiles and to construct the facilities to produce them in both countries.53 With this in mind, Egypt built a missile plant near its CW production facility at Abu-Za'abal. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0202" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Argentina help Egypt get ballistic missiles for CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Argentina was selected as a country that could provide the necessary technologies, and it also had the virtue of being located far from the eyes of foreign intelligence services focusing on the Middle East. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0203" task="">
  <question>
    What role did Argentina play in helping Egypt to acquire ballistic missiles for chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Argentina was selected as a country that could provide the necessary technologies, and it also had the virtue of being located far from the eyes of foreign intelligence services focusing on the Middle East. A trilateral agreement concerning the missile project (named Condor-2 or Badr-2000 in Iraq) was signed in 1984. The goal was to equip Egypt and Iraq each with 200 missiles and to construct the facilities to produce them in both countries.53 With this in mind, Egypt built a missile plant near its CW production facility at Abu-Za'abal 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0204" task="">
  <question>
    What was the long-term impact of the Egyptian Condor-2 missile project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Condor-2 project laid the groundwork for Egyptian-Iraqi cooperation on additional missile manufacturing efforts, which were carried out mainly in Iraq. These missiles were also designed to be capable of delivering CBW warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0205" task="">
  <question>
    Could Egypt's Condor-2 missiles deliver CBW warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During this period, the Iraqis fought a war with Iran in which they employed blister and nerve agents extensively from 1984 to 1988. It is possible that the lessons learned by the Iraqis from their own use of CW, and from defending themselves against Iranian retaliatory use in the final years of the war, were shared with Egypt. In this way, Cairo may have gained considerably in both the theory and practice of chemical warfare from its joint venture with Iraq 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0206" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt's chemical and biological weapons programs benefit from the Iran-Iraq War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is possible that the lessons learned by the Iraqis from their own use of CW, and from defending themselves against Iranian retaliatory use in the final years of the war, were shared with Egypt. In this way, Cairo may have gained considerably in both the theory and practice of chemical warfare from its joint venture with Iraq 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0207" task="">
  <question>
    What was the impact of the Iran-Iraq war on Egypt's CBW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is possible that the lessons learned by the Iraqis from their own use of CW, and from defending themselves against Iranian retaliatory use in the final years of the war, were shared with Egypt. In this way, Cairo may have gained considerably in both the theory and practice of chemical warfare from its joint venture with Iraq 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0208" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that North Korea assisted Egypt with its chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the same time, Egypt cultivated a cooperative relationship with North Korea, a country well-versed in the technology of ballistic missiles and equipped with an impressive CW arsenal, including Scud-B missiles armed with chemical warheads. In 1986, North Korea completed the development of a missile with a somewhat longer range (320 to 340 kilometers) and a series of warheads (standard, cluster, chemical, and biological), which Egypt hoped to emulate 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0209" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt receive CBW support from North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the same time, Egypt cultivated a cooperative relationship with North Korea, a country well-versed in the technology of ballistic missiles and equipped with an impressive CW arsenal, including Scud-B missiles armed with chemical warheads. In 1986, North Korea completed the development of a missile with a somewhat longer range (320 to 340 kilometers) and a series of warheads (standard, cluster, chemical, and biological), which Egypt hoped to emulate 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0210" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Egypt's chemical weapons programs failed to comply with the 1989 Conference on Disarmament in Geneva? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Even as Egypt moved to improve and expand its chemical arsenal, it continued to deny officially any possession of CW. In 1988 and 1989, the Egyptian representative announced to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that Egypt had not produced, developed, or stockpiled CW.56 Moreover, in 1989 the Egyptian Defense Minister stated, &quot;We maintain that we do not have any CW in our possession, and that it is not our intention to manufacture CW.&quot;57 That same year, however, an Egyptian major-general published an article in the Arab Defense Journal entitled &quot;Biochemical War,&quot; the most comprehensive treatise on the subject of CBW ever published in an Egyptian military journal 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0211" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt complied with international CBW protocols? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Even as Egypt moved to improve and expand its chemical arsenal, it continued to deny officially any possession of CW. In 1988 and 1989, the Egyptian representative announced to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that Egypt had not produced, developed, or stockpiled CW.56 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0212" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Egyptian officials propose that developing countries should acquire chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Also in 1989, a senior Egyptian official, Major-General Esmat A. Ezz, published an article in the U.N. disarmament journal UNIDIR Newsletter in which he listed the primary factors driving developing countries to acquire CW. These motivations included the tactical military value of CW, as reflected by the fact that even nations with a nuclear capability continued to improve their chemical inventories, and the need to acquire nonconventional weapons to counter the nuclear threat. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0213" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated Egypt to develop chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    MajorGeneral Ezz concluded that given Egypt's inability to secure a nuclear capability of its own, Egypt and other Arab countries were justified in having CW as a counterweight to the nuclear arsenal attributed to Israel 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0214" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt threatened to use chemical or biological weapons in future conflicts in the Middle East? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 1990, Egyptian Defense Minister Mahmoud Fauzi, in an interview with a Lebanese military periodical, noted that the deployment of CBW was not a new occurrence and that future political and military circumstances would necessitate the development of ballistic missiles as the principal means of delivering such agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0215" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt respond to claims that it had chemical weapons prior to the first Gulf War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In June 1990, two months before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, former Egyptian Defense Minister General Fauzi was interviewed by a Lebanese newspaper. He had just returned from the Arab States Convention in Baghdad with the aim of helping Iraq to withstand the increasing political pressure from the West. In the interview, he argued that despite the Mubarak proposal, &quot;the Arabs should continue acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons intended for mass destruction.&quot;64 In September 1990, an item in the Egyptian press claimed that some of the CW in Iraq's arsenal had been manufactured in Egypt 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0216" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt have CW before the first Gulf War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the interview, he argued that despite the Mubarak proposal, &quot;the Arabs should continue acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons intended for mass destruction.&quot;64 In September 1990, an item in the Egyptian press claimed that some of the CW in Iraq's arsenal had been manufactured in Egypt 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0217" task="">
  <question>
    What conditions have Egyptian officials placed on the dismantling of their chemical and biological weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While denying any possession of CW, Egypt insisted on a linkage between chemical disarmament and the elimination of other WMD. The Egyptian delegation also endorsed a French proposal that while the international community should pursue the longterm goal of destroying all CW arsenals, certain countries had a legitimate need to produce CW as a deterrent during the interim period. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0218" task="">
  <question>
    Will Egypt dismantle its CBW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While denying any possession of CW, Egypt insisted on a linkage between chemical disarmament and the elimination of other WMD. The Egyptian delegation also endorsed a French proposal that while the international community should pursue the longterm goal of destroying all CW arsenals, certain countries had a legitimate need to produce CW as a deterrent during the interim period. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0219" task="">
  <question>
    How can Middle East countries destroy their chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In June 1993, at a Pugwash workshop in Sweden, the Egyptian representative submitted a background paper titled &quot;The Arabs and the Chemical Weapons Convention,&quot; in which he argued that Arab states should not be expected to join the CWC as long as there was no concurrent reduction--but not necessarily elimination--of the nuclear weapons in Israel's possession.71 He then suggested a series of practical steps whose implementation would gradually bring about the elimination of WMD in the Middle East. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0220" task="">
  <question>
    How does Egypt propose that the Middle East can be rid of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In June 1993, at a Pugwash workshop in Sweden, the Egyptian representative submitted a background paper titled &quot;The Arabs and the Chemical Weapons Convention,&quot; in which he argued that Arab states should not be expected to join the CWC as long as there was no concurrent reduction--but not necessarily elimination--of the nuclear weapons in Israel's possession.71 He then suggested a series of practical steps whose implementation would gradually bring about the elimination of WMD in the Middle East. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0221" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that the Egyptian Company for Dye Stuffs and Chemical Products was involved in the production of chemical weapons in Egypt? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Egyptian Company for Dye Stuffs and Chemical Products was expanded to manufacture the pesticide malathion, but was also capable of producing phosphorus pentasulphite,76 a key precursor for VX nerve agent. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0222" task="">
  <question>
    Which companies produce chemical weapons in Egypt? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Egyptian Company for Dye Stuffs and Chemical Products was expanded to manufacture the pesticide malathion, but was also capable of producing phosphorus pentasulphite,76 a key precursor for VX nerve agent. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0223" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied chemical weapons precursors to Iran, Syria, and Egypt? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt also began to import CW precursors from India, which had also become a supplier to Iran and Syria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0224" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied chemical weapons precursors to Middle East countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt also began to import CW precursors from India, which had also become a supplier to Iran and Syria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0225" task="">
  <question>
    What connection is there between the Hungarian company Lampart and Egypt's chemical and biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt also purchased equipment suitable for CW production from the Hungarian company Lampart. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0226" task="">
  <question>
    Which European companies assisted Egypt's chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt also purchased equipment suitable for CW production from the Hungarian company Lampart. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0227" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt chemical weapons programs get around export restrictions on certain chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the same time, Egypt appears to have expanded its industrial infrastructure for the production of nerve gases to diminish its dependence on imports of CW precursors and other raw materials. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0228" task="">
  <question>
    How does Egypt import chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the same time, Egypt appears to have expanded its industrial infrastructure for the production of nerve gases to diminish its dependence on imports of CW precursors and other raw materials. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0229" task="">
  <question>
    Which Egyptian pesticide plants are linked to Egypt's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two Egyptian pesticide plants, in Kafr ElDawar and Kafr El-Zayat, have been suspected of CW agent production.79 Published evidence indicates that the Kafr El-Zayat factory handles highly toxic organophosphorus compounds.80 Another pesticide plant, located in the area of Manuf-AbuRawash and affiliated with the public sector, has been accused by Egyptian critics of illegally producing and storing poisonous materials.81 It can therefore be assumed that both imported and domestically manufactured precursor chemicals are currently being used to produce CW, with an emphasis on advanced VX nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0230" task="">
  <question>
    Which Egyptian chemical companies could produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two Egyptian pesticide plants, in Kafr ElDawar and Kafr El-Zayat, have been suspected of CW agent production.79 Published evidence indicates that the Kafr El-Zayat factory handles highly toxic organophosphorus compounds.80 Another pesticide plant, located in the area of Manuf-AbuRawash and affiliated with the public sector, has been accused by Egyptian critics of illegally producing and storing poisonous materials.81 It can therefore be assumed that both imported and domestically manufactured precursor chemicals are currently being used to produce CW, with an emphasis on advanced VX nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0231" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Egypt produce chemical weapons precursors for VX nerve gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two Egyptian pesticide plants, in Kafr ElDawar and Kafr El-Zayat, have been suspected of CW agent production.79 Published evidence indicates that the Kafr El-Zayat factory handles highly toxic organophosphorus compounds.80 Another pesticide plant, located in the area of Manuf-AbuRawash and affiliated with the public sector, has been accused by Egyptian critics of illegally producing and storing poisonous materials.81 It can therefore be assumed that both imported and domestically manufactured precursor chemicals are currently being used to produce CW, with an emphasis on advanced VX nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0232" task="">
  <question>
    Can Egypt produce VX Nerve Gas indigenously? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It can therefore be assumed that both imported and domestically manufactured precursor chemicals are currently being used to produce CW, with an emphasis on advanced VX nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0233" task="">
  <question>
    How large is Egypt's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This report also stated that while Egypt's CW arsenal could not sustain large-scale operations, its industrial capacity would enable it to produce an additional quantity of agent within a short period of time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0234" task="">
  <question>
    How many ballistic missiles does Egypt have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is plausible that Egyptian Military Industries has acquired the capability to produce submunition warheads for CW delivery, including one containing 1,000 bomblets for the Egyptian-made Sakr-80 rocket, with a range of 80 kilometers.86 Egypt has supplied these rockets to Iraq.87 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0235" task="">
  <question>
    Could Egypt's bioweapons program benefit from technology stolen from U.S. naval hospitals in Egypt? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The functioning in Egypt of a U.S. naval military-medical laboratory for the study and development of means of combating particularly dangerous infectious diseases is also known. The laboratory is one of the leading Near East medical-biological centers, equipped with the latest apparatus and staffed with highly qualified American specialists. Concern is raised by the fact that the subject matter of the research of this laboratory is strictly classified. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0236" task="">
  <question>
    Could Egypt have stolen CW or BW technology from the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The functioning in Egypt of a U.S. naval military-medical laboratory for the study and development of means of combating particularly dangerous infectious diseases is also known. The laboratory is one of the leading Near East medical-biological centers, equipped with the latest apparatus and staffed with highly qualified American specialists. Concern is raised by the fact that the subject matter of the research of this laboratory is strictly classified. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0237" task="">
  <question>
    What is the United States' official position on Egypt's alleged bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1996, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reported that &quot;The U.S. believes that Egypt had developed biological warfare agents by 1972. There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0238" task="">
  <question>
    Have Egypt and North Korea collaborated on missile technology programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A partially owned Arab subsidiary of British Aerospace Dynamics was involved in a joint Egyptian-North Korean project to increase the range of the Scud-B missile and other Egyptian projects involving guided missiles 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0239" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Egypt develop a missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A partially owned Arab subsidiary of British Aerospace Dynamics was involved in a joint Egyptian-North Korean project to increase the range of the Scud-B missile and other Egyptian projects involving guided missiles 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0240" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Egypt has a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The most detailed published reference dealing with Egyptian activities in the area of biological weapons (BW) is a 1993 report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which states: Egypt has a program of military-applied research in the area of biological weapons, but no data have been obtained to indicate the creation of biological agents in support of military offensive programs 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0241" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt has an offensive biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The most detailed published reference dealing with Egyptian activities in the area of biological weapons (BW) is a 1993 report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which states: Egypt has a program of military-applied research in the area of biological weapons, but no data have been obtained to indicate the creation of biological agents in support of military offensive programs 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0242" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt first start its biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The research programs in the area of biological weapons date back to the 1960s. As we all know, in the early 1970s President Sadat confirmed this, announcing the presence in Egypt of a stockpile of biological agents stored tion. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0243" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Egypt developed a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, documents issued within the Egyptian Army throughout the 1960s and captured during the Yom Kippur War indicate the importance that Egypt attributed to the strategic use of BW as well as the operational and tactical utility of these weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0244" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Egypt build the El-Nasr Comapny for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union provided assistance to Egypt for the construction of an exceptionally large pharmaceutical complex called the El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics. The site selected for this complex was at Abu-Za'abal. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0245" task="">
  <question>
    Which country helped Egypt build chemical weapons plants? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union provided assistance to Egypt for the construction of an exceptionally large pharmaceutical complex called the El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics. The site selected for this complex was at Abu-Za'abal. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0246" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between Egypt's El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics and Egypt's chemical weapons facilities at Military Plant No. 801? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shortly after the completion of the El-Nasr plant, moreover, the Company for Chemicals and Insecticides--alias Military Plant No. 801--was constructed nearby. The El-Nasr facility consists of two main industrial wings, one devoted to fermentation and the other to chemical synthesis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0247" task="">
  <question>
    What is Egyptian Military Plant No. 801? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shortly after the completion of the El-Nasr plant, moreover, the Company for Chemicals and Insecticides--alias Military Plant No. 801--was constructed nearby. The El-Nasr facility consists of two main industrial wings, one devoted to fermentation and the other to chemical synthesis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0248" task="">
  <question>
    Which biological weapons-related pathogens has Egypt been researching? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Research and Development Egypt has done applied research on several BW-related pathogens and toxins, including: the bacteria 54 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1998 Dany Shoham that cause anthrax, botulism, plague, cholera, tularemia, glanders, brucellosis, melioidosis, and psitacosis; the rickettsia that cause Q fever; and the viruses that cause Japanese B encephalitis, Eastern equine encephalitis, influenza, and smallpox. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0249" task="">
  <question>
    What progress has Egypt made in developing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Research and development efforts on a few of these agents are discussed below. Botulinum toxin.Various strains of the toxigenic bacterium Clostridium botulinum type B have been successfully cultivated (e.g., in infusion broth medium) and used for toxin production.95 This research took place even though there was no recorded incidence of botulism in Egypt until 1991, when a major outbreak sickened 91 hospital patients in Cairo, 20 percent of whom died.96 Industrial production of some closely related toxins, such as tetanus toxin and various veterinary Clostridial toxins, has been operational for several years, and was modernized in the late 1970s by the Public Health Institute of Bilthoven in the Netherlands.97 Plague. The causative bacterium of plague has been cultivated industrially in Egypt for vaccine production.98 Indigenous outbreaks of this disease have occurred,99 and the causative strains have presumably been isolated and studied. Egyptian scientists have also participated in research on plague conducted by the U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-3) in Cairo, and at Walter Reed Army Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland.100 Egyptian studies have included experimentation with a closely related pathogen, Pasteurella multocida, with a focus on environmental survivability and intranasal infection, presumably as a model pathogen for plague and tularemia.101 Anthrax. Although no scientific work has been published in Egypt on this classic BW agent, it is indigenous to the country. The closely related species Bacillus subtilis has been cultivated in industrial quantities at the El-Nasr pharmaceutical plant for the production of an enzyme.102 Another closely related species, Bacillus brevis, was used as a model bacterium for a continuousfermentation system in a study at the University of Kent, England, conducted by an Egyptian scientist affiliated with the Egyptian Military Technical College.103 Mycotoxins. In work supported in part by the U.S. Army, Egyptian researchers have extensively studied trichothecene mycotoxins, a class of potent toxins produced by the fungal mold Fusarium, including T-2 toxin, vomitoxin, and fusariotoxin.104 Since the 1960s, a closely related fungal mold (Gibberella fujikuori) was routinely used at the El-Nasr pharmaceutical plant for industrial fermentation.105 It has also been alleged that the Egyptian Air Force employed trichothecene mycotoxins as a biochemical weapon during the Yemen civil war.106 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0250" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt conducted research on the biological weapon potential of botulinum toxin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Botulinum toxin.Various strains of the toxigenic bacterium Clostridium botulinum type B have been successfully cultivated (e.g., in infusion broth medium) and used for toxin production.95 This research took place even though there was no recorded incidence of botulism in Egypt until 1991, when a major outbreak sickened 91 hospital patients in Cairo, 20 percent of whom died.96 Industrial production of some closely related toxins, such as tetanus toxin and various veterinary Clostridial toxins, has been operational for several years, and was modernized in the late 1970s by the Public Health Institute of Bilthoven in the Netherlands.9 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0251" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt conducted research on the biological weapon potential of plague? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The causative bacterium of plague has been cultivated industrially in Egypt for vaccine production.98 Indigenous outbreaks of this disease have occurred,99 and the causative strains have presumably been isolated and studied. Egyptian scientists have also participated in research on plague conducted by the U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-3) in Cairo, and at Walter Reed Army Medical Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland.100 Egyptian studies have included experimentation with a closely related pathogen, Pasteurella multocida, with a focus on environmental survivability and intranasal infection, presumably as a model pathogen for plague and tularemia.101 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0252" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt conducted research on the biological weapon potential of Anthrax? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Anthrax. Although no scientific work has been published in Egypt on this classic BW agent, it is indigenous to the country. The closely related species Bacillus subtilis has been cultivated in industrial quantities at the El-Nasr pharmaceutical plant for the production of an enzyme.102 Another closely related species, Bacillus brevis, was used as a model bacterium for a continuousfermentation system in a study at the University of Kent, England, conducted by an Egyptian scientist affiliated with the Egyptian Military Technical College.103 Mycotoxins. In work supported in part by the U.S. Army, Egyptian 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0253" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt conducted research on the biological weapon potential of Mycotoxins? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mycotoxins. In work supported in part by the U.S. Army, Egyptian researchers have extensively studied trichothecene mycotoxins, a class of potent toxins produced by the fungal mold Fusarium, including T-2 toxin, vomitoxin, and fusariotoxin.104 Since the 1960s, a closely related fungal mold (Gibberella fujikuori) was routinely used at the El-Nasr pharmaceutical plant for industrial fermentation.105 It has also been alleged that the Egyptian Air Force employed trichothecene mycotoxins as a biochemical weapon during the Yemen civil war 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0254" task="">
  <question>
    Which biological weapons mycotoxins did Egypt use in the Yemen Civil War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It has also been alleged that the Egyptian Air Force employed trichothecene mycotoxins as a biochemical weapon during the Yemen civil war 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0255" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Egyptian Major-General Ezz? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some 15 years later, Major-General Ezz, the head of the Egyptian Chemical Corps, led an inconclusive U.N. investigation into the alleged use of Fusarium trichothecenes (&quot;yellow rain&quot;) as a biochemical weapon during the late 1970s and early 1980s by the Soviet Union and its communist allies in Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia. Another class of fungal toxins known as aflatoxins have also been studied 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0256" task="">
  <question>
    What role did Egypt play in the development of the class of biological weapons used in producing &quot;yellow rain&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some 15 years later, Major-General Ezz, the head of the Egyptian Chemical Corps, led an inconclusive U.N. investigation into the alleged use of Fusarium trichothecenes (&quot;yellow rain&quot;) as a biochemical weapon during the late 1970s and early 1980s by the Soviet Union and its communist allies in Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia. Another class of fungal toxins known as aflatoxins have also been studied 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0257" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt worked on &quot;Yellow Rain&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some 15 years later, Major-General Ezz, the head of the Egyptian Chemical Corps, led an inconclusive U.N. investigation into the alleged use of Fusarium trichothecenes (&quot;yellow rain&quot;) as a biochemical weapon during the late 1970s and early 1980s by the Soviet Union and its communist allies in Afghanistan, Laos, and Cambodia. Another class of fungal toxins known as aflatoxins have also been studied 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0258" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt conducted research on the biological weapon potential of Rift Valley Fever virus? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rift Valley Fever virus. The causative virus of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) was isolated for the first time in Egypt in October 1977, during a fatal epidemic in Belbeis, ElKhanka, and Cairo that afflicted a large number of people.108 Several strains of the RVF virus indigenous to Egypt have been characterized.109 Extensive studies have been conducted in Egypt on this deadly virus, including the development of improved methods of virus production and research on natural and experimental airborne infection 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0259" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt has a sophisticated level of experience handling and producing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1991, Major-General Ezz published some views about BW agents and their handling that appeared to be based on a degree of practical experience.116 In summary, Egypt appears to have developed several natural pathogens and toxins as warfare agents and has recently taken the first steps to acquire a capability for the genetic engineering of microbial pathogens 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0260" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt have a sophisticated biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1991, Major-General Ezz published some views about BW agents and their handling that appeared to be based on a degree of practical experience.116 In summary, Egypt appears to have developed several natural pathogens and toxins as warfare agents and has recently taken the first steps to acquire a capability for the genetic engineering of microbial pathogens 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0261" task="">
  <question>
    What information has Egypt provided to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on its bioweapons collaborations with Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To date, Egypt has provided only limited information to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on its collaboration with Iraq in the CW field,117 and it has revealed nothing about possible joint activities in the BW field. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0262" task="">
  <question>
    How could Egypt improve its delivery of biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In light of the delivery systems in the Iraqi BW inventory, it is possible that Egypt has adapted aerial bombs and missile warheads for BW delivery. Modified CW agent delivery systems could plausibly serve this purpose. Improved dispersion of agent could be achieved through the development of cluster warheads and aerosolization systems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0263" task="">
  <question>
    What caused Egypt to acquire chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Aware of its inability to acquire nuclear weapons, and believing Israel to possess chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, Egypt has acquired its own CBW capabilities primarily as a strategic counterbalance, an objective clearly reflected in Egyptian policy and statements 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0264" task="">
  <question>
    Did the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in other Arab countries encourage Egypt to acquire biological and chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The nonconventional arms race among the other Arab countries and Iran creates additional proliferation incentives. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0265" task="">
  <question>
    How did Egypt respond to the proliferation of CW and BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The nonconventional arms race among the other Arab countries and Iran creates additional proliferation incentives. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0266" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence to support a claim that the Soviet Union encouraged Egypt to use chemical and biological weapons during the Yemen Civil War? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indeed, the near-simultaneous start in 1963 of the Yemen civil war and the Egyptian CBW program appears to have been no accident. Since the Soviets were providing extensive military assistance to Egypt at the time, direct field-testing of CBW in Yemen may have been a joint Egyptian-Soviet initiative 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0267" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence do we have that Egypt has a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Already, Egypt has relied on its CBW arsenal for deterrence purposes, both before and after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in an apparent attempt to neutralize Israel's nonconventional retaliatory option. The essential supporting role of a BW capability is evident in the Egyptian strategic concept. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0268" task="">
  <question>
    Why does Egypt deny that it has chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt officially denies that it possesses CW or BW, apparently calculating that its undeclared capability is already well-known and hence exerts a deterrent effect without exposing Cairo to international opprobrium. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0269" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries has Egypt provided chemical and biological weapons assistance to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To this end, Cairo has sought to influence the policies of the three other Arab CBW-possessor states (Syria, Libya, and Iraq), particularly with respect to their participation in the CWC, based on shared strategic interests. Thus, it is not surprising that Egypt has cooperated with those countries in upgrading the strategic profile of their CBW capabilities 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0270" task="">
  <question>
    Which Arab countries are known possessors of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    :To this end, Cairo has sought to influence the policies of the three other Arab CBW-possessor states (Syria, Libya, and Iraq), particularly with respect to their participation in the CWC, based on shared strategic interests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0271" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt admit to having BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1970s Egyptian President Anwar Sadat validates that Egypt has a BW stockpile. No specific agents are mentioned. [Note: Varying reports offer different dates as to when these comments were made by Sadat. Some sources claim that these comments were made in 1970, whereas others list the date to be around 1972.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0272" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Sadat? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1970s Egyptian President Anwar Sadat 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0273" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt sign the BWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 April 1972 Egypt signs the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0274" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt ratify the BWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is concerned that the BWC does not explicitly ban the use of biological weapons and must have a better verification component; it does not ratify the convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0275" task="">
  <question>
    What is the BWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0276" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence of production of CBW in Egypt? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a Federation of American Scientists' report from October 1999, there are &quot;indications&quot; of biological weapons  production at El-Nasr Medicinals and Antibiotics. No sources are given for the &quot;almost&quot; certainty or the &quot;indications&quot; mentioned in the report. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3453_3460.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3453_3460.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0277" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt's CBW program receive foreign assistance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1950s-1960s Israeli intelligence claims that Egypt is developing chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs with help from Soviet and German scientists. Additional intelligence reports, however, find no proof that Egypt's CBW programs were led by German scientists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0278" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt's CBW program receive German assistance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1950s-1960s Egypt actively recruits German CW experts. It is also reported that German CBW experts were among a team of scientists working in Egypt during the early CW attacks on Yemen. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0279" task="">
  <question>
    When does Egypt acquire CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By 1963, Egypt completes research and design for the production of nerve agents and cyanide gas, and by 1967, has prepared a defensive capability in case of an Israeli chemical attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0280" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt used CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1963-1967 Egypt is widely suspected of possessing, possibly producing, and using chemical weapons in the form of gas-bombs, including mustard and phosgene, in the Yemeni civil war against Yemeni Republican forces. This resulted in 1,400 deaths, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Until the early 1980s, Egypt provided &quot;the only verified use of chemical weapons since World War I,&quot; according to Harvard biochemist Matthew Masselso. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0281" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt receive CW from the Soviet Union? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Seth Carus of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy claims that Egypt's chemical weapons &quot;probably originated from the Soviet Union.&quot; Whereas CBW expert Harvey McGeorge seems more certain, he states that &quot;the Soviets began supplying Egypt...in the early 1960s.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0282" task="">
  <question>
    With what capabilities of chemical warfare has Egypt supplied Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1963 Egypt reportedly serves as a conduit for approximately 70,000 gas masks purchased by Iraq from a Switzerland. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0283" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt supplied CW to any country? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is suspected of exporting chemical weapons to Syria &quot;shortly&quot; before the October 1973 Middle East war, a claim supported by a 1998 report released by the Defense Intelligence Agency entitled &quot;Chemical Warfare Assessments.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0284" task="">
  <question>
    What capabilities for chemical warfare has Egypt produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 1982 Egypt openly desires US weapons technology. Egyptian production plant Military Plant No. 81 (later known as the Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries) begins to produce gas masks. In a survey of Egypt's aircraft factories, the United States notes that Military Plant No. 36, which is simply known as &quot;Aircraft Factory,&quot; produces decontamination equipment among other seemingly non-CW related materials. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0285" task="">
  <question>
    What aid did Egypt receive in CW from the Soviet Union? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 1986 The United States and Soviet Union discuss a potential agreement to curb the proliferation of chemical weapons. According to US intelligence, the Soviets have supplied six countries, including Egypt, with chemical weapons' material, technology, or advice during the previous two decades. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0286" task="">
  <question>
    What does the Heliopolis Company produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    One of the three factories is the Heliopolis Company for Chemical Industries, which manufactures, among other things, ammunition, mines and NBC protection equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0287" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt, according to representative Mr. Ahmed Darwish, has not acceded to the CWC due to Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT. However, Egypt does adhere to its provisions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0288" task="">
  <question>
    What CW might Egypt possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt is included in a list of countries suspected of possessing tabun, sarin, soman, GF, VX, and mustard agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0289" task="">
  <question>
    What production capabilities for CW does Egypt have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt seems to have production facilities for mustard and nerve agents (the source of the precursors for which are unknown, though one reports suggest Egypt tried to obtain feed stocks from Canada). In addition, Egypt has the ability to produce cyanide gas. The report also cited a September 1993 London Times report that claims Egypt acquired approximately 90 tons of trimethyl &quot;phosphate&quot;, a precursor for &quot;the mustard agent.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0290" task="">
  <question>
    Is Egypt stockpiling chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 2002 Egypt continues to be suspected of stockpiling chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3450.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0291" task="">
  <question>
    When did Egypt start developing BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a 1996 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report, Egypt began developing biological weapons in 1972. There is no evidence indicating the program has been eliminated. There is no specific mention of whether the weapons are developed for an offensive or defensive strategic purpose. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0292" task="">
  <question>
    What did Sadat say about biological warfare? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    &quot;The only reply to biological warfare is that we too should use biological warfare. I believe that the density of the Israeli population confined in a small area would provide the opportunity to reply with the same weapon if they should begin using it. Briefly, we have the instruments of biological warfare in the refrigerators and we will not use them unless they begin to use them.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0293" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt's BW program receive German assistance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the 1960s, Egypt apparently recruited German scientists for its biological weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0294" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence that Egypt had BW as of 1996? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1996 There exists no evidence that Egypt holds or is producing biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0295" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence Egypt ended its BW program as of 1997? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1997 Egypt has provided no evidence demonstrating the elimination of its biological warfare ability, which has existed since at least 1972. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0296" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt have an active BW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman, the United States seems to have no evidence of an active biological weapons program in Egypt. Egypt did sign the BWC in 1972 but has not ratified it. He claims that the United States believes that Egypt possessed biological weapons in 1972 and has not provided evidence of their disposal, suggesting the material might still be active. However, Cordesman writes that Israeli reports indicate different findings in support of an active program. The Israelis point to comments made by former President Anwar Sadat, who in 1970 stated that Egypt has biological weapons stored in refrigerators ready to use against Israel if need be. The program might include &quot;plague, botulism toxin, encephalitis virus, anthrax, Rift Valley fever and mycotoxicosis.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3456.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0297" task="">
  <question>
    Did Egypt get any CBW from Britain? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Cairo also possessed, but did not employ in Yemen, a large quantity of mustard-filled artillery shells, which had been abandoned by the British military in Egypt's Western Desert at the end of World War I. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0298" task="">
  <question>
    What training did the Soviet Union provide Egypt? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Throughout the 1960s, high-ranking Egyptian military officers were trained in the Soviet Union at the Red Army's Academy of Chemical Defense in Moscow,10 where they presumably acquired technical knowledge relevant to offensive CW use. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0299" task="">
  <question>
    What assistance did Egypt receive from Germany in CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, West German specialists in missiles and CBW provided assistance to Egypt.11 In particular, two remarkably toxic compounds developed in Germany--fluoroacetate (a lethal substance) and an oxazepine compound (a psychotropic substance)--were studied by Egyptian scientists at Abu-Za'abal during the 1960s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0300" task="">
  <question>
    What CBW did Egypt give to Syria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The CW that Egypt shipped to Syria included sarin20 and mustard gas21 filled artillery shells22 and aerial bombs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0301" task="">
  <question>
    How did Iraq collaborate with Egypt's CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shortly after the signing of the 1978 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Cairo began secretly to cooperate with Iraq. Baghdad offered considerable financial support to increase Egypt's output of CW agents and chemical munitions, in the hope of reaping some of the rewards.27 Egypt also felt impelled to enhance its strategic-technological cooperation with Iraq through the joint development of a ballistic missile designed to carry, among other payloads, CBW warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0302" task="">
  <question>
    With what chemicals has Egypt supplied Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 tons of hydrogen fluoride were shipped to Egypt from the United Kingdom in 1986. In fact, Egypt was merely a waystation, and the final destination was an Iraqi CW production facility where the hydrogen fluoride was used to produce the nerve agent sarin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0303" task="">
  <question>
    How has the US cooperated with developing Egypt's BW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is information on cooperation between Egypt's research centers in areas of biological research related to biological weapons and certain civilian and military laboratories of the United States, particularly in the field of highly pathogenic microorganisms and dangerous vectors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0304" task="">
  <question>
    What assistance did the Soviet Union give Egypt in developing their pharmaceutical infrastructure? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union provided assistance to Egypt for the construction of an exceptionally large pharmaceutical complex called the El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0305" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the El-Nasr Company for Pharmaceutical Chemicals and Antibiotics? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The site selected for this complex was at Abu-Za'abal. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0306" task="">
  <question>
    What is Military Plant No. 801? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the Company for Chemicals and Insecticides--alias Military Plant No. 801 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0307" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the Company for Chemicals and Insectices? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shortly after the completion of the El-Nasr plant, moreover, the Company for Chemicals and Insecticides--alias Military Plant No. 801--was constructed nearby. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0308" task="">
  <question>
    What capabilities does the El-Nasr plant have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The El-Nasr facility consists of two main industrial wings, one devoted to fermentation and the other to chemical synthesis. The fermentative-antibiotic wing (FAW) manufactures industrial quantities of a variety of culture media for cultivating bacteria and fungi. The FAW also specializes in bacterial sensitivity to antibiotics (its principal pharmaceutical products). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0309" task="">
  <question>
    What possible BW has Egypt researched? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt has done applied research on several BW-related pathogens and toxins, including: the bacteria that cause anthrax, botulism, plague, cholera, tularemia, glanders, brucellosis, melioidosis, and psitacosis; the rickettsia that cause Q fever; and the viruses that cause Japanese B encephalitis, Eastern equine encephalitis, influenza, and smallpox. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0310" task="">
  <question>
    What work has Egypt done with anthrax? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Anthrax. Although no scientific work has been published in Egypt on this classic BW agent, it is indigenous to the country. The closely related species Bacillus subtilis has been cultivated in industrial quantities at the El-Nasr pharmaceutical plant for the production of an enzyme. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0311" task="">
  <question>
    What toxins has Egypt studied? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In work supported in part by the U.S. Army, Egyptian researchers have extensively studied trichothecene mycotoxins, a class of potent toxins produced by the fungal mold Fusarium, including T-2 toxin, vomitoxin, and fusariotoxin. Another class of fungal toxins known as aflatoxins have also been studied. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0312" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt used toxins as BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It has also been alleged that the Egyptian Air Force employed trichothecene mycotoxins as a biochemical weapon during the Yemen civil war. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0313" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt collaborated with Iraq in producing BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1989, the military correspondent of the Egyptian newspaper Al Gumhuriya noted that Egypt and Iraq had agreed to conduct joint projects, the first of which was to assist Iraq in producing defensive measures against CBW.114 The Egyptian Minister of Military Industries vigorously denied that Egypt was in any way cooperating with Iraq to produce CBW or ballistic missiles.115 Nevertheless, the ambiguity between defensive and offensive research and development on BW is well-known, and the documented cooperation between Egypt and Iraq in the CW field may have extended to BW as well. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/shoham53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0314" task="">
  <question>
    Has Egypt assisted Saudi Arabia's developing CBW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the field of aerosol sciences, studies that might be relevant to enhancing the dispersion of CBW agents began in the late 1970s, mainly in collaboration with Egyptian scientists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/shoham63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/shoham63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0315" task="">
  <question>
    What biological agents might Egypt militarize? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There have, however, been some allegations by Israel that Egypt is conducting research to develop anthrax and plague bacteria, botulinum toxin, and Rift Valley fever virus for military purposes. The Egyptian government strongly denies these accusations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0316" task="">
  <question>
    What BW toxins is Egypt suspected to possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mycotoxins, Tetanus toxin 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3441_3442.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3441_3442.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0317" task="">
  <question>
    What BW viruses is Egypt suspected to possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rift Valley fever virus, Encephalitis viruses 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3441_3442.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3441_3442.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0318" task="">
  <question>
    Does Egypt have the infrastructure to produce BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt does have the basic biotechnical infrastructure that could serve as a potential base for a covert BW program. Being a developing nation with a strong agricultural and health services sector, Egypt legitimately conducts research on a host of diseases and pathogens that affect both humans and crops. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3438.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0319" task="">
  <question>
    How much uranium does the HEU program produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under this scenario, the DPRK may have an HEU program producing about 100kg of weapons-grade uranium per year by 2005 at the earliest.[3] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_74.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_74.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0320" task="">
  <question>
    What evidences are there about North Korea's nuclear capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea probably has enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce at least two nuclear weapons. Additionally, North Korea has tested high explosives that might be used in triggering the fission reaction in a nuclear weapon. However, since North Korea has not tested a nuclear explosive device, it is uncertain whether the DPRK has actually developed nuclear weapons. Recently, reports have raised the possibility that Pakistan has assisted North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Notably, a June 2002 CIA report allegedly states that &quot;Pakistan also provided data on how to build and test a uranium-triggered nuclear weapon.&quot;[1] In addition, the same source reported that &quot;Since 1997, the CIA said, Pakistan had been sharing sophisticated technology, warhead-design information, and weapons-testing data with the Pyongyang regime.&quot;[2] If accurate, this report would suggest that North Korea has sufficient knowledge to make nuclear weapons and would not have to test to be assured that these weapons would function. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_1113.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_1113.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0321" task="">
  <question>
    How much Uranium does North Korea produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The number of nuclear weapons that North Korea may have depends on its level of technical sophistication, which may range from a high level requiring little fissile material to a much lower level of expertise requiring significantly greater quantities of HEU or plutonium. At the high end of technological sophistication, North Korea might be capable of using 3kg of weapons-grade plutonium or 10kg of weapons-grade uranium per weapon. Therefore, North Korea could currently produce two to three nuclear weapons with the 6 to 10kg of separated weapons-grade plutonium it is estimated to have. At the low end of weapons engineering sophistication, North Korea may need about 8kg of weapons-grade plutonium or 25kg of HEU per nuclear weapon, applying the IAEA quantities of concern. In that case, North Korea may only be able to produce at most one nuclear weapon with the up to 10kg of separated plutonium it may have. Finally, about 5kg or so of weapons-grade plutonium or about 16kg of HEU per bomb--amounts between the low and high ends of technological sophistication--are reasonable estimates of how much fissile material could be required for North Korea to produce a first-generation nuclear weapon, assuming the DPRK was able to make full use of available expertise, including possible assistance from other countries. In this scenario, North Korea may be able to produce up to two nuclear weapons with the up to 10kg of separated weapons-grade plutonium it may presently have. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_1113.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_1113.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0322" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea have the ability to produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons, in particular, boosted or fission-fusion weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For North Korea to do this, a prerequisite would be to acquire sufficient amounts (at least grams worth) of tritium and deuterium, heavy forms of hydrogen, that fuse together inside such weapons. Although deuterium is relatively easy to acquire, for example from water, tritium is more difficult to produce because it is radioactive and has a relatively short half-life. Perhaps North Korea obtained supplies of tritium from Pakistan or some other supplier. However, there is no reliable open-source evidence for this acquisition or indigenous production of tritium. Therefore, the available evidence suggests that North Korea has not made sophisticated nuclear weapons. This conclusion is significant because it sets limits on North Korea's ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons. Such miniaturization may be necessary for the DPRK to be able to launch nuclear weapons over long distances using its current group of long-range ballistic missiles. If North Korea does not have either an indigenous or foreign source of tritium to enable miniaturization, it would have to turn to aircraft or some other non-missile delivery vehicle to use any nuclear weapons that it may possess, unless the payload of its ballistic missiles is on the order of hundreds of kilograms or more. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_1113.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_1113.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0323" task="">
  <question>
    Where are North Korea's nuclear facilities situated? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea's nuclear facilities span the complete nuclear fuel cycle, with most of these facilities concentrated in Pun'gang-chigu, Yongbyon-kun, North P'yong'an Province. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0324" task="">
  <question>
    What reactors are present at the Yongbyon complex? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Yongbyon nuclear complex also includes a small research reactor, a 5MW(e) gas-graphite moderated reactor, an unfinished 50MW(e) reactor, a fuel fabrication complex, a spent fuel reprocessing facility, and waste storage sites. There is also a 200MW(e) nuclear reactor under construction in T'aech'on-kun, North P'yong'an Province, but work on it was frozen under the Agreed Framework of October 1994. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0325" task="">
  <question>
    Who controls the nuclear facilities in North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The General Department of Atomic Energy under the Cabinet has direct responsibility for the operation and management of facilities dedicated to the generation of electricity. Nominally, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) elects and removes cabinet officials, but the SPA Presidium is empowered to act on behalf of the SPA when it is not in session. Ultimately, the General Department of Atomic Energy is beholden to Kim Jong Il and a small number of officials who hold senior positions in the Korean Workers' Party, the government, and the military. The Academy of Sciences manages most of the research institutions that could be described as "dual-use," and the National Defense Commission has ultimate authority over military applications of nuclear technology and materials. The General Bureau of the Light-Water Reactor Project under the Cabinet is responsible for managing the light water reactor project under the Agreed Framework, but the future of that project is uncertain. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0326" task="">
  <question>
    What is the presidential fund for? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Second Economic Committee (SEC) under the National Defense Commission is responsible for the production of all weapons in North Korea, and the SEC's Fifth Machine Industry Bureau -- also known as the "Fifth General Bureau" -- is responsible for the production of nuclear weapons. Little is known about the budget-making process for the Second Economic Committee and its subordinate bureaus. However, a special fund is called the "Kim Il Sung fund," the "presidential fund," or the "Number 710 fund" is reportedly used to import materials and technologies for the nuclear program. Ultimate control of this fund is almost certainly exercised by Kim Jong Il and the National Defense Commission, but details are unknown. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0327" task="">
  <question>
    What does the Second Natural Science Institute do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Second Natural Science Institute is responsible for all weapons research and development in North Korea, but it likely collaborates with the Academy of Sciences and the Second Economic Committee's Fifth Machine Industry Bureau in the area of nuclear weapons research. The Second Natural Science Institute also conducts research and development for the ballistic missile program, and almost certainly is tasked with responsibility for the design of a nuclear warhead suitable for ballistic missiles in the current inventory and/or for those under development. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0328" task="">
  <question>
    What is NCDB? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) under the General Staff Department in the Ministry of People's Armed Forces is responsible for managing the research and development of defensive measures against nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks.MISSING PASSAGE? The NCDB now consists of seven departments and three research institutes, including the "55th Research Institute" or Nuclear and Atomic Defense Laboratory, which runs simulations and estimates damage and fallout from possible nuclear attacks. North Korean doctrine and operating procedures regarding the storage and use of nuclear weapons are unknown, but the National Defense Commission would have ultimate authority over nuclear weapons storage, deployment, and possible use. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0329" task="">
  <question>
    What was the 1959 agreement with Soviet Union about? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea received its B-25 Betatron facility from the Soviet Union in 1966 as a part of the 1959 agreement on "the peaceful use of atomic energy," which provided for Soviet assistance in North Korea's establishment of a nuclear research institute. The betatron was designed as a gamma radiography facility, and it has been used as a pulsed neutron source to measure cross sections. IAEA technical cooperation reports claim this facility "has outlasted its usefulness." Its current status is unknown. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_501.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_501.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0330" task="">
  <question>
    When was North Korea's first higher educational institute established? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This is North Korea's first higher educational institute in the field of science and technology. It was established in 1947 in Hungnam and was called the Hungnam College of Technology. The school's name was changed to Hamhung University of Chemical Industry in 1954 and it was moved to Hamhung in 1959. The university is well known as the North's foremost training ground for chemists and engineers, and has 46 chemistry-related departments as well as four affiliated research institutes. However, according to Bermudez, it may also be in charge of the research and education of scientists and technicians in spent fuel reprocessing. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_502.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_502.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0331" task="">
  <question>
    What does the Pyongyang College of technology work on? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kim Chaek University of Technology was originally part of Kim Il Sung University before it was established as the Pyongyang College of Technology (??????)" in 1948. In 1951, during the Korean War, the college's name was changed to "Kim Chaek College of Technology (??????)" [Note: General Kim Ch'aek, commander of the KPA's Frontline Headquarters, died in the war.] In 1988, the college was elevated to a university (????). Between 1981 and 1993, a large-scale construction program doubled the size of the campus to its present size of 400,000m2. The university's programs in nuclear reactors, nuclear electronics, nuclear fuel and nuclear engineering specialize in training nuclear researchers and technical personnel. Graduates are reportedly posted to the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center or to nuclear facilities in Packch'on-kun. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_504.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_504.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0332" task="">
  <question>
    What research goes on at Kim Il Sung University? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kim Il Sung University was founded in October of 1946 as North Korea's top university. Since North Korea signed the founding agreement and charter of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) at Dubna in the USSR in 1956, the university has been conducting research and training students in the nuclear field. [Note: JINR is also called the "United Institute of Nuclear Research" or the "Dubna Atomic Energy Research Institute."] In the late 1950's, the university established a nuclear reactor engineering program (???????) and started to send students to JINR for training. According to defector Ko Yong Hwan, the university established a nuclear physics program (?????) in 1959, but the (South) Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute says the program was established in 1973. These programs are under the Atomic Energy Department (?????), which is one of eight departments in the College of Natural Sciences. The university also has the Atomic Energy Research Institute (?????? ???), but the institute's date of establishment is not clear. The nuclear physics curriculum has included courses in nuclear electronics, nuclear fuels, and nuclear reactors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_505.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_505.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0333" task="">
  <question>
    Who funded the cyclotron project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Funding for the cyclotron project was provided by the IAEA, the United States, and the North Korean government, and the facility was fully commissioned in April 1992. The MGC-20 cyclotron produces radioisotopes such as iodine-123 and technetium-99m for use in nuclear medicine and biology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_506.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_506.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0334" task="">
  <question>
    When was the Pyongsong College of Science founded? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Pyongsong College of Science was founded in 1967 as a special college for the training of North Korea's top scientists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_509.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_509.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0335" task="">
  <question>
    What evidences are there that the Pyongsong College of Science is onvolved in nuclear research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The college has a six-year program and five science-related departments with a small number of students. Unlike other North Korean educational institutions, the social status or background of prospective students are given little consideration for admission. Graduates from the Nuclear Physics Department are posted to the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center or to nuclear facilities Packch'on-kun. There is a report that the Academy of Sciences established the Nuclear Physics Research Institute in 1982, and attached the institute to the P'yongsong College of Science. The institute reportedly provides training in nuclear energy theory. The Chemistry Department is reported to have a metallurgy program that has been "involved in nuclear research." 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_509.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_509.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0336" task="">
  <question>
    How did Russia help in North Korea's radiochemistry research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea established the Radiochemistry Institute with Soviet assistance in 1956. The institute focuses on various aspects of fuel fabrication research and reprocessing. According to contracts signed by North Korea and the USSR in accordance with their 1959 agreement on "the peaceful use of atomic energy," the USSR was to provide technical assistance for the establishment of a North Korean nuclear research center. The contracts reportedly included the provision of twenty glove boxes and twenty hot cells for this institute. However, the current status of those glove boxes and hot cells is unknown. According to Georgiy Kaurov, former head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy, this facility has been able to extract radionuclides from irradiated fuel assemblies, and is able to conduct radiochemical research at the highest level. The Radiochemistry Laboratory, which was revealed to be a reprocessing facility during IAEA safeguards inspections in 1992, is under this institute. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_514.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_514.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0337" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries were part of the International Chemical Joint Venture plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1988, the International Trading Corporation of Japan and Korea Yong'aksan General Trading Company invested $20 million to establish the International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation. The joint venture firm was created to refine rare earth products from monazite and export them to Japan. The plant was designed with technology from China's Shanghai Yue Long Chemical Plant, and construction was completed in Hamhung in April 1990. The plant began operations in April 1991. According to Bermudez, monazite is mined at the Ch'olsan Uranium Mine in Ch'olsan-kun (???), North P'yong'an Province, and then transported to the Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company in Hamhung for processing. The Segye Ilbo reported in 1999 that the Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company had been the largest joint venture company in North Korea, but that it had ceased operations in 1997. However, the Korean Central News Agency reported in November 2002 that the firm was still operating. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_522.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_522.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0338" task="">
  <question>
    Where were the Uranium deposits located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1964, North Korea reported that it had discovered approximately 4 million tons of uranium deposits in &quot;Unggi-kun (???),&quot; North Hamgyong Province (????); Hamhung (???), South Hamgyong Province (????); Haegumgang-ri (????), Kosong-kun (???), Kangwon Province (???); Hamhung, Unggi, and Haegumgang. The current status of this mine is unknown. [Note: &quot;Unggi-kun&quot; is an old name for a section of what is now known as the &quot;special administrative city of Nason (?????), which borders on Russia.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_523.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_523.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0339" task="">
  <question>
    What is &quot;ore number three&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The uranium ore extracted from the Kumch'on Uranium Mine is reportedly shipped to the Namch'on Chemical Complex (?????????) in P'yongsan-kun for processing into yellow cake (U3O8) or uranium dioxide (U02). The ore extracted from this mine is called "ore number three (3? ??)." Defector Kim Tae Ho claims that "ore number three" has a uranium content of 0.8 percent, a vanadium content of 1.4%, and other rare metals such as nickel, molybdenum and radium. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_529.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_529.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0340" task="">
  <question>
    What is milling? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Construction of the uranium milling facility in Kusong was completed in 1989. Some sources consider this to be a uranium &quot;conversion&quot; facility. However, this facility processes uranium ore into yellow cake, or UO2. Therefore, the proper description of this facility's function is &quot;milling.&quot; In August 1991, the Kusong Uranium Milling Facility was reported to have a processing capacity of 300kg of ore per day. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_530.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_530.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0341" task="">
  <question>
    Which is North Korea's oldest mine? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Osamu Eya, a Japanese journalist, the uranium mine at Najin was discovered in 1961, and is North Korea's oldest mine. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_532.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_532.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0342" task="">
  <question>
    What are the other naes for the Pakch'on Uranium Milling Facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Other Names: Pakch'on-kun Uranium Ore Milling Facility, April Industrial Enterprise, April Industrial Company (4????), Unjon-kun April Industrial Enterprise, Unjon-kun April Industrial Company (???4????) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_534.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_534.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0343" task="">
  <question>
    How much fuel was reported to be produced by the Yongbyon Fuel Fabrication Plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An anonymous defector claims that this plant processed uranium milled at the Pakch'on Uranium Milling Facility. In December 1992, North Korea was reportedly modifying or expanding the Yongbyon Fuel Fabrication Plant to produce fuel for the 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) reactors that were under construction in Yongbyon-kun and T'aech'on-kun, respectively. This facility produced the approximate 8,000 fuel rods that were discharged from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon in 1994 and now canned and stored in a temporary dry storage facility in Yongbyon. The Yongbyon Fuel Fabrication Plant is now frozen under the Agreed Framework. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_541.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_541.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0344" task="">
  <question>
    What is Hagap? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a diplomatic source, the United States and South Korea received reliable information in 1996 about a suspect underground nuclear facility in an area that US intelligence analysts call Hagap. This is an old name for an area around Kap'hyon-dong, Huich'on, Chagang Province. North Korean defector Kang Myong Do claims to have seen a large excavation project in this region when he was traveling from Huich'on to Kanggye, Chagang Province, in January 1989. Kang claims that the "Third Engineer Bureau (?3???) was constructing tunnels at the site. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_544.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_544.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0345" task="">
  <question>
    What is the evidence that North Korea has an uranium enrichment program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it possesses a program to enrich uranium, and the Hagap facility is a possible site for the uranium enrichment program. According to intelligence and diplomatic sources in Seoul, US government officials briefed the South Korean government around 10 October 2002 about suspicious sites for North Koreas uranium enrichment program. Hagap was one of three suspected sites; the others were Yongjo-ri" and the Academy of Sciences. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_544.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_544.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0346" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Agreed Framework? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In May and June 1994, North Korean technicians, without the supervision of IAEA inspectors, once again discharged the reactor's spent fuel rods and placed them in the cooling pond. This action nearly led to a military confrontation with the United States, before former President Jimmy Carter's trip to Pyongyang defused the crisis. Carter's trip encouraged Kim Il Sung to accept some guidelines that resulted in the negotiation and conclusion of the Agreed Framework in October 1994. Under the terms of the agreement, the spent fuel rods that were unloaded in 1994 have now been canned and are stored in Yongbyon awaiting shipment to still undetermined third country. The agreement has also frozen this reactor, which is scheduled for dismantlement after the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has completed the project to provide two light-water nuclear reactors at Shinp'o, South Hamgyong Province. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_551.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_551.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0347" task="">
  <question>
    Why did North Korea sign the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In exchange for North Korea's signing the NPT in 1985, the USSR agreed to provide four light water nuclear reactors to be built at this site. The agreement, signed in December 1985, stipulated that Moscow would provide technical assistance in the construction of four VVER-440, each with a rating of 440MW(e), or a total of 1,760MW(e). The site in Shinpo had been selected by February 1990 and some preliminary site preparation was done before the USSR cancelled the project in 1991. Originally, the Soviet Union was scheduled to transfer the technical design of the VVER-440 reactor to North Korea by 1994. After the project was cancelled, North Korea decided to pursue indigenous development and design to construct three 635MW(e) light-water reactors at the site. This plan was cancelled once the KEDO light water reactor project began under the terms of the Agreed Framework. In March 1995, the Agreed Framework provided for the establishment of the KEDO consortium, which was created to supply North Korea with two 1,000MW(e) light water power reactors in exchange for Pyongyangs commitment to freeze its other nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons program and to permit the IAEA to verify the completeness and correctness of North Koreas initial declaration. Furthermore, the agreement stipulates that North Korea must uphold its safeguards commitments and remain a signatory to the NPT. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_553.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/45_553.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0348" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Indo-Russian agreement in 2002 about? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In accordance with an Indo-Russian agreement of 12 February 2002, the construction of two VVER-1000MW reactors begins in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu). The reactors will be completed over a five- to six-year period and media reports indicate that nearly 300 Russian companies are involved in the $1.5 billion project. Construction work for the project will be done by Indian personnel with Russian supervision. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0349" task="">
  <question>
    What agreement did India and Russia reach in 2002? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In accordance with an Indo-Russian agreement of 12 February 2002, the construction of two VVER-1000MW reactors begins in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu). The reactors will be completed over a five- to six-year period and media reports indicate that nearly 300 Russian companies are involved in the $1.5 billion project. Construction work for the project will be done by Indian personnel with Russian supervision. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0350" task="">
  <question>
    When did India start its nuclear program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's nuclear program was conceived in the pre-independence era by a small group of influential scientists who grasped the significance of nuclear energy and persuaded political leaders from the Indian National Congress to invest resources in the nuclear sector. In the aftermath of independence in August 1947, the Congress government led by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru launched an ambitious dual-use, three-stage nuclear program to exploit India's abundant natural thorium reserves. The primary focus of the program was the production of inexpensive electricity. However, the decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle--from ore mining, processing and fuel fabrication facilities, research and power reactors, spent-fuel reprocessing plants, heavy water production plants, and waste treatment and disposal facilities--also led to India's acquiring the technical capability to build nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0351" task="">
  <question>
    What were the results of the nuclear tests in 1998? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Similar controversy dogs India's May 1998 tests. After the first of round of tests on May 11, India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announced that it had tested three nuclear devices: a fission device with a yield of 12kt; a thermonuclear device with a yield of 43kt; and a sub-kiloton device with a yield of 0.2kt; The figures were later revised to 45kt for the thermonuclear device and 15kt for the fission device. However, these figures have been disputed by independent analysts, who--citing evidence from seismic data--claim that the cumulative yield of the Indian tests was more likely between 20-30kt, the implications being the thermonuclear test was likely to have been a failure. Senior Indian scientists such as P.K. Iyengar have also publicly suggested that it is likely that the fusion device only burned partially. However, the former head of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Dr. R. Chidambaram has claimed that a &quot;post-shot&quot; analysis of the Pokhran II tests confirmed that the May 1998 tests yielded about 60kt. Chidambaram subsequently asserted that the tests provided India with &quot;the capability to design and fabricate nuclear weapons [in the range] of low-yields up to 200 kilotons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0352" task="">
  <question>
    From where are the raw materials for nuclear tests obtained? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plutonium for India's nuclear stockpile is most likely obtained from two research reactors: the 40MW CIRUS and 100MW Dhruva, which went critical in 1960 and 1985, respectively. The CIRUS reactor is capable of producing 9-10kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually; the corresponding figure for the Dhruva reactor is 20-25kg. The CIRUS reactor was shut down in 1997 for refurbishment and is expected to resume operations in 2003. Although the Dhruva went critical in 1985, vibration problems delayed normal operations until 1988. The irradiated fuel from the reactors is probably reprocessed at either the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay (50 tons per year) or the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant at Kalpakkam (100-125 tons per year). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0353" task="">
  <question>
    Where does India get raw materials for its nuclear weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plutonium for India's nuclear stockpile is most likely obtained from two research reactors: the 40MW CIRUS and 100MW Dhruva, which went critical in 1960 and 1985, respectively. The CIRUS reactor is capable of producing 9-10kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually; the corresponding figure for the Dhruva reactor is 20-25kg. The CIRUS reactor was shut down in 1997 for refurbishment and is expected to resume operations in 2003. Although the Dhruva went critical in 1985, vibration problems delayed normal operations until 1988. The irradiated fuel from the reactors is probably reprocessed at either the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay (50 tons per year) or the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant at Kalpakkam (100-125 tons per year). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0354" task="">
  <question>
    How much Plutonium does India produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to published sources, India produces 20-40kg of plutonium annually and has probably accumulated 280-600kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to build 40-120 weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0355" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of bomber aircrafts does the Indian Air Force (IAF) have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The bomber leg of India's dyad consists of a small number of Mirage 2000s and possibly Jaguar and MiG 27 aircraft. There is evidence to suggest that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is seeking to augment its bomber fleet through the purchase of additional Mirage 2000 multi-role combat aircraft; reports also suggest that the IAF is interested in arming its proposed Su-30 fleet with nuclear capable air-launched cruise missiles. Other reports indicate that India may be interested in acquiring long-range nuclear-capable bombers such as the Tu-22 Backfire bombers from Russia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0356" task="">
  <question>
    What are the limitations of the Prithvi missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, the Prithvi suffers from several limitations such as its short-range, liquid-fueled engines, which add to the logistics burden, and fuel toxicity, which increases the difficulties of handling the weapon system in the field. Hence, the Prithvi missiles will most likely be replaced by the new solid-fueled, short-range Agni ballistic missile (700-800km-range/1,000kg-payload) for nuclear missions. The missiles already in the inventory of the Army and Air Force are likely to be reassigned to perform conventional battlefield support functions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0357" task="">
  <question>
    What is Dhanush? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has also developed a 350km-range naval-variant of the Prithvi: the Dhanush. The missile has completed flight-trials at sea. However, the Indian Navy (IN) has not made a decision to deploy the Dhanush on board surface warships; but the IN might acquire a small number of these missiles and deploy them on board surface warships as part of the inter-services organizational battle to acquire a stake in the proposed &quot;minimum deterrent.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0358" task="">
  <question>
    How is the Dhanush missile related to the Prithvi missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has also developed a 350km-range naval-variant of the Prithvi: the Dhanush. The missile has completed flight-trials at sea. However, the Indian Navy (IN) has not made a decision to deploy the Dhanush on board surface warships; but the IN might acquire a small number of these missiles and deploy them on board surface warships as part of the inter-services organizational battle to acquire a stake in the proposed &quot;minimum deterrent.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0359" task="">
  <question>
    What are the features of the Agni missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The short-(700-800km-range/1000kg-payload), medium- (2,000-2,500km-range /1,000kg-payload), and the planned intermediate-range (3,500-4,000km-range/1,000kg-payload) variants of the Agni ballistic missile are likely to be the mainstay of India's land-based missile force in the future. In comparison to the Prithvi, each of these variants of the Agni combines the advantages of longer-range, higher-payload, and solid-fueled engines. Although it is developing an intermediate-range ballistic missile, India appears to have stopped short of building an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0360" task="">
  <question>
    What is an Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As part of a program to develop a secure, sea-based, second-strike capability, India is developing a nuclear powered submarine, also referred to as the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). However, the DAE's inability to design and integrate a compact reactor power plant for the vessel has led to program delays. It has been reported that India has sought technical advice and assistance for the ATV from Russia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0361" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's nuclear doctrine? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's primary goal is to achieve &quot;economic, political, social, scientific, and technological development&quot; and autonomy in domestic and strategic decisionmaking in an environment free of coercion from either the threat or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. With these objectives in view, the Indian government has adopted a nuclear &quot;no-first-use&quot; or doctrine of &quot;retaliation only.&quot; The doctrine's central goal is to deter the threat of nuclear (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological) weapons use by any state or entity against India or its armed forces. In the event of deterrence failure, the doctrine states that India will resort to punitive strikes to inflict unacceptable losses on the adversary state or entity. However, India will not resort to the threat of use or use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological) weapons, or are not aligned with states that possess such capabilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0362" task="">
  <question>
    Why is India against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although India was initially one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) when that treaty was first proposed in the 1950s and among the first to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, the Indian government's position has changed radically since then. By the early 1990s, when negotiations on the CTBT rapidly moved towards a resolution, Indian elites came to regard the CTBT not as an instrument of controlling the nuclear arms race, its original goal when it was first proposed, but rather as an instrument of nonproliferation that sought to freeze countries along the nuclear learning curve. The Indian government also objected to the treaty's entry-into-force provision, as well as clauses that allowed nuclear weapon states to conduct hydronuclear and hydrodynamic experiments to ensure the safety and reliability of their nuclear arsenals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0363" task="">
  <question>
    What is believed about India's biological capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although some intelligence estimates suggest that India possesses biological weapons, there is very limited open-source information available about a possible Indian biological weapon program. India has defensive biological weapon capabilities and has conducted research on countering various diseases, including plague, brucellosis, and smallpox. India also has an extensive and advanced pharmaceutical industry and is therefore technically capable of developing biological weapons. India ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0364" task="">
  <question>
    What is known about India's biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although some intelligence estimates suggest that India possesses biological weapons, there is very limited open-source information available about a possible Indian biological weapon program. India has defensive biological weapon capabilities and has conducted research on countering various diseases, including plague, brucellosis, and smallpox. India also has an extensive and advanced pharmaceutical industry and is therefore technically capable of developing biological weapons. India ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0365" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although some intelligence estimates suggest that India possesses biological weapons, there is very limited open-source information available about a possible Indian biological weapon program. India has defensive biological weapon capabilities and has conducted research on countering various diseases, including plague, brucellosis, and smallpox. India also has an extensive and advanced pharmaceutical industry and is therefore technically capable of developing biological weapons. India ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0366" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of chemical agents does India possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After many years of denying the existence of a chemical weapon program, India disclosed in June 1997 that it possessed chemical weapons. Few details are publicly available concerning Indian chemical weapon stockpiles, although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which India signed in 1993 and ratified in September 1996, India must destroy 45 percent of its stockpile by 2004 and the remaining stockpile by 2007. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0367" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of missiles does India possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For almost two decades, India has sought to develop and deploy ballistic and other missiles. User trials of the Prithvi-1 (150 km-range) and Prithvi-2 (250 km-range) ballistic missiles have been completed; both variants have been &quot;inducted&quot; into the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced in September 2002 that the naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush) has completed sea trials and is ready for &quot;induction.&quot; Five tests of different versions of the intermediate-range Agni ballistic missile were conducted between May 1989 and January 2001. Limited series production of the Agni-TD-I (1,500 km-range) and Agni-II (2,000-2,500 km-range) has commenced, and the Indian Army is raising a missile group to take possession of the missiles. In January 2003, DRDO conducted a second test of the single-stage, solid-fuel, 700-800 km-range version of the Agni. This new missile has been dubbed the Agni-1; it will be the likely successor to the Prithvi-series, which will henceforth be used in a battlefield support role. India reportedly will test a 3,500-4,000 km-range variant of the Agni (Agni-III) by the end of 2003. 'Development flight-trials' of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos/PJ-10, which India is co-developing with Russian assistance, are likely to continue through 2003, with serial production expected to begin in 2004. However, India's sea-launched ballistic missile, Sagarika, is not expected to become operational before 2010. India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); in November 2002, it rejected a draft of the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) on ballistic missile proliferation on grounds that it is discriminatory and interferes with the peaceful uses of space technology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0368" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons (CW) facilities does India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A high level of secrecy surrounds India's chemical weapons (CW) program, making it difficult to determine the exact number of chemical weapons facilities and organizations involved. India publicly acknowledged that it had a chemical warfare program after ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997, but information on its CW stockpiles and production facilities remains strictly confidential. Under the CWC, India has declared three CW production facilities (CWPFs), two CW storage facilities (CWSFs), and two CW destruction facilities (CWDFs). India has also declared one Schedule 1 facility, four Schedule 2 facilities, 30 Schedule 3 facilities, and 19 discrete organic chemicals (DOC) facilities in its industry declaration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0369" task="">
  <question>
    Does India export chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although much is known about the Indian nuclear program, little information can be cited in open literature that deals with the country's chemical weapons capability. It is widely acknowledged that India has an extensive civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, and Taiwan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0370" task="">
  <question>
    What is the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The US intelligence community releases the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), an unclassified summary of its 2001 report on foreign ballistic missile developments through 2015. The report indicates that India &quot;is making progress toward its aim of achieving self-sufficiency for its missile programs, but it continues to rely on foreign assistance.&quot; The report states that the Prithvi-1 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (150km range) continues to be the only deployed ballistic missile in India. The longer-range Prithvi-2 SRBM (250km) is also addressed as a modified version of the Prithvi-1. While the Agni ballistic missile will become the new mainstay for India's nuclear-armed missile arsenal this decade, the Sagarika sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is estimated to enter service in 2010 or later. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0371" task="">
  <question>
    When was the Trishul SAM test-fired? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India announces the successful test of its Trishul surface-to-air missile at Cochin, Kerala. According to an official statement from the defense ministry, the missile was tested on 28 and 29 January in a &quot;sea-skimming mode&quot; in order to establish its capabilities in an &quot;anti-sea skimmer role.&quot; The missile, which failed in its five previous tests, will undergo further testing before the Navy is allowed to conduct its own trials. For the time being, the Navy will continue to arm its vessels with Barak anti-missile systems, purchased from Israel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0372" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that India imported missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A senior Navy official says that 12 Klub ZM-54 E anti-ship missiles, acquired from Russia for $30 million in 2000, failed to reach the expected range of 100km during two undersea trials in May 2002 and hence will have to be replaced. According to the officials, India has sent requests for proposals to France, Israel, Italy, and the United States. He adds that the defense ministry has promised to provide adequate funds for the procurement of missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0373" task="">
  <question>
    Has India imported missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A senior Navy official says that 12 Klub ZM-54 E anti-ship missiles, acquired from Russia for $30 million in 2000, failed to reach the expected range of 100km during two undersea trials in May 2002 and hence will have to be replaced. According to the officials, India has sent requests for proposals to France, Israel, Italy, and the United States. He adds that the defense ministry has promised to provide adequate funds for the procurement of missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0374" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Indo-Israeli co-operation about? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An Indian defense ministry official says that India's turbojet-powered unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Lakshya, will be subjected to missile-launch trials and other tests during the next two months in Israel. The Lakshya, which is a reusable UAV that can be launched from land or ship, is designed to operate at a maximum altitude of 30,000 feet. Representatives from the Aeronautical Development Establishment in Bangalore will oversee these trials. Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) officials say that the testing of the supersonic Lakshya in Israel is a step towards advanced Indo-Israeli cooperation in UAV production. The Israeli defense ministry, in addition to hosting these trials, has apparently agreed to pay for them as well. While these trials proceed, India will continue to pursue the development of a cruise missile UAV that is capable of carrying a 350kg payload over a range of 600km. Although numerous payloads have already been developed for the Lakshya, the Indian Air Force is apparently dissatisfied with the UAV and is calling for a replacement. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0375" task="">
  <question>
    What are the features of India's METSAT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's 1,060kg meteorological satellite (METCAT) is successfully launched from Sriharikota on board a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). This is the first time that the Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO) uses a PSLV to launch a meteorological satellite into a geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO). The METSAT, which was built by ISRO, &quot;carries a very high resolution radiometer (VHRR) capable of imaging earth in the visible, thermal infrared, and water vapor bands. Its data relay transponder can collect data from unattended meteorological platforms and relay it to the New Delhi Met Data utilization center.&quot; The PSLV has four stages that alternate between solid- and liquid-fuel sources. According to Indian media reports, &quot;the third stage solid propellant motor has been optimized and the liquid propellant in the fourth stage has been increased from two tons to two and a half tons.&quot; P.S. Goel, the Director of ISRO's satellite center, and Ramakrishnan, the Project Director of PSLV Missions, explain that the METSAT launch using the new PSLV series has &quot;given room for optimism that ISRO will be able to further optimize the various stages to raise a payload up to 1,200kg for a variety of uses.&quot; They remark that the PSLV may be able to send payloads into numerous orbits, including the low earth orbit, polar orbit, and GTO. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0376" task="">
  <question>
    When did India test the Akash missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    4 October 2002 India successfully tests the medium-range Akash surface-to-air missile from the Intermediate Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur-on-sea near Balasore. The missile is fired from a mobile launcher. Akash has a range of 25km and can deliver a 55kg payload. The missile's Rajendra radar can engage four to six targets and track multiple enemy aircraft within a 40-60km range. According to DRDO officials, Akash has now entered user trials after completing its guidance test-flights. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0377" task="">
  <question>
    What was BrahMos? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During a visit to NPO Mashinostroyeniya in Reutov (Moscow Region), Russian President Vladimir Putin says the Indo-Russian BrahMos project is a &quot;successful venture with good prospects ahead.&quot; Putin adds that he is happy to see the &quot;accurate and high-quality execution&quot; of Indian defense contracts prior to his trip to India. Putin is scheduled to visit India in early December 2002. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1931_2065.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0378" task="">
  <question>
    Who administers India's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India does have a defensive chemical warfare program, overseen by the Ministry of Defense. The main research institute overseeing India's military and civilian involvement with chemicals and dual use materials are the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, respectively. There are various facilities and laboratories across the country involved in research that could be applicable to a covert chemical warfare program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0379" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents does United Phosphorus Ltd. produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    United Phosphorus Ltd., for example, a Bombay-based company, produces a number of nerve agent precursor chemicals that are listed on Schedule 3 of the CWC, including phosphorus trichloride, phosphorus pentachloride, triethyl phosphite, and trimethyl phosphite. In 1992, United Phosphorus's export license was suspended for shipping trimethyl phosphite to Syria. Another Indian company, Transpek Industry Ltd., also produces a number of dual-use chemicals including thionyl chloride and sulfur dichloride. In 1990, Transpek Industry Ltd. won a bid to install and commission a turn-key chemical plant in Iran, worth an estimated $12.5 million, and in 1996 the company built the world's largest manufacturing facility for thionyl chloride outside of Europe. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0380" task="">
  <question>
    When did India cancel the Agni missile project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1996 - The Agni missile project is cancelled. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0381" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have the infrastructure necessary to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The report states that India is capable of producing chemical weapons, and although India has never admitted to having an offensive chemical weapons program, it produces many dual-use chemicals that can be used as precursors and be able to support a large chemical weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0382" task="">
  <question>
    Can India produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The report states that India is capable of producing chemical weapons, and although India has never admitted to having an offensive chemical weapons program, it produces many dual-use chemicals that can be used as precursors and be able to support a large chemical weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0383" task="">
  <question>
    What are &quot;dual-use&quot; chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    dual-use chemicals that can be used as precursors and be able to support a large chemical weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0384" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence that India and Iran have collaborated towards the production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Iranian government agrees to give an unidentified Bombay-based company the rights to build a sophisticated chemical plant in Qazvim, Iran. The plant is to be used to produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a chemical known as a precursor for chemical weapons. The deal is reportedly worth over $15 million and is negotiated by the Iranian company, Melli Agrochemicals. Shiv Mukherjee, the Minister for Press, Information, and Culture for the Indian Embassy in the United States, dismisses recent press reports that India was in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention for building a factory for the production of phosphorus pentasulfide in Qazin, Iran. Mukherjee states that the chemical was not banned by the CWC and that the Indian government monitors all commercial deals to insure that chemicals are not diverted for other means. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0385" task="">
  <question>
    Has India sold chemical weapons-related equipment and materials to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A CIA report states that from July-December 1996, India has sold chemical weapons-related equipment and materials to Iran. According to a CIA report, India is one of the major suppliers of chemical equipment to Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0386" task="">
  <question>
    When did India ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    3 September 1996 - India deposits with the UN Secretary-General its instrument of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, making it the 62nd country to do so. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0387" task="">
  <question>
    Has India placed conditions on its continued acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral states that India will review its ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention if the United States, China, and Pakistan fail to ratify the treaty.  17 April 1997 India begins contacting experts in international law in an attempt to find a way out if its commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention. India is growing increasingly concerned because the United States, China, and Pakistan have yet to ratify the treaty, which is scheduled to go into effect on 29 April 1997.  ?Sanjeev Miglani, &quot;India Tries to Wiggle Out of Chemical Arms Treaty,&quot; Asia Times, 17 April 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0388" task="">
  <question>
    What would cause India to pull out of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral states that India will review its ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention if the United States, China, and Pakistan fail to ratify the treaty.  17 April 1997 India begins contacting experts in international law in an attempt to find a way out if its commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention. India is growing increasingly concerned because the United States, China, and Pakistan have yet to ratify the treaty, which is scheduled to go into effect on 29 April 1997.  ?Sanjeev Miglani, &quot;India Tries to Wiggle Out of Chemical Arms Treaty,&quot; Asia Times, 17 April 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0389" task="">
  <question>
    Has India taken steps to ensure that its government and military agencies are brought into compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    28 May 1997 India announces the establishment of a national authority to help it fulfill its CWC obligations. The government also calls for all countries that have not yet ratified the treaty, to do so. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0390" task="">
  <question>
    Is India complying with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    28 May 1997 India announces the establishment of a national authority to help it fulfill its CWC obligations. The government also calls for all countries that have not yet ratified the treaty, to do so. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0391" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian government submits its initial declaration to the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at The Hague, disclosing that it possesses chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0392" task="">
  <question>
    How has India been involved with the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 May 1997 India is elected the first chairman of the Executive council of the OPCW. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0393" task="">
  <question>
    Has India declared that it possesses chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 June 1997 -The Indian government submits its initial declaration to the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at The Hague, disclosing that it possesses chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. The Indian Defense Ministry states &quot;based on available information, initial declarations have been filed by India on testing and development of chemical weapons and their related facilities, which were developed only to deal with the situation arising out of a possible use of chemical warfare against India.&quot; [Note: Prior to this admission, the Indian government had repeatedly declared that it did not possess chemical weapons and did not have a chemical weapons program.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0394" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 June 1997 -The Indian government submits its initial declaration to the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at The Hague, disclosing that it possesses chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. The Indian Defense Ministry states &quot;based on available information, initial declarations have been filed by India on testing and development of chemical weapons and their related facilities, which were developed only to deal with the situation arising out of a possible use of chemical warfare against India.&quot; [Note: Prior to this admission, the Indian government had repeatedly declared that it did not possess chemical weapons and did not have a chemical weapons program.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0395" task="">
  <question>
    Has India declared that it possesses chemical weapons production facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 June 1997 -The Indian government submits its initial declaration to the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at The Hague, disclosing that it possesses chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. The Indian Defense Ministry states &quot;based on available information, initial declarations have been filed by India on testing and development of chemical weapons and their related facilities, which were developed only to deal with the situation arising out of a possible use of chemical warfare against India.&quot; [Note: Prior to this admission, the Indian government had repeatedly declared that it did not possess chemical weapons and did not have a chemical weapons program.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0396" task="">
  <question>
    When did India declare that it possesses chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 June 1997 -The Indian government submits its initial declaration to the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at The Hague, disclosing that it possesses chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities. The Indian Defense Ministry states &quot;based on available information, initial declarations have been filed by India on testing and development of chemical weapons and their related facilities, which were developed only to deal with the situation arising out of a possible use of chemical warfare against India.&quot; [Note: Prior to this admission, the Indian government had repeatedly declared that it did not possess chemical weapons and did not have a chemical weapons program.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0397" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's official position towards its chemcial weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 June 1997 India states that it developed its chemical weapons for defensive purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0398" task="">
  <question>
    Does India produce chemical weapons for offensive purposes? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 June 1997 India states that it developed its chemical weapons for defensive purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0399" task="">
  <question>
    Has India granted access to OPCW inspection teams in order to verify compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1997 - A four-person OPCW inspection team visit a laboratory in Gwalior, India to verify India's compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW reports that India is in compliance. A ten-person team of inspectors from the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) conducts an inspection of a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) facility involved in chemical weapons production. The facility is located at Ozra (near Nashik, Maharashtra). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0400" task="">
  <question>
    Was India still producing chemical weapons as of 1997? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 August 1997 - In a speech to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, India Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral states that India still reserves the right to pull out of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Gujral says that India will take such action only if it views that its security is at risk. Gujral also emphasizes that India is no longer producing chemical weapons, but continues to possess such capabilities in order to restrain the aggressive designs of countries that have not given up the idea of using these weapons against India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0401" task="">
  <question>
    Why does India possess chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 August 1997 - In a speech to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, India Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral states that India still reserves the right to pull out of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Gujral says that India will take such action only if it views that its security is at risk. Gujral also emphasizes that India is no longer producing chemical weapons, but continues to possess such capabilities in order to restrain the aggressive designs of countries that have not given up the idea of using these weapons against India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0402" task="">
  <question>
    Can the Indian Agni missile carry a chemical weapons warhead? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 February 1998 - In Bangalore, Indian defense science advisor A.P.J. Abdul Kalam states that the intermediate range Agni missile had the capability to carry a nuclear, biological, or chemical warhead. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0403" task="">
  <question>
    When did the Indian Parliament pass the Chemical Weapons Convention Bill? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2 June 1998 - The Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament, passes the Chemical Weapons Convention Bill, 1997, thus implementing the CWC into Indian law. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0404" task="">
  <question>
    Does the Indian government permit the exportation of Schedule 3 chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An Indian government statement states that the Indian government will allow the export of Schedule 3 chemicals to countries that are signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Companies wishing to export Schedule 3 chemicals will have to provide end-user certificates within 15 days of the actual export date. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0405" task="">
  <question>
    Is it legal in India to export chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An Indian government statement states that the Indian government will allow the export of Schedule 3 chemicals to countries that are signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Companies wishing to export Schedule 3 chemicals will have to provide end-user certificates within 15 days of the actual export date. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0406" task="">
  <question>
    Has the Indian military conducted maneuvers using chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    29 November 1998 - The Indian military carries out maneuvers that involve chemical weapons exercises.  December 1998 - India conducts military exercises in Rajasthan. The exercises involve maneuvers to protect troops from nuclear, chemical and biological attack.  December 1998 - The Indian military conducts a ten-day long war game exercise in the Thar desert of western Rajasthan, close to the border of Pakistan. Code-named &quot;Exercise Shiv Shakti,&quot; nearly 60,000 troops participated in the exercise, which included &quot;testing Indian planning on conducting and surviving nuclear and chemical war using modern technology and new tactics.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0407" task="">
  <question>
    Does India's military train in the use of chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    29 November 1998 - The Indian military carries out maneuvers that involve chemical weapons exercises.  December 1998 - India conducts military exercises in Rajasthan. The exercises involve maneuvers to protect troops from nuclear, chemical and biological attack.  December 1998 - The Indian military conducts a ten-day long war game exercise in the Thar desert of western Rajasthan, close to the border of Pakistan. Code-named &quot;Exercise Shiv Shakti,&quot; nearly 60,000 troops participated in the exercise, which included &quot;testing Indian planning on conducting and surviving nuclear and chemical war using modern technology and new tactics.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0408" task="">
  <question>
    What was the goal of India's &quot;Exercise Shiv Shakti&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1998 - The Indian military conducts a ten-day long war game exercise in the Thar desert of western Rajasthan, close to the border of Pakistan. Code-named &quot;Exercise Shiv Shakti,&quot; nearly 60,000 troops participated in the exercise, which included &quot;testing Indian planning on conducting and surviving nuclear and chemical war using modern technology and new tactics. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0409" task="">
  <question>
    Has the Indian Army trained medical personnel to deal with outcome of use of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    31 December 1998 - The Indian Army had begins training its medical personnel to deal with contingencies arising from the potential use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Training for the fallout of a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack had been done earlier at the college of Military Engineering. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0410" task="">
  <question>
    Does India possess biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although some intelligence estimates suggest that India possesses biological weapons, there is very limited open-source information available about a possible Indian biological weapon program. India has defensive biological weapon capabilities and has conducted research on countering various diseases, including plague, brucellosis, and smallpox. India also has an extensive and advanced pharmaceutical industry and is therefore technically capable of developing biological weapons. India ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0411" task="">
  <question>
    When did India ratify the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0412" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After many years of denying the existence of a chemical weapon program, India disclosed in June 1997 that it possessed chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0413" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons does India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Few details are publicly available concerning Indian chemical weapon stockpiles, although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0414" task="">
  <question>
    When must India destroy its chemical weapons stockpile by? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which India signed in 1993 and ratified in September 1996, India must destroy 45 percent of its stockpile by 2004 and the remaining stockpile by 2007. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0415" task="">
  <question>
    What missile technologies does India employ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For almost two decades, India has sought to develop and deploy ballistic and other missiles. User trials of the Prithvi-1 (150 km-range) and Prithvi-2 (250 km-range) ballistic missiles have been completed; both variants have been &quot;inducted&quot; into the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced in September 2002 that the naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush) has completed sea trials and is ready for &quot;induction.&quot; Five tests of different versions of the intermediate-range Agni ballistic missile were conducted between May 1989 and January 2001. Limited series production of the Agni-TD-I (1,500 km-range) and Agni-II (2,000-2,500 km-range) has commenced, and the Indian Army is raising a missile group to take possession of the missiles. In January 2003, DRDO conducted a second test of the single-stage, solid-fuel, 700-800 km-range version of the Agni. This new missile has been dubbed the Agni-1; it will be the likely successor to the Prithvi-series, which will henceforth be used in a battlefield support role. India reportedly will test a 3,500-4,000 km-range variant of the Agni (Agni-III) by the end of 2003. 'Development flight-trials' of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos/PJ-10, which India is co-developing with Russian assistance, are likely to continue through 2003, with serial production expected to begin in 2004. However, India's sea-launched ballistic missile, Sagarika, is not expected to become operational before 2010. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0416" task="">
  <question>
    Is India a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0417" task="">
  <question>
    Why did India reject a draft of the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) on ballistic missile proliferation? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    in November 2002, it rejected a draft of the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) on ballistic missile proliferation on grounds that it is discriminatory and interferes with the peaceful uses of space technology 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0418" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapon agent does India possess the most of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0419" task="">
  <question>
    Is the Prithvi ballistic missile series operational? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    User trials of the Prithvi-1 (150 km-range) and Prithvi-2 (250 km-range) ballistic missiles have been completed; both variants have been &quot;inducted&quot; into the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. India's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced in September 2002 that the naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush) has completed sea trials and is ready for &quot;induction.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0420" task="">
  <question>
    Is the Agni ballistic missile series operational? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Five tests of different versions of the intermediate-range Agni ballistic missile were conducted between May 1989 and January 2001. Limited series production of the Agni-TD-I (1,500 km-range) and Agni-II (2,000-2,500 km-range) has commenced, and the Indian Army is raising a missile group to take possession of the missiles. In January 2003, DRDO conducted a second test of the single-stage, solid-fuel, 700-800 km-range version of the Agni. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0421" task="">
  <question>
    When will the Agni ballistic missile be put into use? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This new missile has been dubbed the Agni-1; it will be the likely successor to the Prithvi-series, which will henceforth be used in a battlefield support role. India reportedly will test a 3,500-4,000 km-range variant of the Agni (Agni-III) by the end of 2003. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0422" task="">
  <question>
    What is the United States' primary security interest in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The United States has important security interests in South Asia, including preventing another Indo-Pakistani war and enhancing regional stability. Our nonproliferation goal is to persuade India and Pakistan to first cap, then reduce, and eventually eliminate their capabilities to produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. This approach supports our global objective to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons. The consequences of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic, both in terms of the loss of life and for potentially lowering the threshold for nuclear use in other parts of the world, particularly the adjacent Middle East/North Africa region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0423" task="">
  <question>
    What is the India's primary motivation for the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan, which dates to the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947, remains the impetus behind the proliferation of NBC weapons and missiles in the region. The security dynamics of the region are complicated further by India's perception of China as a threat. Pakistan's efforts to develop NBC weapons and missile systems are intended primarily to counter India's substantial conventional military advantage and its perception of India's nuclear threat. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0424" task="">
  <question>
    What initially motivated India to develop NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test. New Delhi continues to view its northern neighbor as a long-term threat despite recently improved relations. It sees Pakistan's NBC weapons and missile capabilities as a more immediate threat. Nuclear rhetoric from Pakistani leaders and Islamabad's pursuit of a mobile SRBM capability reinforce India's perception that New Delhi continues to need a nuclear capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0425" task="">
  <question>
    Why does India have NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test. New Delhi continues to view its northern neighbor as a long-term threat despite recently improved relations. It sees Pakistan's NBC weapons and missile capabilities as a more immediate threat. Nuclear rhetoric from Pakistani leaders and Islamabad's pursuit of a mobile SRBM capability reinforce India's perception that New Delhi continues to need a nuclear capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0426" task="">
  <question>
    Has India signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's very active nuclear energy development program has enabled it to obtain all of the essential materials and facilities for producing nuclear explosives. It has not signed the NPT, but is a member of the IAEA, and several Indian nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0427" task="">
  <question>
    Is India a member of the IAEA? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It has not signed the NPT, but is a member of the IAEA, and several Indian nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0428" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's position towards developing offensive chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While India possesses the infrastructure necessary to support an offensive biological warfare program, including highly qualified scientific personnel and industrial production facilities, it apparently has given priority to research and development applicable only to biological warfare defensive measures. Pakistan has the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting research and development relating to biological warfare. Both countries have signed the Biological Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0429" task="">
  <question>
    How developed is India's ballistic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has one of the more self-sufficient ballistic missile programs in the developing world. It can design and produce missiles with little foreign assistance. However, New Delhi is working to become self-sufficient in all areas of production by the end of the decade. India has two ballistic missile programs -- the Prithvi SRBM and the Agni MRBM. The Indians heavily used technological assistance and parts from Western firms in developing these missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0430" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Prithvi? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Prithvi is a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile using propulsion technology from the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile, and is designed to be deployed with a payload of 1,000 kilograms to a range of 150 kilometers (or 250 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload). The Indian Army has completed user trials with the Prithvi. The missile could quickly enter series production if a deployment decision were taken. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0431" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have a space launch vehicle (SLV) program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Additionally, India has had an ambitious space launch vehicle (SLV) program since the mid-1970s. The program includes three SLVs, which have payload capacities ranging from 150 to 3,000 kg. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0432" task="">
  <question>
    What would India need to do to enable its space launch vehicles (SLVs) to deliver nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons payloads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India could convert these SLVs into IRBMs or ICBMs quite easily but has shown no indications of doing so. It has already built guidance sets and warheads, key components needed to convert an SLV into a ballistic missile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0433" task="">
  <question>
    What are India's most viable options for delivering nuclear or chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has Russian and British ship- and air-launched anti-ship missiles, while Pakistan has Chinese and U.S. ship- and submarine-launched and French air-launched anti-ship missiles. Because India is still developing ballistic missiles, combat aircraft currently are its most viable delivery vehicles for nuclear or chemical weapons. The most likely platforms are the Mirage 2000, MiG-27, MiG-29, and Jaguar. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0434" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have the infrastructure necessary to develop biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on 15 July 1974, India has sought to improve its capabilities in biological technology, largely in a peaceful capacity. India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that utilizes well-trained scientists experienced with infectious diseases and numerous pharmaceutical production facilities and bio-containment laboratories (including BL-3). Some of India?s facilities are dedicated to developing defensive measures to combat biological attacks, and these same facilities could theoretically provide offensive agents as well. India?s expansive biotechnology infrastructure is centered at the Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior.  The DRDE is the primary center for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. Work at the DRDE centers on countering disease threats such as anthrax, brucellosis, cholera, plague, smallpox, viral hemorrhage fever, and botulism. Additionally, the Indian government has established Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) warfare directorates in the Armed Services, as well as an inter-Services coordination committee to monitor the program. The Indian Army has further established a NBC cell at Army HQ to study the effects of NBC warfare 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0435" task="">
  <question>
    Has India shown a predisposition towards developing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has sought to improve its capabilities in biological technology, largely in a peaceful capacity. India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that utilizes well-trained scientists experienced with infectious diseases and numerous pharmaceutical production facilities and bio-containment laboratories (including BL-3). Some of India?s facilities are dedicated to developing defensive measures to combat biological attacks, and these same facilities could theoretically provide offensive agents as well. India?s expansive biotechnology infrastructure is centered at the Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0436" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A recently formed organization, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), is developing the ability to deploy specially trained first responders to the scene of a nuclear or biological attack. Four companies of CISF have been sanctioned, and some 400 personnel receive specialized training. Another six companies will be added soon. The force will be ready for action by the middle of 2003, and will be deployed in four locations across the country: Ghaziabad, to cater to Delhi and other northern areas, Ranchi to the east, Kota to the west, and Chennai, to the south. Thirteen officers of the unit have already undergone eight weeks of nuclear and biological response training in the United States, and seven more are now being trained. These individuals will pass their skills on to other CISF members in a train-the-trainer approach. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0437" task="">
  <question>
    How would India respond to a biological or chemical weapons attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A recently formed organization, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), is developing the ability to deploy specially trained first responders to the scene of a nuclear or biological attack. Four companies of CISF have been sanctioned, and some 400 personnel receive specialized training. Another six companies will be added soon. The force will be ready for action by the middle of 2003, and will be deployed in four locations across the country: Ghaziabad, to cater to Delhi and other northern areas, Ranchi to the east, Kota to the west, and Chennai, to the south. Thirteen officers of the unit have already undergone eight weeks of nuclear and biological response training in the United States, and seven more are now being trained. These individuals will pass their skills on to other CISF members in a train-the-trainer approach. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0438" task="">
  <question>
    Does India possess the capability for delivering biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In terms of delivery, India possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles. However, no information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological agents by these or any other means 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0439" task="">
  <question>
    Has India developed countermeasures against biological weapons attacks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n April 1999, the Indian Army called for the formation of a National Infrastructure Cell to assess threats, implement and monitor countermeasures, and develop ways to rapidly warn potential targets of impending or ongoing attacks. The Army further asked for the establishment of a National Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, comprising scientists and government and private sector officials, to determine approaches to infrastructure defense and countermeasure formulation. In 2001, India increased the scope of its countermeasure capability through a recommendation by the State Government after the Indian Postal Department received 17 &quot;suspicious&quot; letters believed to contain Bacillus anthracis spores. A Bio-Safety Level 2 (BSL-2) Laboratory was established at the Institute of Preventive Medicine to provide guidance in preparing the Indian government for a biological attack. B. anthracis is one of many pathogens studied at the Institute, which also examines pathogens causing tuberculosis, typhoid, hepatitis B, rabies, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Ebola, and plague. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0440" task="">
  <question>
    What advances in biotechnology has India made over the past 20 years? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biotechnology was limited in India until approximately 20 years ago, when the Department of Science and Technology, Department of Biotechnology, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, and a number of private entrepreneurs began to search for means to improve crop yields and seed production. India's need for increases in crop production was especially high, with a significant portion of the population unable to obtain suitable nourishment. India soon made great strides with wheat, pulses, and soy bean hybridization, and, as a result, food production in India increased from 50 million tons a year in 1950 to about 200 millions tons each year in the last several years. In fact, the rate of crop production has increased proportionally with the rate of population growth, and India has become self-sufficient in certain foods.  Many of these advances were facilitated using extensive knowledge of genetic engineering, which in turn provided information on the de novo synthesis of biological agents. Whether such synthesis has actually been done is uncertain. India has made substantial efforts to prepare its military force for a biological attack. In December 1998, India began to train its medical personnel to deal with the eventualities of such an attack. The director general of medical services at the time, Lt. Gen. R. Jayaswal, facilitated the Army Medical Corps? restructuring. This change incorporated a three-tiered training program for doctors and paramedical personnel 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0441" task="">
  <question>
    Where is India's Defense Research and Development Establishment located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India?s expansive biotechnology infrastructure is centered at the Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0442" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDE is the primary center for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. Work at the DRDE centers on countering disease threats such as anthrax, brucellosis, cholera, plague, smallpox, viral hemorrhage fever, and botulism. Additionally, the Indian government has established Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) warfare directorates in the Armed Services, as well as an inter-Services coordination committee to monitor the program. The Indian Army has further established a NBC cell at Army HQ to study the effects of NBC warfare. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0443" task="">
  <question>
    How many chemical weapons facilities has India admitted to having? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the CWC, India has declared three CW production facilities (CWPFs), two CW storage facilities (CWSFs), and two CW destruction facilities (CWDFs). India has also declared one Schedule 1 facility, four Schedule 2 facilities, 30 Schedule 3 facilities, and 19 discrete organic chemicals (DOC) facilities in its industry declaration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0444" task="">
  <question>
    How many chemical weapons facilities does India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the CWC, India has declared three CW production facilities (CWPFs), two CW storage facilities (CWSFs), and two CW destruction facilities (CWDFs). India has also declared one Schedule 1 facility, four Schedule 2 facilities, 30 Schedule 3 facilities, and 19 discrete organic chemicals (DOC) facilities in its industry declaration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0445" task="">
  <question>
    Where are some of India's chemical weapons production facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    CW production, including sites in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh; at Ojhar, near Nashik, Maharashtra; and at Ozra (location unknown) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0446" task="">
  <question>
    Who officially oversees India's chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Control over India's CW program officially starts with the Government of India, which is responsible for ensuring the country's defense. Although the Office of the President is nominally in command of the armed forces, the executive responsibility for national defense and for the CW program rests with the Union Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister. The next level down is the Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister). Within the Ministry of Defence, the CW program is overseen by the Department of Defence Research &amp; Development (DDR&amp;D), which is headed by a Secretary, who is also the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister. The main function of the DDR&amp;D is the formulation of research, design, and development plans for equipment used by the three military services. Reporting to the DDR&amp;D is the Defence Research &amp; Development Organization (DRDO), which administers the government laboratories working in the CW area. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0447" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Raksha Mantri? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The next level down is the Raksha Mantri (Indian Defence Minister) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0448" task="">
  <question>
    What functions are performed at Indian government chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The government-owned facilities involved in CW research, manufacturing, testing, and other related activities are located in various states throughout India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0449" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's Defense Researcn and Development Organisation (DRDO)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the implementation of the CWC, have conducted routine inspections at a number of Defence Research &amp; Development Organisation (DRDO) facilities involved in CW production 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0450" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the regional training center for the OPCW located in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO laboratory in Gwalior is also a regional training center for the OPCW 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0451" task="">
  <question>
    What Indian military facilities are involved with chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chemical defense-related activities also occur outside the DRDO within the three military services: The Indian government has set up NBC warfare directorates in the Army, located in Pune, Maharashtra; the Navy, at INS Shivaji, in Lonavla, Maharashtra; and the Air Force, in Chandigarh. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0452" task="">
  <question>
    Where are India's biological and chemical warfare headquarters located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chemical defense-related activities also occur outside the DRDO within the three military services: The Indian government has set up NBC warfare directorates in the Army, located in Pune, Maharashtra; the Navy, at INS Shivaji, in Lonavla, Maharashtra; and the Air Force, in Chandigarh. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0453" task="">
  <question>
    Where are India's DRDO facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A number of other DRDO facilities, including the Research &amp; Development Establishment (Engineering) (R&amp;DE), in Pune, Maharashtra, and the Vehicles Research &amp; Development Establishment (VRDE), in Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, also participate in chemical defense research. The DRDO laboratories interact with a number of academic institutions across India, including the Indian Institutes of Technology, and work closely with the private sector for the manufacture of DRDO laboratory-produced technologies. The DRDO laboratory in Gwalior is also a regional training center for the OPCW. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0454" task="">
  <question>
    When was the DRDO formed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO was formed in 1958 following the merge of the Technical Development Establishment (TDE) of the Indian Army, the Directorate of Technical Development &amp; Production (DTDP) and the Defense Science Organization (DSO). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0455" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of research are conducted at DRDO facilities in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DRDO laboratories conduct research in a number of fields, such as aeronautics, rockets and missiles, electronics and instrumentation, combat vehicles, engineering, naval systems, armament technology including explosives research, terrain research, advanced computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, works study, systems analysis, and life sciences, including high-altitude agriculture, physiology, food technology, and nuclear medicine.  In addition, DRDO laboratories give technical advice regarding formulation of requirements, evaluation of systems to be acquired, fire and explosive safety, and mathematical and statistical analysis of operational problems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0456" task="">
  <question>
    What role has the Indian DRDO played in the development of guided missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO has been working on the Integrated Guided Missile Development program. The program consists of five missile systems: Prithvi, Akash, Trishul, Nag, and Agni. The Prithvi SS-150 and Agni missile systems are believed to have the capability to carry chemical warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0457" task="">
  <question>
    Which of India's ballistic missiles can carry chemical warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO has been working on the Integrated Guided Missile Development program. The program consists of five missile systems: Prithvi, Akash, Trishul, Nag, and Agni. The Prithvi SS-150 and Agni missile systems are believed to have the capability to carry chemical warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0458" task="">
  <question>
    What are the names of India's ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO has been working on the Integrated Guided Missile Development program. The program consists of five missile systems: Prithvi, Akash, Trishul, Nag, and Agni. The Prithvi SS-150 and Agni missile systems are believed to have the capability to carry chemical warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0459" task="">
  <question>
    Does India possess Integrated Guided Missile Systems capable of carrying chemical warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Prithvi SS-150 and Agni missile systems are believed to have the capability to carry chemical warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0460" task="">
  <question>
    How many Integrated Guided Missile Systems is India developing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO has been working on the Integrated Guided Missile Development program. The program consists of five missile systems: Prithvi, Akash, Trishul, Nag, and Agni. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0461" task="">
  <question>
    What role does the DRDO play in the development of India's chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DRDO laboratories are suspected of developing and maintaining India's chemical weapons. Stockpiles of these weapons are believed to be stored at DRDO facilities in Gwalior and Nashik. The DRDO serves as a training center for doctors, forensic scientists, and police personnel who will be the first responders in a chemical or biological attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0462" task="">
  <question>
    Where are India's stockpiles of chemical weapons located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Stockpiles of these weapons are believed to be stored at DRDO facilities in Gwalior and Nashik. The DRDO serves as a training center for doctors, forensic scientists, and police personnel who will be the first responders in a chemical or biological attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0463" task="">
  <question>
    Who maintains India's chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DRDO laboratories are suspected of developing and maintaining India's chemical weapons. Stockpiles of these weapons are believed to be stored at DRDO facilities in Gwalior and Nashik. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0464" task="">
  <question>
    Where are some of India's biological and chemical decontamination facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the Indian Press Information Bureau reported that the DRDO laboratories in Gwalior and Ahmednagar had developed nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination systems. On 21 June 2002, the Indian Press Information Bureau again reported that the DRDO laboratory in Gwalior had developed two first-aid kits to help treat nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare injuries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0465" task="">
  <question>
    Has India developed chemical weapons protective suits? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO has developed suits that include a facelet, a haversack, gloves, overboots, respirators, leak tester, integrated hoodmask, and canister neelkantha 'A' to protect personnel from a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. In addition, DRDO has developed chemical detection systems such as a residual vapor detection kit, a three-color detector paper, a water poison detection kit, a portable gas chromatograph, and a nerve agent detector. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0466" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the main headquarters of the DRDO located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Other Names: DRDO Address: DRDO consists of many different labs located throughout India. Its main headquarters is located in New Delhi.Website: http://www.drdo.com Phone: 98 11 3011519 Subordinate to: Ministry of Defense Size: DRDO currently consists of between 47-50 labs and employs between 5,000-16,000 scientists and around 20,000-25,000 other scientific, technical, and supporting personnel.Primary Function: Develops defense technologies for the armed services 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2832.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0467" task="">
  <question>
    What is the DRDE? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Defense Research and Development Establishment Other names: DRDE Address: Tansen Road Gwalior 474 002 Website: http://www.drdo.org/labs/dls/drde/index.shtml Subordinate to: Ministry of Defense; Department of Defense; Defense Research &amp; Development Organization (DRDO) Size: Unknown Primary Function: Works on defensive aspects of chemical and biological weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0468" task="">
  <question>
    When was the DRDE founded? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDE has its roots in a research laboratory established by the Maharaja of Gwalior in 1924 to explore forest products and mineral resources in Gwalior. The laboratory came into existence and was inaugurated in 1947 by Lord Mountbatten. The laboratory was then named the Jiwaji Industrial Research Laboratory. It was taken over by the Ministry of Defense in 1962 and by 1973, it was a full-fledged member with its own separate charter of duties. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0469" task="">
  <question>
    What is the primary mission of the DRDE? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Primary Function: Works on defensive aspects of chemical and biological weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0470" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between the DRDE and India's chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Primary Function: Works on defensive aspects of chemical and biological weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0471" task="">
  <question>
    What does the DRDE research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The institute is currently working on the synthesis, process, and product development of bioactive compounds, trace level analysis of chemical and pollutants, control of insect vectors, investigations on viral and bacterial organisms leading to diagnostic procedures and kits for the control of diseases, toxicological evaluation of hazardous material and antidotes, application of bio-technology in human waste disposal and disease control, development of equipments and devices against chemical and biological agents, and organizing and conducting training courses at national and international levels. It is also developing experimental studies of hazardous chemicals and developing antidotes, developing rapid diagnostics tests for pathogenic organisms and remedial/preventive measures, safety evaluation of chemicals and materials developed for the Armed Services, and developing methods for the detection of chemical agents and designing and fabricating protective devices. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0472" task="">
  <question>
    What has the DRDE developed in the past? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The institute has developed detection devises such as water poison detection kits, residual vapor detection kits, three-color detection paper, and a portable gas chromatograph. In October 2001, the company Troikaa Pharmaceuticals Ltd. supplied the institute with emergency kits to help it treat victims of a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack.  The institute has developed protection equipment such as &quot;canisters (with aluminum bodies), filter absorbers for static shelters, MBT/BMP 2/T-72 tanks, naval ships from around the world, and submarines, first aid kit type A and CW type B, and reusable autoinjectors with drug cartridges containing atropine sulfate and 2-PAM chloride.&quot; The institute has developed decontamination procedures and equipment such as personal decontamination kits and portable decontamination apparatuses. It has also worked on &quot;decontamination formulations, synthesis structural elucidation and toxicological evaluation of toxic chemicals. In addition, it has established an analytical procedure for trace level detection of compounds of defense interest and those sent by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for inter-laboratory comparison tests. Antidotes for chemical warfare agents such as cyanide, nerve agents, sulfur mustard, and toxic metals have been developed.&quot; In November 2001, the institute offered four training courses in anti-germ warfare to officers of the State Governments of India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0473" task="">
  <question>
    What is the relationship between the OPCW and the DRDE? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is also the regional training center for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and has trained over 250 chemical weapons inspectors. It has also conducted instructor training courses for the OPCW and is also training its personnel to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0474" task="">
  <question>
    What facilities are contained within the DRDE? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Sophisticated Analytical Instruments Laboratory: Conducts trace level identification and quantification of various organic chemicals using instruments such as a gas chromatograph, a mass spectrometer, a temperature programmed high resolution gas chromatograph, a high performance liquid chromatograph, and a Fourier transform GC infra-red spectrometer. * Quality Assurance Facility: Evaluates surface characterization, breakthrough time, does environmental testing, particulates filtration efficiency, and does vibration testing. * Gas Generation Facility: Uses static and dynamic methods to generate air agent mixtures. * Inhalation Toxicity Facility: Conducts inhalation studies on aerosols, particulates, dusts, and smokes, as well as studies using static and dynamically operated whole body or nose/head only assembly for acute and subacute toxicity. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0475" task="">
  <question>
    Why has the DRDE been suspected of conducting biological weapon (BW) research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Many Western observers have alleged that the institute actually carries out research and development of biological weapons. Officials deny these allegations. It is also believed to be one of the storage sites for India's chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0476" task="">
  <question>
    Where does India conduct BW research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Many Western observers have alleged that the institute actually carries out research and development of biological weapons. Officials deny these allegations. It is also believed to be one of the storage sites for India's chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0477" task="">
  <question>
    Is India researching biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Many Western observers have alleged that the institute actually carries out research and development of biological weapons. Officials deny these allegations. It is also believed to be one of the storage sites for India's chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2834.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0478" task="">
  <question>
    When did India first call for the end of the use of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following a visit by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, the USSR and India issue a joint declaration in which they both call for measures to &quot;prohibit and eliminate&quot; chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0479" task="">
  <question>
    When did work begin on the Prithvi missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 - Work begins on the Prithvi missile. The Prithvi missile is India's first indigenously produced ballistic missile. The SS-150 version is capable of carrying a chemical warhead. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0480" task="">
  <question>
    Which version of the Prithvi missile is capable of carrying a chemical warhead? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The SS-150 version is capable of carrying a chemical warhead. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0481" task="">
  <question>
    When did India first reach final deployment of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980s - India reaches final development and deployment of several chemical agents after Pakistan reportedly has acquired chemical agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0482" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Defense Agricultural Research Laboratory (DARL) previously known as? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1984 - The Agricultural Research Unit is re-designated as the Defense Agricultural Research Laboratory (DARL). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0483" task="">
  <question>
    What was the 1985 Dehli Declaration? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev reaffirmed the 1985 Delhi Declaration, which called for a international ban on nuclear weapons, by also calling for a ban on chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0484" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Pakistan first use chemical weapons against India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 - India accuses Pakistan of using chemical weapons against its troops in Siachen. The weapon is apparently used in the constant border skirmishes between India and Pakistan for control of the Siachen Glacier region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0485" task="">
  <question>
    When did India first deny that it possessed chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1988 - At the U.N. Disarmament Conference, India claims that it does not possess chemical weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0486" task="">
  <question>
    Has India denied having CW or BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1988 - At the U.N. Disarmament Conference, India claims that it does not possess chemical weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm.bak">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm.bak </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0487" task="">
  <question>
    When was the first successful test of the Prithvi SS-150? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1988 - First successful test flight of the Prithvi SS-150 missile, capable of delivering chemical warheads 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0488" task="">
  <question>
    When was the first successful test launch of the Agni missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1989 - The Agni missile has its first successful test-launch. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0489" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors has India shipped to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The West German export company, Rheineisen Chemical Products, admits that it arranged a shipment of 257 tons of thionyl chloride from India to Iran. [Note: Thionyl chloride is a potential precursor for nerve agent or possibly mustard.] 30 June 1989 - Indian officials state that the state-owned trading company, Transpeck Private Ltd., sold Iran 60 tons of thionyl chloride in March. Officials also admit that the company is to send another 257 tons of the same chemical, but the deal was cancelled due to US pressue. 1 July 1989 - The Seacrest Pioneer, a ship carrying thionyl chloride from India to Iran is stopped in Hamriya, Dubai before it can finish its shipment. The containers of the ship were unloaded, and the ship reloaded cargo and sailed back to India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0490" task="">
  <question>
    Has India shipped chemical weapons precursors to other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The West German export company, Rheineisen Chemical Products, admits that it arranged a shipment of 257 tons of thionyl chloride from India to Iran. [Note: Thionyl chloride is a potential precursor for nerve agent or possibly mustard.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm.bak">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm.bak </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0491" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries has India sold chemical weapons precusors to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US officials claim that Indian chemical companies during the previous two years have sold hundreds of tons of chemicals used to make chemical weapons to Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0492" task="">
  <question>
    Are India and Pakistan prepared to use chemical weapons on each other if a conflict should arise? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 March 1991 - According to a statement by Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, India and Pakistan have postured their forces for the possible use of chemical weapons should a conflict erupt. The statement also contends that India most likely has a chemical weapons stockpile because of its large chemical industry infrastructure. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0493" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the Defense Agricultural Research Laboratory located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1991 - The Defense Agricultural Research Laboratory is moved from Leh to Haldwani. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0494" task="">
  <question>
    When did India and the PRC call for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    16 December 1991 - Following a visit by Li Peng, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, India and China issue a joint communique that includes a statement calling for the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0495" task="">
  <question>
    How did India help Iran during the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    20 March 1988 - Iran's Consul General in Hyderabad states that hundreds of Iranian civilians or border towns have been killed and wounded in recent days by Iraqi CW. He requests help from Indian doctors in treating the CW victims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0496" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons assistance did India give to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    20 March 1988 - Iran's Consul General in Hyderabad states that hundreds of Iranian civilians or border towns have been killed and wounded in recent days by Iraqi CW. He requests help from Indian doctors in treating the CW victims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0497" task="">
  <question>
    Who was suspected of helping the Iraqi Army use chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran's Ambassador to India claims in a news conference at the Iranian Embassy that the United States is assisting Iraq in its use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces. Similar news conferences occur in Iranian Embassies in Japan and Belgium. The Iranian Ambassador to India claims that US troops are fighting alongside their Iraqi allies on the Fao Peninsula. He states, &quot;the conspirators have descended now to open and direct military intervention, and worse of all to the use of chemical weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0498" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Iran purchase thionyl chloride from India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran purchases 60 tons of thionyl chloride, a mustard gas or nerve agent precursor from India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0499" task="">
  <question>
    What is thionyl chloride used for? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    thionyl chloride, a mustard gas or nerve agent precursor from India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0500" task="">
  <question>
    How much thionyl chloride did Iran purchase from India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 July 1989 - Officials from the State Trading Corporation in Bombay, India, admit that in March, they sold about 60 tons of thionyl chloride to Iran for approximately $50,000. There are also rumors floating around that State Trading Company's supplier?Transpek Private Ltd.?plans to sell Iran about 257 tons more of the chemical in the coming months. Thionyl chloride is a dual-use precursor that can be used in pesticide production as well as developing chemical weapons capability (e.g., nerve agents). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0501" task="">
  <question>
    Who pressured India not to sell 257 tons of thionyl chloride to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 July 1989 - Washington pressures a German firm and an Indian firm to pull out of a deal to sell 257 tons of thionyl chloride to Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0502" task="">
  <question>
    What Indian-built chemical weapons facility was destroyed by an earthquake in Iran in 2002? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A powerful earthquake strikes northwest Iran today in the Qazvin province. The province is reportedly home to an Indian-built CW facility producing the nerve agent precursor phosphorous pentasulfide. Unnamed US officials claim the plant is a major CW facility. One report indicates that &quot;the Iranian CW infrastructure was built as a plant for the production of pesticides in the late 1980s. Iran's main CW production facility is located at Damghan with other plants located in Isfahan and Parchin.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0503" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors has India sent to Syria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1992 - A 45-ton shipment of trimethyl phosphite to Syria from the Indian chemical company United Phosphorus Ltd., of Bombay, is blocked in Cyprus. Raju Scroff, the owner of the company, states that the chemical was to be used to make pesticides. He states that he had an engineer verify that the Syrian company purchasing the chemical was in fact a pesticide plant, and says that he had received a certificate from the Syrian Chamber of Commerce vouching that the chemicals were for civilian use. 15 August 1992 - A United Phosphorous executive states it will continue sending Syria trimethyl phosphite despite warnings that Syria is using the chemical to make weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0504" task="">
  <question>
    Who did India send chemical weapons precursors to in 1992? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1992 - A 45-ton shipment of trimethyl phosphite to Syria from the Indian chemical company United Phosphorus Ltd., of Bombay, is blocked in Cyprus. Raju Scroff, the owner of the company, states that the chemical was to be used to make pesticides. He states that he had an engineer verify that the Syrian company purchasing the chemical was in fact a pesticide plant, and says that he had received a certificate from the Syrian Chamber of Commerce vouching that the chemicals were for civilian use. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0505" task="">
  <question>
    What was the India-Pakistan Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan issue the Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The declaration states that each side is not to use, develop, produce, or acquire chemical weapons. Each side is also not to assist, induce, or induce anyone else to engage in these activities. Each side is to also work together in finalizing, adopting, and becoming state parties to the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention. Lastly each side reserves the right to develop their chemical industry and related applications and products for peaceful purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0506" task="">
  <question>
    What is Setma, Ltd? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US officials believe that Setma Ltd. is a front company for a nerve gas production firm owned by the Syrian government. India officials state that they have received a certificate from that Syrian Chamber of Commerce stating that the chemicals are to be used for civilian purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0507" task="">
  <question>
    How has India concealed its chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US officials believe that Setma Ltd. is a front company for a nerve gas production firm owned by the Syrian government. India officials state that they have received a certificate from that Syrian Chamber of Commerce stating that the chemicals are to be used for civilian purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0508" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the Indian government suspend the export license of United Phosphorous in 1992? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US officials state that in August 1992, they prevented a shipment by the Indian company United Phosphorous Ltd. of 45 tons trimethyl phosphite from reaching the Syrian Setma Ltd. chemical plant. US officials believe that Setma Ltd. is a front company for a nerve gas production firm owned by the Syrian government. India officials state that they have received a certificate from that Syrian Chamber of Commerce stating that the chemicals are to be used for civilian purposes. 21 September 1992 -The Indian Foreign Ministry states that India will investigate and possibly prosecute United Phosphorous for possible violating export laws. 22 September 1992 - An External Affairs Ministry spokesman states that the Indian Government is going to take action against United Phosphorous. The spokesman said that the company did not get permission from the government to sell trimethyl phosphite to Syria  24 September 1992 - The Indian government, responding to US protest, states that its export-import office is initiating legal action against the company United Phosphorous Ltd because its sale of 45 tons of trimethyl phosphate to Syria. The company also has its export license suspended for 6 months. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0509" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors did United Phosphorous ship to Syria in 1992? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US officials state that in August 1992, they prevented a shipment by the Indian company United Phosphorous Ltd. of 45 tons trimethyl phosphite from reaching the Syrian Setma Ltd. chemical plant. US officials believe that Setma Ltd. is a front company for a nerve gas production firm owned by the Syrian government. India officials state that they have received a certificate from that Syrian Chamber of Commerce stating that the chemicals are to be used for civilian purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0510" task="">
  <question>
    How many chemicals does India restrict the export of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An Indian government spokesman states that 19 chemicals that have both civilian and military use can now only be exported with a license from the federal government. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0511" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Eduardo Falerio? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Eduardo Faleiro states that India believes that the agreement was a model for future arms control agreements. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0512" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that India has a &quot;secret&quot; chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1993 A study by the US Office of Technology Assessment lists India as a country likely to have a secret chemical weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0513" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have a secret chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1993 A study by the US Office of Technology Assessment lists India as a country likely to have a secret chemical weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0514" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons equipment has India sent to Libya? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1993 - An Indian company completes work on poison-gas scrubbing equipment and sends it to Libya. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0515" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's policy towards chemical weapons inspections? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao speaking at the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers characterizes the Chemical Weapons Convention as a great step in the direction of disarmament, nondiscriminatory in its approach, and says that it was the most important of any disarmament process in verification. He states that India was not making chemical weapons and has nothing to hide. In addition, he says that India will train its commercial industry to protect its commercial secrets while participating in the inspection process. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0516" task="">
  <question>
    Does India allow OPCW inspections? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    characterizes the Chemical Weapons Convention as a great step in the direction of disarmament, nondiscriminatory in its approach, and says that it was the most important of any disarmament process in verification. He states that India was not making chemical weapons and has nothing to hide. In addition, he says that India will train its commercial industry to protect its commercial secrets while participating in the inspection process. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0517" task="">
  <question>
    When did the Prithvi SS-150 enter active service? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1994 - The Prithvi SS-150 enters service. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0518" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that India has sold chemical weapons to Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    17 April 1994 - Four container loads that were originally labeled for shipment from India to an Egyptian post are detained in Colombo, Sri Lanka on the suspicion that they are destined for Israel to make nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0519" task="">
  <question>
    Did India sell chemical weapons to Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    17 April 1994 - Four container loads that were originally labeled for shipment from India to an Egyptian post are detained in Colombo, Sri Lanka on the suspicion that they are destined for Israel to make nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0520" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Narasimha Rao? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    3 May 1994 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao hails the Chemical Weapons Convention as a major step towards disarmament, which is universal and nondiscriminatory. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0521" task="">
  <question>
    What is a dual-purpose chemical? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A spokesman states, &quot;This chemical is used in civilian chemical industries to make insecticide and lubricant oil additives. It is also not included as a dual-purpose chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention. There are some chemicals which have restrictions on them for military as well as civilian uses. This is not one of them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0522" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's official position regarding the exportation of dual-purpose chemicals to non-CWC countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian government announces that a shipment of phosphorus pentasulfide will be allowed to leave Colombo, Sri Lanka and proceed to Egypt. A spokesman states, &quot;This chemical is used in civilian chemical industries to make insecticide and lubricant oil additives. It is also not included as a dual-purpose chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention. There are some chemicals which have restrictions on them for military as well as civilian uses. This is not one of them. We took up the matter with the Sri Lankan authorities and the matter has now been satisfactory resolved....We are strictly committed to nonproliferation of chemical weapons and both Sri Lanka and India are original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. We hope that with the coming effect of the CWC, the states who are parties to this will be able to do away with arbitrary and ad hoc trade restrictions on chemicals used for legitimate civilian purposes.&quot; [Note: While India is a party to the CWC, Egypt is not.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0523" task="">
  <question>
    Does India export dual-purpose chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian government announces that a shipment of phosphorus pentasulfide will be allowed to leave Colombo, Sri Lanka and proceed to Egypt. A spokesman states, &quot;This chemical is used in civilian chemical industries to make insecticide and lubricant oil additives. It is also not included as a dual-purpose chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention. There are some chemicals which have restrictions on them for military as well as civilian uses. This is not one of them. We took up the matter with the Sri Lankan authorities and the matter has now been satisfactory resolved....We are strictly committed to nonproliferation of chemical weapons and both Sri Lanka and India are original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. We hope that with the coming effect of the CWC, the states who are parties to this will be able to do away with arbitrary and ad hoc trade restrictions on chemicals 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0524" task="">
  <question>
    Has India used chemical weapons since signing the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1994 - According to Kaleem Siddique, described leader of Hizbul Mujahedeen, a terrorist groub based out of Kashmir, India uses chemical weapons against Kashmiri militants, after it failed to evict them from an area near Srinigar. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0525" task="">
  <question>
    Has India been suspected of using chemical weapons against Kashmiri miltiants? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1994 - According to Kaleem Siddique, described leader of Hizbul Mujahedeen, a terrorist groub based out of Kashmir, India uses chemical weapons against Kashmiri militants, after it failed to evict them from an area near Srinigar. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0526" task="">
  <question>
    Has India been linked to chemical weapons production in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    17 November 1994 - German intelligence papers are quoted as saying that an Indian consortium was building a pesticide plant that could be linked to the production of chemical weapons in Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0527" task="">
  <question>
    What role has India played in the training of OPCW inspectors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    24 November 1994 - India publishes the details of the Module One training course it is offering for training OPCW inspectors and inspection assistants. The course is scheduled to take place from 23 January to 5 March 1995 in Gwalior at the CBW Defense Research and Development Establishment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0528" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons have Indian companies been suspected of assisting Iran to produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The German Intelligence Agency, the BND, states that Indian companies are aiding Iran in its development of tabun and sarin. Indian companies state that they have obtained export licenses and told trade authorities. They also say that they were only involved in building a pesticide plant. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0529" task="">
  <question>
    Has India denied supplying Iran with chemical weapons equipment? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    31 January 1995 - India denies reports that it is supplying Iran with equipment and materials to develop chemical weapons. A statement made by the Joint Secretary, External Publicity, of the Government of India states that the pesticide plants were put out to an international tender and companies from around the world competed for the tender. During this time no concerns were ever expressed by the international community. Also the statement continues by saying that India does not have chemical weapons and because of this, there is no way Indian companies have the technology, equipment, or expertise to aid Iran. Also India is an original signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention and because of this has adopted a strict export licensing mechanism to control and monitor the exports of dual use chemicals. [Note: It must be noted that Iran was also a signatory of the CWC at the time these claims were being made.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0530" task="">
  <question>
    What percentage of India's chemical weapons stockpiles were destroyed in 1999? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1999 - India destroys 1 percent of its chemical weapons stocks as part of its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0531" task="">
  <question>
    Has India destroyed any of its chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1999 - India destroys 1 percent of its chemical weapons stocks as part of its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0532" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons has India been accused of using in Kashmir? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 May 1999 - Unidentified Pakistani sources state that India uses a &quot;nerve gas bomb&quot; against Kashmiri Mujahideen on the Pakistani side of Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0533" task="">
  <question>
    How many OPCW inspections were conducted in India in 1999? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1999 -A total of 15 OPCW inspections are carried out in India. Four are at a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility, six at a Chemical Weapons Production Facility, two at a Chemical Weapons Storage Facility, one inspection is done of Schedule 1 chemicals, and two inspections are conducted for Schedule 3 chemicals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0534" task="">
  <question>
    What research has the DRDO conducted into the destruction of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1999 - The Defense Research and Development Establishment, Gwalior, submits two patents for filing. One is for an improved process for chemical destruction of sulfuric acid. The second is for a process for the preparation of s-alkyl-aryl sulfide di-hydrochlorides. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0535" task="">
  <question>
    Has India declared its chemical weapons production facilities to the OPCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    23 November 1999 - The OPCW Secretariat issues a corrigendum to its 1998 report, declaring India as a party that had declared its Chemical Weapons Production Facilities under Article V of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0536" task="">
  <question>
    Did India meet its OPCW obligations (for the destruction of chemical weapons) in 2000? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2000 - The OPCW Annual Report states that India had met its year 2000 obligation in the destruction of chemical weapons. Also the report states that 23 inspections were done in India during 2000, with 16 at Chemical Weapon Development Facilities, 5 at Chemical Weapon Production Facilities, 3 at Chemical Weapon Storage Facilities, one of a Schedule 1 facility, and two at Schedule 3 facilities. In addition, the report says that India plans to destroy its Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 stockpile of weapons by 29 April 2002. With this India declares it has four Schedule 2 sites, but only one is available for inspection, while it declares 24 Schedule 3 sites, with 19 that can be inspected. India also declares that it has 20 Discrete Organic Plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0537" task="">
  <question>
    How many OPCW inspections were conducted in India in 2000? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Also the report states that 23 inspections were done in India during 2000, with 16 at Chemical Weapon Development Facilities, 5 at Chemical Weapon Production Facilities, 3 at Chemical Weapon Storage Facilities, one of a Schedule 1 facility, and two at Schedule 3 facilities. In addition, the report says that India plans to destroy its Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 stockpile of weapons by 29 April 2002. With this India declares it has four Schedule 2 sites, but only one is available for inspection, while it declares 24 Schedule 3 sites, with 19 that can be inspected. India also declares that it has 20 Discrete Organic Plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0538" task="">
  <question>
    Is India considered a &quot;chemical weapons possessor state&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A report on chemical weapon threats to China claims that before India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, it made a crash production of chemical weapons so that it could have the status of &quot;chemical weapons possessor state.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0539" task="">
  <question>
    What did India do before signing the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A report on chemical weapon threats to China claims that before India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, it made a crash production of chemical weapons so that it could have the status of &quot;chemical weapons possessor state.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0540" task="">
  <question>
    What military preparations is India suspected of making prior to signing the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2000 A report on chemical weapon threats to China claims that before India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, it made a crash production of chemical weapons so that it could have the status of &quot;chemical weapons possessor state.&quot; Chinese chemical weapon defense writers noted that India possesses five chemical weapons production and storage facilities with 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents. The report goes on to state that most of the agents are mustard and that thousands are ready for delivery. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0541" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors did India send to Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Pakistani English-language newspaper The News, reports that Pakistani defense officials are becoming increasing concerned about India's continued research in the field of chemical weapons. According to the unidentified officials India had supplied Iraq with phosgene before the Gulf War to test its effectiveness. They also accuse India of using chemical weapons during the Kargil crisis in 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0542" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have the capability to produce gas masks and protective suits domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian Defense Ministry places orders for thousands of nuclear, biological, and chemical suits from the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB). The ministry also asks the OFB to speed up its production of sophisticated gas masks. The suits are to be manufactured at ordnance factories at Kanpur and Avadi located in Tamil Nadu. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0543" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons research did India give to Vietnam? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As part of a military agreement between India and Vietnam, India agrees to give Vietnam all of its research on countering chemical weapons effects. India agrees to release the data because Vietnam continues to claim reproductive abnormalities caused by Agent Orange in third generation children. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0544" task="">
  <question>
    What restrictions did the Indian Parliament want to place on OPCW inspections in 2000? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    6 May 2000 - The Statesman reports that India is reviewing its Chemical Weapons Implementation legislation. India is now reportedly drafting a bill to deny or restrict OPCW inspections where it felt that is national security interests were at stake. Also India is thinking of implementing a law that would prohibit samples taken from sites in India from leaving the country. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0545" task="">
  <question>
    Has India allowed all OPCW inspections? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    6 May 2000 - The Statesman reports that India is reviewing its Chemical Weapons Implementation legislation. India is now reportedly drafting a bill to deny or restrict OPCW inspections where it felt that is national security interests were at stake. Also India is thinking of implementing a law that would prohibit samples taken from sites in India from leaving the country. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0546" task="">
  <question>
    What is Hizbul Mujahideen? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In May 1999, the pro-Pakistan militant group Hizbul Mujahideen claimed to be in possession of chemical weapons. The group said that its militants fighting in the regions of Kargil and Drass have the weapons and would use them if Indian troops attacked them with any napalm-like devices. [A] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0547" task="">
  <question>
    Has there been any verification of claims that India used chemical weapons in Kashmir? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In May 1999, the pro-Pakistan militant group Hizbul Mujahideen claimed to be in possession of chemical weapons. The group said that its militants fighting in the regions of Kargil and Drass have the weapons and would use them if Indian troops attacked them with any napalm-like devices. [A] The Hizbul Mujadeen threat was, apparently, a reaction to Pakistan?s accusations that India used chemical weapons against Pakistan. In response to the allegations, the Indian army stated that Pakistan has no need to fear a chemical attack because India does not use chemical weapons. [B] Additional Information No verification of Hizbul Mujahideen?s claim to having chemical weapons has been reported. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0548" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated the Hizbul Mujahideen to claim that they had chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In May 1999, the pro-Pakistan militant group Hizbul Mujahideen claimed to be in possession of chemical weapons. The group said that its militants fighting in the regions of Kargil and Drass have the weapons and would use them if Indian troops attacked them with any napalm-like devices. [A] The Hizbul Mujadeen threat was, apparently, a reaction to Pakistan?s accusations that India used chemical weapons against Pakistan. In response to the allegations, the Indian army stated that Pakistan has no need to fear a chemical attack because India does not use chemical weapons. [B] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0549" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Ghulam Rasool? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In mid-June 1999, Ghulam Rasool, a member of the state legislative assembly in Kashmir, said that if India was using &quot;poisonous material against a handful of militants, one cannot rule out the use of nuclear weapons by India.&quot; Pakistan said India is using chemical shells in the shelling across the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kargil sector of Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1999/n9919370.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1999/n9919370.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0550" task="">
  <question>
    Did India build pesticide plants in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1996 Iran and India conclude a contract for construction of a pesticide plant outside Tehran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0551" task="">
  <question>
    What was the goal of the Iran-sponsored Regional Seminar on the National Implementation of the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22-25 April 1996 - Iran holds its first Regional Seminar on the National Implementation of the CWC in Tehran in order to familiarize governments with their rights and obligations under the treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0552" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries attended the Iran-sponsored Regional Seminar on the National Implementation of the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The 15 countries represented at the seminar are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Along with the various workshops presented, the participants are also invited to a &quot;trial inspection&quot; to see how the procedure was conducted under CWC regulations. The mock inspection is conducted at the Shahid Razkani chemical factory in Tehran. Senior officials from two NGOs?SIPRI and the Harvard-Sussex Program?also attended the seminar. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0553" task="">
  <question>
    What dual-use chemicals were going to be produced at the Indian-built chemical plant in Qazvin, Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A report appears that Iran has concluded a &quot;secret multi-million pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas.&quot; Under the agreement, India will reportedly build a sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used to produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used in CW production. [Note: At some point, the deal collapsed and was never fulfilled]. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0554" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors does India produce in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A report appears that Iran has concluded a &quot;secret multi-million pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas.&quot; Under the agreement, India will reportedly build a sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used to produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used in CW production. [Note: At some point, the deal collapsed and was never fulfilled]. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0555" task="">
  <question>
    What countries have helped Iran build its chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is suspected of having developed such a capability with aid from individuals and companies in the West, as well as India and China. Iran's extensive CW program is allegedly masked using its sophisticated pharmaceutical and agro-industrial companies as plausible cover. It is further claimed that these companies serve as a front for importing important chemical precursors and related equipment, which are then diverted to the Iranian CW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0556" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors did India sell to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Also in 1989, the State Trading Corporation of India admitted that it had sold Iran over 60 tons of thionyl chloride (a nerve agent precursor) and that its supplier was planning to ship an additional 257 tons of the chemical to Iran. In 1997, under a reported multi-million dollar deal, India agreed to construct a &quot;sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvim, on the outskirts of Tehran.India also agreed to sell Iran phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical used in the production of pesticides as well as the nerve agent VX. The deal eventually fell apart and a similar deal was eventually concluded with China in 1998. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0557" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Iran is using Indian companies as fronts to acquire chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Report by German intelligence on Iranian efforts to acquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three Indian companies as fronts. &quot;With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory.&quot; The Indian companies named in the classified report include Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. The Iranian companies involved in the building of the poison-gas complex are Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and Shahid Hemat Industrial group. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0558" task="">
  <question>
    What nerve agent precursors has Iran bought from India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * In early 1989, Iran purchased 60 tons of thionyl chloride, a nerve agent precursor, from India.[36] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0559" task="">
  <question>
    What are the names of the Indian companies suspected of supplying chemical weapons equipment to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Report by German intelligence on Iranian efforts to acquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three Indian companies as fronts. &quot;With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory.&quot; The Indian companies named in the classified report include Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index_2332.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index_2332.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0560" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Dr. Majid Tehrani Abbaspur? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran's Chief Security Adviser, Dr. Majid Tehrani Abbaspur, is actively participating in Iran's nuclear weapons program and has been granted &quot;a special budget of millions of dollars to buy the necessary technology.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1996/n9615261.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1996/n9615261.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0561" task="">
  <question>
    How has the Indian Army prepared to handle casualties of NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In a speech before India's parliament, Defense Minister George Fernandes says the Indian Army &quot;has devised a three-tier system of training medical officers and paramedical staff to handle casualties of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Army officers would form the first tier, junior commissioned officers the second and battle field nursing assistants the third.&quot; He says that India has &quot;to do much more keeping in view the impending danger of nuclear and biological weapons.&quot; He says India is prepared to meet any eventuality, including the use of chemical and biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2894.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2894.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0562" task="">
  <question>
    Who is George Fernandes? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In a speech before India's parliament, Defense Minister George Fernandes says the Indian Army &quot;has devised a three-tier system of training medical officers and paramedical staff to handle casualties of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2894.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/2296_2894.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0563" task="">
  <question>
    What international and regional organization is India a member of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INTERNATIONAL &amp; REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons2 (OPCW) South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0564" task="">
  <question>
    Is India a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INTERNATIONAL &amp; REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons2 (OPCW) South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0565" task="">
  <question>
    Is India a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS Nuclear: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IAEA Safeguards Agreement IAEA Additional Protocol Nuclear Safety Convention Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0566" task="">
  <question>
    Has India formally declared its intent not to use chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chemical&amp; Biological: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)4 Geneva Protocol WMD delivery systems: International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0567" task="">
  <question>
    Under what conditions would India abandon the Chemical Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Submitted information on BWC CBMs for 1997, did not submit information from 1998-2002. A number of States, including India, declared upon their accession to the Protocol that it would cease to be binding on them if their enemies, or the allies of their enemies, failed to respect the prohibitions of the Protocol. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0568" task="">
  <question>
    What treaties and agreements has India entered into? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS Nuclear: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IAEA Safeguards Agreement IAEA Additional Protocol Nuclear Safety Convention Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement Chemical&amp; Biological: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)4 Geneva Protocol WMD delivery systems: International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES Zangger Committee Nuclear Suppliers Group Australia Group Missile Technology Control Regime Wassenaar Agreement TERRORISM CONVENTIONS Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection Against the Taking of Hostages Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/india.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0569" task="">
  <question>
    Where is India's Defense Institute of Physiology and Allied Sciences located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Defense Institute of Physiology &amp; Allied Sciences is relocated to a building on Lucknow Road in Delhi. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0570" task="">
  <question>
    Who combined with India to block the establishment of a verification system for the BWC in 1995? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    13 July 1995 - Iran, Pakistan, India, and China obstruct the establishment of a verification system for the BWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0571" task="">
  <question>
    Where is India's Defense Agricultural Research Laboratory located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Defense Agricultural Research Laboratory moves it headquarters to Pithoragarh. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0572" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries has the United States identified as representing a chemical or biological weapons threat to the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US Defense Secretary William Cohen states that over 25 countries have or may be developing chemical and biological weapons and ways to deliver them. Cohen did not list all 25 nations, but states that the programs of North Korea, China, Pakistan, Russia, and India all represented a threat to the United States. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0573" task="">
  <question>
    Does the United States believe that India poses a chemical or biological weapons threat to the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US Defense Secretary William Cohen states that over 25 countries have or may be developing chemical and biological weapons and ways to deliver them. Cohen did not list all 25 nations, but states that the programs of North Korea, China, Pakistan, Russia, and India all represented a threat to the United States. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0574" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries has Libya purchase biological weapons equipment from? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Western intelligence sources, Libya has purchased equipment and laboratory instruments from India, China, and Serbia that allows it to develop its biological weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0575" task="">
  <question>
    Are India's DRDO laboratories open to industrial use? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 1998 The Defense Ministry agrees to open eight Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) laboratories to industrial use. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0576" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1999 - Former Biopreparat first deputy chief Ken Alibek asserts in his book Biohazard that during a trip to India, he saw indications of a possible biological weapons program. Alibek states that increased security at certain Indian facilities convinces him that India is developing these weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0577" task="">
  <question>
    Who is suspected of helping India produce a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    6 July 1999 - According to unidentified Pakistani sources, India has started preparations to develop biological weapons. According to these sources, it is receiving help from Israel, along with unidentified German and Bulgarian companies. The sources also state that India will use these weapons to avert the use of nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2630.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0578" task="">
  <question>
    What joint efforts have the US and India made towards controlling the spread of WMD technologies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US and Indian government officials are scheduled to meet in early April 1999 to examine joint export control policies on controlling the spread of technologies and materials related to the production of weapons of mass destruction. The meetings will be headed by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh.  Both sides are also scheduled to discuss the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, proposals for a worldwide ban on fissile material production, and a nuclear restraint regime for South Asia. Indian officials claim that India's nonproliferation and export control policies have been &quot;impeccable.&quot; The United States would like India to adopt a more extensive export control list of chemicals negotiated under the Chemical Weapons Conventions. Indian officials said that unless the United States is willing to substantially cut back the facilities under sanction as part of the &quot;entities list,&quot; Indo-US export control talks are unlikely to be successful. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1999/n9918991.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1999/n9918991.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0579" task="">
  <question>
    How does India view its policies regarding the export of chemical weapons precursors and chemical weapons technologies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Both sides are also scheduled to discuss the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, proposals for a worldwide ban on fissile material production, and a nuclear restraint regime for South Asia. Indian officials claim that India's nonproliferation and export control policies have been &quot;impeccable.&quot; The United States would like India to adopt a more extensive export control list of chemicals negotiated under the Chemical Weapons Conventions. Indian officials said that unless the United States is willing to substantially cut back the facilities under sanction as part of the &quot;entities list,&quot; Indo-US export control talks are unlikely to be successful. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1999/n9918991.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1999/n9918991.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0580" task="">
  <question>
    What infrastructure does India have for the production of biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 2001 The US Department of Defense reports that India has many qualified scientists, numerous biological and pharmaceutical production facilities, and biocontainment facilities suitable for research and development of dangerous pathogens. The report also states that at least some of these facilities are being used to support research and development for biological warfare (BW) defense work 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0581" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have an official policy regarding the use of NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    18-19 January 2001 - In an inaugural address to a two-day seminar on nuclear, biological, and chemical defense in Lonavala, Indian Vice-Admiral Harinder Singh calls for &quot;urgent steps to meet the asymmetric threats in the form of chemical and biological weapons emerging from the low-intensity proxy wars.&quot; Another speaker, Indian Vice-Admiral A.S. Krishnan, states that chemical and biological weapons appear to be gaining a slow but steady foothold as potential devices for use against military and civilian groups. In addition, Krishnan states that a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense doctrine has been drafted, and the creation of a joint services institute for NBC warfare has been proposed at the College of Military Engineering in Pune. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0582" task="">
  <question>
    Where is India's College of Military Engineering located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, Krishnan states that a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) defense doctrine has been drafted, and the creation of a joint services institute for NBC warfare has been proposed at the College of Military Engineering in Pune. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0583" task="">
  <question>
    What does India consider a bigger threat:  nuclear weapons or chemical / biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 April 2001 In meetings between External Affairs and Defense Minister Jaswant Singh and visiting US officials, India states that it believes that chemical and biological weapons present a greater danger than nuclear weapons. India believes that these weapons are more dangerous because of the ease with which they can be procured by international terrorist groups. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0584" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Jaswant Singh? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 April 2001 In meetings between External Affairs and Defense Minister Jaswant Singh and visiting US officials, India states that it believes that chemical and biological weapons present a greater danger than nuclear weapons. India believes that these weapons are more dangerous because of the ease with which they can be procured by international terrorist groups. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0585" task="">
  <question>
    What was &quot;Operation Complete Victory&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    5-10 May 2001 - India conducts &quot;Operation Complete Victory&quot; in the Pokharen desert. The exercise involves military maneuvers and for the first time incorporates chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons into the exercises. The exercise also tests new equipment such as protective gear, decontamination routines, and electronic warfare systems for battle in a contaminated area. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0586" task="">
  <question>
    Has India conducted military maneuvers using NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    5-10 May 2001 - India conducts &quot;Operation Complete Victory&quot; in the Pokharen desert. The exercise involves military maneuvers and for the first time incorporates chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons into the exercises. The exercise also tests new equipment such as protective gear, decontamination routines, and electronic warfare systems for battle in a contaminated area. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0587" task="">
  <question>
    Where was &quot;Operation Complete Victory&quot; held? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 May 2001 - India concludes &quot;Operation Complete Victory&quot; in the Pokharen desert. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0588" task="">
  <question>
    How many joint research projects does India have with Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 2001 - At the Indo-Russian Joint Council for ILTP in Moscow, India and Russia both identify 146 new joint research and development projects. These projects will cover such fields as biotechnology, immunology, biomedical sciences, and chemical sciences 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0589" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have the capabilities to detect or prevent acts of bioterrorism? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dr. K.K. Datta, Director of the National Institute of Communicable Diseases, states that the Institute does not have the structure in place to prevent and detect incidents of bioterrorism. Datta adds that the Institute is trying to develop such a capability. 25 September 2001 - Union health minister C.P. Thakur states that while India's national laboratories are able to detect any lethal virus that may be deliberately unleashed, India does not have a smallpox vaccine stock available. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0590" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's National Disaster Management Agency? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    October 2001 - A National Disaster Management Agency is set up in the Home Ministry to deal with all types of disasters, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0591" task="">
  <question>
    Have there been suspected biological weapons &quot;attacks&quot; in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    October 2001 - A 12-year-old girl and her cousin in Tulasipur fall unconscious after sniffing white powder in an envelope. The envelope is addressed to one of the girl's father, Madan Sahu, and was sent by his nephew undergoing military training in Ahmednagar, India. The substance is sent for testing, with results not being reported.October 2001 -  VP Saxena, Vice-Chancellor of Jiwaji University in Gwalior receives a letter containing a suspicious powder. Tests at the DRDO reveal that it is chalk powder. October 2001 - The Madras Atomic Power Station in Kalpakam receives a letter containing white powder. Tests on the substance reveal that it does not contain Bacillus anthracis spores. October 2001 - In Vijayawada, seven goldsmiths receive &quot;covers&quot; (envelopes) containing a white powder. Authorities state that &quot;Anthrax-Chavuku Sidamkandi&quot; (&quot;be prepared for death from anthrax&quot;) is scrawled in Tengu on the cover. The substance is sent for testing, which reveals that it does not contain B. anthracis spores. October 2001 - The police chief at a university in Gwalior, India, receives a letter containing suspicious powder. Tests at DRDO reveal that it is chalk powder. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0592" task="">
  <question>
    Has India's government warned its citizens about the possibility of chemical or biological attacks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    15 October 2001 The Indian government cautions people to be on high alert for the possibility of chemical or biological attacks. Officials state that the DRDO and the Defense Ministry are preparing &quot;rapid response teams&quot; to respond to the threat. It is the first time that India's top scientists have outlined the terrorist threat involving these weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0593" task="">
  <question>
    What facility is the center for Anthrax tests in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    19 October 2001 - Dr. S.C. Pasha, the head of biology at the National Institute of Communicable Diseases, states that the Institute is the center for anthrax tests 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0594" task="">
  <question>
    What has India done to prepare for a biological weapons attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    29 October 2001 - At a workshop of Indian scientists and state health officials addressing the issue of bioterrorism, Union Health Minister C.P. Thakur states that India is preparing for a biological attack. Thakur states that the health ministry has prepared India by gearing up public health machinery, stockpiling antibiotics, and organizing continuing education of doctors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0595" task="">
  <question>
    How are India's efforts towards disarmament viewed by the rest of the world? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Given its unhesitating acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which aims to achieve the total elimination of chemical weapons, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of its desire for complete nuclear disarmament.35 However, India has little to offer in between, for its own security or that of others, and little vision of what might lie in between and how it might manage the in-between. In particular, it has so far failed to develop a set of policies that blends collective security with the traditional threat of the use of force. One reason is that the nuclear nonproliferation regime, together with India's non-alignment, have placed obstacles in the way of adopting such an approach. Compared to France--which is involved in NATO and enjoys legitimized access to nuclear technology (due to its test of a nuclear device before January 1, 1967)--India has not been able to enjoy such benefits. As such, its task of finding a middle course is much more difficult. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/walker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/walker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0596" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's position towards the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Given its unhesitating acceptance of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which aims to achieve the total elimination of chemical weapons, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of its desire for complete nuclear disarmament 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/walker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/walker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0597" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Jose Marucio Bustani? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Jose Marucio Bustani, the first Director General of the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), hopes that the recent ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by Russia, India, Iran, and particularly Jordan?an Arab state?may cause Egypt to reconsider its position against signing the CWC, which it continues to link to Israel's non-signing of the NPT. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3449.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3449.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0598" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons is India known or suspected to have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Phosgene (CG)       Choking gas   Unknown   Suspected   Mustard (HD)   Blister agent   Unknown   Unknown   Sarin (GB)   Nerve agent   Unknown   Suspecte 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0599" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons does India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Phosgene (CG)       Choking gas   Unknown   Suspected   Mustard (HD)   Blister agent   Unknown   Unknown   Sarin (GB)   Nerve agent   Unknown   Suspecte 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0600" task="">
  <question>
    What British chemical weapons stockpiles is India known or suspected to have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Phosgene (CG)   Choking gas   Unknown   Unknown   Mustard (HD)   Blister agent   Unknown   Unknown   Riot Control Agent   Unknown   Unknown   Suspected 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0601" task="">
  <question>
    What CW did India inherit from the British? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Phosgene (CG)   Choking gas   Unknown   Unknown   Mustard (HD)   Blister agent   Unknown   Unknown   Riot Control Agent   Unknown   Unknown   Suspected 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2318_2319.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0602" task="">
  <question>
    What is known about India's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although much is known about the Indian nuclear program, little information can be cited in open literature that deals with the country's chemical weapons capability. It is widely acknowledged that India has an extensive civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, and Taiwan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0603" task="">
  <question>
    How many different chemical products does India currently produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The chemical industry is one of the oldest domestic industries in India, contributing significantly to both the industrial and economic growth of the country since it achieved independence in 1947. The chemical industry currently produces nearly 70,000 commercial products, ranging from cosmetics and toiletries, to plastics and pesticides. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0604" task="">
  <question>
    How large is India's pesticide industry? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian pesticide industry has advanced significantly in recent years, producing more than 1,000 tons of pesticides annually. India is the 13th largest exporter of pesticides and disinfectants in the world, and in terms of volume, is the 12th largest producer of chemicals. The Indian agrochemical, petrochemical, and pharmaceutical industries are some of the fastest growing sectors in the economy. With an estimated worth of $28 billion, it accounts for 12.5 percent of the country's total industrial production and 16.2 percent of the total exports from the Indian manufacturing sector. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0605" task="">
  <question>
    How does India's advanced chemical industry assist in its capabilities for producing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's capability to produce chemical weapons is greatly enhanced by the sophistication of its domestic chemical industry. A number of government-owned and private sector companies produce an array of dual-use chemicals that are potential chemical weapons precursors and intermediates. A number of the domestically produced chemicals can be found on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) lists of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals, as well as on the Australia Group's chemical export control list (India is not a member of the Australia Group). For example, Indian companies are capable of producing, or currently produce, 2-chloroethanol and thiodiglycol (both mustard precursors), phosgene, hydrogen cyanide (blood agent), and trimethyl phosphite and thionyl chloride (nerve agent precursors). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0606" task="">
  <question>
    Is India a member of the Australia Group? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A number of the domestically produced chemicals can be found on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) lists of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals, as well as on the Australia Group's chemical export control list (India is not a member of the Australia Group) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0607" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors is India's chemical industry capable of producing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, Indian companies are capable of producing, or currently produce, 2-chloroethanol and thiodiglycol (both mustard precursors), phosgene, hydrogen cyanide (blood agent), and trimethyl phosphite and thionyl chloride (nerve agent precursors) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0608" task="">
  <question>
    Has India weaponized chemical warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has a sophisticated technology base to develop various delivery systems for CW agents. Though it must be noted that all open source research indicates that India has not weaponized a chemical warhead, it does not lack the scientific expertise or resources, if so needed. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0609" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons is India suspected of having? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chinese defense researchers have claimed that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical warfare agents, which are located at five chemical weapons production and storage facilities. It is indicated that these agents include mainly mustard and there are several possible delivery munitions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0610" task="">
  <question>
    How quickly can India reconstitute a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India is reportedly in the process of destroying these weapons, in accordance with its obligations to the CWC. Nevertheless, the sophistication of India's domestic chemical industry would allow it to rapidly reconstitute a significant chemical weapons capability, if it chose to do so. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0611" task="">
  <question>
    What is United Phosphorous? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    United Phosphorus Ltd., for example, a Bombay-based company, produces a number of nerve agent precursor chemicals that are listed on Schedule 3 of the CWC, including phosphorus trichloride, phosphorus pentachloride, triethyl phosphite, and trimethyl phosphite. In 1992, United Phosphorus's export license was suspended for shipping trimethyl phosphite to Syria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0612" task="">
  <question>
    What countries is United Phosphorous suspected of having shipped chemical weapons precursors to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1992, United Phosphorus's export license was suspended for shipping trimethyl phosphite to Syria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0613" task="">
  <question>
    What is Transpek Industry Ltd? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Another Indian company, Transpek Industry Ltd., also produces a number of dual-use chemicals including thionyl chloride and sulfur dichloride. In 1990, Transpek Industry Ltd. won a bid to install and commission a turn-key chemical plant in Iran, worth an estimated $12.5 million, and in 1996 the company built the world's largest manufacturing facility for thionyl chloride outside of Europe. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0614" task="">
  <question>
    Are there Indian companies that possess the capabilities for producing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some Indian companies also produce a wide range of dual-use equipment and materials that can be used to produce chemical weapons, including glass-lined reactor vessels with a total volume greater than 100 liters, glass-lined storage tanks with a total volume greater than 100 liters, and other equipment and technologies associated with chemical weapons development. GMM Pfaudler Ltd., for example, of Karamsad, Gujarat, is one of the leading suppliers of glass-lined equipment and other specialized process equipment for the Indian chemical industry. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0615" task="">
  <question>
    What is the India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Signed in 1992, the Agreement provided for &quot;the complete prohibition of chemical weapons&quot;. It also included a commitment for not developing, possessing or using chemical weapons, as well as not assisting, encouraging or inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the agreement committed both governments to become regional signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, it did not commit India and Pakistan to ratify the CWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0616" task="">
  <question>
    Has India produced chemical weapons stockpiles since signing the India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India signed the CWC on 14 January 1993 and subsequently ratified it on 3 September 1996. Pakistan signed the CWC on 13 January 1993 and ratified the treaty on 28 October 1997. When India and Pakistan signed the Agreement, both countries declared that they did not possess chemical weapons' stockpiles. However, as part of its accession to the CWC, India declared a quantity of chemical munitions produced by its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that caused controversy with Pakistan in terms of India's commitment to and compliance with the bilateral agreement. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0617" task="">
  <question>
    What efforts has India made towards the global prohibition on the use of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mr. Chandrasekhar Das Gupta, head of the Indian delegation informed the US that his country desires a global and broad based decision on this declaration among all nuclear nations, rather than an agreement by India and Pakistan solely. Both sides were optimistic about the outcome of the talks, with US state department saying that the talks were not meant to reach an agreement, but an effort to, &quot;reduce the global spread of weapons of mass destruction.... India was pleased by US and Russian efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles, and extended a suggestion to ban chemical and biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9202655.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9202655.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0618" task="">
  <question>
    Is India a signatory of the MTCR? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Gupta also noted that India imposed MTCR restrictions on its export control programs, despite being a non-signatory to the regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9202655.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9202655.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0619" task="">
  <question>
    Does India impose export controls on its missile technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Gupta also noted that India imposed MTCR restrictions on its export control programs, despite being a non-signatory to the regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9202655.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9202655.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0620" task="">
  <question>
    Where has Iran obtained the bulk of its chemical weapons equipment? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran obtained the bulk of its chemical weapons equipment from China and India. Iran sought dual-use biotech equipment from Europe and Asia, ostensibly for civilian uses. Iran was actively seeking modern tanks, SAMs, and other arms from the CIS, China, and Europe. Aside from some large projects with China, Iranian nuclear-related purchases were not focused on any particular countries and were only indirectly related to nuclear weapons production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707191.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707191.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0621" task="">
  <question>
    Is there direct evidence that Iraq has been purchasing NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The CIA has not observed Iraq purchasing ACW- or WMD-related goods, although it has purchased numerous dual-use items. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707191.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707191.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0622" task="">
  <question>
    Does India conduct weapons research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India does conduct defensive BW research, brought to light in statements made by military spokespersons regarding various defensive exercises involving nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) warfare. Since September 11 and the anthrax attacks in the United States, there has been an increasing interest in NBC defense in India, and a number of NBC-related courses have been established in both the government and private sectors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2290.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2290.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0623" task="">
  <question>
    When was the BWC ratified? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on 15 July 1974, India has sought to improve its capabilities in biological technology, largely in a peaceful capacity. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0624" task="">
  <question>
    Where is India's biotechnology infrastructure situated? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's expansive biotechnology infrastructure is centered at the Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0625" task="">
  <question>
    What activities are going on at DRDE? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDE is the primary center for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. Work at the DRDE centers on countering disease threats such as anthrax, brucellosis, cholera, plague, smallpox, viral hemorrhage fever, and botulism. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0626" task="">
  <question>
    What are the known and suspected CW agents in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
     Phosgene (CG)   Choking gas    Unknown   Suspected Mustard (HD)    Blister agent   Unknown   Unknown Sarin (GB)    Nerve agent    Unknown   Suspected 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2318.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2318.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0627" task="">
  <question>
    What are the known or suspected British CW agents stocked in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
     Phosgene (CG)    Choking gas    Unknown   Unknown Mustard (HD)    Blister agent   Unknown   Unknown Riot Control Agent    Unknown    Unknown   Suspected 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2318.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2318.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0628" task="">
  <question>
    When did India ratify CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India publicly acknowledged that it had a chemical warfare program after ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0629" task="">
  <question>
    What facilities were declared under the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the CWC, India has declared three CW production facilities (CWPFs), two CW storage facilities (CWSFs), and two CW destruction facilities (CWDFs). India has also declared one Schedule 1 facility, four Schedule 2 facilities, 30 Schedule 3 facilities, and 19 discrete organic chemicals (DOC) facilities in its industry declaration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0630" task="">
  <question>
    What is the purpose of OPCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the implementation of the CWC, have conducted routine inspections at a number of Defence Research &amp; Development Organisation (DRDO) facilities involved in CW production, including sites in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh; at Ojhar, near Nashik, Maharashtra; and at Ozra (location unknown). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0631" task="">
  <question>
    What is the evidence that there are defense facilities in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has been more forthcoming about its chemical defense facilities. At least four government-owned facilities are involved in some type of chemical defense activity. Since September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks in the United States, there has been an increasing interest in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense in India, and a number of NBC-related courses have been established in both the government and private sectors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0632" task="">
  <question>
    Who controls India's CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Control over India's CW program officially starts with the Government of India, which is responsible for ensuring the country's defense. Although the Office of the President is nominally in command of the armed forces, the executive responsibility for national defense and for the CW program rests with the Union Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister. The next level down is the Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister). Within the Ministry of Defence, the CW program is overseen by the Department of Defence Research &amp; Development (DDR&amp;D), which is headed by a Secretary, who is also the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0633" task="">
  <question>
    What is the main function of DDR&amp;D? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The main function of the DDR&amp;D is the formulation of research, design, and development plans for equipment used by the three military services. Reporting to the DDR&amp;D is the Defence Research &amp; Development Organization (DRDO), which administers the government laboratories working in the CW area. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0634" task="">
  <question>
    Where are India's CW facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The government-owned facilities involved in CW research, manufacturing, testing, and other related activities are located in various states throughout India. Two key DRDO facilities involved in CW defense research include the Defence Research &amp; Development Establishment (DRDE), in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, and the Defence Materials &amp; Stores Research &amp; Development Establishment (DMSRDE), in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. A number of other DRDO facilities, including the Research &amp; Development Establishment (Engineering) (R&amp;DE), in Pune, Maharashtra, and the Vehicles Research &amp; Development Establishment (VRDE), in Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, also participate in chemical defense research. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0635" task="">
  <question>
    What is the main function of DRDO? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DRDO laboratories interact with a number of academic institutions across India, including the Indian Institutes of Technology, and work closely with the private sector for the manufacture of DRDO laboratory-produced technologies. The DRDO laboratory in Gwalior is also a regional training center for the OPCW. Chemical defense-related activities also occur outside the DRDO within the three military services: The Indian government has set up NBC warfare directorates in the Army, located in Pune, Maharashtra; the Navy, at INS Shivaji, in Lonavla, Maharashtra; and the Air Force, in Chandigarh. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0636" task="">
  <question>
    When did India begin work on the Agni missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979 India begins work on the Agni missile. The missile is India's first intermediate-range ballistic missile and is capable of carrying chemical warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0637" task="">
  <question>
    Where does the main defesive chemical research take place? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India does have a defensive chemical warfare program, overseen by the Ministry of Defense. The main research institute overseeing India's military and civilian involvement with chemicals and dual use materials are the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, respectively. There are various facilities and laboratories across the country involved in research that could be applicable to a covert chemical warfare program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0638" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of chemical agents do India possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's capability to produce chemical weapons is greatly enhanced by the sophistication of its domestic chemical industry. A number of government-owned and private sector companies produce an array of dual-use chemicals that are potential chemical weapons precursors and intermediates. A number of the domestically produced chemicals can be found on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) lists of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals, as well as on the Australia Group's chemical export control list (India is not a member of the Australia Group). For example, Indian companies are capable of producing, or currently produce, 2-chloroethanol and thiodiglycol (both mustard precursors), phosgene, hydrogen cyanide (blood agent), and trimethyl phosphite and thionyl chloride (nerve agent precursors). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0639" task="">
  <question>
    What companies produce chenical agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    United Phosphorus Ltd., for example, a Bombay-based company, produces a number of nerve agent precursor chemicals that are listed on Schedule 3 of the CWC, including phosphorus trichloride, phosphorus pentachloride, triethyl phosphite, and trimethyl phosphite. In 1992, United Phosphorus's export license was suspended for shipping trimethyl phosphite to Syria. Another Indian company, Transpek Industry Ltd., also produces a number of dual-use chemicals including thionyl chloride and sulfur dichloride. In 1990, Transpek Industry Ltd. won a bid to install and commission a turn-key chemical plant in Iran, worth an estimated $12.5 million, and in 1996 the company built the world's largest manufacturing facility for thionyl chloride outside of Europe. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0640" task="">
  <question>
    How many warfare agents does India possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chinese defense researchers have claimed that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical warfare agents, which are located at five chemical weapons production and storage facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0641" task="">
  <question>
    When did India sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India signed the CWC in 1993 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0642" task="">
  <question>
    With which country did India sign an accord for the development of Brahmos? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Russia sign an accord in 1999 to co-develop the Brahmos. The missile is currently undergoing flight trials. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0643" task="">
  <question>
    How much did India pay for the 3M-54E Klub cruise missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India reportedly buys 3M-54E Klub cruise missiles for $30 million. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0644" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have cruise missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India reportedly buys 3M-54E Klub cruise missiles for $30 million. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0645" task="">
  <question>
    How much did India pay for UAVs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India acquires an unspecified number of UAVs for approximately $300 million. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0646" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have UAVs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India acquires an unspecified number of UAVs for approximately $300 million. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0647" task="">
  <question>
    Did India violate the MTCR? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January 1991, Glavkosmos agrees to supply ISRO with two cryogenic engines and the technology to make additional stages for Rs 235 crore. By 1992 the United States imposes sanctions against both entities saying the deal violates the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Although Glavkosmos suspends the contract in 1993, ISRO claims that substantial cryogenic technology has already been transferred. A revised Glavkosmos-ISRO deal in the mid-1990s includes two cryogenic engines minus the technology transfer (two flight-worthy stages, two ground models, and an option for three more cryogenic engines are also added to the contract). In addition, Glavkosmos modifies the payment amount to $128 million. By September 1998, the first cryogenic stage arrives in India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0648" task="">
  <question>
    What is Project Devil? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India decides to procure Pechora missiles after canceling Project Devil, a program to reverse-engineer the SA-2 surface-to-air missile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/1756.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0649" task="">
  <question>
    How does India view its weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India views its nuclear weapons and long-range power projection programs as the key to maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region, deterring Pakistan, safeguarding against potential nuclear threats from China, and attaining great-power status. Among all the developing states with aspirations for weapons of mass destruction and long-range power projection capabilities, India alone has achieved a unique degree of success. Outside the group of the five legally accepted nuclear weapon states and Israel, India perhaps harbors the most sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile programs in the world. India's strategic missile programs have matured to the extent that New Delhi can now deploy short- and medium-range nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in an operational mode against Pakistan and China. Four decades of investments in a missile-related design, development, and manufacturing infrastructure have also made this sector less vulnerable to long-term disruption by technology denial regimes. More significantly, India's sophisticated civilian satellite launch capability makes it one of the few developing states theoretically capable of building an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) within this decade. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0650" task="">
  <question>
    What are the various phases of India's missile programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's missile programs can be roughly divided into four phases. During the first phase (1958-1970), India's missile ambitions were confined to building a first-generation anti-tank missile (ATGM) and developing a three-ton thrust, liquid-fueled rocket engine most likely based on the Soviet SA-2 sustainer motor. Both projects were undertaken by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) with the objective of gaining scientific expertise and creating a technological infrastructure to build modern missiles indigenously in the long term; there were no plans for the immediate serial production of missile systems. However, the DRDO's technical and organizational shortcomings, opposition from the armed services, and weak support from politicians and civilian bureaucrats in the federal government resulted in the failure and ultimate termination of both projects. Phase II of India's missile program spans the decade of the 1970s. During this period, the DRDO undertook two significant projects. The first, Project Devil, was an attempt to &quot;reverse-engineer&quot; the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM). The second, Project Valiant, was an ambitious attempt to develop a 1,500km-range ballistic missile. Both projects emanated from an alliance of interests between scientists in the DRDO, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and some of her influential bureaucratic advisors. Design competence and political symbolism were the primary objectives of both projects. For these reasons and because of the peculiarities of India's civil-military relations, the armed services were kept at the margins of the decisionmaking process. However, India lacked the scientific, engineering, and industrial base to build a long-range ballistic missile. Due to faltering progress, the Indian government terminated the Valiant program in 1974. On the other hand, Project Devil proved to be a partial success. Although Indian engineers were unable to reverse-engineer the SA-2 missile system entirely, they apparently succeeded in developing two solid-fueled boosters and a three-ton, liquid-sustainer engine for the Devil missile. The Indian government revived the flailing missile program in 1980 and in 1983 launched the Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMDP) to develop a family of strategic and tactical guided missiles. The IGMDP involved the development of two strategic ballistic missile systems: two variants of a short-range ballistic missile (Prithvi), and a medium-range technology demonstrator (Agni). Under the program, the DRDO also sought to develop medium- and short-range SAMs (Akash and Trishul), and a third-generation ATGM (Nag). The years 1980-1994, the third phase in India's missile program, marked a crucial turning point. During this period, India's forays into missile building were transformed from exercises in technology-gathering, reverse-engineering, and design competence into a full-fledged program to build a series of operational missile systems. By 1996-1997, the successful development of the Prithvi-1 (150km-range) provided India with the technical option to deploy a limited nuclear strike capability against Pakistan. Similarly, two successful flight-tests of the 1,400km-range Agni missile validated India's &quot;re-entry vehicle&quot; technology. The Agni program thus served as a building block for the design and development of longer-range ballistic missile systems&amp;#8212;systems that would provide India with a nuclear strike capability against China in the future. The fourth phase of India's strategic missile program stretches from the mid-1990s to the present. This phase has been characterized by the partial success of IGMDP, and limited serial production of the Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles. As a result of the armed services commitment to actually purchase indigenous missile systems, the DRDO has been able to shift its focus from technology demonstration to modifying missile systems to meet the field requirements of the user in terms of deployment and operability. Capitalizing on its successes with the Prithvi and Agni, the DRDO embarked on programs to develop shorter- and longer-range versions of the Agni (Agni-1 and Agni-III), a supersonic cruise missile (BrahMos) with Russian collaboration, and a naval variant of the Prithvi (Dhanush). The DRDO is also believed to be developing a sea-launched ballistic missile, the Sagarika, which is expected to become operational by 2010. In addition, India has sought Russian and Israeli collaboration in the development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0651" task="">
  <question>
    When did India launch the Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMDP)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian government revived the flailing missile program in 1980 and in 1983 launched the Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMDP) to develop a family of strategic and tactical guided missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0652" task="">
  <question>
    What was India's Integrated Guided Missile Program (IGMDP)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The IGMDP involved the development of two strategic ballistic missile systems: two variants of a short-range ballistic missile (Prithvi), and a medium-range technology demonstrator (Agni). Under the program, the DRDO also sought to develop medium- and short-range SAMs (Akash and Trishul), and a third-generation ATGM (Nag). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0653" task="">
  <question>
    What is a Prithvi missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Prithvi is a Pakistan-specific missile system and has been configured for nuclear delivery. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0654" task="">
  <question>
    Why was the Agni missile developed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Agni missiles have been designed and developed for delivering nuclear munitions. Despite earlier suggestions of the Agni's potential conventional role, this is now unlikely for reasons of cost-effectiveness and accuracy. The Agni-I will most probably replace the Prithvi for nuclear-targeting missions against Pakistan. Although the longer-range variants of the Agni will inherently be capable of targeting Pakistan as well, they are primarily being developed as a nuclear strike capability against China. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0655" task="">
  <question>
    Why was Sagarika program developed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Sagarika program is believed to be driven by India's long-term goals to achieve a secure sea-based, second-strike nuclear capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0656" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Sagarika program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Sagarika program is believed to be driven by India's long-term goals to achieve a secure sea-based, second-strike nuclear capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0657" task="">
  <question>
    What is BrahMos? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India is also developing a 280-300km-range/200-300kg-payload, supersonic cruise missile in joint partnership with the Russian entity, NPO Mashinostroyeniye.The joint development work on the missile was started in 1998, while the joint company establishing the program was registered in 1995. Derived from the Russian anti-ship missile called the Yakhont, the BrahMos is a dual-mode cruise missile, with its primary mode as an anti-ship missile, with a backup capability to attack shore-based, radio-contrast targets. The missile features a two-stage propulsion system employing a solid propellant booster with a liquid ramjet engine. Russia is believed to be primarily responsible for the propulsion system, while India has primary responsibility for the on-board guidance system. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0658" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of ballistic missiles do India possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At present, the Prithvi-1 and Prithvi-2 are the only ballistic missiles in service with the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. The Prithvi missiles are inherently nuclear-capable, and an undisclosed number of Prithvi-1 missiles have been modified to deliver nuclear warheads. However, the Prithvi suffers from several limitations such as its short-range, liquid-fueled engine, which add to the logistics burden, and fuel toxicity, which increases the difficulty of handling the weapon system in the field. Hence the Prithvi missiles will most likely be replaced by the Agni ballistic missiles for nuclear missions. The missiles already in the inventory of the Army and Air Force are likely to be reassigned to perform conventional battlefield support functions. The DRDO has also developed a 350km-range naval-variant of the Prithvi: the Dhanush. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0659" task="">
  <question>
    What is the difference between the Prithvi-1 and Prithvi-2? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At present, the Prithvi-1 and Prithvi-2 are the only ballistic missiles in service with the Indian Army and Air Force respectively. The Prithvi missiles are inherently nuclear-capable, and an undisclosed number of Prithvi-1 missiles have been modified to deliver nuclear warheads. However, the Prithvi suffers from several limitations such as its short-range, liquid-fueled engine, which add to the logistics burden, and fuel toxicity, which increases the difficulty of handling the weapon system in the field. Hence the Prithvi missiles will most likely be replaced by the Agni ballistic missiles for nuclear missions. The missiles already in the inventory of the Army and Air Force are likely to be reassigned to perform conventional battlefield support functions. The DRDO has also developed a 350km-range naval-variant of the Prithvi: the Dhanush. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0660" task="">
  <question>
    Who monitors India's nuclear force? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's consolidated nuclear force is administered by a tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0661" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the level of the civilian executive, India's Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) is responsible for the management of its nuclear forces and for making all decisions pertaining to the use of nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0662" task="">
  <question>
    What does the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) comprise of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NCA is a two-layered structure. It comprises a Political Council (PC) and an Executive Council (EC). The PC is chaired by the prime minister and is the &quot;sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.&quot; The decisions of the PC are conveyed to the EC, headed by the prime minister's National Security Advisor, who then interfaces with the SFC to execute the political directives of the PC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0663" task="">
  <question>
    Why didn't India join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Despite its emergence as a potential &quot;second-tier&quot; supplier state, India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). New Delhi rejects participation in the MTCR on grounds that India is a victim of such technology-denial regimes, that such regimes are insensitive to India's national security needs, and they interfere with the peaceful uses of space technology. In the past, senior Indian defense officials such as Sivathanu Pillai and Dr. Abdul Kalam have expressed the view that Indian missile programs, both strategic and tactical, are not only aimed at providing the Indian military with weapon systems, but also to generate exports. In 1994, the Indian defense ministry's Department of Defense Production and Supplies included the Prithvi in its catalogue of defense items available for export. Although no Prithvi exports have occurred to date, Indian and Russian officials have publicly expressed their intent to export the BrahMos/PJ-10 cruise missile to friendly &quot;third countries&quot; with mutual consent. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0664" task="">
  <question>
    What is the status of India's missile program at present? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As a result, at the end of three decades, India's guided missile program has now assumed a self-sustaining character. Unlike the 1970s, the missile program is now guided by a clear strategic vision and buttressed by a diverse coalition with strong organizational stakes in politically and strategically determined technological outcomes. In retrospect, the guided missile program has not only become central to India's proposed &quot;minimal deterrent,&quot; but more significantly, it has emerged as the symbol of an independent, self-reliant, and strategically autonomous Indian state. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0665" task="">
  <question>
    What claims were made against India's Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and DRDO? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Sunday Times (London) reports that the British entity GEC-Marconi &quot;secretly exported nuclear and missile technology&quot; to India. The firm's exporting branch supposedly tried to register equipment bound for the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as medical research materials. India denies these claims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0666" task="">
  <question>
    Which company is suspected of selling nuclear missile technology to India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Sunday Times (London) reports that the British entity GEC-Marconi &quot;secretly exported nuclear and missile technology&quot; to India. The firm's exporting branch supposedly tried to register equipment bound for the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) as medical research materials. India denies these claims. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0667" task="">
  <question>
    Who is assisting India in developing submarines? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian submarine entity Rubin is reportedly assisting the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in developing a 90MW pressurized water reactor (PWR), and a double hull for India's nuclear-powered submarine (Advanced Technology Vessel [ATV]). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Nuclear/2860.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0668" task="">
  <question>
    What impact could the development of Indian NBC have on the region? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan in springsummer 1999 highlighted the continued instability of the South Asian region and brought into sharp focus the long-term implications of the May 1998 nuclear tests conducted by both 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0669" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Kargil crisis? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistani forces occupied Indian territory along the northern line of control near Kargil in early 1999, prompting a fierce conflict with India beginning in May. Pakistani forces withdrew in late July under heavy Indian pressure, with U.S. diplomatic assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0670" task="">
  <question>
    What is the source of the conflict between India and Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India -- Pakistan: Dispute Over Kashmir Kashmir has been disputed since the partition of British India in 1947, when both newly independent countries fought to control the province. Currently, both countries control portions of the Muslim-majority state, although India retains the coveted heartland. Wars in 1965 and 1971 resulted in some modifications to the line of control, but hundreds of thousands of troops remain deployed along the line. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0671" task="">
  <question>
    Has India signed or ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0672" task="">
  <question>
    Has India signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Ratified the CWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0673" task="">
  <question>
    Has India signed or ratified the BWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has ratified the BWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0674" task="">
  <question>
    Is India able to produce CW indigenously? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Has sizeable chemical industry, which could be source of dual-use chemicals for countries of proliferation concern. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0675" task="">
  <question>
    What infrastructure does India have for producing BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has many well-qualified scientists, numerous biological and pharmaceutical production facilities, and biocontainment facilities suitable for research and development of dangerous pathogens. At least some of these facilities are being used to support research and development for biological warfare defense work. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0676" task="">
  <question>
    When did India first admit to having a CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In June 1997, it acknowledged that it had a dedicated chemical warfare production program. This was the first time India had publicly admitted that it had a chemical warfare effort. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0677" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have a CW stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While India has made a commitment to destroy its chemical weapons, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0678" task="">
  <question>
    How might India's civilian companies assist a future CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While India has made a commitment to destroy its chemical weapons, its extensive and welldeveloped chemical industry will continue to be capable of producing a wide variety of chemical agent precursors should the government change its policy. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0679" task="">
  <question>
    What capabilities does India have for delivering NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has ship-launched and airborne short-range antiship cruise missiles and a variety of short-range airlaunched tactical missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0680" task="">
  <question>
    How could India use its NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has ship-launched and airborne short-range antiship cruise missiles and a variety of short-range airlaunched tactical missiles, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0681" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have contributed to India's deployment capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nevertheless, India's ballistic missile programs have benefited from the acquisition of foreign equipment and technology, which India has continued to seek, primarily from Russia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0682" task="">
  <question>
    Which neighboring countries are threatened by India's weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This missile will allow India to strike all of Pakistan as well as many key areas of China. Development also is underway for an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), which would allow India to target Beijing. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0683" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have a BW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Ultimately, while there is a strong biological infrastructure in place that could mask a covert offensive BW program, no open source data indicates that this is the case. India does conduct defensive BW research 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2290.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2290.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0684" task="">
  <question>
    What facilities in India may be used for BW research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is a multitude of facilities across India undertaking research on a variety of biotechnology-related issues. Having a strong agricultural base, India has a number of laboratories and facilities that conduct research on various pesticides and diseases affecting agricultural crops. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2290.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2290.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0685" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents might India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Few details are publicly available concerning Indian chemical weapon stockpiles, although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0686" task="">
  <question>
    Where might India have CW agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Few details are publicly available concerning Indian chemical weapon stockpiles, although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0687" task="">
  <question>
    How many CW agents might India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Few details are publicly available concerning Indian chemical weapon stockpiles, although Chinese researchers suggest that India possesses 1,000 tons of chemical weapon agents, mostly mustard agent, located at five chemical weapon production and storage facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0688" task="">
  <question>
    What CW facilities has India declared? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the CWC, India has declared three CW production facilities (CWPFs), two CW storage facilities (CWSFs), and two CW destruction facilities (CWDFs). India has also declared one Schedule 1 facility, four Schedule 2 facilities, 30 Schedule 3 facilities, and 19 discrete organic chemicals (DOC) facilities in its industry declaration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0689" task="">
  <question>
    Where are India's declared CW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has declared three CW production facilities (CWPFs), two CW storage facilities (CWSFs), and two CW destruction facilities (CWDFs). India has also declared one Schedule 1 facility, four Schedule 2 facilities, 30 Schedule 3 facilities, and 19 discrete organic chemicals (DOC) facilities in its industry declaration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0690" task="">
  <question>
    What CW facilities in India have been inspected? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which oversees the implementation of the CWC, have conducted routine inspections at a number of Defence Research &amp; Development Organisation (DRDO) facilities involved in CW production, including sites in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh; at Ojhar, near Nashik, Maharashtra; and at Ozra (location unknown). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0691" task="">
  <question>
    What Indian government facilities are involved in CW research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two key DRDO facilities involved in CW defense research include the Defence Research &amp; Development Establishment (DRDE), in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, and the Defence Materials &amp; Stores Research &amp; Development Establishment (DMSRDE), in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. A number of other DRDO facilities, including the Research &amp; Development Establishment (Engineering) (R&amp;DE), in Pune, Maharashtra, and the Vehicles Research &amp; Development Establishment (VRDE), in Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, also participate in chemical defense research. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0692" task="">
  <question>
    Where are India's CW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The government-owned facilities involved in CW research, manufacturing, testing, and other related activities are located in various states throughout India. Two key DRDO facilities involved in CW defense research include the Defence Research &amp; Development Establishment (DRDE), in Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, and the Defence Materials &amp; Stores Research &amp; Development Establishment (DMSRDE), in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh. A number of other DRDO facilities, including the Research &amp; Development Establishment (Engineering) (R&amp;DE), in Pune, Maharashtra, and the Vehicles Research &amp; Development Establishment (VRDE), in Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, also participate in chemical defense research. The DRDO laboratories interact with a number of academic institutions across India, including the Indian Institutes of Technology, and work closely with the private sector for the manufacture of DRDO laboratory-produced technologies. The DRDO laboratory in Gwalior is also a regional training center for the OPCW. Chemical defense-related activities also occur outside the DRDO within the three military services: The Indian government has set up NBC warfare directorates in the Army, located in Pune, Maharashtra; the Navy, at INS Shivaji, in Lonavla, Maharashtra; and the Air Force, in Chandigarh. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0693" task="">
  <question>
    What is the DRDO? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is established as an amalgamation of the Technical Development Establishment (TDE) of the Indian Army, the Directorate of Technical Development, and the Defense Science Organization. DRDO is set up to provide the Armed Services with new technology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0694" task="">
  <question>
    When did India sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    14 January 1993 India signs the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0695" task="">
  <question>
    Is India's army prepared to use CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1998 The Indian military conducts a ten-day long war game exercise in the Thar desert of western Rajasthan, close to the border of Pakistan. Code-named &quot;Exercise Shiv Shakti,&quot; nearly 60,000 troops participated in the exercise, which included &quot;testing Indian planning on conducting and surviving nuclear and chemical war using modern technology and new tactics.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0696" task="">
  <question>
    Is India reducing its CW stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1999 India destroys 1 percent of its chemical weapons stocks as part of its obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0697" task="">
  <question>
    Is India destroying its CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    4 December 2001In a statement to the Executive Council of the OPCW, the General Secretary states that India has destroyed 29 percent of its Category 1 CW agents and over 39 percent of one declared Category 2 CW agent.  -- Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Executive Council at its twenty-seventh session, 4 December 2001. 30 December 2001India completes destruction of its declared Category 3 chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2699.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2699.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0698" task="">
  <question>
    What CBW delivery systems does India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Both have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear and chemical weapons. * Both are developing missiles. ** India: Has two missile programs: - Prithvi - short range (150-250 km) - Agni - intended range (2,000 km) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0699" task="">
  <question>
    What missiles does India have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Name/ Alt-ernate Prithvi-1/ SS-150 Prithvi-2/ SS-250 Dhanush/ Prithvi-3/ SS-350 Agni-Tech-nology Demon-strator (TD) Agni-I Agni-II Agni-III BrahMos/ PJ-10 Sagarika 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0700" task="">
  <question>
    What CW precursor chemicals can India produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, Indian companies are capable of producing, or currently produce, 2-chloroethanol and thiodiglycol (both mustard precursors), phosgene, hydrogen cyanide (blood agent), and trimethyl phosphite and thionyl chloride (nerve agent precursors).  United Phosphorus Ltd., for example, a Bombay-based company, produces a number of nerve agent precursor chemicals that are listed on Schedule 3 of the CWC, including phosphorus trichloride, phosphorus pentachloride, triethyl phosphite, and trimethyl phosphite. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0701" task="">
  <question>
    Has India used CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Unidentified Pakistani sources state that India uses a &quot;nerve gas bomb&quot; against Kashmiri Mujahideen on the Pakistani side of Kashmir.  -- Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin: News, Background, and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues, Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation, September 1999, Issue Number 45, p. 23. 26 May 1999  Indian denies reports that it is using chemical weapons in Kashmir. The US State Department also states that it has no evidence that India is using these weapons in Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0702" task="">
  <question>
    Why is India supposedly using CW in Kashmir? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 June 1999 Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Chief of Markaz al Dawat al Irshad, accuses India of preparing to use chemical weapons against the Kashmiri Mujahideen. According to Saeed, India is preparing to use these weapons because it is disheartened after having been defeated by the Pakistani army and the Mujahideen. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0703" task="">
  <question>
    How is India supposedly using CW in Kashmir? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 June 1999 According to Pakistan Television, India uses chemical weapons against Pakistani position along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. According to reports shell are launched that exploded 400 meters above ground, releasing a gas that causes suffocation and skin irritation. India describes these reports as &quot;baseless&quot; and as part of &quot;Pakistani propaganda.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0704" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that India used CW in Kashmir? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    8 September 1999 An editorial in the Pakistani newspaper Jang, accuses India of using chemical weapons in the Neelum valley in Kashmir. The article uses the death of two uninjured children at a border village as evidence of the attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0705" task="">
  <question>
    What BW agents does India research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Bio-Safety Level 2 (BSL-2) Laboratory was established at the Institute of Preventive Medicine to provide guidance in preparing the Indian government for a biological attack. B. anthracis is one of many pathogens studied at the Institute, which also examines pathogens causing tuberculosis, typhoid, hepatitis B, rabies, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Ebola, and plague. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0706" task="">
  <question>
    Where are BW agents studied in India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Bio-Safety Level 2 (BSL-2) Laboratory was established at the Institute of Preventive Medicine to provide guidance in preparing the Indian government for a biological attack. B. anthracis is one of many pathogens studied at the Institute, which also examines pathogens causing tuberculosis, typhoid, hepatitis B, rabies, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Ebola, and plague. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0707" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied Iran with NBC protective suits? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mana International Investments, a company registered in Poland and controlled by Israeli businessman Nachum Manbar, supplies Iran with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protective suits. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0708" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Iran received help from Russian scientists for its CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a New York Times report to Russian scientists and US officials, Iran has allegedly succeeded in recruiting at least five scientists from the former Soviet Union &quot;who once worked in laboratories tied to Moscow's vast germ warfare program.&quot; [Note: This claim is refuted by Russian scientists; see 24 January 1999 entry in biological chronology.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0709" task="">
  <question>
    How did Cuba help Iran in improving its CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (CIGB) in Cuba states that CIGB sold Iran the &quot;production technology for three of the CIGB's most significant accomplishments: a recombinant hepatitis B vaccine, IFN-aIIb, and streptokinase.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0710" task="">
  <question>
    What Chinese companies were sanctioned by the Bush government? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Several Chinese entities are sanctioned by the Bush administration for selling materials to Iran. The three firms penalized by the sanctions are Liyang Chemical Equipment, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, as well as Mr. Q.C. Chen. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0711" task="">
  <question>
    Why were the Chinese companies sanctioned by US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Several Chinese entities are sanctioned by the Bush administration for selling materials to Iran. The three firms penalized by the sanctions are Liyang Chemical Equipment, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, as well as Mr. Q.C. Chen. One of those firms produces glass-lined equipment; however, the reports did not mention if such equipment was transferred to Iran. The State Department statement goes on to say that &quot;Q.C. Chen is already subject to US sanctions. In May 1997, he was among seven Chinese entities sanctioned, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, for knowingly and materially assisting Iran's chemical weapons program through the transfer of chemical weapons precursor chemicals and/or chemical weapons-related production equipment and technology. These sanctions currently remain in place.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0712" task="">
  <question>
    Which companies were affected by  the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2002? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Federal Register announces today that two Armenian, two Moldovan, and eight Chinese entities have been sanctioned under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2002 for transferring equipment and/or technology controlled by multilateral export control regimes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0713" task="">
  <question>
    What activities were part of the Iranian CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has a sophisticated base for the development of a chemical weapons program dating back to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) -- a conflict that gave Iran strong incentives for developing a robust chemical defense capability. There are several unclassified allegations and reports that suggest Iran has developed an offensive CW program as well. Most of these claims cannot be verified in open sources. However, reports of transactions of various dual-use material is publicly known. Imports such as thiodyglycol and thionyl chloride can be applied towards legitimate purposes such as dyes, textiles, and pesticides or can be diverted towards an illicit CW program. Iran also imported several tons of phosphorus pentasulfide, which is on the Australia Group's watch list for controlled chemical precursors, but not on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule lists. The compound has several legitimate uses in the agricultural industry, specifically relating to pesticides, but is also a starting point for nerve agents such as VX. Based on such information, some idea of Iran's CW status can be ascertained. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2334.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2334.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0714" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents does Iran possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
     CW Agent   Type   Quantity  Weaponization CS Riot   Control Agent  Unknown  Unknown Mustard Gas   Blister Agent  Unknown  Unknown Hydrogen Cyanide, Cyanogen Chloride  Blood Agents  Unknown   Unknown Phosgene   Choking Agent  Unknown  Unknown Chlorine Gas   Choking Agent  Unknown  Unknown Sarin    Nerve Agent  Unknown Tabun    Nerve Agent  Unknown  Unknown V-Series Nerve Agents (VX, VG, VM, VE)  Nerve Agents  Unknown  Unknown 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2334.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2334.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0715" task="">
  <question>
    What CW activities took place on Abu Musa Island? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Abu Musa island is not a CW facility per se, there have been reports that during a period of tension between Iraq and Iran, Iran deployed CW munitions on the island. The New York Times reported in late March 1995 that, according to administration officials, Iran's military deployment on disputed islands in the Gulf included chemical weapons. Jane's Defense Weekly also reported in April 1995 that US Defense Secretary William Perry revealed that Iran had placed chemical weapons on disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. According to Pentagon officials, the weapons deployed on Abu Musa island were mostly 155mm artillery shells. The Journal of Commerce also reported that Secretary Perry said that Iran had deployed &quot;...6,000 troops, chemical weapons, and anti-ship missiles to unmanned islands in the Strait of Hormuz.&quot; Finally, according to a study by the National Defense University from April 1997, &quot;The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0716" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran occupy Abu Musa Island? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has claimed its authority over the island since 1971 and asserted a physical presence since 1992. In 1992, the dispute over Abu Musa became more acute when Iran unilaterally tried to control the entry of third country nationals into the UAE portion of Abu Musa island. Tehran subsequently backed off in the face of significant diplomatic support for the UAE in the region, but in 1994 it increased its military presence on the disputed islands. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0717" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Abu Musa Island located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    25052'30''N 55001'48''E. Located in the Strait of Hormuz in the mouth of the Persian Gulf, halfway between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0718" task="">
  <question>
    What are the various names for Engineering Research Center of the Construction Crusade? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Engineering Research Center of: the Construction Crusade, Jihad e-Sazandegi, Jahaad-e Saazandegi, Construction Jihad, Jahad-e Sazandegi, and Jahad. Also Jahad Engineering Research Center, Jahad Sazandegi Research Center. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2404.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2404.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0719" task="">
  <question>
    What CBW research is conducted at the Engineering Research Center of the Construction Crusade? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the engineering research center is the government department responsible for all chemical development facilities. Iran established at least one large research and development center under the control of the center, which had allegedly established a significant chemical weapons production capability by mid-1989. The same source reports that the center focuses on research and production of VX. (However, perhaps one could question the accuracy of those allegations due to the Council's reference to VX as a &quot;biological agent&quot;). It is also reported that the Research Center is manufacturing an advanced fermenter designed by its own scientists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2404.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2404.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0720" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Iran's primary CW production facility located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to several sources, Iran's primary suspected chemical weapons production facility is located in the city of Damghan 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2405.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2405.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0721" task="">
  <question>
    What CW activities are going on at Damghan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US experts believe that Iran has at least one chemical warhead assembly plant near Damghan. Middle East Defense News reports (spring 1988) claimed that &quot;neuro-toxic&quot; warheads (presumably nerve agent-type) were being assembled for Iran's Scud-B missiles at Damghan between the Semnan and Shahroud missiles complexes to the east of Tehran. Finally, in March 1988, Die Welt reported that, according to Iraqi intelligence, Iran had converted a medical factory in the area of Damghan into a CW munitions production factory. In a 1995 Special Report, Jane's Intelligence Review noted that the Damghan facility is suspicious because &quot;it has several characteristics of chemical weapon plants: isolation, links to transportation lines, and security. The facility at Damghan is hidden by trees, downwind of town, surrounded by fallow fields and linked to the railroad by a spur.&quot; The report states that in addition to the claims of 155mm shells, the facility also has loaded Scud-B warheads with nerve gas. The missile assembly facility is just 130km away and is connected by the same rail line. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2405.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2405.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0722" task="">
  <question>
    What does Iran's Chemical Industries Group (CIG) produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Located in Esfahan, the Chemical Industries Group is the backbone of the Iranian weapons industry. According to US intelligence sources, CIG is making solid-fuel propellant powders for Iran's ballistic missile and artillery rocket programs. Within the CIG, a state-of-the art chemical plant was built by the Swedish group Bofors in Esfahan starting in the late 1970s as a dual-use fertilizer and explosives factory; however, the plant did not open until 1987 due to Iraqi artillery and missile barrages. The Bofors chemical plant in Esfahan produces TNT, RDX, Hexotol B, Hexotol B4, plastic explosives (C4), and nitrocellulose. Despite very large batch runs of TNT, Hexatol, and Hexogen, the plant operates with a staff of only 300 people since all primary filling lines are fully automated. Today, the plant is fully staffed by Iranians. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0723" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Iran's Chemical Industries Group (CIG) located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Located in Esfahan, the Chemical Industries Group is the backbone of the Iranian weapons industry. According to US intelligence sources, CIG is making solid-fuel propellant powders for Iran's ballistic missile and artillery rocket programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0724" task="">
  <question>
    Are CW produced at Iran's Chemical Industries Group facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to US intelligence sources, CIG is making solid-fuel propellant powders for Iran's ballistic missile and artillery rocket programs. Within the CIG, a state-of-the art chemical plant was built by the Swedish group Bofors in Esfahan starting in the late 1970s as a dual-use fertilizer and explosives factory; however, the plant did not open until 1987 due to Iraqi artillery and missile barrages. The Bofors chemical plant in Esfahan produces TNT, RDX, Hexotol B, Hexotol B4, plastic explosives (C4), and nitrocellulose. Despite very large batch runs of TNT, Hexatol, and Hexogen 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0725" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran maintain any dual-use chemical facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Within the CIG, a state-of-the art chemical plant was built by the Swedish group Bofors in Esfahan starting in the late 1970s as a dual-use fertilizer and explosives factory; however, the plant did not open until 1987 due to Iraqi artillery and missile barrages. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0726" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran been involvd in illegal arms deals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is interesting to note that Bofors was involved in an illegal arms trade scandal in 1987, when it was discovered the company had been illegally selling weapons to Iran, Bahrein, Dubai, Libya, and Oman for 10 years. It is also possible that real or perceived use of cyanide as a CW agent by Iran, such as during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), could have been due to its acrylonitrile production capacity, a process that utilizes hydrogen cyanide -- but this is mostly speculation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0727" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran produced CW derived from cyanide? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is also possible that real or perceived use of cyanide as a CW agent by Iran, such as during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), could have been due to its acrylonitrile production capacity, a process that utilizes hydrogen cyanide -- but this is mostly speculation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0728" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical facilities are located in Esfahan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although the exact location of the suspected facilities are unknown, Esfahan is home to several chemical companies with production capabilities: Poly-Acryl Corporation, Linear Alkyl Benzene Complex, and the Chemical Industries Group. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2406.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0729" task="">
  <question>
    What CW activities going on at Iran's Karaj plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are allegations concerning a chemical weapons production plant that was built with Chinese assistance at this location. It is also a suspected storage site for chemical weapons. The National Council of Resistance of Iran reports that a considerable number of long range missiles, including Scud-Bs, are held in Balal Habashi garrison of the Guards Corps on Karaj Road. The Times (UK) has reported that &quot;the Karaj site is reportedly camouflaged as a complete medical and hospital complex and features a calutron system bought from China,&quot; suggesting some kind of nuclear-related research also being conducted here. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2407.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2407.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0730" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Karaj situated? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The city of Karaj is located about 14km northwest of Teheran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2407.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2407.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0731" task="">
  <question>
    What is the evidence that Iran was conducting biological weapons experiments in Marv Darsht? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Radio Luxemburg, cited by Burck and Flowerree, in February 1984 there was an unconfirmed explosion in the research lab at a &quot;Marv Darsht&quot; or &quot;Marv Dacht&quot; petrochemical complex, in which several people were killed. Experiments on biological weapons were allegedly being carried out at this complex. A Kuwaiti paper reported soon after that this was Iran's &quot;main factory for weapons and chemical products&quot; and that it was destroyed by Iraqi bombing during the Iran-Iraq War. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0732" task="">
  <question>
    What allegations were made by Iran's oppostion against Marv Darsht? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 1985, an Iranian opposition group in Italy reportedly claimed that a chemical fertilizer plant at Marvdasht had been converted over a three-year period with supervision from West German and Italian companies and experts, &quot;...with the aim of making chemical weapons.&quot; An opposition radio station reported later that the plant had manufactured several types of chemical weapons, including mustard gas and cyanide. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0733" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of CW did Iran produce in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 1985, an Iranian opposition group in Italy reportedly claimed that a chemical fertilizer plant at Marvdasht had been converted over a three-year period with supervision from West German and Italian companies and experts, &quot;...with the aim of making chemical weapons.&quot; An opposition radio station reported later that the plant had manufactured several types of chemical weapons, including mustard gas and cyanide. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0734" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of weapons were being produced at Marv Darsht? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 1985, a correspondent of the Voice of Liberation of Iran in Shiraz reported in a telephone dispatch that the chemical fertilizer plant in Marvdasht on the Persepolis-Shiraz highway was manufacturing several types of chemical weapons that were ready for use. The factory's first product was a weapon reportedly containing mustard gas that was being stored in the grounds near the Marvdasht factory, ready for transportation. These bombs were to be deployed on the war fronts with Iraq upon the orders of Khameneh'i. A bomb containing hydrogen cyanide gas was also reportedly produced at the Marvdasht chemical fertiliser plant at that time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2408.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0735" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran received chemical weapons precursors from India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to 1996 British media reports, Melli Agrochemicals had negotiated a secret deal with India earlier that year to build a sophisticated chemical plant in Iran that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons. The plant would manufacture phosphorous pentasulfide, which could be used to make pesticides or CW agents such as VX. One report said, &quot;[The plant] can also be used to make primitive chemical weapons which could be fitted to ballistic missiles for use against Iran's long-standing enemies, such as Israel.&quot; According to the Sunday Telegraph, the Iranians raised the possibility of a chemical plant deal during a state visit to New Delhi by Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani last year. The secret deal was believed to be worth more than Pounds Sterling 10 million ($19.59 million). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2409.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2409.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0736" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents does Iran produce at Parchin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Federal Association of Scientists claims that reports published in Russia described Parchin as the center of the Defense Industries Organization's chemical industry for the production of explosives, fuel, etc. The city of Parchin is also suspected of housing one of Iran's major chemical weapons facilities. In April 1997 the German paper Welt am Sonntag reported that, according to the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Iran could produce &quot;primary products for chemical warfare agents&quot; in the defense factories in Parchin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2410.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2410.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0737" task="">
  <question>
    What chemicals does the facility at Parchin produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran asserted that the Hungarian company Lampert has refurbished Parchin Chemical Industries, described as an aging CW plant. Headed by S.J. Seyyedi, this plant legitimately produces chemical intermediates as well as explosives, including sulfuric acid, ethyl alcohol, dynamite, gun powder, nitrocellulose, acetic acid, acetic anhydride, diethyl ether, ethyl acetate, nitric acid, and anti-freeze. The plant has reportedly resumed production of chemical weapons agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2410.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2410.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0738" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence that the facility at Parchin produced explosives? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, on 25 August 1999, Iran's Defense Ministry inaugurated a new &quot;...colour [sic] and chemical manufacturing plant&quot; at the Parchin Chemical Complex, capable of producing previously imported explosives with a daily production capacity of two tons. There is no firm evidence that the Parchin Chemical Complex is engaged in CW activity, however. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2410.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2410.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0739" task="">
  <question>
    How has Iran's chemical facilities at Qazvin been linked to its CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the Iran Brief, the Qazvin plant is widely believed to produce the nerve agent sarin, in addition to agricultural pesticides. The Federation of American Scientists reports that Qazvin is the location of one of Iran's major chemical weapons facilities. CSIS reports that the true purpose of the pesticide plant in Qazvin is poison gas production that includes organophosphorous compounds, i.e., nerve agents. In July 1995, the Iranian opposition paper, Iran Zamin, reported a fire at the Chemical National Koshavarz factory, located in Alborz, an industrial town near Qazvin. The paper claimed that the factory was a chemical weapons production site. It is not clear whether this factory is the suspected poison gas plant located at Qazvin. Middle East Defense News claims the plant in Qazvin is capable of formulating sarin from imported precursor chemicals and packaging it into weapons canisters. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0740" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran produced nerve agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the Iran Brief, the Qazvin plant is widely believed to produce the nerve agent sarin, in addition to agricultural pesticides. The Federation of American Scientists reports that Qazvin is the location of one of Iran's major chemical weapons facilities. CSIS reports that the true purpose of the pesticide plant in Qazvin is poison gas production that includes organophosphorous compounds, i.e., nerve agents. In July 1995, the Iranian opposition paper, Iran Zamin, reported a fire at the Chemical National Koshavarz factory, located in Alborz, an industrial town near Qazvin. The paper claimed that the factory was a chemical weapons production site. It is not clear whether this factory is the suspected poison gas plant located at Qazvin. Middle East Defense News claims the plant in Qazvin is capable of formulating sarin from imported precursor chemicals and packaging it into weapons canisters. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0741" task="">
  <question>
    What CW were produced at Iran's Chemical National Kosharvarz Factory? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In July 1995, the Iranian opposition paper, Iran Zamin, reported a fire at the Chemical National Koshavarz factory, located in Alborz, an industrial town near Qazvin. The paper claimed that the factory was a chemical weapons production site. It is not clear whether this factory is the suspected poison gas plant located at Qazvin. Middle East Defense News claims the plant in Qazvin is capable of formulating sarin from imported precursor chemicals and packaging it into weapons canisters. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0742" task="">
  <question>
    Can Iran produce Sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Middle East Defense News claims the plant in Qazvin is capable of formulating sarin from imported precursor chemicals and packaging it into weapons canisters. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0743" task="">
  <question>
    What CW were produced at Iran's Qazvin plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Middle East Defense News also details the history of the Qazvin plant, built in 1987 by a consortium that included the German companies Lurgi Metallurgie GmbH, Bayer AG, and BASF (formerly of VEB Bitterfeld), Ciba-Geigy of Switzerland, and an unidentified Yugoslav company. Signed by Iran's state-controlled Nargan Consulting Engineers, the contract stipulated that Iran would use the Qazvin facility to make Amiton, a powerful organophosphorus pesticide classified as a nerve agent by Western governments in the 1950s and withdrawn from the market because of its lethality. (Amiton is a Schedule 2 toxic chemical under the Chemical Weapons Convention.) To handle the deal, Bayer set up a subsidiary in Iran called Bayer-Iran Chemie and began importing equipment from the United States in 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0744" task="">
  <question>
    Did Iran contract with India for chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 23 June 1996, the Sunday Telegraph reported about a &quot;...secret multi-million-pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas.&quot; Under the deal, India would build a sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvin, which would be used to produce phosphorus pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used to produce chemical weapons (e.g., VX nerve agent). The deal collapsed after details of the deal were disclosed in The Telegraph. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0745" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran's Qazvin CW plant still operational? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An earthquake in the northwestern region of Iran in June 2002 may have damaged or destroyed the plant at Qazvin. The IRGC, reportedly responsible for Iran's WMD programs, rushed to Qazvin to assess the damage of the earthquake to strategic facilities in the province. Regular army troops were also sent to help deal with any damage of the CW installations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0746" task="">
  <question>
    Why is Iran's Qazvin CW plant no longer in service? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An earthquake in the northwestern region of Iran in June 2002 may have damaged or destroyed the plant at Qazvin. The IRGC, reportedly responsible for Iran's WMD programs, rushed to Qazvin to assess the damage of the earthquake to strategic facilities in the province. Regular army troops were also sent to help deal with any damage of the CW installations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0747" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran stop producing chemical weapons at Qazvin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An earthquake in the northwestern region of Iran in June 2002 may have damaged or destroyed the plant at Qazvin. The IRGC, reportedly responsible for Iran's WMD programs, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2411.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0748" task="">
  <question>
    When was Iran's Special Industries Organization (SIO) formed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Special Industries Organization (SIO) was created by the President in January 1999. Another report claimed the SIO was set up by President Rafsanjani as a 250-man agency within the presidential services in 1993 to develop chemical weapons. This agency is independent of the Council of Ministers. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2412.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2412.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0749" task="">
  <question>
    What does Iran's Special Industries Organization (SIO) do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The SIO oversees and coordinates various scientific programs. One of those programs reportedly develops chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2412.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2412.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0750" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran's Special Industries Organization (SIO) involved in producing CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The SIO oversees and coordinates various scientific programs. One of those programs reportedly develops chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2412.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2412.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0751" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran accede to the Geneva Protocol? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    5 November 1929 Iran accedes to the Geneva Protocol for the &quot;Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.&quot; Significantly, Iran does not place any reservations on its participation in and adherence to the protocol (i.e., right of in-kind retaliation, etc.). [Note: This becomes an important factor during Iran's war with Iraq (1980-1988), in which Iran resorts to CW acquisition, development, and use in retaliation for Iraq's chemical attacks.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0752" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Bush impose sanctions on China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Bush administration imposes sanctions on several Chinese firms allegedly for selling CBW components to Iran. According to a US State Department statement, &quot;The penalties were imposed for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999 of sensitive equipment and technology controlled by the Australia Group.&quot; One unnamed US intelligence official reportedly told the Washington Times that in April 2001, US intelligence tracked one of the Chinese shipments of chemical-related goods as it made its way to Iran. The three firms penalized by the sanctions are Liyang Chemical Equipment, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, as well as Mr. Q.C. Chen. One of those firms produces glass-lined equipment; however, the reports did not mention if such equipment was transferred to Iran. The State Department statement goes on to say that &quot;Q.C. Chen is already subject to US sanctions. In May 1997, he was among seven Chinese entities sanctioned, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, for knowingly and materially assisting Iran's chemical weapons program through the transfer of chemical weapons precursor chemicals and/or chemical weapons-related production equipment and technology. These sanctions currently remain in place.&quot; The statement continues by claiming that the activities of Q.C. Chen and other Chinese entities have been brought to the attention of the Chinese government on numerous occasions, and that the Chinese government was informed in advance of the decision to place further sanctions on Mr. Chen and others. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0753" task="">
  <question>
    Did China send CBW technology to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Bush administration imposes sanctions on several Chinese firms allegedly for selling CBW components to Iran. According to a US State Department statement, &quot;The penalties were imposed for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999 of sensitive equipment and technology controlled by the Australia Group.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0754" task="">
  <question>
    Has China denied selling CBW technology to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China demands a swift end to the US &quot;practice&quot; of sanctioning Chinese companies. In an official statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China proclaims that it &quot;opposes countries that develop chemical weapons and does not aid countries to develop their chemical weapons....China prohibits the export of sensitive chemical products and their related production technology and equipment.&quot; No mention was made of the specific companies sanctioned. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0755" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Being one of the few countries in the world that has experienced chemical warfare (CW) on the battlefield, Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0756" task="">
  <question>
    How did Iran start its CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran's entanglement with CW stems from the legacy of the Iran-Iraq War. From approximately 1983-1988 during the war with Iraq, Iran suffered extensive CW attacks, including blister (mustard) and nerve agents. By the end of the War, Iran appeared to have suffered as many as 50,000 chemical warfare casualties, of whom perhaps 5,000 died.[1] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0757" task="">
  <question>
    Has there been any Iranian opposition to Iran's CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While several Iranian leaders felt that developing a CW program would counteract the Iraqi threat and prove to be a strong deterrent, others within the clerical Islamic regime publicly condemned any use of chemicals on moral grounds, calling them un-Islamic. Disagreement over a course of policy action led to several contradictory published reports whether or not Iran decided to pursue a CW program. Although the status of its offensive capability is somewhat ambiguous, one can definitely conclude that Iran has a defensive program that can be re-engineered into offensive production, if Iranian national security is threatened. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0758" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of CBW assistance has Iran received from other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China has also been involved in several other sales to Iran, involving CW technology; as a result, several Chinese companies and individuals have faced American sanctions. One example was the 1997 sale by China to Iran of 40,000 barrels of calcium-hypochlorite, a chemical and biological decontaminating agent. Other defensive material purchased by Iran includes respirators from Spain, protective gear from South Korea, and atropine autoinjectors from the Netherlands.[6] In 1995, Asian-Ways, Ltd. World Co (Hong Kong) Ltd. and Mainway International Ltd. were sanctioned by the US State Department for supplying Iran with &quot;nerve gas technology.&quot;[7] According to US press accounts citing a top secret CIA report dated 2 October 1996, China sold Iran nearly 400 metric tons of carbon disulfide, a nerve and riot control gas precursor.[8] In 1997, two more Chinese companies and were sanctioned by the US State Department for selling Iran CW related precursors and equipment. The companies involved were Nanjing Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology Import/Export Corporation. They were accused of exporting thionyl chloride, dimethylamine, and ethylene chlorohydrin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0759" task="">
  <question>
    From which countries did Iran import CW agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Though there is no concrete evidence that Iran is currently developing CW, there have been several instances where CW precursors were purchased from foreign sources in the past. Throughout the 1980s, the United States accused Germany of selling dual-use materials and technology to Iran. In 1989 US authorities found Alcolac International Inc., a pharmaceutical firm based out of Baltimore, Maryland, guilty of illegally shipping almost 120 tons of thiodyglycol (a mustard gas precursor) to Iran. The same year, US Department of Commerce put export controls on 23 specific chemicals that could aid CW proliferation. Also in 1989, the State Trading Corporation of India admitted that it had sold Iran over 60 tons of thionyl chloride (a nerve agent precursor) and that its supplier was planning to ship an additional 257 tons of the chemical to Iran. In 1997, under a reported multi-million dollar deal, India agreed to construct a &quot;sophisticated chemical plant at Qazvim, on the outskirts of Tehran.&quot;[4] India also agreed to sell Iran phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical used in the production of pesticides as well as the nerve agent VX. The deal eventually fell apart and a similar deal was eventually concluded with China in 1998. China reportedly agreed to sell Iran 500 tons of phosphorus pentasulfide.[5] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0760" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents have Iran developed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of the CW agents Iran has allegedly developed include CS gas (a riot control agent), mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide, and phosgene.[9] Some sources, citing US intelligence officials, also claim that Iran has developed sarin, tabun, and V-series nerve agents.[10] There are several delivery routes Iran could take for its chemical agents. Iran is said to have developed 155mm artillery shells, mortar rounds, aerial bombs for chemical fill, and possibly chemical warheads for Scuds.[11] There have also been rumors of using mines to deliver CW agents (120mm).[12] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0761" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran produce mustard gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of the CW agents Iran has allegedly developed include CS gas (a riot control agent), mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide, and phosgene.[9] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0762" task="">
  <question>
    Which CW nerve agents has Iran produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of the CW agents Iran has allegedly developed include CS gas (a riot control agent), mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide, and phosgene.[9] Some sources, citing US intelligence officials, also claim that Iran has developed sarin, tabun, and V-series nerve agents.[10] There are several delivery routes Iran could take for its chemical agents. Iran is said to have developed 155mm artillery shells, mortar rounds, aerial bombs for chemical fill, and possibly chemical warheads for Scuds.[11] There have also been rumors of using mines to deliver CW agents (120mm).[12] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0763" task="">
  <question>
    How could Iran deliver its CBW weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are several delivery routes Iran could take for its chemical agents. Iran is said to have developed 155mm artillery shells, mortar rounds, aerial bombs for chemical fill, and possibly chemical warheads for Scuds.[11] There have also been rumors of using mines to deliver CW agents (120mm).[12] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0764" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's reply to allegations about its CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran continues to deny any allegations that it is actively pursuing an offensive CW program. In 1996, it held the first regional seminar on the national implementation of the CWC in Tehran so that government authorities could familiarize themselves with their duties and obligations under the treaty. It also held a mock &quot;trial inspection&quot; at the Shahid Razkani chemical factory to allow inspectors to see how such a procedure was conducted. Iran submitted a declaration on its chemical facilities and its past CW stockpile, it has destroyed chemical weapons production equipment in the presence of OPCW inspectors, and it has undergone a number of OPCW inspections of its chemical industrial facilities. Iran continues to play an active role at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is recognized as a member in good standing, and currently serves on its executive council. Although US and Israeli intelligence agencies continue to insist Iran maintains a stockpile of chemical weapons, no challenge inspections of Iranian facilities have been requested, and none of the allegations made regarding the stockpiling of CW can be verified in the unclassified domain. However, Iran continues to retain a strong incentive for developing a defensive CW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0765" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran denied developing CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran continues to deny any allegations that it is actively pursuing an offensive CW program. In 1996, it held the first regional seminar on the national implementation of the CWC in Tehran so that government authorities could familiarize themselves with their duties and obligations under the treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0766" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran maintain a stockpile of CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although US and Israeli intelligence agencies continue to insist Iran maintains a stockpile of chemical weapons, no challenge inspections of Iranian facilities have been requested, and none of the allegations made regarding the stockpiling of CW can be verified in the unclassified domain. However, Iran continues to retain a strong incentive for developing a defensive CW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0767" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran permitted inspections of its CW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    no challenge inspections of Iranian facilities have been requested, and none of the allegations made regarding the stockpiling of CW can be verified in the unclassified domain. However, Iran continues to retain a strong incentive for developing a defensive CW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0768" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Iran get the chemical weapons precursors needed to produce VX? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chinese companies have been key suppliers for Iran's chemical weapons program.  The Chinese corporation SinoChem reportedly delivered 500 tons of phosphorous pentasulfide in 1996 (primary precursor of VX, controlled by the Australia Group; China and Iran are not party to this organization).[16] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0769" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Iran get the chemical weapons precursors to produce nerve agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to US press reports citing a top secret CIA report, China sold Iran nearly 400 metric tons of chemicals used to produce nerve agents and riot control gas.[17] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0770" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Iran's primary supplier of CW materials? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China is a key supplier of CW equipment and technologies to Iran according to US Department of Defense. In an unclassified report to Congress, the DCI said that &quot;Chinese firms had supplied CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran,&quot; prior to July 1999, and that evidence during the second half of 1999 &quot;suggests Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded.&quot;[18] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0771" task="">
  <question>
    How long has Iran received CW assistance from China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China has been Iran's main source for chemical weapons precursors, manufacturing equipment, and technical expertise since 1994.[19] In June 1997, the DCI reported that China, during July-December 1996, provided &quot;considerable CW-related assistance&quot; to Iran, including production equipment and technology.[20] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0772" task="">
  <question>
    Has China built dual-use chemical plants in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to an intelligence report, cited by the Washington Times on 30 October 1997, China completed construction in June 1997 of a dual-use plant in Iran for making glass-lined equipment used in producing chemical weapons.[21] The Chinese firm was Nanjing Chemical and Industrial Group.[22] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0773" task="">
  <question>
    What CW equipment have Chinese companies supplied to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A classified US intelligence report identified a Chinese individual, Q.C. Chen, as &quot;a major supplier of glass-lined equipment and chemicals to Iran's chemical weapons program.&quot; Chen is linked to Nocinco (the North Chemical Industries Corp.), a company that was identified by the CIA as &quot;having delivered several hundred tons of carbon disulfide, an ingredient in nerve agents.&quot;[23] Nocinco is affiliated with the China North Industries Corp., Norinco.[24] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0774" task="">
  <question>
    How have Iran's chemical companies obtained chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1995, orders paid for by Razak Laboratories in Teheran and Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries in Tabriz, and brokered by Iran's International Movalled Industries Corporation (Imaco) with the North Chemical Industries Corp. (Nocinco), were not delivered. They consisted of 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine, used in making detergent, and 17 metric tons of sodium sulfide, a chemical that could be used in making mustard gas.[25] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0775" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors has Iran obtained? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1995, orders paid for by Razak Laboratories in Teheran and Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries in Tabriz, and brokered by Iran's International Movalled Industries Corporation (Imaco) with the North Chemical Industries Corp. (Nocinco), were not delivered. They consisted of 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine, used in making detergent, and 17 metric tons of sodium sulfide, a chemical that could be used in making mustard gas.[25] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0776" task="">
  <question>
    Has China supplied Iran with CW decontamination chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January-February 1997, China supplied Iran with 40,000 barrels of calcium hypochlorite, a chemical-biological-radiological decontamination agent.[26] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0777" task="">
  <question>
    Where has Iran bought equipment to produce CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1997, Rex International Development Company Ltd., a company affiliated with the Chinese company Norinco, supplied Iran with high-grade seamless steel pipes, suitable for handling corrosive materials, and associated with chemical weapons production.[27] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0778" task="">
  <question>
    What nerve gas chemical weapons precursors did Iran obtain from Chinese companies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1997, two Chinese companies, Nanjing Industries Group and Technology Import/Export Corporation, supplied Iran with thionyl chloride, dimethylamine (tabun nerve gas precursor), ethyl chlorohydrin (possible mustard precursor), and glass-lined mixing vessels.[28] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0779" task="">
  <question>
    Is China building chemical weapons plants in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 8 March 1996, the Washington Post reported, &quot;US intelligence officials have concluded that companies in China are providing Iran with several virtually complete factories suited for making deadly poison gases,&quot; and that Iranian &quot;military-related organizations&quot; are buying from China glass-lined vessels for mixing precursors, special air-filtration equipment, and the technology to manufacture these items and others indigenously.[29] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0780" task="">
  <question>
    What is the extent of the CW assistance that China provides to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 8 March 1996, the Washington Post reported, &quot;US intelligence officials have concluded that companies in China are providing Iran with several virtually complete factories suited for making deadly poison gases,&quot; and that Iranian &quot;military-related organizations&quot; are buying from China glass-lined vessels for mixing precursors, special air-filtration equipment, and the technology to manufacture these items and others indigenously.[29] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0781" task="">
  <question>
    Could Iran produce CW indigenously? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iranian &quot;military-related organizations&quot; are buying from China glass-lined vessels for mixing precursors, special air-filtration equipment, and the technology to manufacture these items and others indigenously.[29] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0782" task="">
  <question>
    Could Iran become a self-sufficient producer of CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iranian &quot;military-related organizations&quot; are buying from China glass-lined vessels for mixing precursors, special air-filtration equipment, and the technology to manufacture these items and others indigenously.[29] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0783" task="">
  <question>
    Could Iran become a self-sufficient producer of nerve gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In May 1998, the London Daily Telegraph reported that &quot;Iran has concluded a secret deal with China to purchase banned chemicals that will enable it to become self-sufficient in producing large stockpiles of advanced nerve gas.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0784" task="">
  <question>
    Which banned chemical products has Iran obtained for its CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the deal, concluded last month, China supplied Iran with 500 tons of phosphorus pentsulfide, material banned under the terms of the CWC if known to be used in a CW program. The delivery was made in 10 consignments of 50 tons each, for an estimated $924,000. The deal was negotiated by Iran's Defense Industry Organization and China's SinoChem Agency. Previously in 1997, a statement submitted by the office of Madeline Albright -- then US Secretary of State -- concluded that SinoChem had not been involved in any dual-use shipments to Iran.[30] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0785" task="">
  <question>
    Has SinoChem been involved in shipping banned dual-use chemical weapons precursors to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The deal was negotiated by Iran's Defense Industry Organization and China's SinoChem Agency. Previously in 1997, a statement submitted by the office of Madeline Albright -- then US Secretary of State -- concluded that SinoChem had not been involved in any dual-use shipments to Iran.[30] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0786" task="">
  <question>
    How did Iran use Indian companies to obtain CW equipment? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Report by German intelligence on Iranian efforts to acquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three Indian companies as fronts. &quot;With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory.&quot; The Indian companies named in the classified report include Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0787" task="">
  <question>
    Which Indian companies provided CW equipment to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory.&quot; The Indian companies named in the classified report include Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0788" task="">
  <question>
    How is Iran concealing its CW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0789" task="">
  <question>
    Which Iranian companies are assisting in the development of CW facilities in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Iranian companies involved in the building of the poison-gas complex are Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and Shahid Hemat Industrial group.[33] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0790" task="">
  <question>
    Has India built dual-use chemical production plants in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 23 June 1996, the Sunday Telegraph reported about a &quot;secret multi-million-pound deal with the Indian government which will supply banned materials used to manufacture poison gas.&quot; Under the deal, India will build a sophisticate chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used to produce chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0791" task="">
  <question>
    Which Iranian CW facility was slated to be built by India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the deal, India will build a sophisticate chemical plant at Qazvin, which will be used produce phosphorous pentasulfide, a dual-use chemical that could be used to produce chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0792" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Iran obtain thionyl chloride? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In early 1989, Iran purchased 60 tons of thionyl chloride, a nerve agent precursor, from India.[36] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0793" task="">
  <question>
    What missiles did the US sell to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The United States has delivered 3400 TOW missiles to Iran since 1973. A total of 4760 TOWs and 250 launchers will be supplied. Between 1974 and 1975, 2500 Maverick air-to-surface missiles are scheduled for delivery to Iran. The US also plans delivery of 32 Hawk surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries to Iran between 1974 and 1978. [Note: According to the Federation of American Scientists, there are 48 missiles per Hawk battery.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0794" task="">
  <question>
    What arms deal took place between Britain and Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The British Aircraft Corporation agrees to accept Iranian crude oil in payment for a $640 million deal to supply the Imperial Iranian Army with the tracked Rapier short-range anti-aircraft missile system. Furthermore, The British Aircraft Corporation and Iranian Electronics Industries agree to create a new company under the name of Irano-British Dynamics to manufacture the Rapier missile in Iran. This new company will develop and assemble 2,500 Rapier half-tracked, low-level anti-aircraft missiles. The project is expected to produce 75 missiles per month at the site of Parchin. Under the agreement, Iran will be allowed to sell the missiles to third countries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0795" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's Project Flower missile project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran makes its first payment to Israel in the form of $280 million worth of oil for the joint &quot;Project Flower&quot; missile program. The aim of the program is to make a longer-range missile of 150-200km and to make a missile that is a &quot;more heavily armed version of the Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile.&quot; As part of the project, the Iranians start building a missile assembly site close to Sirjan, in south central Iran, and a missile test range close to Rafsanjan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0796" task="">
  <question>
    What missiles were part of Iran's arsenal prior to 1979? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under the Shah, Iran's arsenal includes the following missiles: Hughes Aircraft BGM-71 A, TOW, AGM-65a Maverick, AIM-54A Phoenix, Rapier, MIM-23B Hawk, AIM-7F Sparrow, AIM-9 G/H Sidewinder. Iran also reverse-engineers the Soviet RPG-7, BM 21, and SAM-7 missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0797" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran launch its first missile against Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 March 1985 Iran launches its first missile against Iraq. The Scud missile is fired at the city of Kirkuk at 2:40 a.m. Iraq claims that &quot;time bombs planted by enemy agents&quot; caused the explosion. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0798" task="">
  <question>
    What missiles types does Iran produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Production of the Oghab reaches a &quot;satisfactory rate.&quot; A total of 70 Oghab rockets are launched since it was made operational in 1986. Nine were launched in 1986 and 61 this year. Between 6 December 1986 and 15 February 1987, Iran launches 53 Oghab rockets, mostly aimed at Basra and Khanaqin. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps starts production of small artillery rockets with a short range. These are called the Katyusha, Nakhudsha, and mini-Katyusha. Supposedly before the Shah's regime fell, Iran was preparing to &quot;reverse-engineer the rockets for the Soviet BM-21 122mm multiple-rocket launcher.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1802.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1802.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0799" task="">
  <question>
    How many Iranian Oghab rockets have been launched? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A total of 70 Oghab rockets are launched since it was made operational in 1986. Nine were launched in 1986 and 61 this year. Between 6 December 1986 and 15 February 1987, Iran launches 53 Oghab rockets, mostly aimed at Basra and Khanaqin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1802.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1802.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0800" task="">
  <question>
    When did the &quot;second war of the cities&quot; take place? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    29 February-21 April 1988 This period is known as the &quot;Second War of the Cities&quot; between Iran and Iraq. During this time, the total number of Oghab rockets launched by Iran goes up to around 365. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1803.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1803.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0801" task="">
  <question>
    What terms did Iraq set to end the missile attack on Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After 11 consecutive days of missile strikes on each other's capitals, it appears as if Iran and Iraq are ending reciprocal bombardment. Iraq signals its willingness to end the missile exchanges with Iran, but on its own terms. The first term is that Iraq should make the last bombardment since, as Iraq claims, Iran initiated the exchanges with two missile attacks on Baghdad on 29 February. Iran is believed to have fired the last missile. Iran has launched nearly 30 missile strikes against Baghdad and Iraq has launched more than 50 against Tehran. The Iraqi overture for a cease-fire appears prompted from concern about the damage to civilian morale. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1803.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1803.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0802" task="">
  <question>
    Why did North Korea sell Scuds to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Because Iran helps finance the production of the improved Scuds, North Korea is reportedly sending the Scuds to Iran instead of to the DPRK military. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1804.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1804.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0803" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Iran develop its ballistic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The People's Mojahedeen, an Iranian opposition group, claims that in 1991, Iran buys 170 Scud missiles from North Korea and 2,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launching pads from Bulgaria. Iran reportedly has built ballistic missiles with a range of nearly 185 miles with help from China and North Korea. Iran is also said to have tested these missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1806.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1806.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0804" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's current missile capability? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran currently possesses the capability to employ ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery rockets against its regional neighbors, Israel and US forces deployed in the region. A large number of these systems currently possess the capability to delivery chemical, biological or radiological dispersion warheads. If conditions remain favorable, it will be able to extend the reach of its ballistic missile forces to include Southern Europe, North Africa, and South Asia by 2005-2010 and possibly the continental United States by 2015. A true nuclear weapons delivery capability could be obtained within the next five years. Any one of a host of international or domestic factors, however, could accelerate or delay these developments. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0805" task="">
  <question>
    What does Iran's missile inventory consist of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Available information suggests that Iran has a current ballistic missile inventory of 325-550 systems: 200-300 Shehab-1, 100-150 Shehab-2, 25-100 Shehab-3, and 1-5 Shehab-4/5 prototypes. The relative numbers of Shehab-1 and Shehab-2 systems could change in favor of the Shehab-2 if Iran undertakes to upgrade the earlier systems to Shehab-2 configuration. Reliable estimates of long-range artillery rocket (e.g., Fajr, Nazeat and Zelzal) inventories are unavailable. These totals could quickly be increased should Iran make the decision to either purchase additional systems from the DPRK or accelerate Shehab-3 production.[2] Although information is sparse, Iran is believed to field the equivalent of two surface-to-surface missile brigades. The first is equipped with Shehab-1 systems. This unit consists of six-twelve MAZ-543P TELs and unknown number of MELs. It is believed to be organized into two-three battalions. The second is equipped with Shehab-2 and Shehab-3 systems. It consists of approximately four-six Shehab-2 TELs and four-eight Shehab-3 MELs and is believed to be organized with one-two Shehab-2 and one-two Shehab-3 battalions. Each brigade is believed to have an operational test and evaluation responsibility for its respective missile systems. It is likely that a third brigade equipped with the Shehab-3 will be formed by 2005. There may also exist a small number of independent Shehab-2 or -3 units of battalion size. There are also an unknown number of long-range artillery rocket units, some perhaps of brigade size. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0806" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The continued willingness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Russia to provide Iran with both missiles and missile-related technology that at the very least exceed the intentions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This has been complemented, to a lesser extent, by the willingness of other nations (e.g., Libya and Syria) to cooperate within the realm of ballistic missile development. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0807" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran funded missile development programs in other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The ongoing ability and willingness of Iran to fund the development of missiles and missile-related technology in other countries (e.g., DPRK, Libya, and Syria). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0808" task="">
  <question>
    How will an advanced ballistic missile program affect Iran's political standing in the Middle East? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Development of both an indigenous missile design and production capability, and the evolution of a strategic doctrine that foresees Iran as a regional superpower, &quot;...a missile power second only to the superpowers,&quot; and a &quot;...center...&quot; for other third world nations seeking missile capabilities.[3] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0809" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran have active programs to develop NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran's ballistic missile capabilities are complemented by extensive nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs, which themselves are the recipients of significant foreign assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0810" task="">
  <question>
    How many missile attacks were exchanged during the &quot;war of the cities&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During this War of the Cities, Iran launched a total of 14 Scud-Bs (one against Kirkuk and 13 against Baghdad), while Iraq launched 48 (primarily against Dezful and Bakhtaran -- being unable to reach Tehran). In all but one case, the Iranian missile attacks consisted of a single missile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3392.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3392.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0811" task="">
  <question>
    When did the first &quot;war of the cities&quot; take place? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Immediately following the first War of the Cities in March-June 1985, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hashemi-Rafsanjani led a high-level Iranian delegation to Libya and Syria seeking additional Scud-B missiles and continued military assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3393.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3393.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0812" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have sold Iran Scud missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Immediately following the first War of the Cities in March-June 1985, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hashemi-Rafsanjani led a high-level Iranian delegation to Libya and Syria seeking additional Scud-B missiles and continued military assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3393.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3393.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0813" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Iran aim its rockets at during the war of the cities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the 52 days of the War of the Cities, a total of approximately 532 rockets and missiles were launched by both sides. Iran launched approximately 339 (80 Scud-Bs/Shehab-1s, 253 Oghabs, and 6 Shahin-IIs) and Iraq launched about 193 (189 al-Husayns and 4 Scud-Bs). Of the 80 Scud-B/Shehab-1s launched by Iran, 64 were targeted against Baghdad. The remaining were aimed at Mosul (9), Kirkuk (5), Tikrit (1), and Kuwait (1). These attacks brought the total number of Scud-B class missiles fired by the Missile Unit of the IRGC Air Force during the war to approximately 120.[19] This campaign witnessed the complete depletion of Iran's inventory of R-17 Scud-Bs acquired from Iran and Syria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3393.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/3367_3393.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0814" task="">
  <question>
    What factors influence Iran's missile development? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Necessities of war and the short distance to Iraqi strategic targets. Quantity and quality of missiles and missile-related technology acquired. Size and experience of the indigenous missile-related manpower pool. Capabilities of the Iranian military-industrial infrastructure. Desire to possess the capability to strike directly at Israel and US military facilities within South Asia. Organizational, political, and religious discord amongst the various entities engaged in the design, development, and production of ballistic missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0815" task="">
  <question>
    Who is the Shah of Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The origins of the Iranian missile program date back to the late 1970s and the last years that the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi ruled Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0816" task="">
  <question>
    Who has been suspected of trasnferring WMD technology to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1998-1999 The US government discloses intelligence information that Russian entities are involved in transferring WMD technology to Iran. The Russian government cracks down on the sources of information, thus preventing any further leaks about Russian-Iranian WMD activities. The Russian government action virtually stops intelligence collection, especially in the years 1998 and 1999. These years are marked by intense Iranian activities in its WMD programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0817" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran officially declared its desire to obtain WMD? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 January 1998 Iranian President Khatami denies allegations that Iran is seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. &quot;We are not a nuclear power and do not intend to be, we have not plans to build nuclear weapons and are only seeking to have peaceful nuclear energy,&quot; he says. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0818" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran offered to cooperate with the IAEA? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    8 January 1998 Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reaffirms his administration's desire to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He also declares that Iran is neither currently planning to build nuclear weapons nor will attempt to do so in the future, any nuclear technology will be applied to developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0819" task="">
  <question>
    What steps are Iran's neighbors taking to prevent Iranian acquisition of WMD? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    16 January 1998 The United Arab Emirates gives the United States a list of 15 steps the country is taking to prevent Iran from getting weapons of mass destruction. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0820" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Viktor Mikhailov? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A few days after Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi's visit to Russia, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, is abruptly removed from his position. Official sources state that Mikhailov asks to leave his position so he can concentrate on scientific research. Speculation is that he is removed due to disputes over his suggestions for broadening nuclear cooperation with Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0821" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Kamal Kharazi? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A few days after Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi's visit to Russia, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, is abruptly removed from his position 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0822" task="">
  <question>
    What is the US doing to prevent the Ukraine from selling nuclear weapons technology to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    9 February 1998 James Foley, a spokesman for the US State Department, says the United States wants Ukraine to refrain from making any deal with Iran that will provide it with nuclear weapons technology. Such a deal, the State Department asserts, will result in significant cuts of US aid to Ukraine. Washington has thus far refused to allow a deal between Westinghouse Electric Corporation of the United States and Ukraine that provides Ukraine with two nuclear plants, and will not allow any deal to take place until an agreement is reached on the Iranian reactor. He says the United States may even pay Ukraine for financial losses it sustains from scrapping the Iranian deal. Qol Yisrael International Service reports that the US government suspended several agreements with Ukraine in an effort to coerce it to not sell Iran nuclear turbines. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0823" task="">
  <question>
    Who is believed to control Iran's WMD programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At a meeting with officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi says, &quot;Can we withstand American's threats and domineering attitude with a policy of detente? Can we foil dangers coming from America through dialogue between civilizations? Will we be able to protect the Islamic Republic from international Zionism by signing conventions to ban proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons?&quot; [Note: According to Michael Eisenstadt, the IRGC is believed to control Iran's WMD and missile programs, giving Safavi's views on these matters much importance.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0824" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At a meeting with officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi says, &quot;Can we withstand American's threats and domineering attitude with a policy of detente? Can we foil dangers coming from America through dialogue between civilizations? 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0825" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran suspected of trying to obtain biological or chemical weapons through German companies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    5 October 1998 Der Spiegel reports that Iran's government is &quot;making intensive efforts to acquire sensitive high technology for military purposes.&quot; It further asserts that German companies must use caution in their negotiations with Iran, warning that Iran is trying to procure &quot;nuclear and carrier technology as well as the production of biological and chemical weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0826" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran have long-range missiles capable of delivering biological or chemical weapons payloads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 October 1998 US General Anthony Zinni predicts that Iran will have a nuclear capacity in five years. He says that this capacity, combined with Iran's long-range missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, &quot;will be a more significant problem than Iraq....In the longer term, Iran is a greater threat.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1875.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0827" task="">
  <question>
    What are Iran's strategic goals in acquiring chemcial weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n North Africa and the Middle East, states of proliferation concern -- Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq -- remain poised to develop and use all means at their disposal to threaten U.S. and allied interests in the region and beyond. U.S. conventional military superiority paradoxically creates an incentive for adversary states to acquire NBC weapons. Because our potential adversaries know that they cannot win a conventional war against us, they are more likely to try asymmetric methods such as employing biological or chemical weapons or threatening the use of nuclear weapons. This strategy also applies to particular terrorist groups intent on inflicting a large number of casualties or causing panic, if such groups judge that conventional means are inadequate and they do not fear political or military retaliation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0828" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries are suspected of supplying Iran with NBC technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the last several years, Russian entities have exported ballistic missile and nuclear technology to Iran, and Russia also remains a potential source of biological and chemical warfare expertise. China continues to be a source of missile-related technology. Lastly, North Korea is a key source for ballistic missiles and related components and materials. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0829" task="">
  <question>
    What is China's offical position with regards to supplying assistance to Iran's nuclear facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Beijing has adopted a more responsible supply policy by adhering to international nonproliferation norms like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), by ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), by reaffirming its 1994 pledge to forego exports of complete Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-class surface-to-surface missiles, and by pledging not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, including installations in both Pakistan and Iran.In late 1997, China pledged not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete work on two remaining nuclear projects--a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility--in a relatively short period of time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0830" task="">
  <question>
    What missiles have North Korea sold to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has been a major proliferator of ballistic missiles and related technologies. The sale of No Dong missile technology to Iran has created an immediate, serious and growing capability to target U.S. forces, and our allies in the Middle East. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0831" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran have a secret bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is often accused in Western circles of secretly developing an offensive biological warfare (BW) program. In a 1996 report to the US Senate, the Central Intelligence Agency claimed that &quot;Iran has had a biological warfare program since the early 1980s. Currently the program is in its research and development stages, but we believe Iran holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons...&quot;[1] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0832" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran ratified the BWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and publicly decried all forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0833" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran have the infrastructure necessary to produce bioweapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and publicly decried all forms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time, it does have a very sophisticated biotechnology infrastructure that includes leading research facilities and trained personnel. It has also participated in several scientific exchanges with foreign experts. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0834" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran tried to obtain bioweapons from foreign sources? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has shown an interest in acquiring BW agents from foreign sources. The speaker of the Iranian parliament publicly stated in 1988 that &quot;...we should fully equip ourselves in defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.&quot;[2] Canadian and Dutch scientists were approached by Iranian personnel looking to acquire mycotoxin-producing fungi (Fusarium spp.) in 1989. Sources also claim that Iran has pursued the acquisition of castor beans (known to be used for producing the deadly toxin ricin)[3] and retains several cultures of the anthrax-producing bacteria Bacillus anthracis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0835" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran first develop a bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some Western sources believe that Iran first developed its BW program during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Currently, its growing biotechnology industry does have the potential to divert dual-use agents for illicit warfare purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0836" task="">
  <question>
    Why would Iran pursue a bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are several reasons why Iran would pursue a BW program, including establishing a deterrent against Iraq, establishing regional dominance, or developing an alternative to conventional weapons for asymmetric conflicts. Some experts speculate that in its biological arsenal, Iran possess agents such as botulinum toxin, B. anthracis, and ricin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0837" task="">
  <question>
    What biological weapons is Iran suspected of possessing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some experts speculate that in its biological arsenal, Iran possess agents such as botulinum toxin, B. anthracis, and ricin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0838" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Iran has hired former Soviet bioweapons experts? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, it has been alleged that former Soviet bioweaponeers have been hired by Iran to specifically work on its BW arsenal. These scientists are supposedly experimenting with the causative agents of such diseases as Marburg, smallpox, plague, and tularemia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0839" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of BW research is Iran conducting? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, it has been alleged that former Soviet bioweaponeers have been hired by Iran to specifically work on its BW arsenal. These scientists are supposedly experimenting with the causative agents of such diseases as Marburg, smallpox, plague, and tularemia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0840" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of biological weapons is Iran suspected of developing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These scientists are supposedly experimenting with the causative agents of such diseases as Marburg, smallpox, plague, and tularemia. According to Michael Eisenstadt, Iran &quot;probably is researching such standard agents as anthrax and botulin toxin and it has shown interest in acquiring materials which could be used to produce ricin and mycotoxins.&quot;[4] Another report indicates that &quot;Iran has...conducted extensive research on more lethal active agents like anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and biotoxins.&quot;[5] It must be noted that this latter source, cited by Anthony Cordesman, cannot be independently corroborated, and firsthand data on Iranian BW agents is unavailable in open sources. Some of the most common agents that are associated with the Iranian BW program in the open literature are B. anthracis, botulinum toxin, ricin, T-2 mycotoxin, and Variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox. (A table of cultures that Iran is known to possess is available in the Biological Capabilities section.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0841" task="">
  <question>
    How could Iran deliver a biological weapons payload? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With respect to delivery of any BW agent, it is not immediately clear what route Iran has taken or will take. Some experts believe that Iran is developing the capability to deliver biological agents by Scud missiles, aircraft, or other aerosolization techniques.[6] According to the CIA, Iran possesses weaponized biological agents that could be dispersed by artillery and aerial bombs.[7] The Iranian Shahab missile is reportedly capable of carrying biological warheads.[8] Iran has also conducted chemical and biological defense military exercises with helicopter sprayers and worked with cruise and ballistic missiles, although there is no concrete evidence that it has developed a biological warhead to be fit on such missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0842" task="">
  <question>
    Which Iranian missile(s) can carry biological warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Iranian Shahab missile is reportedly capable of carrying biological warheads.[8] Iran has also conducted chemical and biological defense military exercises with helicopter sprayers and worked with cruise and ballistic missiles, although there is no concrete evidence that it has developed a biological warhead to be fit on such missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0843" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is available about Iran's bioweapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As there is no concrete mechanism for verifying government reports or allegations from exile groups, many of the allegations regarding the Iranian BW program remain unsubstantiated. Most of the literature and accusations come from CIA reports, uncited writings of experts, and claims made by Iranian dissidents. The majority of these reports cite Iranian attempts to purchase fusaria from Canada and the Netherlands as evidence that Iran is working on a covert weapons program. While this could be true, it should be noted that the utility of these fungal species is not limited to BW applications. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0844" task="">
  <question>
    What is known about Iran's BW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The majority of these reports cite Iranian attempts to purchase fusaria from Canada and the Netherlands as evidence that Iran is working on a covert weapons program. While this could be true, it should be noted that the utility of these fungal species is not limited to BW applications. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0845" task="">
  <question>
    From whom did Iran try to obtain BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The majority of these reports cite Iranian attempts to purchase fusaria from Canada and the Netherlands as evidence that Iran is working on a covert weapons program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0846" task="">
  <question>
    What is the overall likelihood that Iran could use its bioweapons in an offensive attack against a target? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Even if Iran possesses these biological agents, it faces a significant challenge in their weaponization and delivery. There is no indication that Iran has successfully weaponized BW agents. Given its current state of technology and the problems associated with delivering a sophisticated BW agent, it is unlikely that Iran currently has the means to carry out a significant biological attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0847" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Iran's primary biological and chemical weapons facility reportedly located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological Facilities Science and Technology Group Other Names: None known Address: Unknown, though it is reportedly located at the Mahsa Building in Teheran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0848" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's Science and Technology Group (STG)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Science and Technology Group (STG) allegedly oversees Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.  History: Allegedly created by President Khatami in January 1999. In 1999, Taqi Ebtekar was the head of the group and Bahari Pour (or Pur) was the director.  Activities: According to the National Council of Resistance (NCR) of Iran, this group of the president's advisors &quot;...oversees the regime's plans and projects in the area of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons.&quot; The NCR is a group opposed to the current regime in Iran; none of its accusations have been verified or corroborated. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0849" task="">
  <question>
    What is the primary function of Iran's Science and Technology Group (STG)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Science and Technology Group (STG) allegedly oversees Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0850" task="">
  <question>
    Who created Iran's Science and Technology Group? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Science and Technology Group (STG) allegedly oversees Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.  History: Allegedly created by President Khatami in January 1999. In 1999, Taqi Ebtekar was the head of the group and Bahari Pour (or Pur) was the director. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0851" task="">
  <question>
    How is Iran's Science and Technology Group (STG) organized? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NCR claims that beneath the STG are four sections: the Defense Ministry's Special Industries Organization, the Jihad Construction Research Center, the Revolutionary Guards' study center at the Imam Hoseyn University, and the Biotechnology Research Center. The National Council of Resistance on Iran reports that in only one branch of the STG, the regime has already developed three biological agents?VX (though in fact a chemical agent), aflatoxin, and Bacillus anthracis?with the help of at least 18 Russian, Chinese, and Korean experts. The same source believes there are many more individuals working on these projects. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0852" task="">
  <question>
    How large is Iran's Science and Technology Group (STG)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Size: At least 18 experts Primary Function: The Science and Technology Group (STG) allegedly oversees Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.History: Allegedly created by President Khatami in January 1999. In 1999, Taqi Ebtekar was the head of the group and Bahari Pour (or Pur) was the director. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0853" task="">
  <question>
    What has Iran done to expand its chemical and biological weapons capacity since 1999? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the group claims that under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group, Iran's ruling mullah's have allegedly: * formed the Revolutionary Gurards' 24th Bessat Brigade for Chemical Attacks, * stockpiled huge quantities of nerve agents, * expanded biotechnology research centers and the NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) Special Industries Organization, * hired Chinese, Korean, and Russian experts under cover of research projects, and * procured the required materials and technology from European countries through the use of dual-use technology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0854" task="">
  <question>
    What is the primary function of Iran's Revioulationary Guard's 24th Bessat Brigade? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the group claims that under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group, Iran's ruling mullah's have allegedly: * formed the Revolutionary Gurards' 24th Bessat Brigade for Chemical Attacks 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0855" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran have chemical weapons troops? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the group claims that under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group, Iran's ruling mullah's have allegedly: * formed the Revolutionary Gurards' 24th Bessat Brigade for Chemical Attacks 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0856" task="">
  <question>
    Does the Iranian military train its troops in the use of CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the group claims that under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group, Iran's ruling mullah's have allegedly: * formed the Revolutionary Gurards' 24th Bessat Brigade for Chemical Attacks 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0857" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents is Iran suspected of stockpiling? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the group claims that under the supervision of the Science and Technology Group, Iran's ruling mullah's have allegedly: * formed the Revolutionary Gurards' 24th Bessat Brigade for Chemical Attacks, * stockpiled huge quantities of nerve agents, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0858" task="">
  <question>
    Which chemical and biological agents has Iran's Science and Technology Group reportedly developed since 1999? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NCR claims that beneath the STG are four sections: the Defense Ministry's Special Industries Organization, the Jihad Construction Research Center, the Revolutionary Guards' study center at the Imam Hoseyn University, and the Biotechnology Research Center. The National Council of Resistance on Iran reports that in only one branch of the STG, the regime has already developed three biological agents?VX (though in fact a chemical agent), aflatoxin, and Bacillus anthracis?with the help of at least 18 Russian, Chinese, and Korean experts. The same source believes there are many more individuals working on these projects. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0859" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran developed biological agents using Anthrax bacteria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The National Council of Resistance on Iran reports that in only one branch of the STG, the regime has already developed three biological agents?VX (though in fact a chemical agent), aflatoxin, and Bacillus anthracis?with the help of at least 18 Russian, Chinese, and Korean experts. The same source believes there are many more individuals working on these projects. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0860" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's STG? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Science and Technology Group (STG) allegedly oversees Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2374.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0861" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology (IROST)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biotechnology Institute of the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology  Source: IROST website Other names: Biotechnology Department of IROST, Biotechnology Research Center, Group of Fermentation and Biological Technology 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0862" task="">
  <question>
    Is the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology (IROST) involved in producing CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biotechnology Institute of the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology  Source: IROST website Other names: Biotechnology Department of IROST, Biotechnology Research Center, Group of Fermentation and Biological Technology 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0863" task="">
  <question>
    How much bioinsecticide is produced each year at the Biotechnology Institute of the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology (IROST)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    nitial research focused on laboratory-scale projects concentrating on the &quot;application of Bacillus thuringiensis against Anopheles larvae.&quot; This research lead to the construction of a biotechnology pilot plant in 1989 for the production of B. thuringiensis. The pilot plant, shown below, was inaugurated in 1990 and produces more than two tons of bioinsecticide per year. As of January 1999, Dr. Nassrin Azimi has been in charge of one of the five biotechnology groups at the center. The center has continued to work on many biotechnology projects at both the laboratory and semi-industrial levels. One of the most successful projects involved producing bacterial insecticides in cooperation with UNESCO. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0864" task="">
  <question>
    Who guards the Iranian Research Organization for Science and Technology (IROST)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Additional Information: The center is guarded by the Pasdaran (Islamic Revolution Guard Corps). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2381.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0865" task="">
  <question>
    What is the primary function of IROST? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    IROST is affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. Size: Seven research departments (electrical and computer, biotechnology, chemical, mechanical, agriculture, materials and metallurgy, and the department of technical development studies). In addition, IROST also maintains research centers in Arak (a research center and an industrial center), Esfahan, Tabriz, Shahrood, Shiraz, Kerman, Gilan, and Mashad.  Primary Function: IROST is committed to improving &quot;the scientific and technical skills in both the public and private sector by supporting the scientists and researchers in [the] technical and financial [arenas].&quot; The primary thrust of IROST, judging from its website, appears to be information technology. It offers website development and web-hosting services. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2383.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2383.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0866" task="">
  <question>
    Are there any suspected links between IROST and Iran's biological or chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are no known accusations that IROST or the PTCC are connected in anyway with biological weapons. However, the PTCC does maintain a significant collection of bacteria and fungi that could be used in a biological warfare (BW) program. For instance, the PTCC maintains cultures of Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis--both of which have been weaponized by other countries in the past. The PTCC also maintains cultures of Bacillus cereus, Listeria monocytogenes, Yersinia pseudotuberculosis, Salmonella paratyphi, Vibrio cholarae, Yersinia enterocolitica, Salmonella typhimurium, Shigella dysenteriae, Shigella boydii, Shigella blexneri, and Cryptococcus neoformans. While it is possible that these pathogens could be weaponized, they have not been the focus of BW programs in other countries in the past. Finally, the PTCC maintains cultures of Bacillus subtilis, Serratia marcescens, and Bacillus thuringiensis. While these agents are not dangerous to humans, they have been used in bioweapons programs in other countries in the past to simulate biological weapons. For instance, B. thuringiensis is very similar to B. anthracis and has been used by other countries to perfect the equipment and techniques necessary to produce and disseminate it. The first project undertaken by IROST appears to have been the cultivation, pilot production, and dissemination of B. thuringiensis. The technologies used for this project would have been directly applicable to the cultivation, production, and dissemination of B. anthracis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0867" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's Persian Type Culture Collection (PTCC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological Facilities Persian Type Culture Collection Other Names: PTCC Address: P.O. Box 15815 ? 3538 Tehran 15819 Islamic Republic of Iran Location: Tehran Website: http://database.irost.net/ 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0868" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran currently conducting research that could benefit the development of its chemical or biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to these programs, the Agricultural Biotechnology department also has conducted significant research on species of Fusarium, fungi that attack wheat crops and produce T-2 and other trichothecene mycotoxins. In 1988 and 1989, Iranian scientists contacted Canadian and Dutch research institutes in an effort to purchase strains of fusaria. These efforts were blocked by the Canadian and Dutch governments for fear that Iran may have planned on using the fungi to develop T-2 mycotoxin for a BW program.[1] In the years following these attempts, Russian and US intelligence speculated that Iran maintained an active BW program focused on the development of mycotoxins.[2] However, it is unclear if these speculations were solely an extrapolation from the 1989 Canadian and Dutch purchase attempts or if the allegations rely on other classified intelligence. Regardless of the allegations, the fusaria research conducted by the Agricultural Biotechnology department appears to be completely benign. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0869" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran conducted research into mycotoxin BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1988 and 1989, Iranian scientists contacted Canadian and Dutch research institutes in an effort to purchase strains of fusaria. These efforts were blocked by the Canadian and Dutch governments for fear that Iran may have planned on using the fungi to develop T-2 mycotoxin for a BW program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2305_2384.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0870" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Iran has produced stockpiles of ricin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1990s Iran reportedly acquires 120 tons of castor beans, used in the production of the toxin ricin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0871" task="">
  <question>
    How long has Iran had an &quot;operational&quot; biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 1993 US President George Bush, in his last arms control compliance report to Congress, states that Iran probably has produced a small amount of biological weapons. CIA Director James Woolsey states that Iran's BW ability &quot;could be operational now.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0872" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the United States place Iran under sanctions in 1993? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    15 January 1993 Title XVI of the US Department of Defense Authorization Act places Iran under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 (PL 101-513). Under this act, the United States opposes, and seeks that other states oppose, transfers of goods or technology to Iran that would contribute to its acquisition of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, or destabilizing numbers of advanced conventional weapons. ?&quot;Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992,&quot; Arms Sales Monitor, 15 January 1993, p. 3. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0873" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran conducted military exercises using chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1993 Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-4, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves &quot;chemical, biological, and radiological operations.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0874" task="">
  <question>
    Where has Iran obtained advanced technology for its bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Spring 1993 Reports suggest that Iran has succeeded in obtaining advanced technology that can be applied to BW from companies in Switzerland, as well as containment equipment and technology from Germany. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0875" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons assistance did Iran receive from Syria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 April 1993 Michael Eisenstadt, writing for Jane's Intelligence Review, states that Syria and Iran have developed a relationship in the field of military cooperation and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He states that the cooperation may include work in the nuclear arena (where Iran enjoys a technological lead) and perhaps the development of chemical and biological warheads (where Syria enjoys a technological lead). [Note: Eisenstadt, as the excerpt above shows, emphasizes &quot;may&quot; and &quot;perhaps,&quot; and offers no concrete examples to back up his speculation.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0876" task="">
  <question>
    What was the focus of &quot;Wa al Fajr&quot; CW military exercises? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Wa al-Fajr-1, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Participating forces in the exercise include &quot;chemical, biological, and radiological units. July 1994 Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fajr-7, in the Northern Persian Gulf. Participating forces in the exercise include &quot;chemical, biological, and radiological units.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0877" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated Iran to expand its biological and chemical weapons program in 1995? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1995 The US DOD believes that Iran probably accelerated its biological weapons development efforts after the 1995 revelations about the scale of Iraq's BW program prior to the Gulf War. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0878" task="">
  <question>
    How is Iran been suspected of concealing its bioweapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1995 The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states in its 1995 Annual Report to Congress that, &quot;The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran's extensive biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities. The Iranian military has used medical, education and scientific research organizations for many aspects of BW agent procurement, research, and production. Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBM's.&quot; The report's finding is that, &quot;The United States reiterates its previous finding that Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.&quot; ?US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, &quot;1995 Annual Report ? Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0879" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran preparing to respond to chemical or biological weapons attacks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1995 Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-6, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves &quot;dealing with injuries from chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks.&quot; IRGC helicopters equipped with spray tanks overfly Iranian naval vessels in the military exercise, &quot;evidently simulating a chemical or biological attack against ships at sea.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0880" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries oppose inspections as part of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC, BTWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    13 July 1995 It is reported that Iran, along with Pakistan, India, and China, is obstructing the establishment of a verification mechanism for the BWC. ?&quot;Pointers,&quot; Jane's Foreign Report, 13 July 1995. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0881" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran been suspected of using aerosolized bioweapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1996 According to press reports, Iran has developed a BW aerosol for terrorist use, which the Iranian leaders have allegedly deployed to assassinate three opponents of the regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0882" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran have BW that can be delivered via an aerosol? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1996 According to press reports, Iran has developed a BW aerosol for terrorist use, which the Iranian leaders have allegedly deployed to assassinate three opponents of the regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0883" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Iran's chemical weapons production facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1996 The Centre for Defence and International Security Studies says that &quot;Iran reportedly has both CW production facilities and a BW research laboratory at Damghan, near a dry lake 300 km east of Tehran. Iran has tried to buy from European countries biological agents for anthrax and toxins that could be used to develop BW weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0884" task="">
  <question>
    How much foreign assistance does Iran need to further develop its biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tehran most likely has investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents. Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant BW program and needs little foreign assistance. It conducts top-notch legitimate biomedical research at various institutes, which we suspect provide support to the BW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0885" task="">
  <question>
    Could Iran develop BW without foreign assistance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tehran most likely has investigated both toxins and live organisms as BW agents. Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant BW program and needs little foreign assistance. It conducts top-notch legitimate biomedical research at various institutes, which we suspect provide support to the BW program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0886" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran suspected of providing chemical or biological weapons to terrorist organizations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Because of the dual-use nature of biomedical technology, Iran's ability to produce a number of both human and veterinary vaccines also gives it the capability for large-scale BW agent production.&quot; The report goes on to say that while there is a danger of countries such as Iran, Libya, and Syria aiding terrorists in creating chemical or biological weapons, the CIA currently has &quot;no evidence of state sponsors providing chemical or biological weapons, or the technologies to produce them, to terrorist groups...&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0887" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Iran have biological weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Sunday Times cites an Israeli analysis that states that Iran has a stockpile of Bacillus anthracis and botulinum toxin in the northwest city of Tabriz. The newspaper says that &quot;both the CIA and the Israelis believe that military scientists working for the Islamic regime in Tehran have developed a deadly BW aerosol that can be carried by a terrorist.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0888" task="">
  <question>
    What is the potential range of the long-range missiles that Iran is developing to deliver chemical and biological warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1996 A report in the German newspaper Bild claims that Iran is developing a 3,500km-range ballistic missile that could carry a 700kg chemical or biological warhead. An analysis of the article notes, &quot;Commenting on the Bild story, Klaus Rose, chairman of the German Parliamentary Defence Committee, said that the reports may be true. 'It is a genuine threat,' Rose told Saar radio. 'The reports are credible.' Rose adds that the Iranian missile could carry a conventional High Explosive warhead as well as chemical and biological warheads. He also suggested that key technologies for the programme were being obtained from North Korea and Russia.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0889" task="">
  <question>
    How is Iran trying to recruit former Soviet weapons experts? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Jane's suggests that Iran and other countries are opening up trade offices in Moscow so that they may recruit former Soviet scientists and weapons experts to work on their weapons of mass destruction programs. Jane's cites the US Defense Department's publication Proliferation Threat and Response, April 1996 as evidence of the existence of Iran's WMD program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0890" task="">
  <question>
    Why would Iran recruit former Soviet NBC weapons experts? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Jane's suggests that Iran and other countries are opening up trade offices in Moscow so that they may recruit former Soviet scientists and weapons experts to work on their weapons of mass destruction programs. Jane's cites the US Defense Department's publication Proliferation Threat and Response, April 1996 as evidence of the existence of Iran's WMD program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0891" task="">
  <question>
    Which companies have been linked to sales of biotoxins or BW to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Iran Brief reports that some of Iran's &quot;major universities and research organizations may be linked to its biological warfare program. Hints of the Iranian program have emerged in bits and pieces in recent years, as mysterious explosions have occurred in Switzerland and Germany at warehouses where biological fermenters were being prepared for shipment to Iran. The main alleged supplier was a subsidiary of Bayer in Germany....On July 8, 1996, the Commerce Department announced that it had fined one US supplier, Sigma Chemical Company of St. Louis, Missouri, $480,000 for having made 48 shipments of biotoxins to various destinations since 1991. Many of those shipments went to Iran. On two occasions, the company applied for licenses to ship biological materials and enzymes to Iran in 1990 and 1991, but was refused. Sigma's client on those occasions were the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and the Biochemistry Institute of Tehran.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0892" task="">
  <question>
    Is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard involved in producing chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The State Department would not respond at the unclassified level as to whether the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is involved in producing biological weapons in Iran. The State Department also has no evidence to suggest that Iran has transferred biological weapons to terrorist groups.  April 1997 Paula DeSutter writes that &quot;Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and other means of delivery and its use of its NBC weapons will be particularly difficult to deter....The IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] has the lead in Iran for the production and employment of NBC weapons and is well organized, coherent, and virulent in their hatred of the United States... 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0893" task="">
  <question>
    Has the Iranian Navy engaged in exercises using chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa Island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz....Iran, and the Iranian Navy in particular, has exercised its BW and CW capabilities in tactical maneuvers that explicitly train the IRGC's 'Shin-mim-re' or 'chemical, biological, and radiological' units. Most of these exercises involve offensive assaults on fixed enemy positions. Thus, they are not strictly defensive...&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0894" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence to believe that Iran's chemical weapons can be used offensively? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa Island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz....Iran, and the Iranian Navy in particular, has exercised its BW and CW capabilities in tactical maneuvers that explicitly train the IRGC's 'Shin-mim-re' or 'chemical, biological, and radiological' units. Most of these exercises involve offensive assaults on fixed enemy positions. Thus, they are not strictly defensive...&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0895" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of the Iran's Shehab-3 and Shehab-4 missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, Iran is developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Mossad states, &quot;Massive Russian assistance and close cooperation with Iran are enabling the Iranian regime to develop independent capabilities to produce medium-range ballistic missile systems within a very short time.&quot; Technical and HUMINT sources reveal that the Shehab-3 and -4 missiles have ranges up to 1,240 miles. The US DIA confirmed the Mossad's information. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0896" task="">
  <question>
    How is Iran acquiring chemical weapons technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Jane's reports that, &quot;Over the last few years, Iran has embarked on what the CIA calls an 'unrelenting' program to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology. The US intelligence community is watching closely to determine Iranian acquisition methods, which range from outright purchases on the world market to developing technology programs domestically.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0897" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of VX nerve agent is Iran reported to have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    United States Secretary of Defense William Cohen states that the United States &quot;is now concerned Iran may have produced up to 200 tons of VX nerve agent 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0898" task="">
  <question>
    How many gallons of anthrax is Iran reported to have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    United States Secretary of Defense William Cohen states that the United States &quot;is now concerned Iran may have produced up to 200 tons of VX nerve agent and 6,000 gallons of anthrax. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2367.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0899" task="">
  <question>
    What Iranian chemical weapons facilities are located on Abu Musa Island? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Activities: Although Abu Musa island is not a CW facility per se, there have been reports that during a period of tension between Iraq and Iran, Iran deployed CW munitions on the island. The New York Times reported in late March 1995 that, according to administration officials, Iran's military deployment on disputed islands in the Gulf included chemical weapons. Jane's Defense Weekly also reported in April 1995 that US Defense Secretary William Perry revealed that Iran had placed chemical weapons on disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. According to Pentagon officials, the weapons deployed on Abu Musa island were mostly 155mm artillery shells.  The Journal of Commerce also reported that Secretary Perry said that Iran had deployed &quot;...6,000 troops, chemical weapons, and anti-ship missiles to unmanned islands in the Strait of Hormuz.&quot; Finally, according to a study by the National Defense University from April 1997, &quot;The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0900" task="">
  <question>
    What is the significance of Abu Musa Island to Iranian chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, according to a study by the National Defense University from April 1997, &quot;The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0901" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons facilities does Iran have in the Strait of Hormuz? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, according to a study by the National Defense University from April 1997, &quot;The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0902" task="">
  <question>
    Where are some of Iran's chemical weapons facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Abu Musa Island Damghan Engineering Research Center for the Contruction Crusade (Jihad-e Sazandegi) Esfahan Karaj Marvdasht Melli Agrochemicals (&quot;National&quot; Agrochemicals) Parchin Qazvin Special Industries Organization (SIO) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0903" task="">
  <question>
    How many Iranian research facilities are suspected to be involved with production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Size of individual research centers unknown. The entire ministry has 12 different divisions and a number of organizations, directorates, offices, and companies. Research centers were established in 20 provinces throughout the country. According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, there are four affiliate research institutes in the cities of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashad that are involved in production and research for WMD. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0904" task="">
  <question>
    Which Iranian research facilities are suspected to be involved with production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Size of individual research centers unknown. The entire ministry has 12 different divisions and a number of organizations, directorates, offices, and companies. Research centers were established in 20 provinces throughout the country. According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, there are four affiliate research institutes in the cities of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashad that are involved in production and research for WMD. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0905" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Engineering Research Center for the Construction Crusade (Jihad-e-Sazandegi?)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    History: The Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi (or &quot;striving for construction and development,&quot; better known as Construction Crusade) was formed in 1983 by Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Consultative Parliament to address poverty through rural development and construction and agricultural growth and self-sufficiency. The ministry played a crucial role in the Iran-Iraq War by constructing strategic bridges, floating bridges, floating vehicles, submarines, freeways for armored vehicles, and special vehicles for use in marshy fields. In the spring of 1983, the office dedicated to army engineering research was moved from war fronts in the south of Iran to Tehran. This Engineering Research Center was the starting point for Jihad-e Sazandegi's future engineering research activities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0906" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between the Engineering Research Center for the Construction Crusade (Jihad-e-Sazandegi) and Iran's chemical or biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the engineering research center is the government department responsible for all chemical development facilities. Iran established at least one large research and development center under the control of the center, which had allegedly established a significant chemical weapons production capability by mid-1989. The same source reports that the center focuses on research and production of VX. (However, perhaps one could question the accuracy of those allegations due to the Council's reference to VX as a &quot;biological agent&quot;). It is also reported that the Research Center is manufacturing an advanced fermenter designed by its own scientists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0907" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between the Engineering Research Center for the Construction Crusade (Jihad-e-Sazandegi) and Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The National Council of Resistance of Iran reports that during the Iran-Iraq War, the Construction Crusade was affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a revolutionary group that reportedly directs the production and employment of WMD in Iran, while also advocating the funding of terrorist groups. The same source notes that the Research Center, now managed by Fadhlallah Wakili-Fard, was originally supposed to be part of the Defense Ministry, but was established separately by IRGC Minister Muhsin Rafiqdust as a means of covering its true intent. According to Paula A. De Sutter, the Construction Crusade acted as the corps of engineers for the IRGC, aiding in the production of material for Iran's biological, nuclear, chemical and missile programs. In 1986, the Tehran Domestic Service reported the IRGC Minister's announcement that &quot;the armament industries of the Corps have made notable progress in the missile, aircraft, biological, chemical and nuclear fields.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0908" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapon technologies is Iran's Engineering Research Center for the Construction Crusade (Jihad-e-Sazandegi) suspected of developing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the engineering research center is the government department responsible for all chemical development facilities. Iran established at least one large research and development center under the control of the center, which had allegedly established a significant chemical weapons production capability by mid-1989. The same source reports that the center focuses on research and production of VX. (However, perhaps one could question the accuracy of those allegations due to the Council's reference to VX as a &quot;biological agent&quot;). It is also reported that the Research Center is manufacturing an advanced fermenter designed by its own scientists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0909" task="">
  <question>
    What biological weapons is Iran stockpiling in Tarbiz? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The ministry also constructed three large wheat silos in the cities of Tabriz, Takistan, and Rasht. According to reports by US experts and Israeli sources, the facility near Tarbiz is being used to store stocks of biological agent such as anthrax and botulinum toxin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2338.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0910" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents did Iran stockpile in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After 1985 [According to Anthony H. Cordesman], Iran begins to stockpile cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and mustard gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0911" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons assistance did Iran receive from North Korea in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Jane's Intelligence Review reports that evidence exists that between 1986 and 1988, Iran received help from North Korea to design and manufacture chemical warheads. The possibility also exists that North Korea directly transferred chemical warheads to Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0912" task="">
  <question>
    Has the UN investigated Iran's reported use of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1986 A second UN mission visits Iran to investigate CW attacks. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0913" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran been attacked by forces using chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 February 1986 IRNA radio reported military communiques stating that Iranian troops came under chemical weapons attack while defending Iranian-held territory surrounding the Umm Qasr naval base on Iraq's Fao peninsula. Chemical weapons decontamination units were at the scene trying to neutralize the agents. The chemical weapons consisted of &quot;'chemical bullets' as well as missiles, each of which carried 40 liters [approximately 10 gallons] of chemical solution.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0914" task="">
  <question>
    Do Iranian hospitals have experience treating victims of chemical weapons attacks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    13 February 1986 Dr. Hamid Sorabpour, a director of a hospital in Tehran, reports that his hospital has already admitted 85 victims of nerve and mustard gas intoxication, and that they expected 70 more to be admitted shortly. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0915" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Iran used chemical weapons against Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    13 February 1986 Iran's UN Ambassador, Said Rajaie Khorassani, accuses Iraqi planes of attacking the Iranian city of Abadan with chemical weapons. Although he gives no direct figures on the numbers of killed by CW in Abadan, Khorassani claims 2,500 Iranians have been injured and 20 killed by mustard, nerve, and blood agents in the past few days. He goes on to accuse the UN Security Council of &quot;callousness and irresponsibility&quot; in not condemning Iraq's CW use and other violations of international law. Khorassani says he officially asked Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to send a team to investigate the attacks. In response to the Iraqi claims that Iran had used CW against Iraq, Khorassani responded that it was a &quot;big lie&quot; and that &quot;when we use it, we will say it.&quot; He warns that &quot;if Iraq uses [CW] one more time, we have to use these weapons if they continue.26 February 1986 The New York Times states that &quot;although [Iraq and Iran] have accused each other of using chemical weapons, there has never been any evidence that Iran has used them in the five-and-a-half year war, according to US and United Nations officials.&quot; (Note: The Times did not mention the names of the officials to which they are referring.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0916" task="">
  <question>
    Which chemical weapons were used against Iranian forces in the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 March 1986 The UN mission sent to investigate Iraqi chemical weapons attacks in Iran conclude that, &quot;Based on evidence gathered during this second visit to Iran, the UN mission unanimously concluded that chemical weapons have been used in the Abadan area against Iranian positions by Iraqi forces. Medical examinations and testimony of Iranian and Iraqi casualties evacuated from the Al-Faw area further confirmed the use of chemical weapons in that war zone by Iraqi forces. Delivery weapons were identified as aerial bombs filled with mustard gas. The mission also concluded that the sheer number of casualties [over 70] seen in Tehran and Ahvaz would indicate an escalation in the use of chemical weapons in 1986 compared to 1984...we unanimously conclude that: (a) On many occassions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces; (b) The agent used has mainly been mustard gas although on some occassions nerve gas was also employed.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0917" task="">
  <question>
    Did Syria supply Iran with chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    25 March 1986 An unidentified &quot;knowledgeable US source&quot; states that Syria has begun producing CW. When asked if the Syrians were providing CW to Iran, the source said, &quot;I think I'd better not answer that question.&quot; The disclosure came at a briefing for reporters at the State Department on the current status of arms control talks. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0918" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran produce chemical weapons suits domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    18 May 1986 Factories in Iran are now producing a military uniform offering protection against chemical weapons. November 1986 Iran claims to have become self sufficient in chemical defensive gear. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0919" task="">
  <question>
    How did Syria and Iran obtain nerve gas warheads during the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    23 November 1986 Simon O'Dwyer-Russell, defense correspondent for the Sunday Telegraph of London, reports that unidentified Western intelligence officials believe that Iran and Syria have acquired nerve gas warheads from the Soviet Union via Libya. These sources say that the warheads can be attached to Scud-B missiles. It is not clear when Libya may have received the warheads, but British intelligence is reported to have &quot;traced the source of the nerve agent back to the Soviet Union.&quot; The warheads can reportedly kill everyone within a 25-square mile area, although such an impact is clearly being overstated. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0920" task="">
  <question>
    Did Iran receive chemical weapons from the Soviet Union during the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    23 November 1986 According to US officials, Iran has received Soviet chemical warfare equipment via Czechoslovakia. Anthony Cordesman and Gary Sick are experts interviewed for this story. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2958.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0921" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Iran finance North Korea's missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1985 Iran agrees to finance the North Korean missile program in exchange for missiles and missile technology. Iran also offers to assist in clandestine technology acquisition in the United States and Western Europe. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0922" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Iran get Scud-B missiles from? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1985 The Soviet Union indirectly provides surface-to-surface missiles (Scud-B) to Iran through Libya and Syria. January 1985 Libya and Syria provide additional Scud-Bs to Iran. Syria also sends its missile technicians to Sardasht to train the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps elements in fueling and operating Scud-Bs. Early 1986 Iran purchases $1.2 billion worth of weapons through Syria, including Scud-Bs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0923" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Iran develop the Oghab tactical artillery rocket? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1985 In the summer, Iran approaches both North Korea and China looking for ballistic missiles and missile technology. It appears from the meetings in Beijing that China has agreed to help Iran manufacture the Oghab tactical artillery rocket. Iran has reportedly fired 253 Oghab rockets at military and civilian targets inside Iraq during the war. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1801.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0924" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Iran is using Indian companies in order to obtain chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1998 German intelligence reports that Iran is making efforts toacquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three separate Indian companies as fronts: &quot;With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory.&quot; The following Indian companies were implicated: Tata Consulting Engineering, Transpek, and Rallis India. The Iranian companies involved in the building of the CW complex are Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and Shahid Hemat Industrial group. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0925" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons is Iran trying to obtain through Indian companies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    German intelligence reports that Iran is making efforts toacquire production equipment for tabun and sarin, using three separate Indian companies as fronts: &quot;With the aid of Indian companies, Iran is nearing the completion of a secret poison-gas plant, which was claimed by the Indian companies to be a pesticide factory.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0926" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents is Iran capable of producing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1998 Iran is capable of producing several CW agents, including nerve, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0927" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons equipment has Iran purchased from Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 1998 An internal Israeli defense ministry report allegedly claims that Israel has maintained military-industrial ties with Iran. The report mentions three suspected business deals: (1) the supply of 58,000 gas masks by Shalon Chemical Industries after the Iran-Iraq War; (2) the supply of gas detectors by Elbit for the identification of chemical warfare agents; and (3) the installation of fire control systems on East European Tanks sold to Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0928" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran declared its chemical weapons under the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 1998 Iran submits its CWC declarations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0929" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons is Iran believed to have stockpiled? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran &quot;manufactures weapons for blister, blood, and choking agents; it is also believed to be conducting research on nerve agents. Iran's stockpile of chemical weapons is believed to include nerve and blister agents. Iran is estimated to have an inventory of several thousand tons of various agents, including sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0930" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons agents can Iran produce each year? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Its production capacity is estimated at as much as 1,000 tons a year, with major production facilities located at Damghan, 300km east of Tehran. Iran is working on developing a self-sufficient CW production capacity that includes more effective nerve agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0931" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Iran's primary chemical weapons facility located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Its production capacity is estimated at as much as 1,000 tons a year, with major production facilities located at Damghan, 300km east of Tehran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0932" task="">
  <question>
    What is Damghan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Its production capacity is estimated at as much as 1,000 tons a year, with major production facilities located at Damghan, 300km east of Tehran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0933" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Mohammad R. Alborzi? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Ambassador Mohammad R. Alborzi, director general of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, delivers Iran's CW declaration during a session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague, Netherlands. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0934" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran first declare that it had chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    18 November 1998 Ambassador Mohammad R. Alborzi, director general of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, delivers Iran's CW declaration during a session of the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) to the CWC in The Hague, Netherlands. In his statement, he admits for the first time that Iran had once possessed CW, in the waning years of the Iran-Iraq War. But he claims that, &quot;...following the establishment of cease fire, the decision to develop chemical weapons capabilities was reversed and the process was terminated.&quot; During the speech, Alborzi repeated that Iran would continue a policy that shuns CW production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0935" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran complied with the OPCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    23 January 1999 The Director General of the OPCW, Jose M. Bustani, says in a visit to Tehran that &quot;Iran is an exemplary state in the campaign against chemical weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0936" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Iran produce VX nerve agent? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 January 1999 The National Council of Resistance of Iran states that VX nerve agent is produced in the Construction Crusade's War Engineering Research Center. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0937" task="">
  <question>
    Have OPCW inspectors visited Iran's chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1999 International CW inspectors from the OPCW visit Iran's chemical sites. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0938" task="">
  <question>
    How has the election of President Khatami influenced the production of chemical and biological weapons in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    13 February 1999 The MKO reports that Iran has accelerated its CBW production program since President Khatami came to office: &quot;Under the supervision of around 25 of their Russian counterparts, Iranian scientists have hastened their efforts to develop chemical and biological weapons....&quot; According to MKO sources, Iran is awaiting sophisticated computers to accelerate its CBW production and has already managed to produce the CW nerve agent VX, as well as anthrax and aflatoxins (biological agents/toxins). In addition to Russian scientists that are assisting Iran's program, the MKO claimed that Chinese and North Korean scientists are also &quot;helping to further Iran's WMD capabilities....&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0939" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran play any role in the development of new treatment techniques for the victims of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    15 May 1999 A center named the International Centre for Training and Treatment of the Victims of Chemical Warfare (ICTTVCW) is inaugurated in Tehran. ?&quot;Chemical Warfare Treatment Center Opens in Teheran,&quot; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 May 1999; FBIS, Document FTS19990515000532, 15 May 1999. 15-20 May 1999 The first international seminar for specialized medical training arranged by the OPCW is convened in Tehran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0940" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons assistance is Iran suspected of having received during the late 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July-December 1999 According to a report by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), during the second half of 1999, &quot;...Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare program from entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly through intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0941" task="">
  <question>
    Has the OPCW certified the Iranian chemical weapons declarations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 1999 The OPCW certifies the Iranian declarations submitted under the CWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0942" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection of Iran's Special Industries Organization to chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1993 Rafsanjani reportedly creates a chemical weapons-related entity, the Special Industries Organization (SIO). This 250-man agency is independent of the Council of Ministers. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0943" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Israel assist Iran in developing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1993 According to the Israeli Supreme Court's ruling, Nahum Manbar signs a memorandum of understanding with Iran to provide the know-how and a list of equipment necessary to build a factory to produce binary shells filled with VX. [Note: Binary shells for VX would pose some tricky engineering problems, which probably wouldn't be solved until they actually produce VX itself and arm shells. After that stage is the issues of fuzing, and designing a system to combine a liquid (QL) with solid sulfur and expect it all to react the way one would want, with the short time involved in ballistic trajectory.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0944" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran sign the Chemical Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    13 January 1993 Iran signs the Chemical Weapons Convention 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0945" task="">
  <question>
    How much did Iran pay North Korea to develop a ballistic missile capable of carrying a chemical weapons payload? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    29 March 1993 According to Western intelligence sources, North Korea and Iran are engaged in a cooperative effort to develop a ballistic missile system capable of carrying nuclear and chemical warheads. Iran reportedly provided North Korea $500 million for the missile program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0946" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Iran's chemical weapons missiles assembled? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is believed that anthrax and sarin warheads have been fitted to Iran's Scud-Cs or other ballistic missiles. The Semnan missile facility reportedly produces five tons of nerve gas per month, which is then shipped to the main missile assembly plant at Isfahan, where it is assembled in warheads and fitted onto Iranian-built Scud-Bs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0947" task="">
  <question>
    What is the significance of Iran's chemical weapons plant at Isfahan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Semnan missile facility reportedly produces five tons of nerve gas per month, which is then shipped to the main missile assembly plant at Isfahan, where it is assembled in warheads and fitted onto Iranian-built Scud-Bs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0948" task="">
  <question>
    How much nerve gas is produced at Iran's Semnan missile facility each month? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Semnan missile facility reportedly produces five tons of nerve gas per month, which is then shipped to the main missile assembly plant at Isfahan, where it is assembled in warheads and fitted onto Iranian-built Scud-Bs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0949" task="">
  <question>
    What CBW payloads can be delivered by Iran's Scud-C missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US intelligence sources confirm that Iran is now capable of delivering CBW using ballistic and short-range missiles, due to advances in &quot;packaging technology.&quot; It is believed that anthrax and sarin warheads have been fitted to Iran's Scud-Cs or other ballistic missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0950" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons products did Iran produce in the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    20 May 1993 The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB) reports that Iran has the industrial production capability for sarin and mustard gas. According to the FSB reported quoted in Jane's Information Group, &quot;a plant for the production of pesticides which could be used as precursors in the manufacture of nerve-paralyzing and blister producing toxic substances operates not far from the capital.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0951" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iraq sold Iran chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    9 September 1993 Arab and Kurdish opposition sources in London report that Iraq has sold large amounts of arms and ammunition to Iran, including missiles and chemical weapons, in exchange for foreign currency. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0952" task="">
  <question>
    Did Iran develop the capability to develop V-agent nerve gases during the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1990s Anthony Cordesman states, &quot;Iran's efforts to equip plants to produces V-agent nerve gases seem to have been delayed by US, British, and German efforts to limit technology transfers to Iran, but Iran may have acquired the capability to produce persistent nerve gas during the mid-1990s.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0953" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors did Iran reportedly import from China during the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1994 Iran purchases mustard and nerve gas precursors from China. The deal is reportedly brokered by Nahum Manbar, the Israeli businessman implicated in a UK/Israeli intelligence operation to penetrate the Iranian chemical procurement network. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0954" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Peter Walascheck reportedly supply to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    15 November 1994 Peter Walascheck is arrested by Croatian officials for making illegal attempts to supply chemical weapons to Iran in the late 1980s. Walascheck, a German national, fled to Croatia in 1988 after he pled guilty to trying to organize a deal with the Baltimore-based Alcolac Inc. to ship thiodyglycol (a known mustard agent precursor) to Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0955" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons production equipment did Iran purchase from Germany? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    17 November 1994 German Customs Intelligence (ZKA) reports that Iran is making attempts to buy peripheral items, such as heating units, which as well as being used in pesticide plants, have applications in the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering CBW. The ZKA documents also warn companies to be on their guard against Iranian inquiries regarding chemicals that can be used to produce rocket fuel. Iran supposedly seeks fine-grained aluminum powder, ammonium perchlorate, and hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB). Exporters are warned to be on the alert for direct or indirect approaches from two Iranian state enterprises, believed to be acting as procurement agencies for Iran's Defense Industries Organization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0956" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Iran deployed offensive chemical weapons capabilities on Abu Musa island? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Late 1994 The IRGC begins to deploy 155mm guns to Abu Musa and reportedly possesses CW there as well. [Note: The 155mm was the typical artillery round used in the West for chemical agent fill during the US offensive CW program.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0957" task="">
  <question>
    Which Chinese companies were sanctioned by the US for selling chemical weapons precursors to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    March 1995 The United States imposes sanctions on three Chinese front companies in Hong Kong for having shipped nerve gas precursors and production equipment to Iran. The three companies are identified as Asian Ways Limited, WorldCo Limited, and Mainway International. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0958" task="">
  <question>
    How much did Libya pay Iran for missile and chemical weapons technology obtained from North Korea and China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Western intelligence agencies, Iran and Libya agree to cooperate in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Libya allegedly offers to pay Iran $31 million for material and know-how that Iran received from North Korea, China, and various Western sources. This could include equipment for a liquid fuel plant. Supposedly, the two countries will work together to increase the range of the Scud-B missile, as well as to develop Libya's al-Fatah missile. The Western intelligence report was issued after a visit to Tripoli by an Iranian Ministry of Defense delegation, and the sources cite past cooperation between the two countries. During the Iran-Iraq War, Libya allegedly supplied missiles to Iran in exchange for CW, which the Libyans then used in their conflict with Chad. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0959" task="">
  <question>
    What Iranian chemical weapons sites have been spotted by commercial satellites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 June 1995 Jane's states,&quot;Iran's developing NBC facilities are in non-descript buildings in cities,&quot; but several sites such as Bushehr are visible to commercial satellites. The image displayed by Jane's shows F-4 Phantom aircraft parked near the facility. Jane's states that while F-4s can carry chemical weapons, the lack of &quot;indications of chemical weapon bunkers at Bushehr&quot; and &quot;since there are no railroads leading into the town, moving chemical munitions to prepare for an attack would require an airlift.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0960" task="">
  <question>
    What Iranian chemical weapons facilities are located at Bushehr? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 June 1995 Jane's states,&quot;Iran's developing NBC facilities are in non-descript buildings in cities,&quot; but several sites such as Bushehr are visible to commercial satellites. The image displayed by Jane's shows F-4 Phantom aircraft parked near the facility. Jane's states that while F-4s can carry chemical weapons, the lack of &quot;indications of chemical weapon bunkers at Bushehr&quot; and &quot;since there are no railroads leading into the town, moving chemical munitions to prepare for an attack would require an airlift.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0961" task="">
  <question>
    What Iranian chemical weapons facilities are located at Damghan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 June 1995 Jane's claims Damghan &quot;is the location of a chemical warhead production facility... It has several characteristics of chemical weapons plants: isolation, links to transportation lines and security. The facility at Damghan is hidden by trees, downwind from town, surrounded by fallow fields, and linked to the railroad by a spur. The perimeter road lies just outside the grove of trees. There are no signs of bunkers, so munitions are probably moved by rail to arsenals on a regular basis. Although reports state that 155mm artillery shells are the major product, the plant reportedly also loads other weapons with nerve gas. According to Critical Mass, by Burrows and Windrem, Scud-B warheads have been loaded with nerve gas at this facility. Since the missiles are assembled 130km to the southwest in Semnan, which lies on the same rail line, it would take little effort to ship the missiles to Damghan before they are deployed.&quot; ?&quot;Special Report, Damghan,&quot; Jane's Intelligence Review ? Special Report, 1 June 1995, p. 16. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0962" task="">
  <question>
    What Iranian chemical weapons facilities are located at Qazvin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1995 According to Iranian opposition elements, a fire breaks out at the Chemical National Koshavarz factory near Qazvin. The unidentified sources claim that the facility was a CW production site, and that some 2,500 people were poisoned from the fire's emissions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0963" task="">
  <question>
    Have Iranian military forces simulated offensive CBW attacks against ships at sea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1995 IRGC helicopters equipped with spray tanks overfly Iranian naval vessels in a military exercise, &quot;evidently simulating a chemical or biological attack against ships at sea.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0964" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iraq allegedly first use chemical weapons against Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    16 November 1980 Iran publishes its first allegation of an Iraqi CW attack. [Note: As shown directly below, there are varying reports as to when exactly Iraq began using CW against Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0965" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran allegedly first start building its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983-1984 A Western analyst reports that, &quot;Iran only seems to have begun a crash effort to create a domestic chemical weapons production capability in 1983-1984. It sought aid from European firms like Lurgi to product [sic] large 'pesticide' plants and began to try to obtain the needed feedstock from a wide range of sources, relying heavily on its Embassy in Bonn manage the necessary deals.&quot; While Lurgi did not provide the pesticide plant Iran sought, Iran did obtain substantial support from other European firms and feedstocks from a wide range of Western sources. [Note: Cordesman does not offer any citations or other evidence to substantiate his claims. His one footnote for all of this information pertains to a deal in 1987 to ship thiodiglycol to Iran from the Baltimore-based company Alcolac. More information on that case is given below.] ?Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 83. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0966" task="">
  <question>
    Did Iran have chemical weapons capabilities at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1984 According to Anthony Cordesman, Iran did not have the ability to produce CW by the time Iraq began using the weapons against it. However, Cordesman states that Iran &quot;seems to have made limited use of chemical mortar and artillery rounds as early as 1985?and possibly as early as 1984?these rounds were almost certainly captured from Iraq. [Note: The source Cordesman cites to back up these claims, a Washington Times article from 29 October 1986, does not exist. Therefore, it remains unclear where Cordesman received this information. It is possible that it was obtained while being member of Senator John McCain's staff.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0967" task="">
  <question>
    What Iranian chemical weapons facilities were located at Marvdasht? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1984 According to an unconfirmed report, an explosion occurs at the Marvdasht complex in Iran. About a dozen technicians involved in CBW experiments are killed. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0968" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Iraqi forces use against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the first few days of the Kheybar operations some 400 Iranians had been wounded or martyred in Iraq's chemical bombing of the Kheybar operational region. The figure, however, rose gradually to 700 and then 1,100, as the Baghdad regime increased its application of the internationally banned chemicals. The injured Iranian combatants were transferred to various hospitals in Khuzestan and later to Tehran and several other cities for initial treatment. Some of the wounded Iranians who had been contaminated with toxic agents released by the Iraqi bombs on Majnoon Islands suffered mostly from facial burns and eye injuries, also having intense nausea, inflamed, tear-flowing eyes, giddiness, loss of equilibrium and intense coughing. The type of the chemicals used were nerve gas, nitrogen mustard [sic], vesicant (blistering), and irritant. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0969" task="">
  <question>
    What Iraqi chemical weapons facilities were located in Samawa? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 March 1984 A Washington Post article states that mustard gas is being produced at an Iraqi facility in the town of Samawa. According to the Post's diplomatic sources, Iraq first used CW in July of 1983 along the central section of the front and that it used CW for a second time in the Penjwin hills along the northern front. However, those attacks were limited in size and scope in comparison to the large scale attacks now being used against Iran's human wave offensives. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0970" task="">
  <question>
    What was Iran's official position on the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2 April 1984 At a news conference in London, Iran's delegate to the UN, Rajai Khorassani, asserts that Iran is &quot;capable of manufacturing chemical weapons. If the Iraqis repeat their crime, we may consider using them. But we think that to resort to retaliation can only be justified when all other means of preventing Iraq are exhausted and still Iraq repeats its crime.&quot;  Early July 1984 The Iranian deputy foreign minister says in Tehran that, &quot;the Islamic Republic of Iran has not and will not use chemical weapons.&quot; ?IRNA, 5 July 1984; FBIS Document FBIS-SAS, 6 July 1984. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0971" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries banned the export of chemical weapons precursors to Iran and Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10-11 April 1984 The United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Australia ban exports of certain chemicals to Iraq and Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0972" task="">
  <question>
    Which Chinese companies were sanctioned in 2001 for selling chemical and biological weapons equipment to Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Several Chinese entities are sanctioned by the Bush administration for selling materials to Iran. The three firms penalized by the sanctions are Liyang Chemical Equipment, the China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, as well as Mr. Q.C. Chen. One of those firms produces glass-lined equipment; however, the reports did not mention if such equipment was transferred to Iran. The State Department statement goes on to say that &quot;Q.C. Chen is already subject to US sanctions. In May 1997, he was among seven Chinese entities sanctioned, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, for knowingly and materially assisting Iran's chemical weapons program through the transfer of chemical weapons precursor chemicals and/or chemical weapons-related production equipment and technology. These sanctions currently remain in place.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408_3409.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/3408_3409.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0973" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Alavi Foundation? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Alavi Foundation (also known as the Moztasafan Foundation of New York until 1992)?a New York-based non-profit charitable organization that a classified 1994 FBI report says is &quot;entirely controlled by the government of Iran&quot;?starts distributing more than $400,000 to a variety of state-run organizations in Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0974" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between the Alavi Foundation and the development of chemical weapons in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Alavi Foundation (also known as the Moztasafan Foundation of New York until 1992)?a New York-based non-profit charitable organization that a classified 1994 FBI report says is &quot;entirely controlled by the government of Iran&quot;?starts distributing more than $400,000 to a variety of state-run organizations in Iran. US government investigators believe that some of this money is used to purchase gas chromatography and other equipment in the United States for Iran's chemical weapons programs. The recipient organizations include Sharif University, the University of Tehran, Islamic Azad University of Karaj, and a number of medical colleges. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0975" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran first start using chemical weapons on the battlefront? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 According to Foreign Affairs, Iran starts using chemical weapons, specifically mustard gas and phosgene, on the battlefront. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0976" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran first start using domestically produced chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987-1988 Iran begins to employ indigenously produced CW. ?David Segal, &quot;The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis,&quot; Foreign Affairs, Summer 1988. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0977" task="">
  <question>
    When were Iran's first reported uses of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1987 Iran reportedly uses CW near Basra and Mehran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0978" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons precursors has Iran bought from the United States? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    First Half of 1987 Iran purchases some 90 tons of thiodiglycol, a precursor for mustard gas, from a US company, Alcolac International, in Maryland. ?Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 249. 1987 American businessmen Harold Greenburg and Nick Defino made a deal with Alcolac International to broker hundreds of tons (or $1 million worth) of thiodiglycol (a key ingredient in mustard gas) for export to Iran and Iraq. Greenburg and Defino would stand to make 1 cent a pound in profit. Charles Tanaka, an export-import agent in Japan, initiated the deal. Dennis Bass, a special agent for the US Customs Service, intercepts 120 tons of poison gas chemical precursors on their way to Iran from Alcolac International in Baltimore. Bass and his men emptied the chemical drums and filled them with water before sending them on their original intended route to Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0979" task="">
  <question>
    How did Libya employ the chemical weapons its received from Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 Iran allegedly supplies Libya with chemical agents in exchange for naval mines. Libya employs the agents against Chadian troops 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0980" task="">
  <question>
    What did Iran receive from Libya in exchange for cehmical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 Iran allegedly supplies Libya with chemical agents in exchange for naval mines. Libya employs the agents against Chadian troops 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0981" task="">
  <question>
    What policies has Iran adopted against the stockpiling of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    9 April 1987 Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati urged the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen the current ban on CW by expanding it to cover the stockpiling, transfer, and development of CW. Velayati states that &quot;The unprecedented level of the use of chemical warfare in recent years has proved beyond doubt that the effective implementation of [an] international convention on the production, use, stockpiling, transfer, and development of chemical weapons is an urgent imperative.&quot; He also states that the strengthened ban should include some form of punishment for those who violate the ban. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0982" task="">
  <question>
    What was Transpek's contribution in Iran's chemical program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1990, Transpek Ltd. won a bid to install and commission a turn-key chemical plant in Iran chemical plant in Iran worth an estimated $12.5 million. In June 1989 the New York Times reported that Traspek Ltd. planned to sell 257 tons of thionyl chloride, used to produce mustard or nerve gas, to Iran and had exported exporting the chemical to Iran through Dubai in March of that same year. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2725.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2321_2725.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0983" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran start its Biological warfare program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is often accused in Western circles of secretly developing an offensive biological warfare (BW) program. In a 1996 report to the US Senate, the Central Intelligence Agency claimed that &quot;Iran has had a biological warfare program since the early 1980s. Currently the program is in its research and development stages, but we believe Iran holds some stocks of BW agents and weapons...&quot;[1] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0984" task="">
  <question>
    Why has Iran shown interest in Biological agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has shown an interest in acquiring BW agents from foreign sources. The speaker of the Iranian parliament publicly stated in 1988 that &quot;...we should fully equip ourselves in defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.&quot;[2] Canadian and Dutch scientists were approached by Iranian personnel looking to acquire mycotoxin-producing fungi (Fusarium spp.) in 1989. Sources also claim that Iran has pursued the acquisition of castor beans (known to be used for producing the deadly toxin ricin)[3] and retains several cultures of the anthrax-producing bacteria Bacillus anthracis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0985" task="">
  <question>
    Why were Iran pursuing its BW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some Western sources believe that Iran first developed its BW program during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Currently, its growing biotechnology industry does have the potential to divert dual-use agents for illicit warfare purposes. There are several reasons why Iran would pursue a BW program, including establishing a deterrent against Iraq, establishing regional dominance, or developing an alternative to conventional weapons for asymmetric conflicts. Some experts speculate that in its biological arsenal, Iran possess agents such as botulinum toxin, B. anthracis, and ricin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0986" task="">
  <question>
    What agents are part of Iran's BW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of the most common agents that are associated with the Iranian BW program in the open literature are B. anthracis, botulinum toxin, ricin, T-2 mycotoxin, and Variola virus, the causative agent of smallpox. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2299.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0987" task="">
  <question>
    What is believed about Iran's biological capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has one of the most advanced biotech industries in the developing world, and has long been recognized as a leader in Southwest Asia in the fields of vaccine research and production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2302.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2302.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0988" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran accede to the Geneva Protocol? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    4 July 1929 Iran accedes to the Geneva Protocol. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0989" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran ratify the BWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 August 1973 Iran ratifies the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0990" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Iran develop biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As a result of the Iran-Iraq War and the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranians, Iran allegedly begins to develop biological weapons by working on the &quot;production of mycotoxins.&quot; Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman acknowledges, however, that &quot;there are insufficient unclassified data to characterize the scale of Iran's biological warfare programs, their focus....It is clear, however, that Iran has such programs and it has good reasons for expanding them....&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0991" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the US impose sanctions on Chinese firms? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Bush administration imposes sanctions on several Chinese firms allegedly selling CBW components to Iran. According to a US State Department statement, &quot;The penalties were imposed for the transfer to Iran since January 1, 1999 of sensitive equipment and technology controlled by the Australia Group.&quot; One unnamed US intelligence official reportedly told the Washington Times that in April 2001, US intelligence tracked one of the Chinese shipments of chemical-related goods as it made its way to Iran. The three firms penalized by the sanctions are Liyang Chemical Equipment, the China Machinery, and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, as well as Mr. Q.C. Chen. One of those firms produces glass-lined equipment; however, the reports did not mention if such equipment was transferred to Iran. The State Department statement goes on to say that &quot;Q.C. Chen is already subject to US sanctions. In May 1997, he was among seven Chinese entities sanctioned, pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, for knowingly and materially assisting Iran's chemical weapons program through the transfer of chemical weapons precursor chemicals and/or chemical weapons-related production equipment and technology. These sanctions currently remain in place.&quot; The statement continues by claiming that the activities of Q.C. Chen and other Chinese entities have been brought to the attention of the Chinese government on numerous occasions, and that the Chinese government was informed in advance of the decision to place further sanctions on Mr. Chen and others. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0992" task="">
  <question>
    What did Bush address Iran as? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In his first State of the Union address, US President George W. Bush calls Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an &quot;axis of evil&quot; and accuses them of supporting terrorism and seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0993" task="">
  <question>
    How did Iran react to Bush's remarks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran rejects statements made by US President Bush in his State of the Union address, denouncing them as &quot;arrogant&quot; and as a desire for hegemony. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi states, &quot;We, besides rejecting American accusations, believe that the world will not tolerate US hegemonic ambitions and believe Mr. Bush would do better by presenting proof of his accusation...The Islamic Republic of Iran considers these remarks as interference in its internal affairs.&quot; Mr. Kharrazi believes that &quot;Bush is intending to divert public opinion from the Middle East issues by raising up a new subject and thereby pave [sic] the ground for the US to continue support for Israel in suppressing the Palestinian nation.&quot; Kharrazi adds, &quot;[t]he American president had better back up his assertions with evidence instead of repeating old and unfounded claims.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0994" task="">
  <question>
    What reasons did Iran give in its support for rebuking Bush's allegations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, in a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, rebuts allegations made by US President Bush during his State of the Union Address. Kharrazi notes &quot;Iran does not seek weapons of mass destruction and, unlike the US ally in this region, is a party to the NPT, CWC, and BWC and has signed the CTBT. As the only victim of weapons of mass destruction in the last generation, Iranian people have felt the horror of these weapons and are determined to ensure that no people will have to go through the same agony...It must be underlined that, unlike the United States, weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran's defense doctrine. Iran is fully committed to observing all relevant international instruments on prohibition of such weapons, and its compliance has been repeatedly verified by the relevant international organizations. At the same time, Iran insists and vigorously pursues its inalienable right to develop its nuclear, chemical, and biological industries for peaceful purposes. This right is guaranteed in all relevant international instruments, and the deliberate campaign by the United States to arbitrarily deprive Iran of this right is a further violation of these regimes.&quot; Kharrazi further states that he believes that the Bush administration seeks to weaken these regimes, so that it remains &quot;unhindered not only in developing and proliferating such weapons but more dangerously in leveling self-serving accusations against others.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0995" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of external support is Iran getting for its BW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Carl Ford, states that Iran has &quot;continued to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad -- primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe -- ostensibly for civilian uses. We believe that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran's BW program. Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran-Iraq War, and likely has evolved beyond agent research and development to the capability to produce small quantities of agent. Iran may have some limited capability to weaponize BW.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0996" task="">
  <question>
    What allegations were made by NCRI against Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, states that Iran is manufacturing biological weapons. Representatives of the NCRI make this claim in London at a session of the House of Commons. The representatives claim the Iran is currently producing anthrax smallpox and plague. They name individuals working on the weapons. Also the group states that program is run at a number of sites, including two universities and a hospital and Iran is trying to increase its biological scientists from 3,000 to 11,000 by sending academics abroad to learn Western biological and chemical skills. The group states that it received the information from another Iranian opposition group, the People's Mojahideen of Iran (PMOI). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0997" task="">
  <question>
    What was Iran's response to NCRI's claims? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran denies the allegations of the National Council of Iranian Resistance that it is producing biological weapons. A senior Iranian government officials says that Iran &quot;strongly deny that we have biological weapons because we do not need any banned weapons.&quot; The official also states that the opposition group is making such allegations because of US pressure on them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0998" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Iran is aquiring WMD? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is indeed credible evidence that Iran is in contravention of at least the spirit of its nonproliferation commitments with respect to the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-0999" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran a member of CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is a member of all of the major multilateral disarmament agreements currently in existence. This includes the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1000" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran a member of BTWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is a member of all of the major multilateral disarmament agreements currently in existence. This includes the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1001" task="">
  <question>
    What regional threats did Iran have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Put simply, Iraq is Iran's only real regional military rival and the only state that could launch a war against it. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1002" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran able to use conventional methods of attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hus, to appreciate the military situation in the Gulf, one must bear in the mind that Iran is not capable of attacking any Gulf Arab state (other than Iraq) with conventional weapons in anything other than a punitive, though possibly painful way. The prospect of invasion across the Gulf is nonexistent for the foreseeable future. An Iranian attack, punitive or otherwise, would be futile militarily and would occasion massive U.S. and Gulf retaliation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1003" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran able to use economic means to exert its will? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, the idea that Iran would seek to &quot;close&quot; the Strait of Hormuz, thereby severely disrupting world oil shipping, also seems unlikely. Such a step would cut off Iran's only outlet for its own oil exports, upon which the regime depends entirely for its economic survival. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1004" task="">
  <question>
    How can Iran impact the region? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    although Iran is unlikely to launch an offensive against any of its neighbors, it does have the ability to undertake terror operations. Indeed, if the Iranians really do want to influence the security situation on the ground in neighboring countries, this is virtually the only way they can do it 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1005" task="">
  <question>
    What terrorist groups has Iran supported? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    they freely admit to having supported such groups as Hamas and Hezbollah. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1006" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran use terrorist operations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    although Iran is unlikely to launch an offensive against any of its neighbors, it does have the ability to undertake terror operations. Indeed, if the Iranians really do want to influence the security situation on the ground in neighboring countries, this is virtually the only way they can do it, and they freely admit to having supported such groups as Hamas and Hezbollah. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1007" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated Iran's development of CBW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the case of chemical and biological weapons (BW), there seems little evidence that either was particularly well developed when the Iran-Iraq war began. Iraq's use of CW against Iran triggered an enormous crash research program in Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1008" task="">
  <question>
    Did Iran use CW in the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Though Iran was never able to employ CW as effectively as Iraq during the conflict, Iran did finish the war with a major program of research and production of both CW and BW, under the control of the Islamic Corps 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1009" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's ability to use CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Today, Iran probably has an ability to conduct limited chemical and biological operations near its borders. Western analysts believe that Iran has effectively mastered the technology to use artillery armed with chemical warheads and to deliver CW and BW by aerial means 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1010" task="">
  <question>
    Where can Iran deploy its CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    But analysts think Iran has little ability to conduct longer range CW and BW operations, outside of the immediate Gulf area, because of the current range limitations of its missile forces and the difficulties in mastering effective warhead technology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1011" task="">
  <question>
    Can Iran use its CBW through terrorist operations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At a minimum, though, Iran has the ability to use CW and BW as terror weapons if it so chooses 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1012" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran likely to use WMD against the US or allies of the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Any use by Iran of WMD against a neighbor aligned with the United States, or against U.S. interests or Israel, would invite massive retaliation, far beyond that which Iran could hope to inflict by its own use of such weapons. It would amount to an act of suicide by the current regime, and the regime realizes this. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1013" task="">
  <question>
    Why might Iran want WMD? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    given that every state associated with Iran's basic threat perceptions (Iraq, the United States, and Israel) possesses WMD of its own as well as the means to strike Iran with these weapons, Iran's own programs may well add up to a strategy of deterrence. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/61/jone61.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1014" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran start producing CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Jane's Intelligence Review, Iran began producing sulfur mustard and phosgene in the mid-1980s -- using these weapons in the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1015" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents did Iran initially develop? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Jane's Intelligence Review, Iran began producing sulfur mustard and phosgene in the mid-1980s -- using these weapons in the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2391.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1016" task="">
  <question>
    When did Iran begin to use CW in the Iran-Iraq war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1984-1985 Iran begins to use lethal CW that was captured from Iraqi unexploded ordinances and in artillery rounds. Analysts have pointed out that it is possible that the Iranian troops were not aware that they were firing chemical munitions, since Iraq did not mark chemical rounds in any special way. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2957.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2957.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1017" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents has Iran stockpiled? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After 1985 [According to Anthony H. Cordesman], Iran begins to stockpile cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and mustard gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1018" task="">
  <question>
    Where are some of Iran's CW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    March 1988 Iran has CW plants in operation at Damghan and Parchin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1019" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Iran produce its gas masks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1988 The gas masks are produced at the Yasa factories. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1020" task="">
  <question>
    What type of CW program assistance has Iran received from foreign countries or companies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Foreign suppliers have provided the following types of assistance: Technical and operations expertise, constructing production facilities, supplying precursor chemicals supplying production equipment, supplying parts for munitions, and training personnel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1021" task="">
  <question>
    What types of agents is Iran capable of producing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran produces the blister agent, mustard, blood agents, and nerve agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1022" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence that Iran is prepared to use CW to supply terrorists? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Webster responds, &quot;I think that there is no current evidence that any of these nations are encouraging the use of chemical agents by terrorist groups that they have supported presently or in the past. But there is an ambivalence, particularly in the Middle East, about the use of chemical weapons. They have difficulty understanding our sense of chemical weapons. They have difficulty understanding our sense of outrage and horror at its use.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1023" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Webster? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1989 William Webster, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1024" task="">
  <question>
    What was Piruzi-4? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-4, at the Northern Persian Gulf. The exercise involves &quot;chemical, biological, and radiological operations.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1025" task="">
  <question>
    When did Piruzi-4 occur? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1993 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1026" task="">
  <question>
    When was Iran first capable of delivery CBW with missile technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    19 April 1993 US intelligence sources confirm that Iran is now capable of delivering CBW using ballistic and short-range missiles, due to advances in &quot;packaging technology.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1027" task="">
  <question>
    What was Wa al-Fajr-1? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Wa al-Fajr-1, in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Participating forces in the exercise include &quot;chemical, biological, and radiological units.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1028" task="">
  <question>
    When was Wa al-Fajr-1 performed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 1993 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1029" task="">
  <question>
    What was the status of Iran's CW program in 1994? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1994 According to analysis conducted by Jane's International Defense Review, Iran possesses several chemical agents as well as the capability to mass produce mustard gas, blood agents, and some nerve agents. Modes of delivery include artillery, missiles, and aircraft and Iranian forces are also reported to have trained for chemical warfare. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1030" task="">
  <question>
    What was Fajr-7? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Fajr-7, in the northern Persian Gulf. Participating forces in the exercise include &quot;chemical, biological, and radiological units.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1031" task="">
  <question>
    When was Fajr-7 performed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1994 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1032" task="">
  <question>
    What was Falaq-2? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Falaq-2, in the Persian Gulf. The exercise entails the &quot;implementation of a chemical offensive and counteroffensive.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1033" task="">
  <question>
    When was Falaq-2 performed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1994 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1034" task="">
  <question>
    What was the status of nerve agents in Iran by 1995? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By 1995 &quot;...Most outside experts [believe] Iran [is] able to mass produce sarin and tabun nerve gases, and persistent nerve gas in the form of V-agents.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1035" task="">
  <question>
    Where are factories that produced CW in Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it does state that until date Iranian CW production has developed around factories in Qazun, al-Razi, Bashwir, and Damghan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1036" task="">
  <question>
    What is Damghan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Jane's claims Damghan &quot;is the location of a chemical warhead production facility... It has several characteristics of chemical weapons plants: isolation, links to transportation lines and security. The facility at Damghan is hidden by trees, downwind from town, surrounded by fallow fields, and linked to the railroad by a spur. The perimeter road lies just outside the grove of trees. There are no signs of bunkers, so munitions are probably moved by rail to arsenals on a regular basis. Although reports state that 155mm artillery shells are the major product, the plant reportedly also loads other weapons with nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2961.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1037" task="">
  <question>
    How large was Iran's CW stockpile in 1996? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a paper published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Iran possesses the &quot;largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the third world.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1038" task="">
  <question>
    How much CW did Iran have in 1996? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has an active chemical warfare program. It produces a variety of agents and may have s much as 2,000 tons of agent in its stockpile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1039" task="">
  <question>
    What was Piruzi-7? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Piruzi-7, in the Persian Gulf: &quot;Among the programs carried out...were...chemical attack and detoxification.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1040" task="">
  <question>
    When was Piruzi-7 performed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 1996 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1041" task="">
  <question>
    What was Zolfaqar? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran conducts a military exercise, code-named Zolfaqar, at Qom. The exercise features &quot;defense operations against chemical warfare,&quot; and uses &quot;powerful chemical defensive weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1042" task="">
  <question>
    When was Zolfaqar performed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1043" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents could Iran produce as of early 1998? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is capable of producing several CW agents, including nerve, phosgene, and hydrogen cyanide. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1044" task="">
  <question>
    What was Iran's CW production capabilities as of 1998? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Its production capacity is estimated at as much as 1,000 tons a year 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2963.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1045" task="">
  <question>
    When was Iran able to equip missiles with CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    4 June 2001 It is reported that the Iranian Fateh-110 missile, which could be armed with conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads, has been developed 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2964.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2964.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1046" task="">
  <question>
    Why is Iran considered part of the &quot;axis of evil&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In his first State of the Union address, US President George W. Bush calls Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an &quot;axis of evil&quot; and accuses them of supporting terrorism and seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1047" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran ended its CW program in accordance with CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 2003 Stephen Rademaker, a US representative, accuses Iran of stockpiling nerve agents and pursuing a chemical weapons program. He makes the accusations in a speech at a conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In the speech he states, &quot;We are most troubled by the activism of Iran, which we believe continues to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and expertise from abroad.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1048" task="">
  <question>
    What is Muajar-4? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran successfully tests a new version of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the Muajar-4, which can potentially deliver chemical and biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1049" task="">
  <question>
    When was Muajar-4 tested? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    16 February 2002 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1050" task="">
  <question>
    What is the threat the Iran presents to the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The proliferation threat posed by Iran is stark and multifaceted. Iran has an ambitious nuclear program, longstanding chemical/biological programs, and a rapidly increasing ballistic missile program. At the same time it is a leading exporter of support for terrorist groups. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/wolf_0602.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/wolf_0602.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1051" task="">
  <question>
    What is the IRGC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a revolutionary group that reportedly directs the production and employment of WMD in Iran 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2404.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2337_2404.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1052" task="">
  <question>
    What are Iran's intentions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran's national objectives and strategies are shaped by its regional political aspirations, threat perceptions, and the need to preserve its Islamic government. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1053" task="">
  <question>
    What are Iran's political aspirations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tehran strives to be a leader in the Islamic world and seeks to be the dominant power in the Gulf. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1054" task="">
  <question>
    What are Iran's threat perceptions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran perceives that it is located in a volatile and dangerous region, virtually surrounded by potential military threats or unstable neighbors. These include the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein, Israel, U.S. security agreements with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and accompanying U.S. military presence in the Gulf, and instability in Afghanistan and the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1055" task="">
  <question>
    What are Iran's intentions towards the USA? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tehran would like to diminish Washington's political and military influence in the region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1056" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's goal for its CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran is making a concerted effort to attain an independent production capability for all aspects of its chemical weapons program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1057" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran achieved it CW program goal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Iran is making a concerted effort to attain an independent production capability for all aspects of its chemical weapons program, it remains dependent on foreign sources for chemical warfare-related technologies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1058" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of Iran's missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran's missiles allow it to strike a wide variety of key economic and military targets in several neighboring countries, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf states. Possible targets include oil installations, airfields, and ports, as well as U.S. military deployment areas in the region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1059" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's potential for supplying other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the future, as Iran becomes more self-sufficient at producing chemical or biological agents and ballistic missiles, there is a potential that it will become a supplier. For example, Iran might supply related equipment and technologies to other states trying to develop capabilities, such as Libya or Syria. There is precedent for such action; Iran supplied Libya with chemical agents in 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1060" task="">
  <question>
    What does Iran gain from China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China is an important supplier of technologies and equipment for Iran's chemical warfare program.  Therefore, Chinese supply policies will be key to whether Tehran attains its long-term goal of independent production for these weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/cbwiran.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/cbwiran.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1061" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran sponsor terrorism? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran remains foremost among the states which sponsor terrorism. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/gati0297.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/gati0297.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1062" task="">
  <question>
    What is a &quot;rogue&quot; state? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Middle Eastern &quot;rogue&quot; states threaten us by maintaining programs for weapons of mass destruction, sponsoring terrorism, often targeted specifically at Americans, and by their hostility toward and active opposition to our political and social systems and those of our friends and allies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/gati0297.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/gati0297.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1063" task="">
  <question>
    What is Iran's attitude towards the USA? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran's clerical regime regards the United States as its principal global adversary. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/gati0297.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/gati0297.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1064" task="">
  <question>
    What is the status of Iran's indigenous ballistic missiles as of 2003? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran, already producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is in the late stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/CIA2003.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/CIA2003.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1065" task="">
  <question>
    What are Iran's CW stockpiles as of 2003? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran already has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking agents--and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them--which it previously has manufactured. It probably also has made some nerve agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/CIA2003.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/CIA2003.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1066" task="">
  <question>
    Other than Iraq, which Middle East countries are seeking chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In this volatile region, the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means to deliver them poses a significant challenge to our ability to achieve these goals. Iran, Iraq, and Libya are aggressively seeking NBC weapons and missile capabilities, constituting the most pressing threats to regional stability. Iran and Iraq have demonstrated their intent to dominate the Persian Gulf and to control access to critical oil supplies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1067" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya seeking CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In this volatile region, the proliferation of NBC weapons and the means to deliver them poses a significant challenge to our ability to achieve these goals. Iran, Iraq, and Libya are aggressively seeking NBC weapons and missile capabilities, constituting the most pressing threats to regional stability. Iran and Iraq have demonstrated their intent to dominate the Persian Gulf and to control access to critical oil supplies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1068" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence to believe that Libya would use chemical weapons against strategic targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya remains a significant proliferation concern. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he is willing and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against his enemies. Libya sees the United States as its primary external threat, owing especially to U.S. support for UN sanctions against Tripoli for its refusal to turn over suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103. Although Libya's capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states he supports and that support him in return. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1069" task="">
  <question>
    Would Libya use CW offensively? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he is willing and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against his enemies. Libya sees the United States as its primary external threat, owing especially to U.S. support for UN sanctions against Tripoli for its refusal to turn over suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103. Although Libya's capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states he supports and that support him in return. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1070" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya capable of delivering chemical weapons to distant targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Libya's capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states he supports and that support him in return. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1071" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya attack targets with its CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Libya's capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states he supports and that support him in return. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1072" task="">
  <question>
    How could Libya use its chemical weapons stockpiles to influence the balance of power in the Middle East? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Libya's capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states he supports and that support him in return. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1073" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's position towards Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi has invaded, occupied, and/or claimed territory in all of Libya's neighbors except Egypt. He has at times supported foreign Islamic extremists, and he has frequently criticized Arab governments that have attempted to open dialogue with Israel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1074" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya been linked to terrorist movements? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has a long history of subverting and destabilizing Arab and African nations by supporting coups, funding and training opposition forces and guerrilla groups, and plotting the assassinations of foreign leaders. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1075" task="">
  <question>
    How has Libya sought to destablize countries in the Middle East? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has a long history of subverting and destabilizing Arab and African nations by supporting coups, funding and training opposition forces and guerrilla groups, and plotting the assassinations of foreign leaders. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1076" task="">
  <question>
    How has Libya responded to Arab governments that were publicly supportive of Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has a long history of subverting and destabilizing Arab and African nations by supporting coups, funding and training opposition forces and guerrilla groups, and plotting the assassinations of foreign leaders. Qadhafi has invaded, occupied, and/or claimed territory in all of Libya's neighbors except Egypt. He has at times supported foreign Islamic extremists, and he has frequently criticized Arab governments that have attempted to open dialogue with Israel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1077" task="">
  <question>
    What has Libya done to expand its military? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya remains a potential threat to the international community and neighboring states. While pursuing his political and military aspirations, he has squandered the country's oil wealth on a program for NBC weapons, missiles, and an enormous inventory of conventional military equipment. Since seizing power in 1969, Qadhafi has unsuccessfully attempted to turn the Libyan state into a regional military power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1078" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya considered to be a regional military power in the Middle East? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya remains a potential threat to the international community and neighboring states. While pursuing his political and military aspirations, he has squandered the country's oil wealth on a program for NBC weapons, missiles, and an enormous inventory of conventional military equipment. Since seizing power in 1969, Qadhafi has unsuccessfully attempted to turn the Libyan state into a regional military power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1079" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya used chemical weapons against its enemies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi has demonstrated both his desire to acquire ballistic missiles and an NBC weapon capability as well as his willingness to use the capabilities at his disposal. In 1987, when his military operation against Chad was nearing defeat, Qadhafi ordered his forces to use chemical agents against Chadian troops. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1080" task="">
  <question>
    Did Libya use CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1987, when his military operation against Chad was nearing defeat, Qadhafi ordered his forces to use chemical agents against Chadian troops. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1081" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya fired ballistic missiles at European targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In response to U.S. retaliatory strikes for the terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque, Qadhafi fired SCUD missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa. Although the SCUD missiles did not cause significant damage, the act constituted a symbolic gesture of defiance directed at the United States and the international community. Finally, and more importantly, Qadhafi has ordered kidnappings and both supported and employed international terrorism against Western nations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1082" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya attacked targets using ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In response to U.S. retaliatory strikes for the terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque, Qadhafi fired SCUD missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1083" task="">
  <question>
    What acts of terrorism has Libya sponsored? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, and more importantly, Qadhafi has ordered kidnappings and both supported and employed international terrorism against Western nations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1084" task="">
  <question>
    Why has Libya tried to develop chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi, who remains largely unchallenged as Libya's leader, controls nearly all policy decisions for his country. His aim is to enhance Libya's military strength and power projection capability, in part by possessing NBC weapons and missiles. Qadhafi apparently believes these efforts promote Libya's status as a regional military power, enhance national prestige, and provide Libya limited strategic military capabilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1085" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated Libya to acquire CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi apparently believes these efforts promote Libya's status as a regional military power, enhance national prestige, and provide Libya limited strategic military capabilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1086" task="">
  <question>
    How much control does Qadhafi have on Libya's policies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi, who remains largely unchallenged as Libya's leader, controls nearly all policy decisions for his country. His aim is to enhance Libya's military strength and power projection capability, in part by possessing NBC weapons and missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1087" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied Libya with the chemical weapons it used against Chadian troops in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya is one of few nations in the last decade to have employed chemical weapons, having dropped chemical agents from a transport aircraft against Chadian troops in 1987. Iran supplied the agents in exchange for naval mines. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1088" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Libya get the CW that it deployed in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya is one of few nations in the last decade to have employed chemical weapons, having dropped chemical agents from a transport aircraft against Chadian troops in 1987. Iran supplied the agents in exchange for naval mines. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1089" task="">
  <question>
    How did Libya obtain CW from Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya is one of few nations in the last decade to have employed chemical weapons, having dropped chemical agents from a transport aircraft against Chadian troops in 1987. Iran supplied the agents in exchange for naval mines. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1090" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya produce chemical weapons indigenously? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n addition, Tripoli has looked to establish an indigenous chemical warfare program, and in late 1988, with extensive foreign assistance, completed construction of the Rabta chemical agent facility. During three years of operation, at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents were produced at this facility. When the United States brought Libya's chemical warfare program to the attention of the international media in 1988, Libya responded in 1990 by fabricating a fire to make the Rabta facility appear to have been seriously damaged. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1091" task="">
  <question>
    Is the Libyan chemical weapons facility at Rabta currently active? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although the Rabta facility appears inactive, Libya's chemical weapons program continues to flourish. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1092" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Libya produce chemical weapons after production was stopped at the Rabta chemical weapons plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To replace the Rabta facility, Libya has begun constructing a large, underground chemical warfare plant near Tarhunah, a mountainous region about 60 kilometers southeast of Tripoli. Putting the facility underground masks its activities and increases its survivability in case of an attack. In the meantime, Libya will rely on foreign sources for its precursor needs. Libya claims it will not sign the CWC as long as other countries in the region possess NBC weapons. Libya almost certainly will keep its chemical warfare program as long as Qadhafi remains in power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1093" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya expected to abandon its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya claims it will not sign the CWC as long as other countries in the region possess NBC weapons. Libya almost certainly will keep its chemical warfare program as long as Qadhafi remains in power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1094" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Libya obtain the chemical weapons precursors it needs to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Putting the facility underground masks its activities and increases its survivability in case of an attack. In the meantime, Libya will rely on foreign sources for its precursor needs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1095" task="">
  <question>
    Why is Libya's biological weapons program so primitive? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, hampered by its inadequate biotechnical foundation, the Libyan offensive biological warfare program remains in the early research and development stage. Libya may look to small research and development programs supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its technical knowledge. These technical shortcomings, combined with limitations in Libya's overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude production of militarily effective biological warfare systems for the foreseeable future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1096" task="">
  <question>
    How sophisiticated is Libya's BW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, hampered by its inadequate biotechnical foundation, the Libyan offensive biological warfare program remains in the early research and development stage. Libya may look to small research and development programs supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its technical knowledge. These technical shortcomings, combined with limitations in Libya's overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude production of militarily effective biological warfare systems for the foreseeable future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1097" task="">
  <question>
    How could Libya expand its BW research and development efforts? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya may look to small research and development programs supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its technical knowledge. These technical shortcomings, combined with limitations in Libya's overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude production of militarily effective biological warfare systems for the foreseeable future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1098" task="">
  <question>
    What challenges does Libya face in expanding its BW capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, hampered by its inadequate biotechnical foundation, the Libyan offensive biological warfare program remains in the early research and development stage. Libya may look to small research and development programs supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its technical knowledge. These technical shortcomings, combined with limitations in Libya's overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude production of militarily effective biological warfare systems for the foreseeable future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1099" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya suspected of being able to produce sophisticated biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, hampered by its inadequate biotechnical foundation, the Libyan offensive biological warfare program remains in the early research and development stage. Libya may look to small research and development programs supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its technical knowledge. These technical shortcomings, combined with limitations in Libya's overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude production of militarily effective biological warfare systems for the foreseeable future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1100" task="">
  <question>
    Which country manufactured the naval mines that Libya supplied to Iran in 1987 in exchange for chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1987 Iran reportedly begins supplying Libya and Syria with CW stocks. One report (ABC News) alleges that Iran is supplying Libya with CW in exchange for Soviet-made &quot;sophisticated mines.&quot; Libya denies the charges. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1101" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Iran send to Libya in 1987 in exchange for naval mines? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    3 December 1987 US government officials state that Iran traded chemical weaponry to Libya in return for sophisticated naval mines. According to the officials, the CW was probably a mixture of mustard gas and nerve agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1102" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence that Iraq built a chemical weapons facility in Libya? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The US report is entitled &quot;The Iraqi WMD Challenge, Myths and Realities,&quot; and was prepared by the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House of Representatives. It charged that Iraq had stored 400 Scud missiles in Sudan, was building a chemical weapons plant in Libya, and was hiding materials for a nuclear weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808279.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808279.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1103" task="">
  <question>
    Have Iraq and Libya collaborated to produce CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The US report is entitled &quot;The Iraqi WMD Challenge, Myths and Realities,&quot; and was prepared by the Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the House of Representatives. It charged that Iraq had stored 400 Scud missiles in Sudan, was building a chemical weapons plant in Libya, and was hiding materials for a nuclear weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808279.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808279.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1104" task="">
  <question>
    Did Libya hide CW for Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It charged that Iraq had stored 400 Scud missiles in Sudan, was building a chemical weapons plant in Libya, and was hiding materials for a nuclear weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808279.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808279.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1105" task="">
  <question>
    How has Libya been prevented from obtaining long-range ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The imposition of UN sanctions has impeded Libyan efforts to obtain foreign assistance for its longer range missile programs. Nevertheless, even if Libya were to obtain a No Dong-class MRBM, Tripoli would be likely to continue to try for longer range systems to increase the number of US and NATO targets it can hold at risk. If a missile were offered with range sufficient to strike 2,500 kilometers into Europe, Libya would try to obtain it. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1106" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of weapons of mass destruction could Libya deliver using ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has biological and chemical weapons programs. Libya would need significant foreign assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, but Tripoli?s nuclear infrastructure enhancements remain of concern. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1107" task="">
  <question>
    What would happen to Libya's ballistic missile program if all foreign assistance was stopped? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya?s missile program depends on foreign support, without which the program eventually would grind to a halt. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1108" task="">
  <question>
    How dependent is Libya's missile program on foreign support? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya?s missile program depends on foreign support, without which the program eventually would grind to a halt. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1109" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Cuba has been providing chemical or biological weapons support to Libya's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    17 May 2002 In an article regarding possible Cuban assistance to Iran's BW program, Middle East Newsline quotes unnamed US officials as stating that Iran has developed CW and is seeking assistance for BW. Middle East Newsline also states that a &quot;senior [Bush] administration official...said Washington has discussed allegations that Moscow is helping Iran's ballistic missile and chemical weapons program as well as building a nuclear infrastructure that could be used for the production of chemical weapons.&quot; ?&quot;Cuba Markets WMD Technology to Iran, Libya,&quot; Middle East Newsline, 17 May 2002. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1110" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Libya managed to obtain ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 2002 A London-based daily, the World Tribune, reports that &quot;Libya has signed a $13.5 billion weapons deal with Iran for ballistic missiles with chemical warheads and the training to deploy and operate them.&quot; According to the report, the information came from an article in the Berlin-based Die Welt, which cites, &quot;Western intelligence sources.&quot; The original article in Die Welt, however, says nothing about chemical warheads being part of this arms deal contract. Rather, it only mentions WMD and CW as an interest and capability that Libya has built up over time. While it is possible that the London article might have obtained information from its own intelligence sources, it appears that the German report is the source of the claims. ?&quot;Report: Libya Goes Ballistic in $13.5 Billion Deal with Iran,&quot; World Tribune, 21 August 2002, &lt;http://www.worldtribune.com&gt;; J 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1111" task="">
  <question>
    From whom did Libya receive ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical weapons warheads in 2002? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 2002 A London-based daily, the World Tribune, reports that &quot;Libya has signed a $13.5 billion weapons deal with Iran for ballistic missiles with chemical warheads and the training to deploy and operate them.&quot; According to the report, the information came from an article in the Berlin-based Die Welt, which cites, &quot;Western intelligence sources.&quot; The original article in Die Welt, however, says nothing about chemical warheads being part of this arms deal contract. Rather, it only mentions WMD and CW as an interest and capability that Libya has built up over time. While it is possible that the London article might have obtained information from its own intelligence sources, it appears that the German report is the source of the claims. ?&quot;Report: Libya Goes Ballistic in $13.5 Billion Deal with Iran,&quot; World Tribune, 21 August 2002, &lt;http://www.worldtribune.com&gt;; J 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1112" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any evidence that Iran and Libya have been collaborating to develop chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    18 October 2003 An unidentified Middle Eastern source states that Iran and Libya signed a secret agreement on chemical weapons in October 2002. The agreement was reportedly signed in Tripoli. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1113" task="">
  <question>
    Has Iran and Libya worked together to acquire CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    18 October 2003 An unidentified Middle Eastern source states that Iran and Libya signed a secret agreement on chemical weapons in October 2002. The agreement was reportedly signed in Tripoli. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1114" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya and Iran last collaborate to produce CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    18 October 2003 An unidentified Middle Eastern source states that Iran and Libya signed a secret agreement on chemical weapons in October 2002. The agreement was reportedly signed in Tripoli. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1115" task="">
  <question>
    How did Libya originally seek to acquire a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On the other hand, we have evidence of how proliferation occurs: not by governments waking up in the morning with the thought that they have good dual-use technology, so why not make a bomb? Rather, states determined to acquire WMD seek coherently and systematically to procure the equipment needed for that purpose. The Indian and the North Korean nuclear programs were consciously dual-use from the beginning with a view to put these technologies to military use. Israel received the needed facilities from France for the single purpose of building nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Iraq started out with complex procurement operations for weapons purposes. Iraq and Libya did the same for chemical weapons. The push was political, and the technology followed, not the other way around. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1116" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the United Kingdom restrict exports to Libya in 1992? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Six African states appeared on a British Department of Trade list of 33 countries considered sensitive destinations for export. Included were South Africa, for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs; Egypt, for its rocket program and interest in chemical weapons and supply links to Iraq; Libya, for its missile, chemical weapons, and nuclear projects. Also included were Angola and Somalia, for chemical weapons use, and Algeria for its Chinese-aided clandestine nuclear program. Trade Minister Tim Sainsbury said that the list was &quot;based on strategic and proliferation concerns and other criteria, including the risk of diversion and the lack of effective export controls.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9201463.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9201463.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1117" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya expected to use chemical weapons against Egypt? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1987 US intelligence indicates that Libya might be building a chemical weapons plant. Egypt, a suspected possessor of chemical weapons, has tense relations with Libya, suggesting that a skirmish might escalate to the use of chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1118" task="">
  <question>
    Who is a likely target of Libya's CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1987 US intelligence indicates that Libya might be building a chemical weapons plant. Egypt, a suspected possessor of chemical weapons, has tense relations with Libya, suggesting that a skirmish might escalate to the use of chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1119" task="">
  <question>
    Other than Egypt, which Arab countries have used chemical weapons in war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 1989 The Reagan administration is expected to propose that the United Nations be given broad powers allowing the organization to investigate suspected chemical weapon use anywhere in the world. The announcement comes as the United States seemed particularly concerned with chemical weapons production among Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt. According to a New York Times article, &quot;there have been reports that Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Libya are employing chemical weapons in warfare.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1120" task="">
  <question>
    Will Libya sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi is not likely to sign or ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1121" task="">
  <question>
    How much of a threat do Libya's chemical weapons pose? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, while Libya?s ability to deliver any of its existing stockpile of chemical agents is not great, the threat to Egypt, U.S. forces in the region, or NATO cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1122" task="">
  <question>
    What has hampered Libya's progress in developing a ballistic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Similarly, Libyan efforts to develop its own missile have met with only limited success. Its Al Fatah missile program remains in the testing stage. This developmental effort uses a rocket with a fairly small payload. Libya?s lack of progress with its missile program is directly related to its inability to gain adequate foreign assistance for its efforts, again partly due to UN sanctions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1123" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Libya use transport aircraft to deploy chemical weapons against Chadian troops in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has land- and sea-launched short range anti-ship cruise missiles that it purchased from Soviet and European sources. Many of the systems are old and likely are suffering from maintenance problems. Libya also has a variety of fighter aircraft, some old bombers, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons.  Libya used transport aircraft in its attempt to deliver chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1124" task="">
  <question>
    How many ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical warheads does Libya have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US intelligence agencies have identified Soviet-made mobile Scud missiles in Libya being moved to remote areas to protect them from an expected attack. Libya has at least 80 Scud-B missiles with a range of 175 mi capable of carrying chemical warheads. The CIA confirmed in January 1992 that the Libyans are building a second chemical weapons facility with containers similar to those at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9201464.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9201464.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1125" task="">
  <question>
    What missile systems could Libya use to deliver chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Most Libyan missile development programs have had limited success. Libya has developed a 200km-range liquid-fueled missile, but there is no evidence of deployment. It has been reported that German technical experts have been assisting Libya with the 300-450 mile-range Al-Fatih solid-fuel missile, but there is no indication of successful development. Other possible missile delivery systems include the 50km-range Exocet AM.39, the 83km-range SS-N-2C, the 180km-range Otomat-2, and the 220-300km-range Scud-B (R-17E). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1126" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Libya produce most of its nerve gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's primary nerve and mustard gas production facilities are located in an industrial park at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1127" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Libya produce most of its mustard gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's primary nerve and mustard gas production facilities are located in an industrial park at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1128" task="">
  <question>
    Why has Libya scaled back production of blister and nerve agents at its chemical weapons facility at Rabta? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the late 1980's, blister and nerve agents have been produced at Rabta, but the production rate has been low, and plant is not being utilized due to fear of attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1129" task="">
  <question>
    From which countries has Libya received chemical weapons assistance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are reports of two other underground chemical weapons facilities being constructed, one near Tarhunah, 65 miles southeast of Tripoli, and another near Sabah, 460 miles south of Tripoli. Libya has received foreign assistance in its chemical weapons program from many countries. In October 1996, a German national was convicted in a German court for selling a computer to Libya that was designed to be used in chemical weapons production, and for helping Libya import emission treatment for poison gas production from India using an _Irish_ dummy corporation. There have also been reports that China, North Korea, Germany, Switzerland, and other European nations have given technical support and provided advisors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1130" task="">
  <question>
    Other than North Korea, which countries have provided chemical weapons advisors or technical support to Libya's chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There have also been reports that China, North Korea, Germany, Switzerland, and other European nations have given technical support and provided advisors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707922.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1131" task="">
  <question>
    Did Libya sell oil to South Africa in exchange for chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The South African government has denied a 21 June 1998 report by Con Coughlin in the British newspaper &quot;Sunday Telegraph&quot; that it concluded a $418 million arms-for-oil deal with Libya. South African President Nelson Mandela said that he maintains a close relationship with Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, but a statement issued by Mandela's office said that &quot;the government wishes to put on record that neither President Nelson Mandela nor the South African government and its agencies have entered into any discussions - let alone concluded any deals - with Libya on arms for oil transactions.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1132" task="">
  <question>
    What did Libya reportedly receive from South Africa in exchange for oil? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The &quot;Sunday Telegraph&quot; alleged that South Africa would supply Libya with weapons, spare parts, and possibly biological and chemical weapons information in exchange for Libyan oil. According to the &quot;Sunday Telegraph,&quot; the deal was negotiated by Libya's foreign security and intelligence chief, Musa Kusa, and will also include advanced equipment such as surface-to-air missiles. South Africa has previously agreed to provide Libya with spare parts for its attack helicopters and Mirage fighter aircraft. South Africa has also considered selling its Rooivalk combat helicopter to Libya. According to Coughlin, South African officials are very concerned with preserving the country's defense industry. One South African official said &quot;we will do business with any country that will reciprocate.&quot;[1] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1133" task="">
  <question>
    Has China admitted to helping Libya develop chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China denies that it  is helping  Libya, or any other country, develop chemical weapons . ...  China has consistently stood for a comprehensive prohibition and complete  destructionof chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/chemchr.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/chemchr.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1134" task="">
  <question>
    How much open-source information is available on Libya's biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is very limited open-source information indicating Libya is pursuing a biological weapons (BW) program. The country acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on January 19, 1982, but questions remain regarding Libya?s compliance with the treaty. There are allegations that the alleged chemical weapon (CW) plants at Rabta and Tarhunah could contain BW research facilities as well. U.S. intelligence agencies have alleged that Libya?s leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, has attempted to recruit South African scientists to assist in the acquisition of BW, and that Libya has started to develop pathogens and toxins for weapons use. If so, security experts believe that Libya is several years away from acquiring a militarily significant indigenous BW capability. Libya?s government strongly denies acquiring or producing BW. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1135" task="">
  <question>
    From which country did Libya try to recruit scientists to help with its biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. intelligence agencies have alleged that Libya?s leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, has attempted to recruit South African scientists to assist in the acquisition of BW, and that Libya has started to develop pathogens and toxins for weapons use. If so, security experts believe that Libya is several years away from acquiring a militarily significant indigenous BW capability. Libya?s government strongly denies acquiring or producing BW. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1136" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya admit to having biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    If so, security experts believe that Libya is several years away from acquiring a militarily significant indigenous BW capability. Libya?s government strongly denies acquiring or producing BW. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1137" task="">
  <question>
    How far is Libya from producing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    If so, security experts believe that Libya is several years away from acquiring a militarily significant indigenous BW capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1138" task="">
  <question>
    How much open-source information is available on Libya's chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is a significant amount of open-source literature concerning Libya?s acquisition and use of chemical weapons (CW); it is well documented that Libya employed Iranian-supplied mustard gas bombs against Chad, its southern neighbor, in 1987. The U.S. government maintains that Libya continues to produce CW, including blister and nerve agents, at clandestine facilities in Tarhunah, 50 miles southeast of Tripoli, and at the Pharma 150 complex in Rabta, located in the Sahara Desert 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. Libya is one of the few states that refuses to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1139" task="">
  <question>
    How sure are we that Libya used chemical weapons against Chadian troops in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it is well documented that Libya employed Iranian-supplied mustard gas bombs against Chad, its southern neighbor, in 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1140" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya use CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it is well documented that Libya employed Iranian-supplied mustard gas bombs against Chad, its southern neighbor, in 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1141" task="">
  <question>
    How far are the Libyan chemical weapons facilities in Tarhuhah and Rabta from the Libyan capital of Tripoli? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The U.S. government maintains that Libya continues to produce CW, including blister and nerve agents, at clandestine facilities in Tarhunah, 50 miles southeast of Tripoli, and at the Pharma 150 complex in Rabta, located in the Sahara Desert 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. Libya is one of the few states that refuses to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1142" task="">
  <question>
    From where did Libya obtain its first ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya first acquired Scud-B missiles in the early 1970s from the Soviet Union. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1143" task="">
  <question>
    Other than North Korea, which countries have provided technical support to Libya's ballistic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Also, after the lifting of the 1999 sanctions, reports of increased technical and structural assistance from countries like Iran, North Korea, China, India, and Russia have raised concerns over Libya?s growing ability to manufacture ballistic missiles. Libya is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1144" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1145" task="">
  <question>
    Has the U.S. threatened to take military action against Libya's chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 19 May 1996, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi announced that his country was exploring ways &quot;to make an anti-missile missile.&quot; In April 1996, the U.S. announced that it had not ruled out using conventional weapons to stop Libya from completing what Washington claimed was a chemical weapons plant in Tarunah, near Tripoli. Libya has said the site is an irrigation project. Gaddafi said the missile would be developed to defend Libya against foreign aggression, including the threat of a nuclear attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1146" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya been researching missile defenses? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 19 May 1996, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi announced that his country was exploring ways &quot;to make an anti-missile missile.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1147" task="">
  <question>
    How could the US act to stop Libya from developing CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n April 1996, the U.S. announced that it had not ruled out using conventional weapons to stop Libya from completing what Washington claimed was a chemical weapons plant in Tarunah, near Tripoli. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1148" task="">
  <question>
    What does Libya claim is the purpose of its Tarunah CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Washington claimed was a chemical weapons plant in Tarunah, near Tripoli. Libya has said the site is an irrigation project. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1996/m9606169.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1149" task="">
  <question>
    Who does Libya view as its primary external threat? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has  shown that he is willing and capable of using  chemical weapons and missiles  against his enemies. Libya  sees the United States as its primary external  threat, owing to unrelenting United States opposition to Libya's support for  terrorism, NBC programs, and aggressive behavior. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1150" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya suggested that it would use chemical weapons against its enemies? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has  shown that he is willing and capable of using  chemical weapons and missiles  against his enemies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1151" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between Dr. Claus Tuchhaendler and Libya's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Germany's Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (BKA) and the public prosecutor in Munich have been investigating Dr. Claus Tuchhaendler and Walter Ziegler for the past six months. Tuchhaendler and Ziegler are under investigation for allegedly providing Libya with &quot;high-tech supplies&quot; from Germany and Switzerland. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808137.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808137.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1152" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between Walter Ziegler and Libya's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Germany's Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (BKA) and the public prosecutor in Munich have been investigating Dr. Claus Tuchhaendler and Walter Ziegler for the past six months. Tuchhaendler and Ziegler are under investigation for allegedly providing Libya with &quot;high-tech supplies&quot; from Germany and Switzerland. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808137.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808137.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1153" task="">
  <question>
    How is Libya's chemical weapons plant at Rabta expected to figure into its continued development of CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya clearly intends to reestablish its offensive chemical weapons capability and has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents at its Rabta   facility, which ostensibly reopened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1154" task="">
  <question>
    What is the CW production capacity of Libya's Rabta CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents at its Rabta   facility, which ostensibly reopened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1155" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical agents has Libya produced at its chemical weapons plant at Rabta since 1995? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya clearly intends to reestablish its offensive chemical weapons capability and has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents at its Rabta   facility, which ostensibly reopened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1156" task="">
  <question>
    Officially, what does Libya claim is the primary function of its chemical weapons plant at Rabta? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya clearly intends to reestablish its offensive chemical weapons capability and has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents at its Rabta   facility, which ostensibly reopened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1157" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya expected to develop an offensive chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya clearly intends to reestablish its offensive chemical weapons capability and has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents at its Rabta   facility, which ostensibly reopened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/tene02_03.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1158" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Libya receive poison-gas scrubbing equipment from in 1993? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1993 An Indian company completes work on poison-gas scrubbing equipment and sends it to Libya. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2696.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1159" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya first start seeking chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the late 1970s, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi has sought to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly chemical and biological weapons (CBW). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1160" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya first develop basic chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By the late 1980s, Libya had developed a rudimentary capability to produce such weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1161" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated Libya to pursue a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Western experts view the pursuit of CBW as a means of bolstering Libya's military capability, since the country lacks effective conventional ground, air, or naval forces. Libyan CBW programs may also represent a bid by Colonel Qadhafi to offset Israel's nuclear capability with weapons often called the &quot;poor man's atomic bomb.&quot; This motivation may stem from Libya's thwarted efforts to obtain its own nuclear capability. Thus far, Libya has been unsuccessful in its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons because of international sanctions and the fact that it lacks the necessary financial and technical resources. Qadhafi's pursuit of CBW capabilities is of concern to the international community because of his often erratic behavior and the fact that Libya is believed to possess two of the largest CW production complexes ever constructed in the developing world. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1162" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's official position with regards to its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's official position is that it does not have a CBW program and that its chemical production facilities are intended solely for peaceful purposes.2 But informed observers believe these denials demonstrate Qadhafi's penchant for &quot;saying one thing and doing the exact opposite.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1163" task="">
  <question>
    How do experts expect Libya to deliver CBW to potential targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Western and Libyan exile sources, Libya's effort to acquire CBW is coupled with an aggressive strategy to acquire ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver them. Because CBW are relatively cheaper to produce and easier to conceal than nuclear weapons, the possibility looms that Libya could employ chemical or biological weapons either directly or through surrogates, such as terrorist groups 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1164" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Libya would use terrorist groups to deliver CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Because CBW are relatively cheaper to produce and easier to conceal than nuclear weapons, the possibility looms that Libya could employ chemical or biological weapons either directly or through surrogates, such as terrorist groups 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1165" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya ever used chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indeed, Libya has already resorted to chemical warfare on a small scale as an assymetric response to conventional military inferiority. In 1987, Libya's military operation in Chad was near defeat following a series of dramatic reversals. When Chadian forces, with French support, launched a surprise attack on a military base inside Libya, Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iraniansupplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1166" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya first use chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1987, Libya's military operation in Chad was near defeat following a series of dramatic reversals. When Chadian forces, with French support, launched a surprise attack on a military base inside Libya, Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iraniansupplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1167" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Libya use against Chadian forces in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    When Chadian forces, with French support, launched a surprise attack on a military base inside Libya, Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iraniansupplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1168" task="">
  <question>
    What CW is Libya known to have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iraniansupplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1169" task="">
  <question>
    How did Libya deliver chemical weapons against Chadian forces in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iraniansupplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1170" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Libya obtain the stores of mustard gas it used against Chadian forces in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iraniansupplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1171" task="">
  <question>
    How does Libya's chemical weapons capabilities affect the balance of power in the Middle East? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's CBW program might also play a catalytic role in a future Arab-Israeli war. Nevertheless, given Israel's nuclear capability and overwhelming conventional military strength, even the deployment of Libyan chemical weapons on ballistic missiles would not significantly alter the Arab-Israeli balance of power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1172" task="">
  <question>
    What do Libya's chemical weapons capabilities include? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's chemical warfare capabilities reportedly include personal protective equipment, Soviet-type decontamination units, and a stockpile of chemical agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1173" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya have CW protective suits? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's chemical warfare capabilities reportedly include personal protective equipment, Soviet-type decontamination units, and a stockpile of chemical agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1174" task="">
  <question>
    How many chemical weapons facilities does Libya have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the late 1980s, Libya has sought to develop an indigenous production capability for chemical weapons (CW) manufacture and storage at three primary facilities in isolated parts of the country 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1175" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's Pharma 150 (Rabta) CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pharma 150 (Rabta) The first CW production facility, known as Pharma 150, is a large industrial complex at Rabta, a sparsely populated and mountainous desert area about 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. The Reagan administration first publicized the existence and purpose of the Rabta facility in the fall of 1988. Considered to be one of the largest CW production facility in the developing world, the Rabta complex consists of a CW agent production plant, a chemical munitions storage building, and a steel mill. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1176" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Libya's Pharma 150 CW facility located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pharma 150 (Rabta) The first CW production facility, known as Pharma 150, is a large industrial complex at Rabta, a sparsely populated and mountainous desert area about 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1177" task="">
  <question>
    How is Libya's Pharma 150 (Rabta) CW facility defended? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The complex is defended with Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1178" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Libya build its chemical weapons plant at Pharma 150? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to published reports, the Rabta plant was built with the help of private companies from a dozen nations, including both Western and Eastern bloc countries. Firms from Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy, as well as Japan, provided Libya with the technology and materials to manufacture chemical weapons. The German firm Imhausen-Chemie AG played a central role in construction of the Rabta facility. In 1989, Imhausen reportedly contracted with Salzgitter Industriebau, another German company, to supply plans for a large chemical plant to produce highly toxic materials at Rabta.7 Other German firms also cooperated with Imhausen but claim that they believed they were delivering goods for a pharmaceutical plant being built in Hong Kong. Imhausen used this cover story to move sensitive goods through its Hong Kong-based trading company, Pen Tsao Materia Medica Center, which had a branch in Hamburg and was able to circumvent German export controls.8 The German equipment and supplies were transshipped through Hong Kong and Singapore before reaching Libya 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1179" task="">
  <question>
    What assistance did Libya receive from Japanese companies in the construction of its chemical weapons plant at Pharma 150 (Rabta)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1980s, a Japanese company, Nihon Seikojo, or Japan Steel Works, played a major role in the construction of the metal-working plant at the Rabta complex.17 The company stated that it had delivered general-purpose machine tools, which it believed would be used for a desalinization plant. However, the proximity of the metal-working plant to the CW factory indicated that the Libyans intended to fabricate munitions and delivery vehicles for poison gas. Japan Steel Works subcontracted the electrical system for the machine shop to Toshiba in 1985. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1180" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied Libya's Pharma 150 (Rabta) chemical weapons facility with precursor chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In June 1990, U.S. officials claimed that China was supplying the Rabta plant with raw materials for CW agents.20 This allegation followed a report in April 1990 that a Chinese manufacturer of artillery shells had been linked to Rabta, an indication that Libya was interested in the production of chemical munitions 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1181" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya's Pharma 150 (Rabta) chemical weapons facility begin producing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to U.S. intelligence sources, the Rabta factory began mass-producing CW agents in 1990, although there is some evidence that pilot production began earlier.24 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1182" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons were produced at Libya's Pharma 150 (Rabta) chemical weapons facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the early 1990s, Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day.25 In March 1990, American and German intelligence sources claimed that Libya had produced approximately 30 tons of mustard gas at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1183" task="">
  <question>
    What is reported output of Libya's Pharma 150 (Rabta) CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day.25 In March 1990, American and German intelligence sources claimed that Libya had produced approximately 30 tons of mustard gas at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1184" task="">
  <question>
    What CW does Libya make at its Pharma 150 (Rabta) CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day.25 In March 1990, American and German intelligence sources claimed that Libya had produced approximately 30 tons of mustard gas at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1185" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya produce blister agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1186" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya produce tabun? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1187" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya produce sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1188" task="">
  <question>
    What nerve agents can Libya reportedly produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1189" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's Pharma 200 CW plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pharma 200 (Sebha) A second Libyan CW plant, called Pharma 200, is reportedly almost identical to the Rabta plant. It is located underground in a remote desert location, 650 miles south of Tripoli in the Sebha Oasis, a military base about 95 kilometers north of the Chadian-Libyan border. Construction of Pharma 200 began in the late 1980s and was completed in 1992. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1190" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Libya's Pharma 200 CW facility located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pharma 200 (Sebha) A second Libyan CW plant, called Pharma 200, is reportedly almost identical to the Rabta plant. It is located underground in a remote desert location, 650 miles south of Tripoli in the Sebha Oasis, a military base about 95 kilometers north of the Chadian-Libyan border. Construction of Pharma 200 began in the late 1980s and was completed in 1992. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1191" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's capacity for producing CW artillery shells at Pharma 150? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 1991, U.S. intelligence officials reported that in the vicinity of Rabta, Libya had built a new complex of S-shaped concrete bunkers covered with sand, which contained special equipment to assemble poison gas artillery shells and bombs.29 The United States warned that this development represented a new phase in Libya's efforts to acquire a CW capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1192" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons are reportedly produced at Libya's Pharma 200 (Sebha) facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. officials claimed that the Chinese government was selling an estimated 10,000 tons of chemicals that could be used to manufacture CW agents at Pharma 200.37 The plant reportedly produced lewisite and sarin nerve gas. As at Rabta, most of the plant workers were Thai nationals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1193" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya produce Lewisite? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. officials claimed that the Chinese government was selling an estimated 10,000 tons of chemicals that could be used to manufacture CW agents at Pharma 200.37 The plant reportedly produced lewisite and sarin nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1194" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied Libya with precursor chemicals for Libya's Pharma 200 CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. officials claimed that the Chinese government was selling an estimated 10,000 tons of chemicals that could be used to manufacture CW agents at Pharma 200 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1195" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Libya obtain CW precursors for its Pharma 200 CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. officials claimed that the Chinese government was selling an estimated 10,000 tons of chemicals that could be used to manufacture CW agents at Pharma 200 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1196" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of CW precursor chemicals could have already been processed at Libya's Pharma 200 CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. officials claimed that the Chinese government was selling an estimated 10,000 tons of chemicals that could be used to manufacture CW agents at Pharma 200 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1197" task="">
  <question>
    What is known about Libya's chemical weapons facility at Tarhunah? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi resolved to build an entirely new, underground CW production complex near the town of Tarhunah, 50 miles southeast of Tripoli. This facility was intended to supplant the Rabta plant. As with the other two plants, the Libyan government has claimed at various times that Tarhunah is a petrochemical complex or that the facility's tunnels are part of the Great Man-Made River Project to funnel water from Libya's southern acquifers to its coastal cities.39 The Tarhunah facility, extending over six square miles, is a labyrinth of tunnels carved into the side of a hollowed-out mountain. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1198" task="">
  <question>
    What does Libya claim it produces at its CW facility at Tarunah / Tarhunah? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As with the other two plants, the Libyan government has claimed at various times that Tarhunah is a petrochemical complex or that the facility's tunnels are part of the Great Man-Made River Project to funnel water from Libya's southern acquifers to its coastal cities 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1199" task="">
  <question>
    How large is Libya's CW facility at Tarhunah / Tarunah? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Tarhunah facility, extending over six square miles, is a labyrinth of tunnels carved into the side of a hollowed-out mountain. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1200" task="">
  <question>
    How is Libya's CW facility at Tarhunah defended? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Tarhunah facility, extending over six square miles, is a labyrinth of tunnels carved into the side of a hollowed-out mountain.40 The plant's entrance is located in the middle of a long, narrow valley between two mountain peaks, making it difficult for spy-satellites to view the factory or for fighter aircraft to destroy it. The plant also is virtually impregnable to conventional air attack because of three 450foot-long tunnels, protected above by 100 feet of sandstone and several feet of reinforced concrete.41 To make the plant even more difficult to attack, Libya reportedly obtained blueprints used by the former Soviet Union to build underground bomb shelters.42 Apparently, only a direct hit on the top of the mountain with a nuclear warhead would be capable of destroying the facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1201" task="">
  <question>
    How does Libya's CW facility at Tarhunah compare with other CW facilities around the world? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director John Deutch has called Tarhunah &quot;the world's largest underground chemical-weapons plant. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1202" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya's CW facility at Tarhunah become operational? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plant was expected to become fully operational by the end of 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1203" task="">
  <question>
    What is the CW production capacity of the Libyan CW facility at Tarhunah? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plant was expected to become fully operational by the end of 1997 and to produce more than 2,500 tons of mustard gas44 and other deadly agents such as the nerve agents sarin (90 metric tons) and soman (1,300 metric tons) In early 1996, it was reported that the facility was already capable of storing most of Libya's stockpile of chemical weapons--about 100 tons.46 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1204" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons are produced at Libya's CW facility at Tarhunah? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plant was expected to become fully operational by the end of 1997 and to produce more than 2,500 tons of mustard gas44 and other deadly agents such as the nerve agents sarin (90 metric tons) and soman (1,300 metric tons) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1205" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya produce soman? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plant was expected to become fully operational by the end of 1997 and to produce more than 2,500 tons of mustard gas44 and other deadly agents such as the nerve agents sarin (90 metric tons) and soman (1,300 metric tons) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1206" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Libya's three major CW facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Tarhunah facility, extending over six square miles, is a labyrinth of tunnels carved into the side of a hollowed-out mountain.40 The plant's entrance is located in the middle of a long, narrow valley between two mountain peaks, making it difficult for spy-satellites to view the factory or for fighter aircraft to destroy it.:Pharma 200 (Sebha) A second Libyan CW plant, called Pharma 200, is reportedly almost identical to the Rabta plant. It is located underground in a remote desert location, 650 miles south of Tripoli in the Sebha Oasis, a military base about 95 kilometers north of the Chadian-Libyan border. Construction of Pharma 200 began in the late 1980s and was completed in 1992.Pharma 150 (Rabta) The first CW production facility, known as Pharma 150, is a large industrial complex at Rabta, a sparsely populated and mountainous desert area about 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1207" task="">
  <question>
    What connection is there between the CW programs in Libya and South Africa? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On February 11, 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela promised to investigate claims that members of the South African Defense Force had sold chemical precursors or expertise to Libya after the 1994 election. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1208" task="">
  <question>
    How does Libya obtain chemical weapons precursors that are no longer available on the worldwide market? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To manufacture the precursor chemicals needed as raw materials for the Tarhunah facility, many of which are no longer available from foreign suppliers, Libya has built a production plant near the northeastern town of Benghazi 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1209" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya produce its own chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To manufacture the precursor chemicals needed as raw materials for the Tarhunah facility, many of which are no longer available from foreign suppliers, Libya has built a production plant near the northeastern town of Benghazi 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1210" task="">
  <question>
    What Libyan chemical weapons facilities are located in Benghazi? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To manufacture the precursor chemicals needed as raw materials for the Tarhunah facility, many of which are no longer available from foreign suppliers, Libya has built a production plant near the northeastern town of Benghazi 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1211" task="">
  <question>
    Were Western governments able to stop the construction of Libya's Tarhunah CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In late 1996, reports began to surface that construction of the Tarhunah plant had fallen behind schedule because of the success of Western governments in disrupting the global procurement network Libya had established for the project.59 Middle East defense expert Anthony Cordesman stated in late 1996 that work on the plant had ceased.60 Furthermore, according to a Western diplomat in Cairo, there was little security in the vicinity of Tarhunah, suggesting that the project was dormant.61 Nevertheless, U.S. officials remained concerned about Tarhunah because of Qadhafi's history of deception. Some analysts suspected that work on the plant may have merely slowed down, and that equipment was being transported at night, when it was difficult to detect.62 These concerns were apparently justified. In February 1997, Israeli military intelligence sources revealed that work on the plant had halted temporarily and then resumed in late 1996, entering a new stage in which chemical production equipment was being installed.63 American and Israeli sources estimate that the Tarhunah plant might be ready for CW production by the end of 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1212" task="">
  <question>
    Has intelligence suggested that Libya has abandoned the construction of its Tarhunah CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Middle East defense expert Anthony Cordesman stated in late 1996 that work on the plant had ceased.60 Furthermore, according to a Western diplomat in Cairo, there was little security in the vicinity of Tarhunah, suggesting that the project was dormant.61 Nevertheless, U.S. officials remained concerned about Tarhunah because of Qadhafi's history of deception. Some analysts suspected that work on the plant may have merely slowed down, and that equipment was being transported at night, when it was difficult to detect. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1213" task="">
  <question>
    What did Libya do to conceal the construction of its Tarhunah CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some analysts suspected that work on the plant may have merely slowed down, and that equipment was being transported at night, when it was difficult to detect.62 These concerns were apparently justified. In February 1997, Israeli military intelligence sources revealed that work on the plant had halted temporarily and then resumed in late 1996, entering a new stage in which chemical production equipment was being installed 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1214" task="">
  <question>
    When will Libya's Tarhunah CW facility become fully operational? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    American and Israeli sources estimate that the Tarhunah plant might be ready for CW production by the end of 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1215" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Libya has a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    No hard data are available from open sources about Libya's effort to develop and produce biological weapons (BW). It is believed that the Libyan BW program &quot;is in the early research and development stage 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1216" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya have effective delivery systems for its biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's BW capabilities reportedly include an unconfirmed number of microbial and toxin agents, although Libya reportedly has not yet succeeded developing effective delivery systems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1217" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Libya's primary biological weapons facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although little is known about the locations of the facilities that manufacture BW agents, Libya's Rabta facility, although primarily a CW plant, is believed to contain biological research facilities.70 It is possible that like Rabta, the Tarhunah CW plant could also manufacture biological agents in the near future 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1218" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya have BW production facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although little is known about the locations of the facilities that manufacture BW agents, Libya's Rabta facility, although primarily a CW plant, is believed to contain biological research facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1219" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya have BW research facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although little is known about the locations of the facilities that manufacture BW agents, Libya's Rabta facility, although primarily a CW plant, is believed to contain biological research facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1220" task="">
  <question>
    What BW research and development does Libya conduct at its Pharma 150 (Rabta) CW plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's Rabta facility, although primarily a CW plant, is believed to contain biological research facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1221" task="">
  <question>
    What BW research and development does Libya conduct at its Pharma 200 (Tarunah / Tarhunah) CW facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is possible that like Rabta, the Tarhunah CW plant could also manufacture biological agents in the near future 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1222" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya tried to recruit foreign bioweapons exports to augment its bioweapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In early 1995, U.S. intelligence sources claimed that Qadhafi was attempting to recruit South African scientists to Tripoli to assist Libya's development of biological weapons.71 These scientists had secretly developed biological weapons that were allegedly used to assassinate opponents of South Africa's apartheid regime.72 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1223" task="">
  <question>
    Which country's scientists were suspected of helping Libay develop CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In early 1995, U.S. intelligence sources claimed that Qadhafi was attempting to recruit South African scientists to Tripoli to assist Libya's development of biological weapons.71 These scientists had secretly developed biological weapons that were allegedly used to assassinate opponents of South Africa's apartheid regime.72 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1224" task="">
  <question>
    When do experts suspect that Libya will be able to weaponize biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it may be several years before Libya is capable of weaponizing BW agents. As other developing countries have discovered, developing effective BW munitions and missile warheads is technologically demanding because of the need to avoid killing the microbial agents in the process of dissemination and to disperse them at the proper altitude. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1225" task="">
  <question>
    When will Libya have BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it may be several years before Libya is capable of weaponizing BW agents. As other developing countries have discovered, developing effective BW munitions and missile warheads is technologically demanding because of the need to avoid killing the microbial agents in the process of dissemination and to disperse them at the proper altitude. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1226" task="">
  <question>
    What are the biggest challenges Libya faces in developing effective weaponized biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it may be several years before Libya is capable of weaponizing BW agents. As other developing countries have discovered, developing effective BW munitions and missile warheads is technologically demanding because of the need to avoid killing the microbial agents in the process of dissemination and to disperse them at the proper altitude. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1227" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya have the technological capacity to develop effective BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    it may be several years before Libya is capable of weaponizing BW agents. As other developing countries have discovered, developing effective BW munitions and missile warheads is technologically demanding because of the need to avoid killing the microbial agents in the process of dissemination and to disperse them at the proper altitude. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1228" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's preferred means of delivering chemical weapons to targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Available documentation indicates that Libya is intent on delivering CBW agents at distant targets with ballistic missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1229" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya succeeded in creating a chemical weapons warhead for a ballistic missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While Libya has not yet succeeded in devising effective biological warheads, it has made progress in developing chemical warheads. Two major Libyan ballistic-missile programs are reportedly under way: the al-Fateh (&quot;Conqueror&quot;) and al-Fajer al-Jadid projects. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1230" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's al-Fateh missile project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The al-Fateh project is a research and development effort to develop a ballistic missile with a range of 950 kilometers, although the missile is not yet operational 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1231" task="">
  <question>
    What is the reported range of Libya's al-Fateh missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The al-Fateh project is a research and development effort to develop a ballistic missile with a range of 950 kilometers, although the missile is not yet operational 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1232" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's al-Fajer al-Jadid missile project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    74 The al-Fajer al-Jadid project seeks to upgrade Libya's Scud B surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 190 miles, to deliver chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1233" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of Libya's Scud B missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's Scud B surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 190 miles, to deliver chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1234" task="">
  <question>
    Which ballistic missiles can Libya arm with chemical weapons payloads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    74 The al-Fajer al-Jadid project seeks to upgrade Libya's Scud B surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 190 miles, to deliver chemical weapons. Another possibility would be to place chemical warheads on the Nodong-1 advanced ballistic missiles, with a range of 810 miles. Libya has reportedly received the technology for the development of such missiles from North Korea 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1235" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya received missile technology from North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Another possibility would be to place chemical warheads on the Nodong-1 advanced ballistic missiles, with a range of 810 miles. Libya has reportedly received the technology for the development of such missiles from North Korea 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1236" task="">
  <question>
    Can Libya deliver chemical weapons from fighter aircraft? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Yet another delivery option would be to equip Libya's Su-24D &quot;Fencer&quot; advanced fighter aircraft with chemical bombs.77 Libya currently has only a primitive capability to refuel such aircraft in mid-air, although it could potentially strike at Israel 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1237" task="">
  <question>
    What is the relationship between Libya's chemical weapons program and their nuclear weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has embarked on a full-scale effort to develop a CBW capability as the most cost-effective means of bolstering its overall military posture, which lacks effective conventional military forces or nuclear weapons. Furthermore, for Qadhafi, CBW are a substitute for his thwarted efforts to obtain a nuclear bomb. Nevertheless, Libya is still believed to be seeking nuclear weapons. This intention was officially confirmed in mid-April 1990, when Qadhafi called for the inclusion of a nuclear component in the development of a multifaceted deterrent force 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1238" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Libya is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has denied seeking nuclear weapons, experts consider this commitment suspect. Although Libya signed the NPT on July 18, 1968 and ratified it on May 26, 1975, Tripoli did not enter into a formal safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until 1980. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1239" task="">
  <question>
    Are Libya's nuclear facilities safeguarded by the IAEA? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Libya signed the NPT on July 18, 1968 and ratified it on May 26, 1975, Tripoli did not enter into a formal safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until 1980. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1240" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's official policy towards CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's leaders have issued contradictory statements about the role of CBW as a deterrent or a usable military capability. On the one hand, regime officials have maintained that the three suspected CW plants are designed only to produce pharmaceuticals or are part of a water reservoir system.On the other hand, Libya has declined to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature in January 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997. Libya has also refused to open its chemical installations to international inspection. In mid-March 1990, Libya's deputy foreign minister for European affairs stated that the Libyan government was prepared to dismantle the Rabta facility in exchange for Western financing of a new facility to manufacture pharmaceuticals, to be built under Western supervision at a new site.85 This offer was rejected, however, since Libya could still produce and stockpile chemical weapons at clandestine sites. Indeed, the Libyan regime also has used various forms of subterfuge to deceive Western governments about the true nature of its CBW facilities 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1241" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    .On the other hand, Libya has declined to join the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature in January 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1242" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya offered to dismantle its CW facilities in exchange for aid? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's deputy foreign minister for European affairs stated that the Libyan government was prepared to dismantle the Rabta facility in exchange for Western financing of a new facility to manufacture pharmaceuticals, to be built under Western supervision at a new site 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1243" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya maintain secret CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This offer was rejected, however, since Libya could still produce and stockpile chemical weapons at clandestine sites. Indeed, the Libyan regime also has used various forms of subterfuge to deceive Western governments about the true nature of its CBW facilities 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1244" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya tried to conceal its CBW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indeed, the Libyan regime also has used various forms of subterfuge to deceive Western governments about the true nature of its CBW facilities 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1245" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya opened its chemical facilities to inspection from the OPCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has also refused to open its chemical installations to international inspection 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1246" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya offered to dismantle its chemical weapons facilities in exchange for Western support? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In mid-March 1990, Libya's deputy foreign minister for European affairs stated that the Libyan government was prepared to dismantle the Rabta facility in exchange for Western financing of a new facility to manufacture pharmaceuticals, to be built under Western supervision at a new site.85 This offer was rejected, however, since Libya could still produce and stockpile chemical weapons at clandestine sites. Indeed, the Libyan regime also has used various forms of subterfuge to deceive Western governments about the true nature of its CBW facilities 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1247" task="">
  <question>
    How are Libya's chemical weapons program expected to be affected  when UN sanctions on Libya are lifted? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In Africa, while Libya's progress had been slowed by UN sanctions in the past, now that these sanctions have been suspended, Libya may renew procurement activity to support its NBC weapons and missile programs. Further, as long as Qadhafi remains in power, we will be concerned about Libya's efforts. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1248" task="">
  <question>
    Have military forces from Libya trained with Usama Bin Laden? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The diverse groups under his umbrella afford Bin Laden resources beyond those of the people directly loyal to him. With his own inherited wealth, business interests, contributions from sympathizers in various countries, and support from close allies like the Egyptian and South Asian groups that signed his fatwa, he funds, trains, and offers logistic help to extremists not directly affiliated with his organization. He seeks to aid those who support his primary goals -- driving U.S. forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the Saudi ruling family from power, and &quot;liberating Palestine&quot; -- or his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Western-oriented governments in predominantly Muslim countries. His organization has sent trainers throughout Afghanistan as well as to Tajikistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen and has trained fighters from numerous other countries, including the Philippines, Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and Eritrea. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1249" task="">
  <question>
    How did Libyan forces deliver chemical weapons to Chadian targets in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya used transport aircraft in its attempt to deliver chemical agents against Chadian troops in 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1250" task="">
  <question>
    What options does Libya have for delivering chemical weapons to targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya also has a variety of fighter aircraft, some bombers, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1251" task="">
  <question>
    What are Libya's anti-ship capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has land- and sea-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles that it purchased from Soviet and European sources, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Many of the systems are old and likely are suffering from maintenance problems. In the future, while Libya likely will continue to focus on its anti-ship missile capabilities, it may try to purchase land attack cruise missiles 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1252" task="">
  <question>
    Do Libyan chemical weapons pose a threat to ships in the Mediterranean? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has land- and sea-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles that it purchased from Soviet and European sources, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Many of the systems are old and likely are suffering from maintenance problems. In the future, while Libya likely will continue to focus on its anti-ship missile capabilities, it may try to purchase land attack cruise missiles 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1253" task="">
  <question>
    What is the operational status of Libya's anti-ship cruise missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has land- and sea-launched short-range anti-ship cruise missiles that it purchased from Soviet and European sources, which are potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. Many of the systems are old and likely are suffering from maintenance problems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1254" task="">
  <question>
    What are the biggest challenges that Libya faces to developing a sophisticated chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Among any of its NBC programs, Libya has made the most progress with its chemical warfare effort. However, it remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, mechanical and technical expertise, and chemical warfare-related equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1255" task="">
  <question>
    How did the imposition of UN sanctions affect Libya's attempts to develop a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    From 1992 to 1999, UN sanctions continued to limit the type and amount of support Tripoli receives from abroad. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1256" task="">
  <question>
    How did the lifting of UN sanctions affect Libya's attempts to develop a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Libya wasted no time in reestablishing contacts with foreign sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals for its program. Clearly, Tripoli has not given up its goal of reestablishing its offensive chemical warfare ability and continues to pursue an indigenous chemical warfare production capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1257" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical agents had Libya produced prior to 1990? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Prior to 1990, Libya produced about 100 tons of chemical agents -- mustard and some nerve agent -- at a chemical facility at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1258" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents had Libya produced prior to 1990? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Prior to 1990, Libya produced about 100 tons of chemical agents -- mustard and some nerve agent -- at a chemical facility at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1259" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Libya cease chemical weapons production at its Rabta plant in 1990? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, it ceased production there in 1990 due to intense international media attention and the possibility of military intervention, and fabricated a fire to make the Rabta facility appear to have been seriously damaged. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1260" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Libya &quot;fake&quot; a fire at its Rabta chemical weapons plant in 1990? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, it ceased production there in 1990 due to intense international media attention and the possibility of military intervention, and fabricated a fire to make the Rabta facility appear to have been seriously damaged. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1261" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's official position towards its Rabta chemical weapons plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya maintains that the facility is a pharmaceutical production plant and announced in September 1995 that it was reopening the Rabta pharmaceutical facility. Although production of chemical agents has been halted, the Rabta facility remains part of the Libyan chemical weapons program, and future agent production cannot be ruled out. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1262" task="">
  <question>
    What does the 1995 reopening of Libya's Rabta chemical weapons complex mean for Libya's ability to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya maintains that the facility is a pharmaceutical production plant and announced in September 1995 that it was reopening the Rabta pharmaceutical facility. Although production of chemical agents has been halted, the Rabta facility remains part of the Libyan chemical weapons program, and future agent production cannot be ruled out. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1263" task="">
  <question>
    How did the 1990 closure of Libya's Rabta CW plant affect the development of Libya's chemical weapons capability? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After 1990, the Libyans shifted their efforts to trying to build a large underground chemical production facility at Tarhunah. However, the pace of activity there has slowed, probably due to increased international attention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1264" task="">
  <question>
    How does Libya respond to allegations that the Tarhunah complex is actually a chemical weapons plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Libyans claim that the Tarhunah tunnel site is a part of the Great Man-made River Project, a nationwide irrigation effort. Libya has not become a state party to the CWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1265" task="">
  <question>
    How did UN sanctions affect Libya's ability to obtain ballistic missile technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Despite the presence of UN sanctions from 1992 to 1999, Libya continued to seek ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise. However, the sanctions restricted the flow of ballistic missile goods and technology ultimately reaching Tripoli, although Libya has successfully obtained them, most notably from Serbia and from Indian companies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1266" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries provided missile technology to Libya in violation of UN sanctions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, the sanctions restricted the flow of ballistic missile goods and technology ultimately reaching Tripoli, although Libya has successfully obtained them, most notably from Serbia and from Indian companies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1267" task="">
  <question>
    How did the lifting of UN sanctions in 1999 affect Libya's missil development programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Such foreign assistance is critical to maintaining Libya's missile development program and, with the 1999 suspension of UN sanctions, Libya may have greater latitude to seek foreign assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1268" task="">
  <question>
    What is the operational status of Libya's SCUD missile force? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya continues to maintain an aging SCUD missile force, although the missiles likely suffer from poor maintenance and their operational status is questionable. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1269" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya tried to develop its own domestic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has tried, with limited success, to develop its own indigenous missile, and to extend the range of its aging SCUD force for many years under the Al Fatah and other missile programs. These indigenous programs are heavily dependent on foreign support and remain in the testing phase. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1270" task="">
  <question>
    How far has Libya gotten with the development of its own missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These indigenous programs are heavily dependent on foreign support and remain in the testing phase. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1271" task="">
  <question>
    What is the operational status of Libya's al-Fatah missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has tried, with limited success, to develop its own indigenous missile, and to extend the range of its aging SCUD force for many years under the Al Fatah and other missile programs. These indigenous programs are heavily dependent on foreign support and remain in the testing phase 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1272" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya managed to significantly modify the capabilities of the SCUD missiles it possesses? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Similarly, Libya's SCUD modification efforts also have shown little progress despite some foreign assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1273" task="">
  <question>
    What are the long-term goals of Libya's ballistic missile programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tripoli also is interested in a longer-range missile, such as the North Korean No Dong MRBM, or a similarly capable system, which it may pursue in light of the suspended UN sanctions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1274" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries would be at risk from a Libyan long-range missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Should Libya succeed with its effort to purchase or perhaps develop such a missile, the missile could threaten Egypt, Israel, NATO countries in southern Europe and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1275" task="">
  <question>
    Who could Libya attack with its missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Should Libya succeed with its effort to purchase or perhaps develop such a missile, the missile could threaten Egypt, Israel, NATO countries in southern Europe and U.S. forces in the Mediterranean region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1276" task="">
  <question>
    How is the lifting of UN sanctions expected to affect the development of Libya's biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This program has not advanced beyond the research and development stage, although it may be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent. Libya's program has been hindered by the country's poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999. Without foreign assistance and technical expertise to help Libya use available dualuse materials, the Libyan biological warfare program is not likely to make significant progress beyond its current stage. On the other hand,with the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya's ability to acquire biologicalrelated equipment and expertise will increase. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1277" task="">
  <question>
    What BW assistance would Libya be able to obtain when UN sanctions are lifted? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Without foreign assistance and technical expertise to help Libya use available dualuse materials, the Libyan biological warfare program is not likely to make significant progress beyond its current stage. On the other hand,with the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya's ability to acquire biologicalrelated equipment and expertise will increase. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1278" task="">
  <question>
    Why hasn't Libya had more success with the development of its CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This program has not advanced beyond the research and development stage, although it may be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent. Libya's program has been hindered by the country's poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1279" task="">
  <question>
    How long was Libya under UN sanctions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's program has been hindered by the country's poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in place from 1992 to 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1280" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries in the Middle East are aggressively seeking NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran, Iraq, and Libya are aggressively seeking NBC weapons and missile capabilities, constituting the most pressing threats to regional stability. Iran and Iraq have demonstrated their intent to dominate the Persian Gulf and to control access to critical oil supplies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1281" task="">
  <question>
    Who does Libya view as its primary external threat? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya remains a significant proliferation concern. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he is willing and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against his enemies. Libya sees the United States as its primary external threat, owing especially to U.S. support for UN sanctions against Tripoli for its refusal to turn over suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103. Although Libya's capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states he supports and that support him in return. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1282" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Muammar Qadhafi? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya remains a significant proliferation concern. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has shown that he is willing and capable of using chemical weapons and missiles against his enemies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1283" task="">
  <question>
    Why does Libya view the United States as a threat? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya sees the United States as its primary external threat, owing especially to U.S. support for UN sanctions against Tripoli for its refusal to turn over suspects in the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1284" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya perceived as a threat to provide chemical weapons to terrorist organizations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Libya's capabilities to use chemical agents and missiles are limited, Qadhafi could provide these weapons to states he supports and that support him in return. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1285" task="">
  <question>
    Who provides Iran with SCUD-B missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran first acquired SCUD-B ballistic missiles from Libya and North Korea and used them during the Iran-Iraq war. Later it received SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles from North Korea, and CSS-8 missiles and other material from China. Iran fired nearly 100 SCUD-B missiles at Iraq from 1985 to 1988. As was the case with chemical weapons, Iran's motivation to improve and expand its ballistic missile force results from the war with Iraq, during which Iran could not respond adequately to Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian cities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1286" task="">
  <question>
    Did Libya have access to SCUD-B missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran first acquired SCUD-B ballistic missiles from Libya and North Korea and used them during the Iran-Iraq war. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1287" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Iran expand its NBC weapons programs sharply during the 1980s and 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As was the case with chemical weapons, Iran's motivation to improve and expand its ballistic missile force results from the war with Iraq, during which Iran could not respond adequately to Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian cities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1288" task="">
  <question>
    Who provides Iran with SCUD-C missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran first acquired SCUD-B ballistic missiles from Libya and North Korea and used them during the Iran-Iraq war. Later it received SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles from North Korea, and CSS-8 missiles and other material from China. Iran fired nearly 100 SCUD-B missiles at Iraq from 1985 to 1988. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1289" task="">
  <question>
    Who provides Iran with CSS-8 / SA-2 missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran first acquired SCUD-B ballistic missiles from Libya and North Korea and used them during the Iran-Iraq war. Later it received SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles from North Korea, and CSS-8 missiles and other material from China. Iran fired nearly 100 SCUD-B missiles at Iraq from 1985 to 1988. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1290" task="">
  <question>
    How does Iran plan to expand its ballistic missile capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has a two-track ballistic missile program. In addition to acquiring SCUD missiles and missile-related equipment from North Korea, it also seeks to establish its own missile production capability. Its production program is planned for both liquid-fueled and solid-propellant missiles. As part of the process, Iran has already begun assembling missiles using foreign-made components and eventually it may produce these components domestically. Further, it is actively attempting to acquire other assistance and missile-related technology from a variety of foreign sources for its goal of producing an MRBM. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1291" task="">
  <question>
    What targets can Iran currently strike with its inventory of missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With its current inventory of missiles, Iran can strike targets in neighboring countries, including oil installations and ports in Saudi Arabia. With a longer range missile, such as the North Korean NODONG, it would be able to strike targets in Israel and in most of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1292" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons did Iraq have after May 1994, according to the UN? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The chief inspector of the UN Special Commission chemical destruction group said on May 11, 1994, that all known Iraqi chemical munitions, agents, and precursors had been eliminated. The group had been destroying Iraq's chemical warfare stockpile at the Samarra chemical weapons complex since June 1992. Over 27,000 chemical-filled bombs, rockets, and artillery shells had been destroyed, to include 30 SCUD chemical warheads. About 500 tons of mustard and nerve agents, and thousands of tons of precursor chemicals, were burned off or chemically neutralized. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1293" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya have a history of aggressive behavior towards countries in its region? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has a long history of subverting and destabilizing Arab and African nations by supporting coups, funding and training opposition forces and guerrilla groups, and plotting the assassinations of foreign leaders. Qadhafi has invaded, occupied, and/or claimed territory in all of Libya's neighbors except Egypt. He has at times supported foreign Islamic extremists, and he has frequently criticized Arab governments that have attempted to open dialogue with Israel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1294" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya been known to sponsor terrorist acts (such as assassinations or bombings)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has a long history of subverting and destabilizing Arab and African nations by supporting coups, funding and training opposition forces and guerrilla groups, and plotting the assassinations of foreign leaders. Qadhafi has invaded, occupied, and/or claimed territory in all of Libya's neighbors except Egypt. He has at times supported foreign Islamic extremists, and he has frequently criticized Arab governments that have attempted to open dialogue with Israel.  Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya remains a potential threat to the international community and neighboring states. While pursuing his political and military aspirations, he has squandered the country's oil wealth on a program for NBC weapons, missiles, and an enormous inventory of conventional military equipment. Since seizing power in 1969, Qadhafi has unsuccessfully attempted to turn the Libyan state into a regional military power. Qadhafi has demonstrated both his desire to acquire ballistic missiles and an NBC weapon capability as well as his willingness to use the capabilities at his disposal. In 1987, when his military operation against Chad was nearing defeat, Qadhafi ordered his forces to use chemical agents against Chadian troops. In response to U.S. retaliatory strikes for the terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque, Qadhafi fired SCUD missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa. Although the SCUD missiles did not cause significant damage, the act constituted a symbolic gesture of defiance directed at the United States and the international community. Finally, and more importantly, Qadhafi has ordered kidnappings and both supported and employed international terrorism against Western nations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1295" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya NBC capabilities allowed it to become a regional military power? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While pursuing his political and military aspirations, he has squandered the country's oil wealth on a program for NBC weapons, missiles, and an enormous inventory of conventional military equipment. Since seizing power in 1969, Qadhafi has unsuccessfully attempted to turn the Libyan state into a regional military power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1296" task="">
  <question>
    How does Libya finance its NBC programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under Qadhafi's leadership, Libya remains a potential threat to the international community and neighboring states. While pursuing his political and military aspirations, he has squandered the country's oil wealth on a program for NBC weapons, missiles, and an enormous inventory of conventional military equipment. Since seizing power in 1969, Qadhafi has unsuccessfully attempted to turn the Libyan state into a regional military power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1297" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya fired its SCUD missiles against European targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi has demonstrated both his desire to acquire ballistic missiles and an NBC weapon capability as well as his willingness to use the capabilities at his disposal. In 1987, when his military operation against Chad was nearing defeat, Qadhafi ordered his forces to use chemical agents against Chadian troops. In response to U.S. retaliatory strikes for the terrorist bombing of a Berlin discotheque, Qadhafi fired SCUD missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa. Although the SCUD missiles did not cause significant damage, the act constituted a symbolic gesture of defiance directed at the United States and the international community. Finally, and more importantly, Qadhafi has ordered kidnappings and both supported and employed international terrorism against Western nations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1298" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya been successful in developing a strong conventional military? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi's efforts to become a recognized military power in the region have been generally unsuccessful. Despite accumulating a large military inventory, Libya has failed to develop its conventional military capabilities, as evidenced by its embarrassment at the hands of Chadian forces in the 1980s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1299" task="">
  <question>
    Why has Libya failed to emerge as a regional leader? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Even though Qadhafi has been successful in holding on to power in Libya, he has not become a regional leader. His numerous schemes to form political unions with other Arab states have failed, and his support of insurgent and opposition movements has done little to enhance Libya's standing or further its policy agenda. Qadhafi's continued support for terrorism has resulted in an extended confrontation with the United States and, more recently, has prompted United Nations sanctions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1300" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's primary motivation for the acquisition of NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As a result of these setbacks, Qadhafi has placed greater emphasis on a more dangerous strategy: developing NBC weapons and missiles. Qadhafi views these weapons as critical in his drive to establish himself as the leader of the Arab world. In addition, he hopes that ongoing efforts to develop and ultimately produce NBC weapons, especially nuclear weapons, will give his nation prestige among Islamic and other Third World nations, recognition he has sought for three decades. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1301" task="">
  <question>
    Who provided Libya with a nuclear reactor in the 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya deposited its instruments of ratification to the NPT in 1975 and its declared facilities are under IAEA full scope safeguards. Libya's rudimentary nuclear program includes a small research reactor, provided by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, at the Tajura nuclear research center near Tripoli 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1302" task="">
  <question>
    When was Libya's Rabta chemical weapons facility completed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, Tripoli has looked to establish an indigenous chemical warfare program, and in late 1988, with extensive foreign assistance, completed construction of the Rabta chemical agent facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1303" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons were produced at Libya's Rabta chemical weapons facility during its first 3 years of operation? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    uring three years of operation, at least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents were produced at this facility. When the United States brought Libya's chemical warfare program to the attention of the international media in 1988, Libya responded in 1990 by fabricating a fire to make the Rabta facility appear to have been seriously damaged. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1304" task="">
  <question>
    When does Libya claim that it will sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya claims it will not sign the CWC as long as other countries in the region possess NBC weapons. Libya almost certainly will keep its chemical warfare program as long as Qadhafi remains in power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1305" task="">
  <question>
    Are there estimates as to when Libya will give up its chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya claims it will not sign the CWC as long as other countries in the region possess NBC weapons. Libya almost certainly will keep its chemical warfare program as long as Qadhafi remains in power. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1306" task="">
  <question>
    What challenges does Libya face to its attempts to develop a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya continues its efforts to establish a biological warfare capability. However, hampered by its inadequate biotechnical foundation, the Libyan offensive biological warfare program remains in the early research and development stage. Libya may look to small research and development programs supported by universities to fill in the gaps in its technical knowledge. These technical shortcomings, combined with limitations in Libya's overall ability to put agents into deliverable munitions, will preclude production of militarily effective biological warfare systems for the foreseeable future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1307" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya likely to be able to purchase NODONG missiles from North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    International constraints make purchasing a longer range missile, such as North Korea's NODONG, difficult. In addition, developing an indigenous ballistic missile production program also requires extensive foreign assistance. So far, Libya's program has made slow progress in its 13-year history, and has succeeded only in manufacturing liquid-fueled rockets with an approximate range of 200 kilometers. However, despite this lack of dramatic gain, the program continues to receive government support. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1308" task="">
  <question>
    What is the maximum range of the longest of Libya's ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    So far, Libya's program has made slow progress in its 13-year history, and has succeeded only in manufacturing liquid-fueled rockets with an approximate range of 200 kilometers. However, despite this lack of dramatic gain, the program continues to receive government support. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1309" task="">
  <question>
    Other than ballistic missiles, what other means of delivery does Libya possess for chemical weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has Soviet-made shipborne and European-made land-based and shipborne anti-ship cruise missiles. Libya has artillery and tactical rockets, as well as several aircraft that could deliver chemical agents, including MiG-23, Su-22, and Su-24 fighters; Tu-22 bombers; Mi-2 and Mi-8 helicopters; and AN-26 transports. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1310" task="">
  <question>
    Where has Libya obtained most of its shipborne and anti-ship missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has Soviet-made shipborne and European-made land-based and shipborne anti-ship cruise missiles. Libya has artillery and tactical rockets, as well as several aircraft that could deliver chemical agents, including MiG-23, Su-22, and Su-24 fighters; Tu-22 bombers; Mi-2 and Mi-8 helicopters; and AN-26 transports. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/me_na.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1311" task="">
  <question>
    What is China's official position on allegations that it transferred chemical weapons to Libya? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During a telephone interview with a journalist from France's AFP news agency, responding to the allegation that China transferred chemical weapons to Libya, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated: &quot;China denies that it is helping Libya, or any other country, develop chemical weapons. ... China has consistently stood for a comprehensive prohibition and complete destruction of chemical weapons. ... China is a non-chemical weapons state. It does not cooperate with any other countries in the field of development and production of chemical weapons.&quot; [AFP (Hong Kong)i in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/chemchr.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/chemchr.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1312" task="">
  <question>
    How did Libya obtain chemical weapons from Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 Iran allegedly supplies Libya with chemical agents in exchange for naval mines. Libya employs the agents against Chadian troops.  September 1987 A somewhat different report out of the United Kingdom alleges that Iran was supplying Libya with newly developed CW in exchange for missiles: &quot;Iran has agreed to supply Libya with Iranian-produced chemical weapons in exchange for advanced Soviet Scud-B missiles, according to informed sources in Tehran and Tripoli....The sources said Iran had developed three new types of chemical mortar shells and rockets for use against ships, tanks and troop concentrations.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1313" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya obtain chemical weapons from Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 Iran allegedly supplies Libya with chemical agents in exchange for naval mines. Libya employs the agents against Chadian troops.  September 1987 A somewhat different report out of the United Kingdom alleges that Iran was supplying Libya with newly developed CW in exchange for missiles: &quot;Iran has agreed to supply Libya with Iranian-produced chemical weapons in exchange for advanced Soviet Scud-B missiles, according to informed sources in Tehran and Tripoli....The sources said Iran had developed three new types of chemical mortar shells and rockets for use against ships, tanks and troop concentrations.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1314" task="">
  <question>
    What did Libya trade Iran for chemical weapons in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 Iran allegedly supplies Libya with chemical agents in exchange for naval mines. Libya employs the agents against Chadian troops.  September 1987 A somewhat different report out of the United Kingdom alleges that Iran was supplying Libya with newly developed CW in exchange for missiles: &quot;Iran has agreed to supply Libya with Iranian-produced chemical weapons in exchange for advanced Soviet Scud-B missiles, according to informed sources in Tehran and Tripoli....The sources said Iran had developed three new types of chemical mortar shells and rockets for use against ships, tanks and troop concentrations.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1315" task="">
  <question>
    What was the United States' response to Libya acquiring chemical weapons from Iran in 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    24 September 1987 The United States has sent 2,000 gas masks to Chad after State Department officials claim they have irrefutable evidence that the Libyan/Iranian mines-for-CW transfer took place. The officials state that according to shaky intelligence, there is a possibility another similar transfer may be in the works.  5 October 1987 The United States is preparing to send stinger missiles [manportable surface-to-air missiles MANPADS] to Chad in an effort to bolster that country's defenses against Libya after Libya allegedly acquired CW from Iran. The stingers are intended to counter the CW threat now posed by Libyan planes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1316" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did Iran provide to Libya in 1987 in exchange for naval mines? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    3 December 1987 US government officials state that Iran traded chemical weaponry to Libya in return for sophisticated naval mines. According to the officials, the CW was probably a mixture of mustard gas and nerve agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2959.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1317" task="">
  <question>
    According to Israeli sources, which Arab countries have missiles that can reach Israeli targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    13 March 1995 Quoting a high-ranking Israeli defense official, the daily Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot says that Syria, Iran, Libya, and other unnamed Arab countries have long- and medium-range missiles ready to launch at Israel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1318" task="">
  <question>
    What missile technology did Libya seek to purchase from Iran in 1995? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1995 Western intelligence agencies claim that Iran and Libya plan to co-develop long-range ballistic missiles. Libya reportedly has offered $31 million for material and technical information that Iran has obtained from China, North Korea, and other countries. Libya is believed to be developing a 600 mile-range surface-to-surface missile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1319" task="">
  <question>
    What agreement over missile technology did Libya and Iran reach in 1995? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 April 1995 Iran and Libya agree to cooperate in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Libya allegedly offers to pay Iran $31 million for material and know-how that Iran receives from North Korea, China, and Western sources. This could include equipment for a liquid-fuel plant. Supposedly, the two countries will work together to increase the range of the Scud-B missile, as well as to develop Libya's Al-Fatah missile. The Western intelligence report follows a visit to Tripoli by an Iranian Ministry of Defense delegation. The intelligence sources cite past cooperation between the two countries: during the Iran-Iraq War, Libya supplied missiles to Iran in exchange for chemical weapons, which the Libyans used against Chad. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1320" task="">
  <question>
    How did Iran expect to use Libya to obtain North Korean Nodong missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1995 Iran acquires North Korean Nodong missiles. [Note: This article also refers to the Nodong as a Scud-D.] The Israelis say that with the help of Libya, Iran acquires the technology to equip the Nodong with conventional warheads that have four times the destructive power of a Scud-B missile. Iran has already acquired more than 200 Scud-B missiles from North Korea. The Iranians deny the claims and accuse Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom of waging a propaganda war against Iran. Despite Iranian protests to the contrary, Israel insists that Iran acquires at least 12 North Korean Nodong missiles 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1321" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Libya provided Iran with missile technology in 1995? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2 May 1995 Israeli sources claim that Libya helped Iran with conventional warhead technology, enabling its Nodong-1 missiles to carry four times the explosives of its Scud-B. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1810.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1322" task="">
  <question>
    Which Middle East countries have employed chemical weapons or ballistic / anti-ship missiles during the past 10 years? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are several dangerous trends in the Middle East and North Africa regarding NBC weapons and missiles. Several states, including Iran, Iraq, and Libya, have employed chemical weapons, ballistic, or anti-ship cruise missiles within the last 10 years. Several states have developed, or are attempting to develop, NBC warheads for their missiles. Iraq is a case in point, having admitted, after the Gulf War, to possession of operational chemical and biological missile warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1323" task="">
  <question>
    Is Iran now capable of producing SCUD missiles domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has an ambitious missile program, with SCUD B, SCUD C, and CSS-8 (a Chinese surface-to-surface missile derived from a surface-to-air missile) missiles in its inventory. Having first acquired SCUD missiles from Libya and North Korea for use during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians are now able to produce the missile themselves. This has been accomplished with considerable equipment and technical help from North Korea. Iran has made significant progress in the last few years toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in ballistic missile production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1324" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Iran become a self-sufficient producer of SCUD missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran has an ambitious missile program, with SCUD B, SCUD C, and CSS-8 (a Chinese surface-to-surface missile derived from a surface-to-air missile) missiles in its inventory. Having first acquired SCUD missiles from Libya and North Korea for use during the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians are now able to produce the missile themselves. This has been accomplished with considerable equipment and technical help from North Korea. Iran has made significant progress in the last few years toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in ballistic missile production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1325" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Iran could help Libya become a self-sufficient producer of ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the future, as Iran becomes more self-sufficient at producing chemical or biological agents and ballistic missiles, there is a potential that it will become a supplier. For example, Iran might supply related equipment and technologies to other states trying to develop capabilities, such as Libya or Syria. There is precedent for such action; Iran supplied Libya with chemical agents in 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1326" task="">
  <question>
    Why has Libya traditionally supported terrorism and insurgency groups? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libyan leader Qadhafi is a leading advocate of Pan-Arabism and views himself as a revolutionary voice for developing countries and defender against Western imperialism and Zionist influences. His ideology has led to numerous unsuccessful attempts to form unions with other Arab states, support to insurgent and opposition movements in developing countries, and an extended period of confrontation with the United States and, more recently, the United Nations. Although Qadhafi has retreated from supporting subversion, destabilization, and terrorism in hopes of having the UN sanctions against Libya lifted, Libya has retained a significant infrastructure to support terrorist activities against Western interests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1327" task="">
  <question>
    Why hasn't Libya been more successful in developing NBC capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Qadhafi?s major limiting factor is Libya?s lack of a sufficient technological infrastructure to support domestic development of NBC weapons and missiles. All Libyan programs must rely on significant infusions of foreign equipment, technology, and expertise. Only Libya?s chemical warfare program has made any demonstrable progress developing facilities capable of supporting large-scale indigenous programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1328" task="">
  <question>
    What economic factors have limited Libya's efforts to develop chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to an inadequate infrastructure, Libya has serious economic problems that threaten the regime and complicate its long-term goal of establishing domestic production capabilities. Libya?s economic problems result from insufficient economic development outside the oil sector, economic and financial mismanagement, the absence of private enterprise, and corruption. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1329" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Lacks scientific and technical base. Remains in research and development stage. Ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1330" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya ratified the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nuclear Has long standing goal of acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon. Suffers from mismanagement; little foreign assistance. Ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Signed the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1331" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nuclear Has long standing goal of acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon. Suffers from mismanagement; little foreign assistance. Ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Signed the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1332" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya signed the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nuclear Has long standing goal of acquiring or developing a nuclear weapon. Suffers from mismanagement; little foreign assistance. Ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Signed the African Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1333" task="">
  <question>
    Does Libya's economy produce enough funds to support continued development of its chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Libyan economy also suffers from years of socialist-oriented policies and the use of financial resources for unnecessarily large inventories of conventional weapons and other large projects. Despite its economic problems and associated internal unrest, funds for Libya?s NBC and missile programs probably will remain adequate to support continued research and development. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1334" task="">
  <question>
    Do any of Libya's land- or sea-launched cruise missiles have the ability to carry chemical weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Land- and sea-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; none have NBC warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1335" task="">
  <question>
    What targets face the most risk from Libya's chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, while Libya?s ability to deliver any of its existing stockpile of chemical agents is not great, the threat to Egypt, U.S. forces in the region, or NATO cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1336" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's Great Man-Made River Project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After the media attention at Rabta, Libya shifted its emphasis to construction of an underground chemical warfare facility at Tarhunah, southeast of Tripoli. In response to international attention, Qadhafi claimed that Tarhunah was part of the Great Manmade River Project, a nationwide irrigation effort. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1337" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Egypt expect Libya to use chemical weapons in actions against Egyptian targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 1987 US intelligence indicates that Libya might be building a chemical weapons plant. Egypt, a suspected possessor of chemical weapons, has tense relations with Libya, suggesting that a skirmish might escalate to the use of chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1338" task="">
  <question>
    Which Middle East countries have reportedly used chemical weapons in war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 1989 The Reagan administration is expected to propose that the United Nations be given broad powers allowing the organization to investigate suspected chemical weapon use anywhere in the world. The announcement comes as the United States seemed particularly concerned with chemical weapons production among Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt. According to a New York Times article, &quot;there have been reports that Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Libya are employing chemical weapons in warfare.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1339" task="">
  <question>
    Who is suspected of supplying Syria with chemical weapons technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1989 Iran and Iraq join Egypt, Syria, and Libya in either openly deploying chemical weapons or being suspected of producing them. Egypt is believed to have provided Syria with their CW technology. ?David Fairhall, &quot;US-Soviet Convention Would Help Reverse Trend to Poison Warfare,&quot; The Guardian (London), 26 September 1989. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Egypt/3434_3447.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1340" task="">
  <question>
    What Arab states does Libya view as strategic threats? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    where the Iraqi-Iranian competition for regional domination has also stimulated interest in strong (so far conventional) armament among the smaller Gulf states (the Saudi Arabian acquisition of Chinese CSS-2 intermediate-range missiles is noteworthy here). Inter-Arab competition (Syria-Iraq; Egypt-Libya) adds to the region's complexity. Fundamentalist Sudan remains a source of instability at Egypt's southern flank. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1341" task="">
  <question>
    How do dual-use technologies foster the proliferation of NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    we have evidence of how proliferation occurs: not by governments waking up in the morning with the thought that they have good dual-use technology, so why not make a bomb? Rather, states determined to acquire WMD seek coherently and systematically to procure the equipment needed for that purpose. The Indian and the North Korean nuclear programs were consciously dual-use from the beginning with a view to put these technologies to military use. Israel received the needed facilities from France for the single purpose of building nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Iraq started out with complex procurement operations for weapons purposes. Iraq and Libya did the same for chemical weapons. The push was political, and the technology followed, not the other way around. Does all this mean we should be complacent about technology diffusion? Not at all. But the direction of concern must be different: it is not the growing number of &quot;virtual arsenals&quot; that is of concern. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1342" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Libya sought to expand its non-military chemical capabilities in order to develop offensive chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    we have evidence of how proliferation occurs: not by governments waking up in the morning with the thought that they have good dual-use technology, so why not make a bomb? Rather, states determined to acquire WMD seek coherently and systematically to procure the equipment needed for that purpose. The Indian and the North Korean nuclear programs were consciously dual-use from the beginning with a view to put these technologies to military use. Israel received the needed facilities from France for the single purpose of building nuclear weapons. Pakistan and Iraq started out with complex procurement operations for weapons purposes. Iraq and Libya did the same for chemical weapons. The push was political, and the technology followed, not the other way around. Does all this mean we should be complacent about technology diffusion? Not at all. But the direction of concern must be different: it is not the growing number of &quot;virtual arsenals&quot; that is of concern. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1343" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Britain restrict exports to Libya in 1992? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Six African states appeared on a British Department of Trade list of 33 countries considered sensitive destinations for export. Included were South Africa, for its ballistic missile and nuclear programs; Egypt, for its rocket program and interest in chemical weapons and supply links to Iraq; Libya, for its missile, chemical weapons, and nuclear projects. Also included were Angola and Somalia, for chemical weapons use, and Algeria for its Chinese-aided clandestine nuclear program. Trade Minister Tim Sainsbury said that the list was &quot;based on strategic and proliferation concerns and other criteria, including the risk of diversion and the lack of effective export controls.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9201463.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9201463.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1344" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's position on CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's official position is that it does not have a CBW program and that its chemical production facilities are intended solely for peaceful purposes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1345" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya trying to obtain CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the late 1970s, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi has sought to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly chemical and biological weapons (CBW). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1346" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya achieved the capability to produce CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By the late 1980s, Libya had developed a rudimentary capability to produce such weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1347" task="">
  <question>
    What is Libya's motivation for developing CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Western experts view the pursuit of CBW as a means of bolstering Libya's military capability, since the country lacks effective conventional ground, air, or naval forces. Libyan CBW programs may also represent a bid by Colonel Qadhafi to offset Israel's nuclear capability with weapons often called the &quot;poor man's atomic bomb.&quot; This motivation may stem from Libya's thwarted efforts to obtain its own nuclear capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1348" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya ever used CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has already resorted to chemical warfare on a small scale as an assymetric response to conventional military inferiority. In 1987, Libya's military operation in Chad was near defeat following a series of dramatic reversals. When Chadian forces, with French support, launched a surprise attack on a military base inside Libya, Qadhafi ordered his forces to attack the Chadian troops by dropping Iranian supplied mustard gas bombs from a transport aircraft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1349" task="">
  <question>
    When has Libya used chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1350" task="">
  <question>
    Where did Libya get the CW to use against Chad? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran supplied the agents in exchange for naval mines. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/meafrica.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1351" task="">
  <question>
    What capabilities for chemical warfare does Libya have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's chemical warfare capabilities reportedly include personal protective equipment, Soviet-type decontamination units, and a stockpile of chemical agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1352" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya signed or ratified the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Libya signed the NPT on July 18, 1968 and ratified it on May 26, 1975, Tripoli did not enter into a formal safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until 1980. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1353" task="">
  <question>
    What is NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1354" task="">
  <question>
    What is Pharma 150? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pharma 150 (Rabta) The first CW production facility, known as Pharma 150, is a large industrial complex at Rabta, a sparsely populated and mountainous desert area about 75 miles southwest of Tripoli. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1355" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Rabta complex? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Considered to be one of the largest CW production facility in the developing world, the Rabta complex consists of a CW agent production plant, a chemical munitions storage building, and a steel mill. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1356" task="">
  <question>
    What countries aided the building of the Rabta complex? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Firms from Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy, as well as Japan, provided Libya with the technology and materials to manufacture chemical weapons. The German firm Imhausen-Chemie AG played a central role in construction of the Rabta facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1357" task="">
  <question>
    What CW's can be produced at Rabta? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the early 1990s, Rabta was reportedly capable of producing the blister agent sulfur-mustard and the deadly nerve agents sarin and tabun at a rate of 10,000 pounds a day.25 In March 1990, American and German intelligence sources claimed that Libya had produced approximately 30 tons of mustard gas at Rabta. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1358" task="">
  <question>
    What is Pharma 200? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pharma 200 (Sebha) A second Libyan CW plant, called Pharma 200, is reportedly almost identical to the Rabta plant. It is located underground in a remote desert location, 650 miles south of Tripoli in the Sebha Oasis, a military base about 95 kilometers north of the Chadian-Libyan border. Construction of Pharma 200 began in the late 1980s and was completed in 1992. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1359" task="">
  <question>
    What countries aided the development of Sebha? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two additional German companies, Rose of Stuttgart and Abacus in Ulm, were suspected in June 1990 of helping to design the facility.33 It was also reported that Libya had requested Thyssen, a German firm, to supply hydraulic lift equipment for the plant.34 Other equipment was supplied by the Swiss firm EDM Engineering and by the Italian firm Technoglass ICM.35 The Chinese government was also involved in the project. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1360" task="">
  <question>
    What CW's can Sebha produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plant reportedly produced lewisite and sarin nerve gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1361" task="">
  <question>
    What is Tarhunah? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tarhunah With the operations at the Rabta complex severely hampered in 1991 because of its exposure as a CW plant, Qadhafi resolved to build an entirely new, underground CW production complex near the town of Tarhunah, 50 miles southeast of Tripoli. This facility was intended to supplant the Rabta plant. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1362" task="">
  <question>
    What CW's can Tarhunah produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The plant was expected to become fully operational by the end of 1997 and to produce more than 2,500 tons of mustard gas44 and other deadly agents such as the nerve agents sarin (90 metric tons) and soman (1,300 metric tons). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1363" task="">
  <question>
    How does Libya intend to delivery CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Available documentation indicates that Libya is intent on delivering CBW agents at distant targets with ballistic missiles. While Libya has not yet succeeded in devising effective biological warheads, it has made progress in developing chemical warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1364" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missiles does Libya have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two major Libyan ballistic-missile programs are reportedly under way: the al-Fateh (&quot;Conqueror&quot;) and alFajer al-Jadid projects.73 The al-Fateh project is a research and development effort to develop a ballistic missile with a range of 950 kilometers, although the missile is not yet operational.74 The al-Fajer al-Jadid project seeks to upgrade Libya's Scud B surface-to-surface missiles, with a range of 190 miles, to deliver chemical weapons.75 Another possibility would be to place chemical warheads on the Nodong-1 advanced ballistic missiles, with a range of 810 miles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1365" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya received assistance in developing ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 allowed Libya to expand its efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. Outside assistance--particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and Chinese entities--has remained critical to its ballistic missile development programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/CIA2003.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/CIA2003.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1366" task="">
  <question>
    What is the future of Libya's ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya lacks the infrastructure required to develop by 2015 a ballistic missile system with sufficient range to target US territory. Libya's paths to obtaining an ICBM during the time frame of this Estimate probably would be to purchase a complete missile system or to set up a foreign assistance arrangement where foreign scientists and technicians design, develop, and produce a missile and the necessary infrastructure in Libya. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1367" task="">
  <question>
    How dependent on foreign assistance is Libya's missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya's missile program depends on foreign support, without which the program eventually would grind to a halt. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/fmd2015.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1368" task="">
  <question>
    How else can Libya deliver CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Yet another delivery option would be to equip Libya's Su-24D &quot;Fencer&quot; advanced fighter aircraft with chemical bombs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1369" task="">
  <question>
    What are CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    chemical weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1370" task="">
  <question>
    Are Libya's CW facilities active? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rabta and Tarhunah believed to be inactive, although chemical program not completely abandoned. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1371" task="">
  <question>
    How has foreign assistance advanced Libya's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Libya has made the most progress with its chemical warfare effort. However, it remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, mechanical and technical expertise, and chemical warfare-related equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1372" task="">
  <question>
    How much CW did Rabta produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Prior to 1990, Libya produced about 100 tons of chemical agents -- mustard and some nerve agent -- at a chemical facility at Rabta. However, it ceased production there in 1990 due to intense international media attention and the possibility of military intervention, and fabricated a fire to make the Rabta facility appear to have been seriously damaged. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1373" task="">
  <question>
    Can Rabta still produce CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the Libyans announced its reopening in September 1995 as a pharmaceutical facility. The Rabta facility remains capable of producing chemical agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/graphics.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/graphics.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1374" task="">
  <question>
    Is Libya still developing BCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 19: Libya announced its intention to halt its WMD program and eliminate any stockpiles of WMD or WMD materials under full verification by the international community. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1375" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya announce the intent to stop developing WMD? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    December 2003 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1376" task="">
  <question>
    Has Libya ratified the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In consonance with its new positive approach to nonproliferation, Libya ratified both the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 6 January 2004. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1377" task="">
  <question>
    When did Libya ratify the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    6 January 2004 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/iaea.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1378" task="">
  <question>
    How many North Korean facilities produce chemical weapons or chemical weapons-related materials? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At least 12 facilities in the DPRK have been linked with the production and/or storage of CW agents, their raw chemicals and precursors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1379" task="">
  <question>
    How many CW facilities does North Korea have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At least 12 facilities in the DPRK have been linked with the production and/or storage of CW agents, their raw chemicals and precursors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1380" task="">
  <question>
    Where are chemical weapons weaponized in North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    CW agents are then moved to either the Sakchu or Kanggye-based CW facilities for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1381" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is available about the locations of North Korea's chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of these facilities, including those that produce synthetic fibers (vinalon, a polymer that is unique to North Korea) and basic chemicals such as sulphuric acid and ammonia, have been profiled in open sources (including North Korean print media). Some of the active and reserve Nuclear and Chemical Defense battalions are also reportedly based at some of these chemical complexes. However, because photographs of some of these manufacturing sites have been published, and thus their location and other details compromised, one must consider their role in the military production of CW agents as questionable at best. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1382" task="">
  <question>
    How reliable is the intelligence available on the locations of chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of these facilities, including those that produce synthetic fibers (vinalon, a polymer that is unique to North Korea) and basic chemicals such as sulphuric acid and ammonia, have been profiled in open sources (including North Korean print media). Some of the active and reserve Nuclear and Chemical Defense battalions are also reportedly based at some of these chemical complexes. However, because photographs of some of these manufacturing sites have been published, and thus their location and other details compromised, one must consider their role in the military production of CW agents as questionable at best. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1383" task="">
  <question>
    What percentage of North Korea's chemical industry is associated with the production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As part of a &quot;heavy industry,&quot; chemicals are a key component to the command socialist economy in the DPRK, in which all production is under governmental control. With the emphasis of an economy based on military preparedness, it is not an exaggeration to say that all chemical production (as well as other segments of heavy industry) is militarized in the DPRK. Despite numerous reports alleging large-scale CW production, the extent to which chemicals are diverted or produced for chemical warfare in North Korea is not clear. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1384" task="">
  <question>
    Is North Korea's chemical industry closely linked to its CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With the emphasis of an economy based on military preparedness, it is not an exaggeration to say that all chemical production (as well as other segments of heavy industry) is militarized in the DPRK. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1385" task="">
  <question>
    What North Korean government agencies oversee the production of chemical weapons in North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With regard to North Korean chemical and biological (CB) weaponry, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is of most relevance. From an organizational perspective, the Ministry of Chemical Industry is actually separate from this line of command, but presumably is in coordination with production and transfer of chemical intermediates for CW agent manufacture. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1386" task="">
  <question>
    What does the North Korean Fifth Machine Industry Bureau do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With regard to North Korean chemical and biological (CB) weaponry, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is of most relevance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1387" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea fill artillery shells with chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At Kanggye and Sakchu, CW agents brought from the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau are filled into artillery (including mortar and artillery rocket) shells, which are requisitioned from the Third Machine Industry Bureau 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1388" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea prepare its sprayed or aerially-delivered chemical weapons munitions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, chemical spray tanks and aerial munitions are also prepared at Sakchu and Kanggye, and can be filled with CW agent from bulk storage at various airfields right before their use in wartime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1389" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea store chemical weapons protective suits and decontamination chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Also associated with the offensive part of the chemical weapons apparatus, Factory No. 279 is responsible for defensive material, including decontamination chemicals, protective suits, and detection equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1390" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea store its chemical weapons munitions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following their final assembly and filling, chemical munitions are brought to &quot;store offices&quot; at the Maram Materials Corporation and the Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation, located in Maram-dong, Pyongyang and Anby?n-kun, Kangw?n Province, respectively. Reportedly, North Korean chemical weapons stores are placed into underground tunnels, with bulk CW agents stored in large (12' high) tanks, along with CW defense equipment supplied from Factory No. 279. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1391" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea store its chemical weapons underground? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, North Korean chemical weapons stores are placed into underground tunnels, with bulk CW agents stored in large (12' high) tanks, along with CW defense equipment supplied from Factory No. 279. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1392" task="">
  <question>
    What is the North Korean Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Requirements are established by the Second Economic Committee, while the actual production of CW agents is carried out under the directive of the Fifth Machine Industry bureau. The filling, storage, and handling of munitions is carried out under the auspices of the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1393" task="">
  <question>
    What role does North Korea's Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) play in the production and deployment of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Comprising seven different units, the NCDB is actively involved in the research and development of weapons, as well as nuclear and chemical defense. These are divided into the following departments: operations, training, materials, technology, reconnaissance, section No. 32, and mining/underground facility operations. No. 32--an organization of which very little is known--has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1394" task="">
  <question>
    What types of chemical weapons research is conducted at North Korea's Section 32? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    section No. 32, and mining/underground facility operations. No. 32--an organization of which very little is known--has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1395" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea conduct CBW research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    No. 32--an organization of which very little is known--has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1396" task="">
  <question>
    What research facilities operate as part of North Korea's Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These are divided into the following departments: operations, training, materials, technology, reconnaissance, section No. 32, and mining/underground facility operations. No. 32--an organization of which very little is known--has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. Three additional research institutes (???=???)--No. 55, No. 710, and No. 398--also operate under the aegis of the NCDB. Apparently, No. 710 research institute is involved in laser-related technology, possibly for weapons applications, with a research staff of about 250. With approximately 250 researchers, the No. 398 research institute is involved in decontamination operations in both nuclear and chemical environments and is reportedly developing antidotes, masks, and suits. The No. 55 research institute has about 70 on its research staff and is responsible for simulating nuclear and chemical contamination for decontamination operations and training. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1397" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons materials does North Korea store at the Sariwon Storage Site? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Sariw?n Chemical Weapons Storage Site (??????????) Location: Sariw?n (????), North Hwanghae Province (????), North Korea Subordinate to: Maram and Chiha-ri Materials Corporations ( ??????????), Department of Materials (???), the Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau (??????), General Staff Department (???????), Ministry of People's Armed Forces (?????); or possibly the 815th Mechanized Unit (815?????) [Note: Kim W?n Pong, director of the Northeast Asia Research Institute (????????) in Japan, claims this facility is subordinate to the 815th Mechanized Unit (815?????).] Size: One storage building, an underground storage facility, and 30 storage tanks Primary Function: Chemical weapons storage Description: This facility is one of the six chemical weapons storage sites in North Korea. The Sariw?n storage site has been associated with the IV Corps, Korean People's Army. This site also has a training center for the handling of chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Missile/51_978.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Missile/51_978.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1398" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons is North Korea suspected of having? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    If official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are to be believed, the DPRK military possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. (It is not clear, however, if this amount includes the munitions or only the CW agents themselves.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1399" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons are contained in the North Korean chemical weapons arsenal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, the CW agents in the DPRK arsenal include all of the major classes, such as phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister) and sarin (nerve agent).However, a 2002 report from the commander of US Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, also suggests that North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1400" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons can North Korea produce self-sufficiently? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    General Thomas A. Schwartz, also suggests that North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1401" task="">
  <question>
    Can North Korea produce any CW indigenously? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1402" task="">
  <question>
    How has North Korea's chemical weapons program progressed over the past 50 years? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By 1954, the KPA established nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense units, probably along the lines of the Soviet model. According to some accounts, North Korea's offensive CW program also began at this time, relying mostly on Chinese assistance for chemical weapons development. Kim Il-sung's &quot;Declaration for Chemicalization&quot; in 1961 called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production, and the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) was also established during this time. In 1966, for reasons that are unclear, the DPRK later turned to the Soviets for assistance in CW, mostly in the form of training manuals and small quantities of nerve and mustard agents. Following this period of Soviet-led assistance, North Korea made substantive gains in the area of chemical warfare. Still, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that North Korea had only a defensive capability in CW, while noting that its development of offensive chemical weapons would have been the next logical step. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1403" task="">
  <question>
    When was North Korea first capable of producing chemical weapons in large quantities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    inally, by the late 1980s, it was reported that North Korea was able to produce CW agents in large quantity, and deployed large numbers of chemical ordnance. In January 1987, the South Korean defense ministry told the South Korean press that the DPRK possessed up to 250 tons of chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and nerve agents. Recent estimates of North Korean chemical ordnance by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) have since been raised to the thousands of tons, probably based on recent information provided by North Korean defectors, including former members of DPRK military and NBC defence organizations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1404" task="">
  <question>
    How large is North Korea's chemical weapons defense force? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea's chemical defense force is estimated to be around 13,000 personnel, probably making it the third-largest CW service in the world, with chemical defense units incorporated at the regimental level. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1405" task="">
  <question>
    Where are North Korea's chemical weapons defense personnel trained? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Hamhung Chemical Engineering College is responsible for much of the training of the Korean People's Army in CW defense. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1406" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea test its chemical weapons munitions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two main factories located in the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly tasked with the final preparation, filling, and distribution of CW agents in artillery shells from 80 mm and larger, as well as 240mm caliber artillery rockets. Testing of agents is also reportedly performed at these two locations, possibly in very large underground facilities. In addition to thousands of artillery rounds, hundreds of forward deployed Scud-B, Frog-5 and Frog-7 missiles, plus about 30 Scud-C missiles could be armed with chemical warheads. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1407" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons has North Korea produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Phosgene (CG, carbonyl chloride) Diphosgene (DP, trichloromethylchloroformate) Mustard (sulfur and nitrogen) Lewisite Phosgene oxime (CX) Sarin (GB) Tabun (GA) Soman (GD) VX VG (Amiton, Tetram) VM VE Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochloroarsine) Diphenylchloroarsine (DA) CN (chloracetophenone, Mace?) CS, Riot-control agent (RCA) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1408" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea produce phosgene? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Phosgene (CG, carbonyl chloride) Diphosgene (DP, trichloromethylchloroformate) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1409" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea produce Lewisite or Adamsite? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mustard (sulfur and nitrogen) Lewisite Phosgene oxime (CX) Sarin (GB) Tabun (GA) Soman (GD) VX VG (Amiton, Tetram) VM VE Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochloroarsine) Diphenylchloroarsine (DA) CN (chloracetophenone, Mace?) CS, Riot-control agent (RCA) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1410" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea produce Sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Sarin (GB) Tabun (GA) Soman (GD) VX VG (Amiton, Tetram) VM VE Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochloroarsine) Diphenylchloroarsine (DA) CN (chloracetophenone, Mace?) CS, Riot-control agent (RCA) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1411" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea produce Tabun? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tabun (GA) Soman (GD) VX VG (Amiton, Tetram) VM VE Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochloroarsine) Diphenylchloroarsine (DA) CN (chloracetophenone, Mace?) CS, Riot-control agent (RCA) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1412" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea produce Soman nerve gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Soman (GD) VX VG (Amiton, Tetram) VM VE Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochloroarsine) Diphenylchloroarsine (DA) CN (chloracetophenone, Mace?) CS, Riot-control agent (RCA) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1413" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of nerve gasses does North Korea produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tabun (GA) Soman (GD) VX VG (Amiton, Tetram) VM VE Cyanogen chloride (CK) Hydrogen cyanide (AC) BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) Adamsite (DM, diphenylaminochloroarsine) Diphenylchloroarsine (DA) CN (chloracetophenone, Mace?) CS, Riot-control agent (RCA) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1414" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons did North Korea possess in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1980s, open source estimates claimed that North Korea possessed some 250 tons of CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1415" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons did North Korea possess in the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the late 1980s, open source estimates claimed that North Korea possessed some 250 tons of CW agents. A decade later, this figure was revised up to 4,500 tons or more. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1416" task="">
  <question>
    How sophisticated is North Korea's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a former commander of US Forces in Korea, the DPRK is indigenously capable of producing World War I agents, namely choking, irritant, and blister type of agents. It is unknown, however, what the North possesses in the way of the modern nerve agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1417" task="">
  <question>
    What do we know about North Korea's ability to produce modern nerve agent CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is unknown, however, what the North possesses in the way of the modern nerve agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1418" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical industry infrastructure was built during North Korea's first Seven-Year Plan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the first Seven-Year Plan (1961-1967, and adjusted further to 1970), the DPRK was able to increase production of chemical products while expanding their variety. The Pongung Chemical Factory began with a vinyl chloride production line, inaugurating the &quot;February 8 Vinalon Plant&quot; in 1961. This factory was the first major step for the DPRK to fully involve itself in organic chemical industry. Other industrial plants followed, including the H?ngnam Fertilizer, Pongung chemical, Aoji Chemical, Chongsu Chemical, Hwas?ng and Sunch'?n Chemical factories. This nascent chemical sector, however, remained at a relatively low level in terms of overall quality. The Aoji and Hwas?ng chemical plants were largely based on coal, and ammonia and caustic soda were produced primarily at the Pongung factory. Carbide dominated the production lines at Chongsu and Sunch'?n. Currently, North Korea has an estimated calcium carbide production capacity of at least 550,000 tons per year. The production of calcium carbide is especially important in the case of North Korea, as it can be used to generate acetylene for organic synthesis (especially synthetic polymers). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1419" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical industry infrastructure was built during North Korea's Six-Year Plan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Increasing production of chemical fertilizers was the major objective of the the Six-Year Plan of 1971-1976. The North Korean petrochemical industry also developed during this period, replacing a nearly exclusive reliance on coal. The DPRK further developed the &quot;February 8 Vinalon Complex&quot; in the 1970s to produce synthetic resins. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1420" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical industry infrastructure was built during North Korea's third Seven-Year Plan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With the newly introduced policy of fostering a light industry, as well as production of chemical fertilizers to improve agricultural yields and stave off hunger among its populace, the third Seven-Year Plan (1987-1993) expanded further chemical production facilities at the following sites:* Sariw?n Potash Complex * Sunch'?n Vinalon Complex (increased capacity to 100,000 tons of vinalon per year) * July 4th Factory (Manp'o), Chagang Province * Haeju Triple Superphosphate Fertilizer Factory * Tanchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Factory  Goals set at this time included increasing production of chemical fertilizers by 7.2 million tons, synthetic fibers by 25,000 tons, resins and plasticizers by 500,000 tons, as well as tripling lactic acid, doubling caustic soda, and nearly quintupling sodium carbonate production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1421" task="">
  <question>
    Where are some of North Korea's chemical production facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Sariw?n Potash Complex  * Sunch'?n Vinalon Complex (increased capacity to 100,000 tons of vinalon per year)     * July 4th Factory (Manp'o), Chagang Province  * Haeju Triple Superphosphate Fertilizer Factory * Tanchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Factory 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1422" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean chemical plants were targeted for modernization in 1991? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1991, Kim Il Song called on the DPRK chemical factories to take more initiative in improving and expanding their roles in the chemical industry. The city of Hamh?ng in South Hamgy?ng Province was selected as the site for the development of a large chemical industry complex. The largest chemical site in North Korea, the Hamh?ng Fertilizer Complex, was slated for modernization, as well as the February 8 Vinalon Complex. The results of these improvements are unclear. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1423" task="">
  <question>
    What commercial chemical products does North Korea produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Commodity chemicals including lactic acid, hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide (current production capacity said to be 150,000 tons), calcium carbide, and ammonia make up the first tier of intermediates. Acetic acid, phthalic acid, methanol, benzene, toluene, and xylene make up the second tier in the DPRK's organic chemical industry. Sulfuric acid is produced at the lactic acid plants in the H?ngnam Fertilizer Complex, the Munpyong and Nampo refineries, and as a by-product at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex. The DPRK claims to have a production capacity of 800,000 tons of sulfuric acid, more than half of which is made at H?ngnam. Caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) is produced the February 8 Vinalon Complex, Sinuiju Chemical Factory, and 60 other smaller production facilities. The DPRK is estimated to have a production capacity of 200,000 tons for ammonium nitrate and nitric acid, 75% of which is produced at the H?ngnam Fertilizer Complex. Overall chemical fertilizer outputs in the DPRK reportedly increased more than 400% from 1960 to 1975 (462,000 tons in the latter year). In 1989, the DPRK claimed it had produced 5.6 million tons of chemical fertilizers of all types. Nonetheless, the Bank of Korea estimated that only 770,000 tons of chemical fertilizers were actually produced in 1997. One estimate puts production of nitrogen-based fertilizers (ammonia sulfate), ammonia, and synthetic resins in the DPRK at 700,000 tons spread out across the H?ngnam Fertilizer Complex, Aoji Chemical Factory, Namhung Youth Chemical Complex, the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex, February 8 Vinalon Complex, and the Aoji Petrochemical Factory.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50. </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1424" task="">
  <question>
    What dual-use chemicals can North Korea produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Commodity chemicals including lactic acid, hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide (current production capacity said to be 150,000 tons), calcium carbide, and ammonia make up the first tier of intermediates. Acetic acid, phthalic acid, methanol, benzene, toluene, and xylene make up the second tier in the DPRK's organic chemical industry. Sulfuric acid is produced at the lactic acid plants in the H?ngnam Fertilizer Complex, the Munpyong and Nampo refineries, and as a by-product at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50. </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1425" task="">
  <question>
    What is the production capacity of North Korea's chemical plants? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Commodity chemicals including lactic acid, hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide (current production capacity said to be 150,000 tons), calcium carbide, and ammonia make up the first tier of intermediates. Acetic acid, phthalic acid, methanol, benzene, toluene, and xylene make up the second tier in the DPRK's organic chemical industry. Sulfuric acid is produced at the lactic acid plants in the H?ngnam Fertilizer Complex, the Munpyong and Nampo refineries, and as a by-product at the Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex. The DPRK claims to have a production capacity of 800,000 tons of sulfuric acid, more than half of which is made at H?ngnam. Caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) is produced the February 8 Vinalon Complex, Sinuiju Chemical Factory, and 60 other smaller production facilities. The DPRK is estimated to have a production capacity of 200,000 tons for ammonium nitrate and nitric acid, 75% of which is produced at the H?ngnam Fertilizer Complex. Overall chemical fertilizer outputs in the DPRK reportedly increased more than 400% from 1960 to 1975 (462,000 tons in the latter year). In 1989, the DPRK claimed it had produced 5.6 million tons of chemical fertilizers of all types. Nonetheless, the Bank of Korea estimated that only 770,000 tons of chemical fertilizers were actually produced in 1997. One estimate puts production of nitrogen-based fertilizers (ammonia sulfate), ammonia, and synthetic resins in the DPRK at 700,000 tons spread out across the H?ngnam Fertilizer Complex, Aoji Chemical Factory, Namhung Youth Chemical Complex, the Kim Chaek Iron and Steel Complex, February 8 Vinalon Complex, and the Aoji Petrochemical Factory.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1426" task="">
  <question>
    How efficient are North Korea's chemical plants? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As in most other sectors in the DPRK, shortfalls in energy production and aging factory equipment mean that North Korea has an under-performing chemical sector. Most of North Korea's chemical products appear to be limited to polymer-based manufacturing, producing large quantities of polyethylene, acrylonitrile, and vinalon (polyvinyl alcohol). Unfortunately, few countries have any demand for vinalon, which is an inferior textile fiber. Only four basic products from petroleum, such as acrylics and other polymer fibers, were produced in North Korea as of 1995. As of 1998, the DPRK was still unable to produce nylon and polyester in significant quantity, while the opposite is true for vinalon (&quot;Chuch'e fiber&quot;). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1427" task="">
  <question>
    What capacity does North Korea have to refine chemicals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea may also possess a minor production capability for refined chemicals, especially in the important category of organophosphates. An indigenous capacity to produce organophosphate (OP) compounds, a group of chemicals that makes up a rapidly growing market, would also be critical for North Korea to produce pesticides as well as flame-retardants, synthetic oils, and plasticizers. This basic infrastructure could also be used for nerve agent production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1428" task="">
  <question>
    Can North Korea produce chemical weapons precursors domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In order to provide feedstocks for synthetic fibers, particularly polyvinyl alcohol, the DPRK is required to have a large source of ethylene. Through derivatives of petrochemical activities as well as acetylene production (i.e., calcium carbide), such a compound could be diverted to production of mustard or possibly Lewisite (both blister agents).  North Korea may also possess a minor production capability for refined chemicals, especially in the important category of organophosphates. An indigenous capacity to produce organophosphate (OP) compounds, a group of chemicals that makes up a rapidly growing market, would also be critical for North Korea to produce pesticides as well as flame-retardants, synthetic oils, and plasticizers. This basic infrastructure could also be used for nerve agent production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1429" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons could North Korea produce domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In order to provide feedstocks for synthetic fibers, particularly polyvinyl alcohol, the DPRK is required to have a large source of ethylene. Through derivatives of petrochemical activities as well as acetylene production (i.e., calcium carbide), such a compound could be diverted to production of mustard or possibly Lewisite (both blister agents).  North Korea may also possess a minor production capability for refined chemicals, especially in the important category of organophosphates. An indigenous capacity to produce organophosphate (OP) compounds, a group of chemicals that makes up a rapidly growing market, would also be critical for North Korea to produce pesticides as well as flame-retardants, synthetic oils, and plasticizers. This basic infrastructure could also be used for nerve agent production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/50.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1430" task="">
  <question>
    What is the primary function of North Korea's Preventive Military Medical Unit? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following Kim Il Sung?s November 1980 order to develop biological and chemical weapons, North Korea accelerated its biological weapons development at the Preventive Military Medical Unit, the Party Central Biological Research Institute (????????), and the No. 25 Factory. According to a 1992 report by South Korea?s Agency for National Security Planning (???????), North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1431" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea reportedly weaponize biological weapons agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1432" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea begin to produce biological and chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following Kim Il Sung?s November 1980 order to develop biological and chemical weapons, North Korea accelerated its biological weapons development at the Preventive Military Medical Unit, the Party Central Biological Research Institute (????????), and the No. 25 Factory. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1433" task="">
  <question>
    How many different types of bioweapons does North Korea produce? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1434" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea produce BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1435" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea produce biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea accelerated its biological weapons development at the Preventive Military Medical Unit, the Party Central Biological Research Institute (????????), and the No. 25 Factory. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1436" task="">
  <question>
    What is North Korea's Party Central Biological Research Institute? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following Kim Il Sung?s November 1980 order to develop biological and chemical weapons, North Korea accelerated its biological weapons development at the Preventive Military Medical Unit, the Party Central Biological Research Institute (????????), and the No. 25 Factory. According to a 1992 report by South Korea?s Agency for National Security Planning (???????), North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1437" task="">
  <question>
    What is North Korea's Munch'on Agar Factory? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1438" task="">
  <question>
    What BW are made at North Korea's No. 25 Factory? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1439" task="">
  <question>
    What is North Korea's No. 25 Factory? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following Kim Il Sung?s November 1980 order to develop biological and chemical weapons, North Korea accelerated its biological weapons development at the Preventive Military Medical Unit, the Party Central Biological Research Institute (????????), and the No. 25 Factory. According to a 1992 report by South Korea?s Agency for National Security Planning (???????), North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1440" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea possess the capability to produce anthrax? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a 1992 report by South Korea?s Agency for National Security Planning (???????), North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1441" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea possess the capability to produce plague bacteria? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a 1992 report by South Korea?s Agency for National Security Planning (???????), North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1442" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea possess the capability to produce weaponized typhoid? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a 1992 report by South Korea?s Agency for National Security Planning (???????), North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at these three facilities. The report says that these BW agents are sent to the Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_2050.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1443" task="">
  <question>
    How many North Korean facilities have been linked to production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chemical Facilities At least 12 facilities in the DPRK have been linked with the production and/or storage of CW agents, their raw chemicals and precursors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1444" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea weaponize its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    CW agents are then moved to either the Sakchu or Kanggye-based CW facilities for weaponization. Some of these facilities, including those that produce synthetic fibers (vinalon, a polymer that is unique to North Korea) and basic chemicals such as sulphuric acid and ammonia, have been profiled in open sources (including North Korean print media). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1445" task="">
  <question>
    Why are North Korean commerical chemical plants suspected of being chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of the active and reserve Nuclear and Chemical Defense battalions are also reportedly based at some of these chemical complexes. However, because photographs of some of these manufacturing sites have been published, and thus their location and other details compromised, one must consider their role in the military production of CW agents as questionable at best.  As part of a &quot;heavy industry,&quot; chemicals are a key component to the command socialist economy in the DPRK, in which all production is under governmental control. With the emphasis of an economy based on military preparedness, it is not an exaggeration to say that all chemical production (as well as other segments of heavy industry) is militarized in the DPRK. Despite numerous reports alleging large-scale CW production, the extent to which chemicals are diverted or produced for chemical warfare in North Korea is not clear. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1446" task="">
  <question>
    What percentage of North Korea's commercial chemical industry is suspected of supporting North Korea's chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With the emphasis of an economy based on military preparedness, it is not an exaggeration to say that all chemical production (as well as other segments of heavy industry) is militarized in the DPRK. Despite numerous reports alleging large-scale CW production, the extent to which chemicals are diverted or produced for chemical warfare in North Korea is not clear. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1447" task="">
  <question>
    What is North Korea's National Defense Commission (NDC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The highest decision-making body in the DPRK for the military industry is the National Defense Commission (NDC), of which Kim Jong Il was &quot;re-elected&quot; chairman in 1998. Directly subordinate to the NDC is the Second Economic Committee (SEC), which, despite its innocuous-sounding name, is the linchpin for much of North Korean development and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1448" task="">
  <question>
    What is North Korea's Second Economic Committee (SEC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Directly subordinate to the NDC is the Second Economic Committee (SEC), which, despite its innocuous-sounding name, is the linchpin for much of North Korean development and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1449" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between North Korea's Second Economic Committee (SEC) and its chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Directly subordinate to the NDC is the Second Economic Committee (SEC), which, despite its innocuous-sounding name, is the linchpin for much of North Korean development and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1450" task="">
  <question>
    Is North Korea's Second Economic Committee (SEC) involved with CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Directly subordinate to the NDC is the Second Economic Committee (SEC), which, despite its innocuous-sounding name, is the linchpin for much of North Korean development and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1451" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean government organization is responsible for North Korea's chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Created in the 1970s, the SEC is in charge of the planning, manufacturing, and distribution of all ordnance in the DPRK, including international trade in munitions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1452" task="">
  <question>
    When was North Korea's Second Economic Committee (SEC) formed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Created in the 1970s, the SEC is in charge of the planning, manufacturing, and distribution of all ordnance in the DPRK, including international trade in munitions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1453" task="">
  <question>
    Where is North Korea's Second Economic Committee's headquarters located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Located in Kangdong-kun, Pyongyang, the SEC consists of eight bureaus and 190 munitions factories; in spring 2001, its directors were Kim Man Ch'?l and Ch?n By?ng Ho, both NDC and Korean Worker's Party Central Committee members. The eight bureaus consist of a general affairs office, with seven others dealing specifically with a variety of weapons platforms and technologies: 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1454" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Kim Man Chol? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Located in Kangdong-kun, Pyongyang, the SEC consists of eight bureaus and 190 munitions factories; in spring 2001, its directors were Kim Man Ch'?l and Ch?n By?ng Ho, both NDC and Korean Worker's Party Central Committee members. The eight bureaus consist of a general affairs office, with seven others dealing specifically with a variety of weapons platforms and technologies 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1455" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Chon Byong Ho? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Located in Kangdong-kun, Pyongyang, the SEC consists of eight bureaus and 190 munitions factories; in spring 2001, its directors were Kim Man Ch'?l and Ch?n By?ng Ho, both NDC and Korean Worker's Party Central Committee members. The eight bureaus consist of a general affairs office, with seven others dealing specifically with a variety of weapons platforms and technologies 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1456" task="">
  <question>
    What weapons technologies are developed by North Korea's Second Economic Committee (SEC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the SEC consists of eight bureaus and 190 munitions factories; in spring 2001, its directors were Kim Man Ch'?l and Ch?n By?ng Ho, both NDC and Korean Worker's Party Central Committee members. The eight bureaus consist of a general affairs office, with seven others dealing specifically with a variety of weapons platforms and technologies:    * machine industry bureau: small arms and ammunition   * machine industry bureau: tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)     * machine industry bureau: multi-stage rockets     * machine industry bureau: guided missiles     * machine industry bureau: nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons     * machine industry bureau: battleships and submarines * machine industry bureau: production and purchase of war planes 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1457" task="">
  <question>
    What North Korean government organization oversees North Korea's production of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With regard to North Korean chemical and biological (CB) weaponry, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is of most relevance. From an organizational perspective, the Ministry of Chemical Industry is actually separate from this line of command, but presumably is in coordination with production and transfer of chemical intermediates for CW agent manufacture. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1458" task="">
  <question>
    Who is responsible for North Korea's CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With regard to North Korean chemical and biological (CB) weaponry, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is of most relevance. From an organizational perspective, the Ministry of Chemical Industry is actually separate from this line of command, but presumably is in coordination with production and transfer of chemical intermediates for CW agent manufacture. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1459" task="">
  <question>
    What is North Korea's Fifth Machine Industry Bureau? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With regard to North Korean chemical and biological (CB) weaponry, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is of most relevance. From an organizational perspective, the Ministry of Chemical Industry is actually separate from this line of command, but presumably is in coordination with production and transfer of chemical intermediates for CW agent manufacture. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1460" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between North Korea's Fifth Machine Industry Bureau and its production of biological and chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With regard to North Korean chemical and biological (CB) weaponry, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is of most relevance. From an organizational perspective, the Ministry of Chemical Industry is actually separate from this line of command, but presumably is in coordination with production and transfer of chemical intermediates for CW agent manufacture. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1461" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean munitions plants are most heavily involved with the construction of offensive biological and chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Kanggye and Sakchu munitions plants represent the meeting of nominally civilian chemical enterprises, under the titles of the Second Economic Committee's General Machine Industry Bureau and the Equipment Department of the NCDB. At Kanggye and Sakchu, CW agents brought from the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau are filled into artillery (including mortar and artillery rocket) shells, which are requisitioned from the Third Machine Industry Bureau. Reportedly, chemical spray tanks and aerial munitions are also prepared at Sakchu and Kanggye, and can be filled with CW agent from bulk storage at various airfields right before their use in wartime. Also associated with the offensive part of the chemical weapons apparatus, Factory No. 279 is responsible for defensive material, including decontamination chemicals, protective suits, and detection equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1462" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea produce defensive equipment against chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Also associated with the offensive part of the chemical weapons apparatus, Factory No. 279 is responsible for defensive material, including decontamination chemicals, protective suits, and detection equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1463" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea have CBW protective equipment? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Also associated with the offensive part of the chemical weapons apparatus, Factory No. 279 is responsible for defensive material, including decontamination chemicals, protective suits, and detection equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1464" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea have the ability to rapidly prepare chemical weapons and bioweapons munitions prior to combat? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At Kanggye and Sakchu, CW agents brought from the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau are filled into artillery (including mortar and artillery rocket) shells, which are requisitioned from the Third Machine Industry Bureau. Reportedly, chemical spray tanks and aerial munitions are also prepared at Sakchu and Kanggye, and can be filled with CW agent from bulk storage at various airfields right before their use in wartime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1465" task="">
  <question>
    How quickly can North Korea produce CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, chemical spray tanks and aerial munitions are also prepared at Sakchu and Kanggye, and can be filled with CW agent from bulk storage at various airfields right before their use in wartime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1466" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea assemble CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, chemical spray tanks and aerial munitions are also prepared at Sakchu and Kanggye, and can be filled with CW agent from bulk storage at various airfields right before their use in wartime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1467" task="">
  <question>
    What CW activities does North Korea conduct at Sakchu and Kanggye? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, chemical spray tanks and aerial munitions are also prepared at Sakchu and Kanggye, and can be filled with CW agent from bulk storage at various airfields right before their use in wartime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1468" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean government organization oversees the procurement and development of artillery and rocket shells? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    t Kanggye and Sakchu, CW agents brought from the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau are filled into artillery (including mortar and artillery rocket) shells, which are requisitioned from the Third Machine Industry Bureau. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1469" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea store its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following their final assembly and filling, chemical munitions are brought to &quot;store offices&quot; at the Maram Materials Corporation and the Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation, located in Maram-dong, Pyongyang and Anby?n-kun, Kangw?n Province, respectively. Reportedly, North Korean chemical weapons stores are placed into underground tunnels, with bulk CW agents stored in large (12' high) tanks, along with CW defense equipment supplied from Factory No. 279. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1470" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea store its chemical weapons underground? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, North Korean chemical weapons stores are placed into underground tunnels, with bulk CW agents stored in large (12' high) tanks, along with CW defense equipment supplied from Factory No. 279. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1471" task="">
  <question>
    How is North Korea's National Defense Commission (NDC) organized? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Comprising seven different units, the NCDB is actively involved in the research and development of weapons, as well as nuclear and chemical defense. These are divided into the following departments: operations, training, materials, technology, reconnaissance, section No. 32, and mining/underground facility operations. No. 32--an organization of which very little is known--has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. Three additional research institutes (???=???)--No. 55, No. 710, and No. 398--also operate under the aegis of the NCDB. Apparently, No. 710 research institute is involved in laser-related technology, possibly for weapons applications, with a research staff of about 250. With approximately 250 researchers, the No. 398 research institute is involved in decontamination operations in both nuclear and chemical environments and is reportedly developing antidotes, masks, and suits. The No. 55 research institute has about 70 on its research staff and is responsible for simulating nuclear and chemical contamination for decontamination operations and training. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1472" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea conduct research into chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    ection No. 32, and mining/underground facility operations. No. 32--an organization of which very little is known--has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1473" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea research CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    ection No. 32, and mining/underground facility operations. No. 32--an organization of which very little is known--has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1474" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea research decontamination operations for chemical and nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    No. 398 research institute is involved in decontamination operations in both nuclear and chemical environments and is reportedly developing antidotes, masks, and suits. The No. 55 research institute has about 70 on its research staff and is responsible for simulating nuclear and chemical contamination for decontamination operations and training. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1475" task="">
  <question>
    What is North Korea's NCDB? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1476" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean government or military organizations have been suspected of involvement with North Korea's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DPRK Chemical Warfare Organization Simplified organizational chart of North Korea's CW apparatus:Second Economic Committee General Staff Department 5th General Machine Industry Bureau Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau External Economic General Bureau (Yongaksan Company) Chemical warfare agent production facilities (12) Chemical munitions fill (chemical weapons manufacture): Sakchu Kangygye  Chemical weapons storage facilities: Maram Chiha-ri Depots, special munitions Naval, Air Force commands Army corps Artillery corps Equipment department Factory 279 (CW defensive materiel) General Rear Service Bureau (The relationship of the General Rear Service Bureau and North Korea's CW infrastructure is not clear, but is presumed to play some role) National Defense Commission 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1477" task="">
  <question>
    How many chemical weapons troops does North Korea have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a 2002 ROK-based article, North Korea operates the following chemical troops: battalion (army corps), battery (division), and platoon (regiment). At last count (1999), the NCDB consisted of 13,000 personnel. The NCDB has its own department of operations, consisting of eight battalions. Two of these battalions, the 17th and 18th, are considered active, while the remaining (13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 37th and 38th) are on reserve. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1478" task="">
  <question>
    Where are North Korea's chemical weapons troops based? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of the billets for these battalions have been identified in the open literature: * NCDB (reserve) Sunch'?n Vinalon Complex    * NCDB (reserve) Namhung Youth Chemical Complex     * NCDB (active) Onj?ng-ri, S?ngch'?n-gun     * NCDB (active) S?k'am-ri, P'y?ngw?n-gun * NCDB (reserve) Sariw?n Potash Fertilizer Complex 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1479" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean commercial chemical production facilities are also suspected of storing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some of the billets for these battalions have been identified in the open literature: * NCDB (reserve) Sunch'?n Vinalon Complex    * NCDB (reserve) Namhung Youth Chemical Complex     * NCDB (active) Onj?ng-ri, S?ngch'?n-gun     * NCDB (active) S?k'am-ri, P'y?ngw?n-gun * NCDB (reserve) Sariw?n Potash Fertilizer Complex 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1480" task="">
  <question>
    How are North Korea's battalions of chemical troops organized? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Lee Ch'ung Kuk has also provided details about the organization of the 18th Nuclear and Chemical Defense Battalion, which may be similar to the 17th and other units held in reserve. According to Yi, the battalion had a nuclear/chemical reconnaissance company (1st Company), while the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th companies were described as &quot;decontamination&quot; units. The 6th company was responsible for flame-throwers and presumably obscurant smokes (also referred to as &quot;Smoke Screen Company&quot;). The latter had once been located in Sadong-kuy?k, Pyongyang, and was transferred to the 18th Battalion in June 1993, also according to Lee. Interestingly, none of these companies that were described by Lee had specific duties with regard to offensive use of chemical weapons, but were responsible mainly for reconnaissance and decontamination operations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1481" task="">
  <question>
    Has North Korea taken steps to protect its military airfields from chemical weapons attacks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to aerial-delivered chemical ordnance (bombs, possibly other types of ordnance), DPRK military airfields (as of 1993) have posted a platoon of chemical defense personnel equipped decontamination and detection systems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1482" task="">
  <question>
    What is the relationship between North Korea's General Rear Service Bureau and its chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    General Rear Service Bureau (The relationship of the General Rear Service Bureau and North Korea's CW infrastructure is not clear, but is presumed to play some role) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/51.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1483" task="">
  <question>
    Who has North Korea been suspected of selling chemical weapons to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 1997 Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy accuses China and North Korea of shipping &quot;terrible chemical weapons&quot; to Syria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1484" task="">
  <question>
    Which targets could North Korea launch chemical weapons attacks against? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Hwang Chang Yop, 74, a former tutor of North Korean leader Kim Chong Il who defected to South Korea, asserts that North Korea has developed nuclear and chemical weapons that are &quot;capable of scorching&quot; South Korea and Japan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1485" task="">
  <question>
    What could potentially motivate North Korea to make a chemical weapons attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Hwang Chang Yop, 74, a former tutor of North Korean leader Kim Chong Il who defected to South Korea, asserts that North Korea has developed nuclear and chemical weapons that are &quot;capable of scorching&quot; South Korea and Japan. He also states that North Korea could potentially start a war out of sheer desperation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1486" task="">
  <question>
    Why would North Korea use chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has developed nuclear and chemical weapons that are &quot;capable of scorching&quot; South Korea and Japan. He also states that North Korea could potentially start a war out of sheer desperation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1487" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons is North Korea expected to be able to produce annually? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Following the questioning of defecting DPRK Workers' Party Secretary, Hwang Chang Yop, South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha states that North Korea is believed to possess about 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. In testimony before the National Assembly Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee, he declares that North Korea operates eight chemical weapons plants in &quot;Oaji&quot; and elsewhere that are capable of producing 5,000 tons of chemical weapons annually. He also said that the ROK government would &quot;urge North Korea at international meetings to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).&quot; [Note 1: The foreign minister in this case was probably referring to Aoji-ri; Note 2: The figure of 5,000 tons is also referred to in a 28 November 2001 report quoting South Korean military sources.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1488" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea have chemical weapons plants? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha states that North Korea is believed to possess about 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. In testimony before the National Assembly Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee, he declares that North Korea operates eight chemical weapons plants in &quot;Oaji&quot; and elsewhere that are capable of producing 5,000 tons of chemical weapons annually. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1489" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of CW can North Korea produce annually at its Oaji site? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    he declares that North Korea operates eight chemical weapons plants in &quot;Oaji&quot; and elsewhere that are capable of producing 5,000 tons of chemical weapons annually. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1490" task="">
  <question>
    Has North Korea joined the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 May 1997 ROK Vice Foreign Minister Yi Ki Chu expresses &quot;deep concern over the failure of North Korea to join the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention],&quot; saying that the DPRK's stockpile of chemical weapons poses a threat to the security of both South Korea and Northeast Asia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1491" task="">
  <question>
    Who is working with South Korea to develop counter-measures to North Korea's chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1997 South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha testifies that the ROK government is working with the United States to develop counter-measures to North Korean chemical and biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1492" task="">
  <question>
    How is South Korea preparing for a North Korean CBW attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1997 South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Chong Ha testifies that the ROK government is working with the United States to develop counter-measures to North Korean chemical and biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1493" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons munitions was North Korea suspected of having in 1997? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Korean Joint Chief of Staff states in an official report that North Korea is developing about 15 tons of chemical weapons daily and has a stockpile of approximately 1,000 tons. Of the latter, 70 tons are actually filled in munitions and are deployed, while the remaining are in bulk storage. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1494" task="">
  <question>
    Which chemical weapons agents is North Korea suspected of having? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 October 1997 Ch'oe Ju Hwal testifies that North Korea possessed the following chemical weapons (CW) agents in its arsenal: sarin, soman, tabun, V-agents; mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride (yamoshun). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1495" task="">
  <question>
    What is yamoshun? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 October 1997 Ch'oe Ju Hwal testifies that North Korea possessed the following chemical weapons (CW) agents in its arsenal: sarin, soman, tabun, V-agents; mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride (yamoshun). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1496" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea have cyanide-based CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 October 1997 Ch'oe Ju Hwal testifies that North Korea possessed the following chemical weapons (CW) agents in its arsenal: sarin, soman, tabun, V-agents; mustard, lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride (yamoshun). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1497" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean chemical weapons facilities are located near the North Korea-China border? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1998 Satellite images (Spot Image, software by Research Systems) obtained by a South Korean news agency purports to confirm that North Korea is producing chemical weapons in facilities along its northern border with China. A facility is identified in Sakchu &quot;believed to had chemical agents into military ordnance, possibly even missile warheads.&quot; The imagery also seems to show widespread environmental damage around the facility, leading many to believe that the facility is releasing dangerous chemicals into the atmosphere rather than neutralizing them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1498" task="">
  <question>
    What non-conventional means of chemical weapons delivery is North Korea prepared to use? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    ROK government officials claim that a North Korean &quot;kamikaze&quot; or suicide squad &quot;with some 140 run-down fighters . . . could be outfitted with chemical weapons including poison gas.&quot;  South Korea is conducting military exercises in Kumchon County to deflect any North Korean agents that intend to enter the country using hang gliders, paragliders, and hot air balloons to launch chemical weapons attacks. South Korean Defense Ministry officials also report that, &quot;For the past two years, North Korea has been importing hang gliders, motorized paragliders and hot air balloons and has been training a special unit to use them to sneak into South Korea for espionage or possible to launch biological or chemical weapons attacks.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1499" task="">
  <question>
    Would North Korea use &quot;kamikaze&quot; troops to deliver CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    ROK government officials claim that a North Korean &quot;kamikaze&quot; or suicide squad &quot;with some 140 run-down fighters . . . could be outfitted with chemical weapons including poison gas.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1500" task="">
  <question>
    Is North Korea a member of the OPCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 December 1998 Japan asks the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to urge North Korea to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1501" task="">
  <question>
    What countries are seen as potential buyers of Russian NBC weapons technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hat creates an unacceptably high risk that some material could be sold to potential aggressors like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or Serbia. Many Russian weapons scientists are also unemployed or unpaid and vulnerable to foreign recruitment.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1502" task="">
  <question>
    Has North Korea bought NBC weapons from Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hat creates an unacceptably high risk that some material could be sold to potential aggressors like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or Serbia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1503" task="">
  <question>
    Has North Korea denied developing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 March 1999 North Korea refutes US assertions that it is developing chemical weapons and instead accuses the United States of employing unconventional munitions during the Korean War. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1504" task="">
  <question>
    How is North Korea expected to deliver its chemical weapons agents to targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) estimates that the DPRK possesses eight chemicals plants, four research laboratories, and six storage facilities as chemical weapon-related facilities, and that the DPRK would employ chemical weapons (CW) agents by means of &quot;mortars, field artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and Frog, Scud and Nodong-1 missiles on land, fire support vessels at sea, and fighters, bombers and transport aircraft in the air.&quot; The DPRK &quot;has the capability of launching chemical munitions into our forward areas and as far as Pusan and Mokpo. The North may also dare to launch such an attack through its SOF [special operations forces] troops armed with chemical weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1505" task="">
  <question>
    How could North Korea carry out a CBW attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) estimates that the DPRK possesses eight chemicals plants, four research laboratories, and six storage facilities as chemical weapon-related facilities, and that the DPRK would employ chemical weapons (CW) agents by means of &quot;mortars, field artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and Frog, Scud and Nodong-1 missiles on land, fire support vessels at sea, and fighters, bombers and transport aircraft in the air.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1506" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons delivery devices does North Korea possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) estimates that the DPRK possesses eight chemicals plants, four research laboratories, and six storage facilities as chemical weapon-related facilities, and that the DPRK would employ chemical weapons (CW) agents by means of &quot;mortars, field artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and Frog, Scud and Nodong-1 missiles on land, fire support vessels at sea, and fighters, bombers and transport aircraft in the air.&quot; The DPRK &quot;has the capability of launching chemical munitions into our forward areas and as far as Pusan and Mokpo. The North may also dare to launch such an attack through its SOF [special operations forces] troops armed with chemical weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1507" task="">
  <question>
    How large is North Korea's chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A South Korean document, originating from the defense ministry, states that North Korea is increasingly focusing on stockpiling chemical weapons. It is estimated that current stockpiles lie around 5,000 tons, five times what it was in 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1508" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of chemical weapons agents is North Korea suspected of producing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In an unclassified report, a special advisor to the commander in chief (CINC) of the UN Command in Korea reports that &quot;USFK [US Forces in Korea] J2 assesses that the North is self-sufficient in the production of chemical components for first generation chemical agents. They have produced stockpiles estimated at up to 5,000 metric tons of several types of agents, including nerve, choking, blister, and blood.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1509" task="">
  <question>
    Which North Korean research unit reportedly develops chemical weapons warheads for the Nodong-1 missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1 January 2001 The South Korean newspaper Sindong-a reports that Unit 32, the most secretive element within the DPRK Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau, oversees chemical weapons research and production. It is further estimated that chemical warheads for the Nodong-1 are also researched and developed by Unit 32. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1510" task="">
  <question>
    Has North Korea accused other countries of developing biological or chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    18 October 2001 The DPRK claims that Japan, under the pretense of building defenses against chemical warfare, is in fact &quot;making preparations for biological and chemical warfare.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1511" task="">
  <question>
    Can North Korea deploy missiles with chemical weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    5 March 2002 General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces, United States Forces Korea, testifies before the US Senate. His assessment of the North Korean military posture included the following statement: &quot;A large number of North Korean chemical weapons threaten both our military forces and the civilian population centers of South Korea and Japan. We assess that North Korea has very large chemical stockpiles and is self-sufficient in the production of chemical components for first generation chemical agents...North Korea can deploy missiles with chemical warheads and potentially have the ability to weaponize biological agents for missile delivery.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1512" task="">
  <question>
    How does the US view North Korea's CBW capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Bolton also says that George W. Bush's reference to North Korea as being part of an &quot;axis of evil&quot; was &quot;more than a rhetorical flourish--it was factually correct.&quot; Bolton says the Agreed Framework is &quot;in serious doubt&quot; unless safeguards inspections begin soon, and there is &quot;little doubt that North Korea has a chemical weapons program and &quot;one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_678.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1513" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents is North Korea reported to possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, the CW agents in the DPRK arsenal include all of the major classes, such as phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister) and sarin (nerve agent). However, a 2002 report from the commander of US Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, also suggests that North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1514" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents can North Korea produce without foreign assistance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, a 2002 report from the commander of US Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, also suggests that North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1515" task="">
  <question>
    How does North Korea's chemical weapons program rank in size with other known chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This assessment ranks North Korea among the largest possessors of chemical weaponry in the world. If official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are to be believed, the DPRK military possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. (It is not clear, however, if this amount includes the munitions or only the CW agents themselves.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1516" task="">
  <question>
    How successful has North Korea been in developing chemical weapons over the past 20 years? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the three decades after the establishment of the DPRK (in 1947), the North Korean CW program had uneven success in obtaining and weaponizing CW agents. However, it would appear that over the last 20 years, the DPRK has increased its capacity not only in CW agent production but also the development and deployment of a variety of chemical delivery systems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1517" task="">
  <question>
    Can North Korea deliver chemical weapons agents using Nodong long-range missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to defector accounts, the DPRK's long-range missiles such as the Nodong, and other ballistic rockets and artillery pieces with calibres larger than 80mm, are capable of delivering CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1518" task="">
  <question>
    Where have the bulk of North Korea's chemical weapons munititions been deployed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Despite North Korea's moribund economy and some hints of softening rhetoric from its leadership, the quantity and quality of new artillery placed near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have actually increased in the last several years. Many of these artillery platforms, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) of up to 320mm, are forwardly deployed near the DMZ. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1519" task="">
  <question>
    What first motivated North Korea to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As early as 1947, the KPA manual addressed at least the theory of CW operational doctrine. It noted the utility of forcing the enemy to &quot;suit up&quot; in preparation for real or imagined use of chemical agents, for doing so would degrade the fighting ability of enemy forces. By 1954, the KPA established nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense units, probably along the lines of the Soviet model. According to some accounts, North Korea's offensive CW program also began at this time, relying mostly on Chinese assistance for chemical weapons development 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1520" task="">
  <question>
    What was the North Korean &quot;Declaration for Chemicalization&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kim Il-sung's &quot;Declaration for Chemicalization&quot; in 1961 called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production, and the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) was also established during this time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1521" task="">
  <question>
    Who provided assistance to North Korea's chemical weapons programs in the 1950s and 1960s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to some accounts, North Korea's offensive CW program also began at this time, relying mostly on Chinese assistance for chemical weapons development. Kim Il-sung's &quot;Declaration for Chemicalization&quot; in 1961 called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production, and the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) was also established during this time. In 1966, for reasons that are unclear, the DPRK later turned to the Soviets for assistance in CW, mostly in the form of training manuals and small quantities of nerve and mustard agents. Following this period of Soviet-led assistance, North Korea made substantive gains in the area of chemical warfare. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1522" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons capabilities did North Korea have prior to 1980? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Still, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that North Korea had only a defensive capability in CW, while noting that its development of offensive chemical weapons would have been the next logical step. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1523" task="">
  <question>
    What was the scope of North Korea's chemical weapons program in the late 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, by the late 1980s, it was reported that North Korea was able to produce CW agents in large quantity, and deployed large numbers of chemical ordnance. In January 1987, the South Korean defense ministry told the South Korean press that the DPRK possessed up to 250 tons of chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and nerve agents. Recent estimates of North Korean chemical ordnance by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) have since been raised to the thousands of tons, probably based on recent information provided by North Korean defectors, including former members of DPRK military and NBC defence organizations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1524" task="">
  <question>
    Which types of chemical weapons are expected to make up the majority of North Korea's chemical weapons arsenal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DPRK is believed to maintain 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents, primarily mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-series nerve agents. (Other reports from DPRK defectors--including allegations of a &quot;nitrogen, sulfur, and mercury&quot; chemical weapon that causes &quot;respiratory paralysis&quot;--seem rather farfetched.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1525" task="">
  <question>
    Why does North Korea supposedly emphasize production of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Due to challenges posed by a limited source of indigenously produced precursors for CW agents, it is believed that North Korea emphasizes production of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents. (Previous reports have also alleged a large stock of sarin nerve agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1526" task="">
  <question>
    How does North Korea's dependence on importing some chemical weapons precursors limit the growth and development of its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Due to challenges posed by a limited source of indigenously produced precursors for CW agents, it is believed that North Korea emphasizes production of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents. (Previous reports have also alleged a large stock of sarin nerve agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1527" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea fill munitions with chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    CW agents are then moved to either a Sakchu- or Kanggye-based chemical weapons facility for weaponization, i.e., the filling of weapons with agents for deployment. It is also reported that shipments of CW agents are conducted in such a way so as not to attract undue attention, and are camouflaged as ordinary military cargo. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1528" task="">
  <question>
    What city is the most likely target of North Korean chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, the DPRK has traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications that this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious tactical use of chemical weapons by the DPRK would be to terrorize South Korean civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea's artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection against CW attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1529" task="">
  <question>
    How large is North Korea's chemical defense force? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea's chemical defense force is estimated to be around 13,000 personnel, probably making it the third-largest CW service in the world, with chemical defense units incorporated at the regimental level. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1530" task="">
  <question>
    What role does North Korea's Hamhung Chemical Engieering College play in North Korea's development of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Hamhung Chemical Engineering College is responsible for much of the training of the Korean People's Army in CW defense. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1531" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Hamhung Chemical Engineering College? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Hamhung Chemical Engineering College is responsible for much of the training of the Korean People's Army in CW defense. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1532" task="">
  <question>
    What size of artillery shells does North Korea use to deliver its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two main factories located in the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly tasked with the final preparation, filling, and distribution of CW agents in artillery shells from 80 mm and larger, as well as 240mm caliber artillery rockets. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1533" task="">
  <question>
    Where does North Korea supposedly test its chemical weapons and chemical weapons delivery devices? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Two main factories located in the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly tasked with the final preparation, filling, and distribution of CW agents in artillery shells from 80 mm and larger, as well as 240mm caliber artillery rockets. Testing of agents is also reportedly performed at these two locations, possibly in very large underground facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1534" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missiles could North Korea use to deliver chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to thousands of artillery rounds, hundreds of forward deployed Scud-B, Frog-5 and Frog-7 missiles, plus about 30 Scud-C missiles could be armed with chemical warheads. All of them could easily strike much of South Korea. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1535" task="">
  <question>
    How many artillery shells per hour could North Korea fire into South Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A South Korean security analyst suggested that DPRK artillery pieces of calibers 170mm and 240mm &quot;could fire 10,000 rounds per minute to Seoul and its environs.&quot; Given all of North Korea's artillery along on the DMZ, it has been estimated that the KPA could fire over 5 million artillery shells per hour. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1536" task="">
  <question>
    What has North Korea threatened to do to South Korean targets, like Seoul? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1994, during heightened tensions over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the DPRK threatened to turn Seoul into a &quot;sea of fire.&quot; One of the highest ranking North Korean government officials to defect to the South, Hwang Jang Yop, said in April 1997 that the DPRK military was able to do just that, using a combination of chemical and nuclear weapons delivered by missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1537" task="">
  <question>
    What challenges does North Korea face to production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea faces many obstacles in actually employing CW agents, not to mention their manufacture and storage. To be sure, the wide availability of oil-derived intermediates, especially ethylene oxide, makes the large-scale manufacture of simple CW agents such as mustard well within the capabilities of the DPRK. However, it is not clear how well North Korea would be able to manufacture large quantities of nerve agents, such as sarin, soman, and VX, without putting a great burden on already limited resources 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1538" task="">
  <question>
    How has the unavailability of chemical weapons precursors affected North Korea's ability to produce certain kinds of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the 1990s, the unavailability of precursors required to manufacture some nerve agents may very well have challenged the DPRK logistical supply network. For example, in 1996 an ethnic Korean in Japan was caught exporting 50kp of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of cargo vessels bringing food aid to the DPRK. Ostensibly, this chemical was intended for use by a North Korean entity for electroplating purposes. But because sodium fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, the Japanese authorities arrested the individual (himself a Japanese citizen) for trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount (50kg) of this chemical had little consequence in terms of producing militarily significant amounts of nerve agent. But the sodium fluoride episode points to a serious problem faced by North Korea, namely the lack of domestically-manufactured chemical precursors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1539" task="">
  <question>
    How has North Korea sought to circumvent international restrictions on the trade of certain kinds of chemical weapons precursors that it needs to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the 1990s, the unavailability of precursors required to manufacture some nerve agents may very well have challenged the DPRK logistical supply network. For example, in 1996 an ethnic Korean in Japan was caught exporting 50kp of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of cargo vessels bringing food aid to the DPRK. Ostensibly, this chemical was intended for use by a North Korean entity for electroplating purposes. But because sodium fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, the Japanese authorities arrested the individual (himself a Japanese citizen) for trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount (50kg) of this chemical had little consequence in terms of producing militarily significant amounts of nerve agent. But the sodium fluoride episode points to a serious problem faced by North Korea, namely the lack of domestically-manufactured chemical precursors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1540" task="">
  <question>
    How has the unavailablity of chemical weapons precursors affected the range of chemical weapons produced by North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nonetheless, the DPRK has also shown a single-minded emphasis on buttressing its military capabilities despite a poverty-stricken economy and populace. Although the majority of the CW stockpile in the North may not be of the more sophisticated and lethal nerve agent variety, it may contain a large quantity of casualty agents such as mustard, phosgene, and Lewisite, all compounds that are relatively easy to manufacture. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1541" task="">
  <question>
    Why didn't North Korea join the CWC in the early 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea and the Chemical Weapons Convention In the early 1990s--according to reports from DPRK defectors--the North Korean Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces debated over whether to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Although the foreign ministry was apparently in favor of participating in the regime, the military was opposed, and Kim Chong Il apparently sided with the latter. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1542" task="">
  <question>
    Could North Korea benefit by joining the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    If North Korea wishes to foster a viable chemical industry, a case could be made that its accession to the CWC would make long-term economic sense by giving it access to trade in treaty-controlled chemicals and technology. In the short term, however, a knowledgeable official at the OPCW noted that North Korea would not reap immediate benefits by joining the CWC regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1543" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have tried to get North Korea to join the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since 1997, the South Korean government has insisted that the DPRK join the CWC, to no avail. North Korea has also rebuffed efforts on the part of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as well as the Japanese government, to persuade it to participate in the chemical disarmament regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1544" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea withdraw from the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and in April 2003, Pyongyang declared that its bilateral &quot;denuclearization agreement&quot; with Seoul was no longer valid. In December 2002, Pyongyang lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and expelled IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze under the Agreed Framework of October 1994. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1545" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea stop allowing IAEA inspectors to monitor its nuclear sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and in April 2003, Pyongyang declared that its bilateral &quot;denuclearization agreement&quot; with Seoul was no longer valid. In December 2002, Pyongyang lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and expelled IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze under the Agreed Framework of October 1994. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1546" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea permit inspections of its nuclear sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and in April 2003, Pyongyang declared that its bilateral &quot;denuclearization agreement&quot; with Seoul was no longer valid. In December 2002, Pyongyang lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and expelled IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze under the Agreed Framework of October 1994. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1547" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea declare that it had an Uranium-enrichment program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In October 2002, North Korea confirmed U.S. intelligence reports that it had a clandestine enriched uranium weapons program in violation of the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1548" task="">
  <question>
    Has North Korea complied with the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n October 2002, North Korea confirmed U.S. intelligence reports that it had a clandestine enriched uranium weapons program in violation of the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea?s pledge to suspend missile flight-testing until 2003 reduced tensions on the Korean peninsula and in the region, but it continues to export ballistic missiles and missile technology. In December 2002, Spanish and American naval forces intercepted a North Korean ship loaded with Scud missiles bound for Yemen; however, the shipment was allowed to proceed to its destination. North Korea conducted cruise missile tests in February and March 2003, but has not conducted a ballistic missile test since August 1998. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1549" task="">
  <question>
    Who did North Korea ship Scud missiles to in 2002? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In December 2002, Spanish and American naval forces intercepted a North Korean ship loaded with Scud missiles bound for Yemen; however, the shipment was allowed to proceed to its destination. North Korea conducted cruise missile tests in February and March 2003, but has not conducted a ballistic missile test since August 1998. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1550" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea last conduct a ballistic missile test? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea conducted cruise missile tests in February and March 2003, but has not conducted a ballistic missile test since August 1998. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1551" task="">
  <question>
    Where is North Korea's primary nuclear research complex located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea established a nuclear energy research complex at Y?ngby?n in 1964 and set up a Soviet research reactor at the site in 1965. North Korea subsequently expanded the complex and built a number of new facilities, including a large plutonium reprocessing plant (Radiochemistry Laboratory). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1552" task="">
  <question>
    How much weapons-grade plutonium is North Korea expected to possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Discrepancies between North Korean declarations and IAEA inspection findings indicate that North Korea might have reprocessed enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. According to a December 2001 National Intelligence Council report, the U.S. intelligence community ascertained in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1553" task="">
  <question>
    How many nuclear weapons is North Korea expected to possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to a December 2001 National Intelligence Council report, the U.S. intelligence community ascertained in the mid-1990s that North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1554" task="">
  <question>
    Who supplied North Korea with materials for its highly-enriched Uranium production facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In mid-2002, U.S. intelligence discovered that North Korea had been receiving materials from Pakistan for a highly enriched uranium production facility. In October 2002, the U.S. State Department informed North Korea that the U.S. was aware of this program, which is a violation of Pyongyang?s nonproliferation commitments. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1555" task="">
  <question>
    What was the United States' response to the discovery that North Korea had an operational highly-enriched Uranium production facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The U.S. responded by announcing in November 2002 that it would suspend heavy fuel oil shipments being provided under the terms of the Agreed Framework, which had led North Korea to freeze plutonium production facilities. Pyongyang then declared the following month that it was lifting the freeze on its nuclear program, ostensibly in order to generate electricity. In late December 2002, North Korean technicians broke seals and disabled cameras that had been installed by the IAEA in order to monitor the freeze. North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors on 31 December 2002, curtailing the Agency?s capacity to monitor Pyongyang?s nuclear activities. The IAEA has not been able to verify the completeness and correctness of North Korea?s initial declaration submitted in 1992, and the Agency cannot verify whether fissile material has been diverted to military use. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1556" task="">
  <question>
    How extensive is North Korea's biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Pyongyang acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987, North Korea is suspected of having a biological weapon (BW) program. Production of biological weapon agents appears to have begun in the early 1980s. To date, North Korea has likely developed and produced anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin, and plague bacteria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1557" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons could North Korea produce during wartime? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea's chemical weapon (CW) production capability is estimated to be about 4,500 tons per year, though this could increase to 12,000 tons per year in case of war. North Korea appears to have emphasized the weaponization of mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-type chemical agents. Reports indicate that North Korea has some 12 CW facilities where raw chemicals, precursors, and actual agents are produced and/or stored, and six major storage depots for CW ordnance. North Korea also has placed thousands of artillery systems?including multiple launch rocket systems that are particularly effective for CW delivery?within reach of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Seoul. Pyongyang has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1558" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of North Korea's Scud-C missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1984. Pyongyang has subsequently produced the 500 km-range Scud-C, the 800 km-range Scud-D, and a 1300 km-range missile known as the Nodong. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1559" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of North Korea's Scud-D missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1984. Pyongyang has subsequently produced the 500 km-range Scud-C, the 800 km-range Scud-D, and a 1300 km-range missile known as the Nodong. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1560" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of North Korea's Nodong missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    April 1984. Pyongyang has subsequently produced the 500 km-range Scud-C, the 800 km-range Scud-D, and a 1300 km-range missile known as the Nodong. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1561" task="">
  <question>
    What was the goal of North Korea's Paektusan-1 / Taepodong-1 missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In August 1998, North Korea flight-tested the Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1) in a failed attempt to place a small satellite into earth orbit. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1562" task="">
  <question>
    What is the goal of North Korea's Taepodong-2 missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea is continuing to develop the so-called ?Taepodong-2,? which is estimated to have intercontinental range. The Taepodong-2 has not been flight-tested, but U.S. intelligence analysts believe it could be ready for testing at any time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1563" task="">
  <question>
    When is North Korea expected to test the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea is continuing to develop the so-called ?Taepodong-2,? which is estimated to have intercontinental range. The Taepodong-2 has not been flight-tested, but U.S. intelligence analysts believe it could be ready for testing at any time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1564" task="">
  <question>
    How many ballistic missiles does North Korea possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pyongyang has deployed as many as 600-750 ballistic missiles, including about 175-200 Nodongs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1565" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries has North Korea exported missiles or missile technology to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has exported missiles, missile components, and technology to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1566" task="">
  <question>
    When will North Korea resume missile testing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In September 1999, Pyongyang agreed to a moratorium on missile flight tests and recently announced that it would maintain the moratorium until at least 2003. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1567" task="">
  <question>
    Is North Korea a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1568" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have objected to the IAEA's call for special inspections for North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2/93 Brazil objects to the IAEA's demand for special inspections of suspected nuclear facilities in North Korea 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1569" task="">
  <question>
    What restrictions has Japan placed on exports to North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1/93 Japan is considering new restrictions which will require exporters to obtain prior approval from the Ministry of International Trade &amp; Industry (MITI) when selling machine tools and advanced electronic equipment to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1570" task="">
  <question>
    What did Iran offer Pakistan in 1992 in exchange for military technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1992 Iran reportedly offers to pay for Pakistan's entire$3.5billiondefensebudgetinexchange for Pakistan's nuclear technology. Pakistan refuses, but the offer is not withdrawn. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1571" task="">
  <question>
    What intelligence about North Korean missile sales did South Korean officials provide to Israel in 1993? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Korean intelligence officials have recently visited with Israeli military officials in secret to obtain information about the Israeli air bombing raids against Iraqi nuclear facilities in 1981. In return for this information, South Korea is providing Israel with intelligence information concerning North Korea's alleged weapons sales of the Nodong No. 1 missile to Iran and Syria. It is believed that Director General of Israel's Defense Ministry General, David Ivri, is scheduled to visit South Korea in 5/93. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1572" task="">
  <question>
    What restrictions did Japan place on North Korea in an effort to get North Korea to permit IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    3/12/93 Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa calls on North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT. Miyazawa reiterates Japan's policy that normalization of relations could not take place between the countries until North Korea allows international inspection of its facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1573" task="">
  <question>
    How many nuclear tests did North Korea carry out in the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS 1980-89 North Korea carries out 70 nuclear tests and continues to develop detonating technology, according to South Korean Defense Minister Kwon Young-hae. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1574" task="">
  <question>
    What was North Korea's response to the joint US-South Korean military exercises known as &quot;Team Spirit&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The North Korean Foreign Affairs Ministry states that North Korea will take &quot;necessary self-defensive measures&quot; should the U.S. and South Korea resume the Team Spirit military exercises. The military exercises are scheduled to begin in 1/93 and conclude 4/93, and willinvolve190,000troops,including50,000 U.S. personnel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1575" task="">
  <question>
    What was Team Spirit? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. and South Korea resume the Team Spirit military exercises. The military exercises are scheduled to begin in 1/93 and conclude 4/93, and willinvolve190,000troops,including50,000 U.S. personnel. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1576" task="">
  <question>
    How did North Korea respond to calls that it resume allowing IAEA inspectors to monitor North Korean nuclear facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement declares that North Korea might take &quot;countermeasures of self-defense&quot; if the U.S. and other countries press for inspections of certainfacilities. Therefusalisaswitchinpolicy for the North Koreans, who formerly stated that the IAEA inspectors could &quot;travel anywhere in the country 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1577" task="">
  <question>
    What reasons did North Korea give for its withdrawal from the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Yong Nam issues a statement to the U.N. Security Council announcing the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT. The North Korean government cites the resumption of Team Spirit military exercises between the U.S. and South Korea, and the 2/25/93 IAEA resolution demanding for special inspections of two North Korean military sites, as reasons for withdrawal. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1578" task="">
  <question>
    How many nuclear weapons could North Korea build? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dr. Kim Tae-u, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis in South Korea, says that it is certain that North Korea possesses six to seven nuclear weapons. He says North Korea appears to have extracted at least 14 to 15 kgs of plutonium  since 10/86, and may now have 40 to 50 kgs of plutonium. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1579" task="">
  <question>
    Why did North Korea withdraw from the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korean Ambassador to Russia, Son Song-pil, warns that the U.S. and South Korean Team Spirit military exercises scheduled for 3/93 may force North Korea to close its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections. Son Song-pil says that North Korea views the manoeuvres as preparation for potential nuclear war and, under such circumstances, North Korea cannot &quot;fulfill its commitments&quot; to allow IAEA inspections. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1580" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that North Korea has been manufacturing weapons-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In reference to these findings, CIA Director James Woolsey says on 2/24/93 that it may have been possible for North Korea to manufacture &quot;enough fissile material for at least one nuclear weapon.&quot; Western sources state that the quantity of plutonium produced by North Korea can be determined by examining small amounts of liquid highlevel waste from the 5 MW reactor at Yongbyon, which would not be made available until 4/93, when fuel is unloaded from the reactor core. A Japanese military expert says that remote sensing data of nuclear sites near Yongbyon provides evidence of small-scale detonations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1581" task="">
  <question>
    How much did Iran pay North Korea for missile technology to deliver CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Iran allegedly paid North Korea $500 million towards a ballistic missile system capable of delivering nuclear and chemical weapons. North Korea will in turn allegedly provide Iran with an &quot;unspecified number of nuclear bombs&quot; as well as &quot;designs for nuclear-weapons-reprocessing plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1582" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries worked to prevent the IAEA from holding special inspections in North Korea in 1993? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    2/16/93 Diplomatic sources in New York say that IAEA Director General Hans Blix is facing obstacles from China and Russia on the issue of holding a special inspection in North Korea. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1583" task="">
  <question>
    How many kg of plutonium did North Korea receive from Russia in 1992? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1992 According to Germany's Stern magazine, North Korea acquires 56 kg of plutonium from Russia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/nu12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1584" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that North Korea's ballistic missile programs are being funded by Iran? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Western intelligence sources have stated that North Korea's ballistic missile program is being financed in part by Iran. Iran allegedly paid North Korea $500 million towards a ballistic missile system capable of delivering nuclear and chemical weapons. North Korea will in turn allegedly provide Iran with an &quot;unspecified number of nuclear bombs&quot; as well as &quot;designs for nuclear- weapons-reprocessing plants.&quot; On 18 April 1993, the North Korean government publicly rejected the reports as &quot;totally unfounded [1].&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1993/n9309743.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1993/n9309743.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1585" task="">
  <question>
    What biological weapons development occurs at North Korea's No. 25 Factory? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological Facilities No. 25 Factor Primary Function: Production of biological warfare (BW) agents Following Kim Il Sung?s November 1980 order to develop biological and chemical weapons, North Korea accelerated its biological weapons development by deploying special personnel to the No. 25 Factory, the Microbiological Institute (??????),and the Medical Institute (?????). The No. 25 Factory is reportedly a site for biological weapons production. According to a 1992 report by South Korea?s Agency for National Security Planning (???????), North Korea produces 13 types of BW agents, such as bacillus anthracis (anthrax), cholera, typhoid bacillus and plague bacteria at the No. 25 Factory, the Party Central Biological Research Institute (????????), and the Preventive Military Medical Unit (????????). The report says that these BW agents are sent to the  Munch??n Agar Factory (??????) for weaponization. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/57_296.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/57_296.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1586" task="">
  <question>
    Is North Korea's military prepared for an attack against South Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to defector Hwang Jang-yop, North Korea is prepared for a full-scale offensive into South Korea. North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il believes his troops could successfully seal off any reinforcements to the US forces already in South Korea because Tokyo and many other Japanese cities, as well as US military installations in Japan would be exposed to direct missile attacks from North Korea. All heavy equipment of the Korean People's Army is self-propelled. The North Korean military openly brags that it can destroy South Korea with a blow three times more powerful than anything South Korea might be able to mete out against strategic targets in North Korea. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1999/m9910866.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1999/m9910866.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1587" task="">
  <question>
    What strategic alternatives does possessing a large stockpile of chemical weapons afford North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Many senior officials in North Korea believe that the international tension fuelled by the North Korean nuclear issue was due to foreign authorities having entrapped North Korea with the safeguard agreement of 1992. Thus, many officials feel North Korea should stockpile large amounts of chemical weapons. North Korean leaders have confirmed that they would not join the treaty on the prohibition of testing biological and chemical weapons. Officials have conceded the possession of such weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1999/m9910866.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1999/m9910866.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1588" task="">
  <question>
    How sophisticated is North Korea's biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An examination of open-source data finds varying assessments concerning North Korea and its purported capabilities in biological weaponry. These estimates can range from North Korea having a rudimentary biological warfare (BW) program, to actual possession of biological weapons already deployed. One recent South Korean Ministry of Defense analysis released to the public have concluded that, without positing which ones, North Korea has weaponized 1-2 BW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1589" task="">
  <question>
    How many biological weapons agents has North Korea weaponized? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    One recent South Korean Ministry of Defense analysis released to the public have concluded that, without positing which ones, North Korea has weaponized 1-2 BW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1590" task="">
  <question>
    How quickly could North Korea produced biological weapons agents in wartime? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability and has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention. Despite the fact that its citizens are starving, the leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to do so, and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these deadly weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1591" task="">
  <question>
    Is North Korea expected to have spent a lot of money developing biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW capability and has developed and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of the [Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention. Despite the fact that its citizens are starving, the leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, and other crude biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1592" task="">
  <question>
    What challenges does North Korea face in developing a sophisticated bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has developed a modicum of biotechnology-related infrastructure, but is sorely deficient in advanced equipment and expertise. Production of growth media?agar, peptone, yeast extract (from breweries)?in North Korea is probably sufficient to culture large quantities of BW agents. Less clear are North Korea?s capabilities in weaponization and delivery of these agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1593" task="">
  <question>
    Do North Korea's commercial industries produce goods that could be used to benefit a bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has developed a modicum of biotechnology-related infrastructure, but is sorely deficient in advanced equipment and expertise. Production of growth media?agar, peptone, yeast extract (from breweries)?in North Korea is probably sufficient to culture large quantities of BW agents. Less clear are North Korea?s capabilities in weaponization and delivery of these agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1594" task="">
  <question>
    Where did North Korea obtain its initial biological weapons cultures? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, the results at this stage were lackluster. An estimated 10-13 different types of pathogens were investigated during the early development process, including the etiological agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox, and yellow fever. [3] During this period, it is also reported that the DPRK imported anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), plague (Yersinia pestis) and cholera (Vibrio cholerae) bacteria, presumably obtained from culture collections in Japan. Typhoid (i.e., causative bacterium Salmonella typhi) is also mentioned as a prototypical BW agent in the North Korean development program, although this may be due to confusion with typhus and its causative agent (Rickettsia prowazekii) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1595" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea begin a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Noting that &quot;poisonous gas and bacteria can be used effectively in war,&quot;[1] North Korean leader Kim Il Sung (d. 1994) ordered the &quot;concentrated development of biological weapons&quot; in the early 1960s.[2] Following this directive a laboratory and facility organization were established under the aegis of the Academy of National Defense. However, the results at this stage were lackluster. An estimated 10-13 different types of pathogens were investigated during the early development process, including the etiological agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, smallpox, and yellow fever. [3] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1596" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea begin to produce biological weapons agents domestically? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Actual production of BW agents, including the causative bacteria of cholera, typhus (rickettsial), tuberculosis, and anthrax is reported to have begun in the early 1980s. Unlike North Korea?s history with CW development, biological weapons development in the DPRK has been mostly indigenous. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1597" task="">
  <question>
    What biological agents have reportedly been developed by North Korean scientists for biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Anthrax Bacillus anthracis Botulism (botulinum toxin) Clostridium botulinum Plague Yersinia pestis Yellow fever Yellow fever virus Typhoid Salmonella typhi Cholera Vibrio cholerae (01) Hemorrhagic fevers Korean hemorrhagic fever virus (?) Tuberculosis Mycobacterium tuberculosis Typhus Rickettsia prowazekii Smallpox Smallpox virus (variola) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1598" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that North Korea has been producing exotic biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mangold and Goldberg in their 1999 book Plague Wars quote former and high-ranking Pentagon officials that North Korea has also been developing &quot;unusual toxins,&quot; although no more details have been published in the open literature. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1599" task="">
  <question>
    Which biological agents has North Korea most likely produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Disease Causative agent Anthrax Bacillus anthracis Botulism (botulinum toxin) Clostridium botulinum Plague Yersinia pestis 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1600" task="">
  <question>
    How have North Korean bioweapons experts weaponized anthrax? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is believed, however, that anthrax and smallpox are atop the list of potential DPRK biological weapons, with perhaps plague not following too far behind. North Korean biological weapons scientists have reportedly treated anthrax spores with a form of microencapsulation, thereby protecting the organisms from UV light, and have been compared to the Soviet version of weaponized anthrax. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1601" task="">
  <question>
    What steps has North Korean taken towards weaponizing smallpox? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Within the last few years (since at least 1999) there has been a focus upon the threat of smallpox, and North Korea reportedly has cultures of this pathogen (variola major). According to an unnamed defector from the former Soviet Union, North Korean soldiers have been recently vaccinated against smallpox. It should be noted that US military personnel were vaccinated against smallpox until 1989. It is possible that North Korea has been following standardized practice without any thought to employing smallpox virus as an offensive weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1602" task="">
  <question>
    How could North Korea launch a biological weapons attack on the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, some US military intelligence estimates consider North Korea as having weaponized BW agents for a limited number of missiles, although it does not appear to possess advanced biological delivery systems. However, this same source (Plague Wars, 1999, p. 327) was quoted as saying that One of our main worries remains the thought of one man, from North Korea?s well-trained special operations force, carrying a portable BW sprayer on his back and silently launching a devastating anthrax attack on a US base at night. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1603" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea possess weaponized biological weapons warheads that could be used in ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Reportedly, some US military intelligence estimates consider North Korea as having weaponized BW agents for a limited number of missiles, although it does not appear to possess advanced biological delivery systems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1604" task="">
  <question>
    What percentage of North Korean ballistic missiles can carry chemical or biological warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In contrast to the ample and diverse capabilities to deliver CW agents, it is much less clear what comparable ordnance is available to the DPRK in terms of biological weaponry. ROK estimates that half of North Korea?s long-range missiles and 30% of its artillery pieces are capable of delivering chemical or biological warheads. Because of the recent attention to the North Korean BW threat, reportedly ROK forces (approximately 600,000) will receive anthrax inoculations, and the ROK government is also looking to acquire new smallpox vaccine in the near future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1605" task="">
  <question>
    How are North Korea's biological weapons development programs organized within the North Korean government? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Little is also known about the biological warfare program and organization in North Korea, although Joseph Bermudez suggests that it follows in similar lines with the DPRK CW infrastructure. If this is the case, then the Second Economic Committee and its subsidiary Fifth Machine Industry Bureau would fulfill requirements for biological weapons set by the North Korean military. The latter organizations are directed by the National Defense Commission and the Ministry of People?s Armed Forces. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1606" task="">
  <question>
    Where are the primary North Korean biological weapons facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These included three BW production and six BW research facilities. While the latter group were not fully elucidated, the three production sites were located at Chongju, Munchon, and along the Sohae coast.According to defector Ch?oe Ju Hwal, a former sergeant in the Korean People's Army, there exists a &quot;Joint Research Institute&quot; that is responsible biological weapons development. This institute is placed within the military-medical department, under command of the General Rear Service Bureau of the Ministry of People?s Armed Forces. Another report suggests a biological research facility associated with the North Korean BW program is located in S?ngch??n County (???), South P?yongan Province, perhaps near Onj?ng-ri (???) (also the reported location of a Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau training site since 1992). Growth media is reportedly supplied (200 tons per annum) by a facility in Munch?on, Kangwon Province. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1607" task="">
  <question>
    Where is growth media for the North Korean biological weapons programs produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Growth media is reportedly supplied (200 tons per annum) by a facility in Munch?on, Kangwon Province. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1608" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea accept the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea and the 1972 Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC) North Korea acceded to the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 13 March 1987. Heightened concerns regarding North Korea?s efforts in nuclear weaponry, however, as well as its ongoing missile development and export program have overshadowed much of the ongoing discussions (to the extent that these have occurred at all) concerning the BTWC and the DPRK. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1609" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea widthdraw from the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1610" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea remove the freeze on its nuclear program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In December 2002, Pyongyang lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and expelled IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze under the Agreed Framework of October 1994. In October 2002, North Korea confirmed U.S. intelligence reports that it had a clandestine enriched uranium weapons program in violation of the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1611" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea sign the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985 but did not submit to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections until May 1992. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1612" task="">
  <question>
    Why did North Korea invalidate its declaration with South Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 12 May 2003, North Korea announced that the bilateral &quot;Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula&quot; signed with South Korea on 20 January 1992 was no longer valid because of &quot;U.S. actions&quot; [Note: the U.S. was not a signatory]. Under the agreement, North and South Korea pledged not to produce nuclear weapons, not to reprocess plutonium, and not to enrich uranium. Under the Agreed Framework of October 1994, Pyongyang also agreed to fulfill its commitments under the joint declaration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1613" task="">
  <question>
    What is the extent of North Korea's HEU program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are also concerns about North Korea's suspected highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which is a different path to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the summer of 2002, US intelligence reportedly discovered new evidence about transfers of HEU technology and/or materials from Pakistan in exchange for ballistic missiles. In October 2002, a delegation led by James Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, visited Pyongyang and notified North Korean officials that the United States was aware of Pyongyang's HEU development program. Compared to plutonium-production facilities, the type of HEU production facilities that the DPRK may be developing would be difficult to detect, and therefore, it is difficult to accurately assess the program's stage of development. Most reports indicate the program was initiated in the mid-1990s, but there is evidence that the program could have begun as early as the 1980s. Most indications are that the HEU program is employing gas-centrifuge technology, but when the program exactly began is still unclear. There are also reports that North Korea is seeking or experimenting with laser-isotope separation technology, but it is unlikely that Pyongyang will be able to apply this technology in the foreseeable future. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1614" task="">
  <question>
    How did Soviet Union help North Korea in its nuclear program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided extensive technical assistance while North Korea constructed its Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center, which included the installation of a Soviet IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor, and other facilities (see Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center). The small research reactor has been used to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel. The cabinet and the Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the nuclear facilities, but ultimate control of the program and decisions over weapons development belonged to North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. The program appeared to begin as a peaceful one, but whatever Kim's original intentions, the Cuban Missile Crisis may have prompted initiation of a dedicated nuclear weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1615" task="">
  <question>
    Why did North Korea fail to meet the IAEA deadline? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After signing the NPT, countries have 18 months to complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In North Korea's case, it was later discovered that the agency provided the wrong documents for the safeguards agreement and the IAEA subsequently gave North Korea an additional 18 months to complete the agreement. Nevertheless, North Korea failed to meet the extended deadline, as Pyongyang demanded that the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and that Washington and Seoul terminate the joint military exercise "Team Spirit." 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1616" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North and South Korea then signed the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," whereby both sides promised "not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons." The agreement also bound the two sides to forgo the possession of "nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." The agreement also provided for a bilateral inspections regime, but the two sides failed to agree on its implementation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1617" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea accede to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea acceded to the Biological Toxin and Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 13 March 1987. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1618" task="">
  <question>
    What are North Korea's CW capabilties? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This assessment ranks North Korea among the largest possessors of chemical weaponry in the world. If official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are to be believed, the DPRK military possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. (It is not clear, however, if this amount includes the munitions or only the CW agents themselves.) Reportedly, the CW agents in the DPRK arsenal include all of the major classes, such as phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister) and sarin (nerve agent). However, a 2002 report from the commander of US Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, also suggests that North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1619" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Declaration for Chemicalization? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kim Il-sung's &quot;Declaration for Chemicalization&quot; in 1961 called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production, and the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) was also established during this time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1620" task="">
  <question>
    What does the North Korean CW arsenal contain? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The DPRK is believed to maintain 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents, primarily mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-series nerve agents. (Other reports from DPRK defectors--including allegations of a &quot;nitrogen, sulfur, and mercury&quot; chemical weapon that causes &quot;respiratory paralysis&quot;--seem rather farfetched.) Pak Tong Sam at the South Korean Agency for Defense Development has estimated that North Korea's chemical weapons production capability is 4,500 tons annually in peacetime, and this could increase to 12,000 tons in wartime. An unknown portion of CW agents are stored in bulk, but a significant portion is reported to be filled into artillery shells and rocket warheads. Due to challenges posed by a limited source of indigenously produced precursors for CW agents, it is believed that North Korea emphasizes production of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents. (Previous reports have also alleged a large stock of sarin nerve agent.) In 2001, it was estimated that there are 12 facilities in the DPRK where raw chemicals, precursors, and CW agents are produced and/or stored. CW agents are then moved to either a Sakchu- or Kanggye-based chemical weapons facility for weaponization, i.e., the filling of weapons with agents for deployment. It is also reported that shipments of CW agents are conducted in such a way so as not to attract undue attention, and are camouflaged as ordinary military cargo. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1621" task="">
  <question>
    What CW agents does North Korea possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Open-source assessments of North Korean chemical weapons stockpiles have changed significantly over the past decade. Reports by defectors and other accounts in the open literature indicate that North Korea currently possesses blister (e.g., mustard), nerve (e.g., sarin), choking (e.g., phosgene), and blood agents (e.g., hydrogen cyanide). A North Korean defector in 1997 told a US Congressional committee that the DPRK possessed a blister agent called &quot;Lizut,&quot; or Lewisite, in its arsenal. VE and VG nerve agents are also mentioned in South Korean assessments of DPRK chemical weapons, although these reports do not appear to be based on hard data but rather on inference. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1622" task="">
  <question>
    How advanced is North Korea's missile technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea is the most advanced of the &quot;late missile developers&quot; and since the demise of the Soviet Union has probably become the greatest exporter of complete ballistic missile systems, components, and technology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1623" task="">
  <question>
    Is North Korea a member of the Missile technology Control Regime (MTCR)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1624" task="">
  <question>
    When did North Korea start its missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea first entered the field of rockets and missiles in the early 1960s with the production of multiple rocket launchers.[1] By 1965, Kim Il Sung had probably made the political decision to seek an indigenous ballistic missile production capability. That year marked the establishment of the Hamhung Military Academy, where North Korean personnel began to receive training in missile development.[2] In general, the 1960s marked the procurement of rockets, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), anti-ship missiles, and the initial development of human resources to support a missile program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Missile/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Missile/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1625" task="">
  <question>
    What does a plutonium-based bomb program require? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A plutonium-based bomb program requires capabilities to mine and mill uranium, process it into reactor fuel, transform the isotopic content of the fuel by &quot;burning&quot; it in a reactor, extract plutonium from the spent fuel, form the plutonium into the core of a fission-implosion weapon, and develop and test high explosives used to initiate fission. Although technically sub-optimal, even reactor-grade plutonium can be used as fissile material in nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1626" task="">
  <question>
    Does North Korea have nuclear reactors that produce plutonium? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has had two operating reactors (a 5MW(e) reactor and an IRT-2000 research reactor) for producing plutonium. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_165.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_165.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1627" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that North Korea has an uranium program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the US State Department, in October 2002 North Korea admitted to a US government delegation that it had a uranium enrichment program. However, North Korean officials subsequently claimed they only admitted to having &quot;a plan to develop nuclear weapons.&quot; At this time, it is uncertain whether North Korea has enriched any uranium. According to a November 2002 unclassified CIA assessment, &quot;North Korea embarked on the effort to develop a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program about two years ago.&quot;[1] Moreover, the CIA report estimated that North Korea is building a centrifuge plant that could be fully functional by &quot;mid-decade&quot; and could then produce enough weapons-grade uranium (typically greater than 90% enriched uranium) for two or more weapons per year. North Korea's uranium enrichment program may have begun as early as 1995, possibly with the assistance of Pakistan.[2] In March 2000, then-President Bill Clinton could not certify that North Korea was not manufacturing or otherwise acquiring HEU. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_74.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Nuclear/44_74.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1628" task="">
  <question>
    How could Pakistan create a bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While Pakistan is not known to possess biological weapons (BW), it has talented biomedical and biochemical scientists and well-equipped laboratories, which would allow it to quickly establish a sophisticated BW program, should the government so desire. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1629" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan have the biologists and biochemists necessary to start a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While Pakistan is not known to possess biological weapons (BW), it has talented biomedical and biochemical scientists and well-equipped laboratories, which would allow it to quickly establish a sophisticated BW program, should the government so desire. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1630" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Pakistan has been researching biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    ndeed, the United States reported in 1996 that Islamabad had been &quot;conducting research and development with potential biological warfare applications.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1631" task="">
  <question>
    Do we know if Pakistan has a biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is not known whether this potential has since been realized. Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in April 1972 and ratified it in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1632" task="">
  <question>
    When did Pakistan ratify the Bioloigcal and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in April 1972 and ratified it in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1633" task="">
  <question>
    When did Pakistan sign the Bioloigcal and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in April 1972 and ratified it in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1634" task="">
  <question>
    When did Pakistan sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and ratified the treaty in 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1635" task="">
  <question>
    When did Pakistan ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and ratified the treaty in 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1636" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan admitted to having chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Islamabad has apparently made no admission in its treaty-mandated declarations of having possessed chemical weapons (CW). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1637" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan's compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) revealed anything about its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Islamabad has apparently made no admission in its treaty-mandated declarations of having possessed chemical weapons (CW). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1638" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Pakistan has a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Further, there is no reliable information in publicly available literature asserting that Pakistan has ever possessed CW, although some analysts suspect that it supports an offensive program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1639" task="">
  <question>
    Do analysts suspect that Pakistan has chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Further, there is no reliable information in publicly available literature asserting that Pakistan has ever possessed CW, although some analysts suspect that it supports an offensive program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1640" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence has been uncovered relating to Pakistan's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Further, there is no reliable information in publicly available literature asserting that Pakistan has ever possessed CW, although some analysts suspect that it supports an offensive program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1641" task="">
  <question>
    What types of ballistic missiles is Pakistan developing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan is developing both solid- and liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, based extensively on foreign systems. In the early 1990s, Pakistan purchased a small number of 300 km-range M-11 ballistic missiles from China; Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi. By the late 1990s, China helped Pakistan develop the 750 km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile, which was last tested in October 2002. In the late 1990s, Pakistan also acquired a small number of 1,500 km-range Nodong ballistic missiles from North Korea. The Pakistani version of the Nodong, known as the Ghauri, was flight-tested in April 1998 and April 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1642" task="">
  <question>
    Which Pakistani agencies are developing ballistic missiles for Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The ballistic missiles are being developed by two rival agencies, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Khan Research Laboratories, which fall under the aegis of the National Development Complex. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1643" task="">
  <question>
    What has motivated Pakistan to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The long-standing Indo-Pakistani rivalry continues to drive the pursuit of NBC weapons and especially ballistic missiles on the Asian subcontinent. After 50 years of independence and three wars, territorial disputes and deep-seated mistrust continue to divide the two countries. Each maintains substantial forces along their common border. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1644" task="">
  <question>
    Are India and Pakistan developing ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan are developing ballistic missiles. As with other weapons programs, Pakistani and Indian pursuit of ballistic missiles is largely driven by the perception that these missiles are necessary to counter their rival?s capabilities. India?s development of MRBMs also is motivated by its desire to be recognized as a great power and strategic competitor with China. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1645" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan possess the chemical industry infrastructure to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has a sizable chemical industry and recently declared its chemical warfare program, as called for under the CWC.  Pakistan has the ability to transition from research and development to chemical agent production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1646" task="">
  <question>
    Could Pakistan make the transition from chemical weapons research to chemical weapons production? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has a sizable chemical industry and recently declared its chemical warfare program, as called for under the CWC.  Pakistan has the ability to transition from research and development to chemical agent production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1647" task="">
  <question>
    How does Pakistan's capacity for supporting a biological weapons program differ from India's capacity? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has research and development facilities geared toward biological warfare defense. Pakistan may have the capability to support a limited biological warfare program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1648" task="">
  <question>
    How can Pakistan's chemical weapons program be characterized? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan has imported a number of chemicals that can be used to make chemical agents and is moving slowly toward a commercial chemical industry capable of producing all precursor chemicals needed to support a chemical weapons stockpile. Pakistan has also ratified the CWC. Both India and Pakistan have a wide variety of delivery means available for chemical agents, including artillery, aerial bombs, and missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1649" task="">
  <question>
    How extensive is Pakistan's alleged biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nonetheless, Pakistan is believed to have the resources and capabilities to support a limited biological warfare research and development effort. Both India and Pakistan have ratified the BWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1650" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan accused India of stockpiling chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 March 1999 In a meeting with the Director General for the OPCW, Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz accuses India of preparing and stockpiling chemical weapons. ?&quot;Aziz: Pakistan Not Manufacturing Chemical Weapons,&quot; Al-Akhbar in Urdu, 7 May 1999, available from FBIS, document identification number BK0903081199. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1651" task="">
  <question>
    Has India uncovered evidence of Pakistan's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1999 The Indian Army claims it seized Pakistani document that indicates the presence of chemical weapons in the Kaksar area of Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1652" task="">
  <question>
    Where has Pakistan supposedly deployed chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1999 The Indian Army claims it seized Pakistani document that indicates the presence of chemical weapons in the Kaksar area of Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1653" task="">
  <question>
    Why does Pakistan believe that India would use chemical weapons against Pakistani military positions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 June 1999 Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Chief of Markaz al Dawat al Irshad, accuses India of preparing to use chemical weapons against the Kashmiri Mujahideen. According to Saeed, India is preparing to use these weapons because it is disheartened after having been defeated by the Pakistani army and the Mujahideen. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1654" task="">
  <question>
    Have there been media reports of Indian forces using chemical weapons in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    8 September 1999 An editorial in the Pakistani newspaper Jang, accuses India of using chemical weapons in the Neelum valley in Kashmir. The article uses the death of two uninjured children at a border village as evidence of the attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1655" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between India's chemical weapons program and Iraq's WMD programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    20 January 2000 The Pakistani English-language newspaper The News, reports that Pakistani defense officials are becoming increasing concerned about India's continued research in the field of chemical weapons. According to the unidentified officials India had supplied Iraq with phosgene before the Gulf War to test its effectiveness. They also accuse India of using chemical weapons during the Kargil crisis in 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1656" task="">
  <question>
    How will Pakistan's signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention affect Pakistan's nuclear weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed, chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), said that Pakistan will not open its nuclear installations for inspection. Ahmed also said that Pakistan's nuclear installations &quot;have no connection with Pakistan's decision to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1657" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan expected to reduce its nuclear weapons stockpile now that it has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed, chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), said that Pakistan will not open its nuclear installations for inspection. Ahmed also said that Pakistan's nuclear installations &quot;have no connection with Pakistan's decision to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1658" task="">
  <question>
    How many nuclear facilities does Pakistan have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan currently has 40 nuclear facilities. Of these, only two, KANUPP and CHASHNUPP, are inspected by the IAEA because equipment for the facilities was imported under mutual agreements with the exporting countries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1659" task="">
  <question>
    How many of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are inspected by the IAEA? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan currently has 40 nuclear facilities. Of these, only two, KANUPP and CHASHNUPP, are inspected by the IAEA because equipment for the facilities was imported under mutual agreements with the exporting countries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1660" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have received ballistic missile technology from North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and potentially to the United States itself, because it is a major proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses-missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and underground facility expertise-to other countries of missile proliferation concern. These countries include Iran, Pakistan and others. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1661" task="">
  <question>
    Could Pakistan's ballistic missiles pose a threat to the United States? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and potentially to the United States itself, because it is a major proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses-missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and underground facility expertise-to other countries of missile proliferation concern. These countries include Iran, Pakistan and others. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1662" task="">
  <question>
    How did Pakistan's test of nuclear weapons affect India's chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the Pakistani nuclear tests, India has announced its intention to increase its spending on missiles and nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1663" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan have biological and chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to its nuclear weapons, Pakistan has biological and chemical weapons programs. Chinese assistance has been crucial to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1664" task="">
  <question>
    How could Pakistan's chemical and biological weapons programs affect international stability in South Asia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Second, India and Pakistan may seek additional technical assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers-India from North Korea, Iran and Russia; Pakistan from North Korea and China-because of the threats they perceive from one another and because of India's anxieties about China, combined with their mounting international isolation. Third, their growing missile and WMD capabilities have direct effects on U.S. policies, both regional and global, and could significantly affect U.S. capability to play a stabilizing role in Asia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1665" task="">
  <question>
    How are Pakistan's chemical and biological weapons programs expected to affect U.S. policy towards India and South Asia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Second, India and Pakistan may seek additional technical assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers-India from North Korea, Iran and Russia; Pakistan from North Korea and China-because of the threats they perceive from one another and because of India's anxieties about China, combined with their mounting international isolation. Third, their growing missile and WMD capabilities have direct effects on U.S. policies, both regional and global, and could significantly affect U.S. capability to play a stabilizing role in Asia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1666" task="">
  <question>
    Where do India and Pakistan receive technical assistance for their chemical weapons programs and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Second, India and Pakistan may seek additional technical assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers-India from North Korea, Iran and Russia; Pakistan from North Korea and China-because of the threats they perceive from one another and because of India's anxieties about China, combined with their mounting international isolation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1667" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Pakistan receive technical assistance for its chemical weapons and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Second, India and Pakistan may seek additional technical assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers-India from North Korea, Iran and Russia; Pakistan from North Korea and China-because of the threats they perceive from one another and because of India's anxieties about China, combined with their mounting international isolation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1668" task="">
  <question>
    Other than Pakistan, which countries have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa, India, Pakistan and Israel have also not signed the NPT. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1669" task="">
  <question>
    What did Egypt claim would help it reduce its dependence on chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This includes the Diamona nuclear facility in Israel which is believed to contain fissile materials needed for nuclear weapons. Egypt and other Arab countries indicated that placing Diamona under international safeguards could lead to reduction of their need for chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1670" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the United States stop sending aid to Pakistan in the early 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In May 1991, Bush called on those Mideast countries that have not signed the treaty to do so. In 1990, US administration and Congress withdrew aid to Pakistan because of its nonproliferation performance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1671" task="">
  <question>
    Did India worry that Pakistan would not sign the Chemical Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India begins contacting experts in international law in an attempt to find a way out if its commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention. India is growing increasingly concerned because the United States, China, and Pakistan have yet to ratify the treaty, which is scheduled to go into effect on 29 April 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1672" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan possess intelligence about India's chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    11 March 1998 Pakistani Foreign Minister Ayub Khan states that India possesses chemical weapons and can use them against Pakistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2697.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1673" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Pakistan can equip its ballistic missiles with chemical or biological weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 September 1999 A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan &quot;will be armed with non-conventional warheads.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1674" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Iran can equip its ballistic missiles with chemical or biological weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 September 1999 A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan &quot;will be armed with non-conventional warheads.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1675" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that India can equip its ballistic missiles with chemical or biological weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 September 1999 A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan &quot;will be armed with non-conventional warheads.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1676" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that North Korea can equip its ballistic missiles with chemical or biological weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 September 1999 A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan &quot;will be armed with non-conventional warheads.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1677" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that China can equip its ballistic missiles with chemical or biological weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 September 1999 A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan &quot;will be armed with non-conventional warheads.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1678" task="">
  <question>
    Who would be the likely target for Pakistan's chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Both India and Pakistan are capable of developing chemical weapons, and are striving to develop longer range missiles for deep strikes into each other's territory. Egypt and Israel are developing and producing missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1993/m9303170.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1993/m9303170.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1679" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan capable of developing chemical weapons (CW)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Both India and Pakistan are capable of developing chemical weapons, and are striving to develop longer range missiles for deep strikes into each other's territory. Egypt and Israel are developing and producing missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1993/m9303170.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1993/m9303170.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1680" task="">
  <question>
    What is the likely impact of Pakistan chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to the immediate risks to regional security, the development of NBC weapons in South Asia has the potential to undercut broader U.S. and international nonproliferation objectives. Both India and Pakistan, for different reasons, have refused to sign the NPT. Their nuclear programs, outside of this widely accepted international norm, serve as dangerous examples for nations in other regions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1681" task="">
  <question>
    Has India been willing to accept export controls on chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NBC weapons and missile infrastructures in South Asia also pose potential proliferation threats, as possible sources of supply. India and Pakistan's slowness to adopt export controls consistent with established international control regimes is reason for concern. As each nation continues its programs, the danger of transferring technology to states outside the region remains possible. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1682" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan been willing to accept export controls on chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NBC weapons and missile infrastructures in South Asia also pose potential proliferation threats, as possible sources of supply. India and Pakistan's slowness to adopt export controls consistent with established international control regimes is reason for concern. As each nation continues its programs, the danger of transferring technology to states outside the region remains possible. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1683" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between the size of India's military and Pakistan's development of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan's efforts to develop NBC weapons and missile systems are intended primarily to counter India's substantial conventional military advantage and its perception of India's nuclear threat. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1684" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between India's nuclear weapons arsenal and Pakistan's development of chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan's efforts to develop NBC weapons and missile systems are intended primarily to counter India's substantial conventional military advantage and its perception of India's nuclear threat. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1685" task="">
  <question>
    What is Pakistan's official position with regards to allegations that it has chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan deny possessing chemical and biological weapons, but point with pride to the progress of their indigenous missile development programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1686" task="">
  <question>
    What is India's official position with regards to allegations that it has chemical and biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan deny possessing chemical and biological weapons, but point with pride to the progress of their indigenous missile development programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1687" task="">
  <question>
    Should Pakistan be believed when it claims that it doesn't have active chemical or biological weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan continue to cloak their NBC weapons programs in secrecy or deliberate ambiguity. Both continue to deny possessing nuclear weapons, while periodically issuing veiled threats alluding to their capability to employ these weapons if necessary. India and Pakistan deny possessing chemical and biological weapons, but point with pride to the progress of their indigenous missile development programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1688" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan threatened to use biological weapons against India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan continue to cloak their NBC weapons programs in secrecy or deliberate ambiguity. Both continue to deny possessing nuclear weapons, while periodically issuing veiled threats alluding to their capability to employ these weapons if necessary. India and Pakistan deny possessing chemical and biological weapons, but point with pride to the progress of their indigenous missile development programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1689" task="">
  <question>
    Does India view Pakistan's chemical and biological weapons as a threat? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test. New Delhi continues to view its northern neighbor as a long-term threat despite recently improved relations. It sees Pakistan's NBC weapons and missile capabilities as a more immediate threat. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1690" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan believe that possessing chemical and biological weapons will serve as a deterrent to war with India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistani leaders believe that a nuclear capability is essential to deter war with India, or failing that, to ensure the survival of the nation. Its nuclear program has widespread political and popular support. Missile procurement and development, initially to counter the Indian missile program which began in the mid-1980s, are driven by a desire to augment limited offensive air capabilities against India (which holds almost a 3:1 advantage in combat aircraft) and to field a more effective delivery system. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1691" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan a self-sufficient producer of chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Like India, Pakistan has signed the CWC, and can produce chemical agents and munitions. It has procured dual-use chemical precursors from foreign sources and hopes to achieve self-sufficiency in producing precursors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1692" task="">
  <question>
    Does India have an offensive biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While India possesses the infrastructure necessary to support an offensive biological warfare program, including highly qualified scientific personnel and industrial production facilities, it apparently has given priority to research and development applicable only to biological warfare defensive measures. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1693" task="">
  <question>
    Could Pakistan produce an offensive biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan has the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting research and development relating to biological warfare. Both countries have signed the Biological Weapons Convention. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1694" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan import chemical weapons precursors for its chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Pakistan must obtain precursors for chemical agent production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1695" task="">
  <question>
    Could biological research conducted in Pakistan have biological weapons applications? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    * Pakistan is conducting research and development with potential biological warfare applications. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1696" task="">
  <question>
    Did Pakistan acquire chemical weapons before India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980sIndia reaches final development and deployment of several chemical agents after Pakistan reportedly has acquired chemical agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1697" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries could attack India using chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian Ministry of Defense sets up a special cell designed to prepare the Indian armed forces for a chemical attack by a neighboring country (i.e., Pakistan and/or China). The cell is tasked with looking at mainly defensive measures against a chemical attack. The cell is also to study the effect of chemical gases in different climate conditions and also the effectiveness of decontamination kits, chemical detectors, and protective gear. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1698" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan been accused of using chemical weapons against India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 India accuses Pakistan of using chemical weapons against its troops in Siachen. The weapon is apparently used in the constant border skirmishes between India and Pakistan for control of the Siachen Glacier region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1699" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan prepared to use chemical weapons against India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 March 1991 According to a statement by Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, India and Pakistan have postured their forces for the possible use of chemical weapons should a conflict erupt. The statement also contends that India most likely has a chemical weapons stockpile because of its large chemical industry infrastructure. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1700" task="">
  <question>
    What agreements have India and Pakistan reached on the use of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    31 October 1991 India and Pakistan both agree to consider issuing a joint declaration on chemical weapons. They also agree to a meeting of a panel of experts at a future date to exchange views on negotiating an accord banning production, deployment, and use of chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1701" task="">
  <question>
    Have countries (other than India) prepared for a Pakistani chemical weapons attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    5-10 March 1996 Iran conducts the Zafar (Victory) military exercise in the Sistan-Baluchestan province near the Pakistan border, which includes simulated chemical weapons attacks on Iranian forces and &quot;defensive operations including repelling chemical attacks.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1702" task="">
  <question>
    Did Pakistan attend international seminars to learn about its committments under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22-25 April 1996 Iran holds its first Regional Seminar on the National Implementation of the CWC in Tehran in order to familiarize governments with their rights and obligations under the treaty. The 15 countries represented at the seminar are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Along with the various workshops presented, the participants are also invited to a &quot;trial inspection&quot; to see how the procedure was conducted under CWC regulations. The mock inspection is conducted at the Shahid Razkani chemical factory in Tehran. Senior officials from two NGOs?SIPRI and the Harvard-Sussex Program?also attended the seminar. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2962.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1703" task="">
  <question>
    Have authorities blocked chemical weapons equipment shipments to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In April 1996, equipment which could be used for manufacturing chemical and nuclear weapons was impounded by officials at the port of Naples, Italy before it could be shipped to Lahore, Pakistan. The equipment was found in five containers with paperwork indicating that the containers were components of a water boiler. Inside the containers, customs officers discovered a reactor with a cooling sheath, distilling equipment, pumps, and centrifuges. According to the exporting company, Smith Kline, the equipment was for manufacturing an antibiotic called cefadrin. The cargo, which originated in Rome, is being held for customs violations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1996/n9615122.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1996/n9615122.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1704" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan tried to violate chemical or biological weapons export regulations by importing chemical or biological weapons equipment? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In April 1996, equipment which could be used for manufacturing chemical and nuclear weapons was impounded by officials at the port of Naples, Italy before it could be shipped to Lahore, Pakistan. The equipment was found in five containers with paperwork indicating that the containers were components of a water boiler. Inside the containers, customs officers discovered a reactor with a cooling sheath, distilling equipment, pumps, and centrifuges. According to the exporting company, Smith Kline, the equipment was for manufacturing an antibiotic called cefadrin. The cargo, which originated in Rome, is being held for customs violations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1996/n9615122.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1996/n9615122.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1705" task="">
  <question>
    When were the first chemical weapons tests conducted in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1930s and 1940s The United Kingdom carries out chemical weapon tests throughout different locations in India and Pakistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1706" task="">
  <question>
    What is covered by the India - Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INDIA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS  Signed in 1992, the Agreement provided for &quot;the complete prohibition of chemical weapons&quot;. It also included a commitment for not developing, possessing or using chemical weapons, as well as not assisting, encouraging or inducing, in any way, anyone to engage in the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1707" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons commitments does the India - Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons require of India and Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Furthermore, the agreement committed both governments to become regional signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, it did not commit India and Pakistan to ratify the CWC. India signed the CWC on 14 January 1993 and subsequently ratified it on 3 September 1996. Pakistan signed the CWC on 13 January 1993 and ratified the treaty on 28 October 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1708" task="">
  <question>
    Did the India - Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons require India and Pakistan to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    When India and Pakistan signed the Agreement, both countries declared that they did not possess chemical weapons' stockpiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1709" task="">
  <question>
    Why was there controversy over the India - Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, as part of its accession to the CWC, India declared a quantity of chemical munitions produced by its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that caused controversy with Pakistan in terms of India's commitment to and compliance with the bilateral agreement. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1710" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did India declare that it when it ratified the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, as part of its accession to the CWC, India declared a quantity of chemical munitions produced by its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that caused controversy with Pakistan in terms of India's commitment to and compliance with the bilateral agreement. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1711" task="">
  <question>
    Why was Pakistan concerned when India declared that it had chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, as part of its accession to the CWC, India declared a quantity of chemical munitions produced by its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that caused controversy with Pakistan in terms of India's commitment to and compliance with the bilateral agreement. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1712" task="">
  <question>
    How many Scud missiles did North Korea ship to Iran, Syria, and Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea has exported about 400 Scud-type missiles to Iran, Syria, and Pakistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1713" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan actively trying to acquire chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The report states that Iraqi middlemen are using &quot;dummy&quot; companies to order machine parts and chemical processing equipment. According to the Sueddeutsche newspaper, Iran, Pakistan, and India are also actively trying to acquire atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1714" task="">
  <question>
    How is India expected to be purchasing ballistic missile components? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The head of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), August Hanning, reports that Iran, as well as Iraq, Pakistan, and India, purchase missile components through subcontractors and &quot;bogus firms&quot; in Germany. Iran is developing the Shehab-4 missile with an expected range of 2,000km. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1715" task="">
  <question>
    How is Pakistan expected to be purchasing ballistic missile components? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The head of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), August Hanning, reports that Iran, as well as Iraq, Pakistan, and India, purchase missile components through subcontractors and &quot;bogus firms&quot; in Germany. Iran is developing the Shehab-4 missile with an expected range of 2,000km. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1716" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran fear an chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons attack from Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Second, the Gulf States are misled to believe that the Iranian armament project is aimed at them. In reality, this project intends to defend Iran from any threat from the Pakistani nuclear capabilities, the possible divergence of Iran and Turkey about the roads of oil pipeline, the bitter animosity it has with Iraq, and the unstable situation in Afghanistan and other central Asian Islamic republics. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_1816.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1717" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan suspected of supplying Islamic separatists in Kashmir with chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 27 September, the daily newspaper Jehad-e-Kashmir, of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), reported that Islamic separatists in POK possess chemical weapons. Agent: tear gas 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/72/cbrn72.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/72/cbrn72.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1718" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan helped Iran import chemical weapons precursors? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US authorities are investigating an agreement by an US company to transfer thiodiglycol to Iran, circumventing US export control laws. The company, Alcolac of Baltimore, MD, began shipping the chemical in February 1987 for Colimex, a West German company now named Chemco GmbH. The February shipment made first went to Norfolk, VA, where customs officials intercepted the shipment and replaced the drums of thiodiglycol with drums of water. The agents then tracked the shipment to Singapore, where it was then transshipped to Karachi, Pakistan. In Pakistan, the shipment was again transferred, this time to an Iranian ship called the SS Iran Ekram. From Karachi, the shipment was sent to Bandar Abbas, Iran, where it was off-loaded. From there, it made its way to a company in Tehran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2960.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1719" task="">
  <question>
    Did China continue to sell chemical and biological weapons to Pakistan after the U.S. imposed sanctions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A CIA report released 21 July 1998 says that China continued to sell missile technology, advanced conventional arms, and unconventional arms to Pakistan and Iran in 1997. The report also identified North Korea and Russia as major suppliers. The report contrasts dramatically with the Clinton administration's assessment that China is &quot;curbing dangerous weapons proliferation.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808094.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808094.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1720" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that terrorists in Pakistan have been producing chemical weapons independently? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In August 2002, it was reported that Pakistani authorities discovered three laboratories in Karachi that were being used to produce chemical weapons such as cyanide.[A,B,C] The laboratories had reportedly been setup by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi activists, to produce poisonous gases and that the individuals who were arrested were planning on using the gas in a future attack.[A] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1589.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1589.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1721" task="">
  <question>
    Have independent chemical weapons laboratories been found in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In August 2002, it was reported that Pakistani authorities discovered three laboratories in Karachi that were being used to produce chemical weapons such as cyanide.[A,B,C] The laboratories had reportedly been setup by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi activists, to produce poisonous gases and that the individuals who were arrested were planning on using the gas in a future attack.[A] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1589.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1589.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1722" task="">
  <question>
    Where have terrorist-linked chemical weapons production facilities been found in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In August 2002, it was reported that Pakistani authorities discovered three laboratories in Karachi that were being used to produce chemical weapons such as cyanide.[A,B,C] The laboratories had reportedly been setup by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi activists, to produce poisonous gases and that the individuals who were arrested were planning on using the gas in a future attack.[A] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1589.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1589.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1723" task="">
  <question>
    Have Pakistani companies been linked to terrorist organizations seeking to acquire material for chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A Bulgarian business man, Ivan Ivanov, has alledged that bin Laden attempted to get him to supply Al-Qaeda with radioactive material. During a meeting last April just over the Pakistani border in China, bin Laden and Ivanov discussed setting up an environmental company to buy nuclear waste. The day after his meeting with bin Laden, Ivanov was approached by a Pakistani chemical engineer who said he was interested in buying nuclear fuel rods from the Bulgarian Kozlodui reactor. He was offered $200,000 to set up an environmental front company to do so. Ivanov's story was backed-up by Bulgaria's former defence minister, Velizar Shalamanov. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/677.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/677.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1724" task="">
  <question>
    What dual-use technologies can Pakistan buy from the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The bill would authorize the sale of &quot;dual-use technologies that do not contribute directly or indirectly to missile development, or to a nuclear, chemical or biological weapons program.&quot; The sale of safety-related equipment would also be permitted under the bill. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1999/m9909580.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1999/m9909580.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1725" task="">
  <question>
    How is the US pressuring Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni briefed Pakistani Army Chief General of Staff Pervez Musharaf on conditions for resuming military ties on a 21 April 1999 visit to Islamabad.[1] Indian military and political leaders were also informed through the US Embassy in New Delhi on the conditions for resuming US military ties.[1] Those conditions included signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a ban on fissile material production, implementation of clear export controls, and an exercise of strategic restraint. The phased plan called for reciprocal visits, military exercises, officer education, troop training and strategic planning activities. [1] US military officials stressed the plan would not involve equipment provided through the US foreign military sales program, but the last phase of re-engagement could involve limited technology sharing. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1999/m9909580.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1999/m9909580.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1726" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the US lift sanctions against Pakistan after September 11? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As far as Pakistan is concerned, the lifting of all nuclear sanctions was triggered principally by the practical necessity of cooperating with Pakistan after September 11 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1727" task="">
  <question>
    Why is Pakistan of strategic importance to the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Right now the Bush administration has to court Pakistan, because the United States needs Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1728" task="">
  <question>
    How could US action in Afghanistan affect Pakistan's political stability? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    But if U.S. goals expand to include the removal of the Taliban, it could lead to a crisis within Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, and at that point, questions about political instability will arise. In the medium and long term, the United States is going to be focused on ensuring that Pakistan remains a moderate Islamic state. Washington is likely to try and ensure political stability and the return to democracy in Pakistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1729" task="">
  <question>
    What type of government would the US like to see emerge in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    United States is going to be focused on ensuring that Pakistan remains a moderate Islamic state. Washington is likely to try and ensure political stability and the return to democracy in Pakistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1730" task="">
  <question>
    Could Pakistan's government or military  be dominated by Islamic extremists? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Finally, it will press Pakistan to reevaluate its support for the Taliban and to assess seriously the possible blowback from efforts to dislodge the Taliban in Afghanistan, that is, to recognize the danger that Pakistan might itself at some stage become the victim of &quot;Talibanization.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1731" task="">
  <question>
    Has the US stopped trying to limit the development of Pakistan's NBC weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    I think the lifting at this time of the [sanctions imposed by the] Glenn Amendment, Pressler Amendment, and Symington Amendment (in the case of Pakistan), should not be taken as a sign that the Bush administration has thrown in the towel on nonproliferation in South Asia and is now going to accept or legitimize the nuclear-weapon state status of these two countries. One factual point: the decision to lift the sanctions was taken before September 11 and before the need to get Pakistan to work with us on this campaign. I know this for a fact. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1732" task="">
  <question>
    When did the US decide to lift sanctions on Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    One factual point: the decision to lift the sanctions was taken before September 11 and before the need to get Pakistan to work with us on this campaign. I know this for a fact. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1733" task="">
  <question>
    What would be the impact of a successful CBW non-proliferation program in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    So the agenda is restraint, rather than rollback. And I hope before long that the Bush administration will make clear that its agenda is restraint and that India and Pakistan restraining those capabilities will help the United States promote a broader nonproliferation agenda. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1734" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan's government committed to dismantling its NBC weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Moreover, the government of Pakistan continues to assert that nuclear risk reduction is an item of trade rather than something that is intrinsically necessary and essential for South Asia. I find this stance very, very worrisome, and hope that it will change. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1735" task="">
  <question>
    Is there reason to suspect that Pakistan's military leadership may assist Islamic fundamentalists? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    But Pakistan is a country where people have multiple allegiances. The army reflects the society more than ever before in its history. And the army will be under strain and the society will be under strain in the weeks and months to come. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1736" task="">
  <question>
    What is the US currently doing to limit the spread of CBW weapons in India and Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    I think even though the dialogue between India and Pakistan has been placed on the back burner, and invariably we are focusing on terrorism, I think attention will focus on what the Pakistani government agencies have done in Afghanistan and what is really happening in Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1737" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    If the United States were to broaden its focus on terrorism to include Pakistani state sponsorship of militant activities in Kashmir, and were to bring pressure on Pakistan to reduce state-sponsored violence at some level, then there might also be pressure on India to accept some sort of an international mediation effort to address the Kashmir issue. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1738" task="">
  <question>
    Did Pakistan officially support the Taliban? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Karl Inderfurth calling on Pakistan openly to stop their support of the Taliban. We have concurrent resolutions of the U.S. Congress from October 2000, House resolution 414 and Senate resolution 150, calling on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. All of these declarations were made from 1998 up through 2000. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1739" task="">
  <question>
    Why is the United States now motivated to ally with Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    ending Pakistani support of the Taliban but no implementation. Now the United States is basically going [in a new direction], and Pakistan has become our main ally. The conclusion that many are drawing is that one reason we are so keen on allying with Pakistan--there are other possible allies like Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan--is because they are the ones that have nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1740" task="">
  <question>
    What role did Pakistan play in bringing the Taliban to power? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the same time, no one is even raising the issue that Pakistan essentially created the Taliban. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1741" task="">
  <question>
    How did the US punish China for shipping missile technology to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    he US agreed to lift sanctions imposed on China (in August 1993) for missile exports to Pakistan. Once sanctions were lifted, China agreed not to export missiles &quot;featuring the primary parameters of the MTCR&quot;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1742" task="">
  <question>
    Is China currently sending missile technology to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US agreed to lift sanctions imposed on China (in August 1993) for missile exports to Pakistan. Once sanctions were lifted, China agreed not to export missiles &quot;featuring the primary parameters of the MTCR&quot;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1743" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) Established: 1985. Membership: seven states - Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Purposes: to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia, to strengthen collective self-reliance, to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in various fields, and to cooperate with international and regional organizations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1744" task="">
  <question>
    What is the purpose of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) Established: 1985. Membership: seven states - Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Purposes: to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia, to strengthen collective self-reliance, to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in various fields, and to cooperate with international and regional organizations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1745" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan proposed banning nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At SAARC's summit in 1987 there was disagreement over a proposal by Pakistan for a South Asian treaty banning nuclear weapons; the final declaration simply noted SAARC's resolve to &quot;contribute&quot; to nuclear disarmament 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1746" task="">
  <question>
    When did India and Pakistan exchange lists of their nuclear facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January 1992, 1993, and 1994, India and Pakistan exchanged lists of their nuclear-related facilities. Each side has questioned the completeness of the other's lists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1747" task="">
  <question>
    Have India and Pakistan reached agreements over the use of CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INDIA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS Signed in 1992, the Agreement provides for &quot;the complete prohibition of chemical weapons&quot; and commits both governments to become regional signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, it does not commit India and Pakistan to ratify the CWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1748" task="">
  <question>
    Did the India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons require India and Pakistan to sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INDIA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS Signed in 1992, the Agreement provides for &quot;the complete prohibition of chemical weapons&quot; and commits both governments to become regional signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, it does not commit India and Pakistan to ratify the CWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1749" task="">
  <question>
    When was the India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons signed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INDIA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS Signed in 1992, the Agreement provides for &quot;the complete prohibition of chemical weapons&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1750" task="">
  <question>
    Who receives missile technology from China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the missile area, we see China exporting components and technology which are assisting both Pakistan and Iran in the acquisition of missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1751" task="">
  <question>
    How has China tried to prevent the illegal transfer of NBC technology to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China has taken a number of steps. It has adopted a much more restrained and responsible approach to the export of nuclear equipment and technology. In the past, China had actually contributed to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program. That is to say it contributed to facilities in Pakistan that do not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or inspections. This has been a very unfortunate practice. But the Chinese committed in May 1996 not to provide any assistance to these unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. And we have no reason to conclude that they have violated this undertaking. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1752" task="">
  <question>
    Has China contributed nuclear material to Pakistan's nuclear facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China had actually contributed to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program. That is to say it contributed to facilities in Pakistan that do not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or inspections. This has been a very unfortunate practice. But the Chinese committed in May 1996 not to provide any assistance to these unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. And we have no reason to conclude that they have violated this undertaking. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1753" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    That is to say it contributed to facilities in Pakistan that do not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or inspections. This has been a very unfortunate practice. But the Chinese committed in May 1996 not to provide any assistance to these unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. And we have no reason to conclude that they have violated this undertaking. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1754" task="">
  <question>
    Does China provide assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    But the Chinese committed in May 1996 not to provide any assistance to these unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. And we have no reason to conclude that they have violated this undertaking. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1755" task="">
  <question>
    Does China continue to provide missiles and missile technology to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    They also have taken some steps in the missile proliferation area, but these are more modest. One useful step is agreement to ban the export of any long-range ground-to-ground missiles. And we believe that China has not exported complete ground-to-ground missiles since making that agreement. We're concerned, however, that China continues to provide components and technology to both Pakistan and Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1756" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of missiles has China sent to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    They also have taken some steps in the missile proliferation area, but these are more modest. One useful step is agreement to ban the export of any long-range ground-to-ground missiles. And we believe that China has not exported complete ground-to-ground missiles since making that agreement. We're concerned, however, that China continues to provide components and technology to both Pakistan and Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1757" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan have a Uranium enrichment program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    I have followed Chinese behavior in this area very closely for a number of years, and it is entirely plausible to me that there are activities that go on that are not approved and are not even known about by the central government. A case in point was the sale several years ago of ring magnets, relatively unsophisticated pieces of equipment, to Pakistan's uranium enrichment program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/einh0198.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1758" task="">
  <question>
    What would be the consequences of a war between India and Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The consequences of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic, both in terms of the loss of life and for potentially lowering the threshold for nuclear use in other parts of the world, particularly the adjacent Middle East/North Africa region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1759" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan contributed to the worldwide proliferation of NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NBC weapons and missile infrastructures in South Asia also pose potential proliferation threats, as possible sources of supply. India and Pakistan's slowness to adopt export controls consistent with established international control regimes is reason for concern. As each nation continues its programs, the danger of transferring technology to states outside the region remains possible. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1760" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan obtained dual-use chemicals for CW production from foreign countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Like India, Pakistan has signed the CWC, and can produce chemical agents and munitions. It has procured dual-use chemical precursors from foreign sources and hopes to achieve self-sufficiency in producing precursors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1761" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Pakistan equivalent of India's Prithvi SRBM missile project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan has an SRBM industry that includes a large solid rocket motor production complex and a ballistic missile test facility. However, Pakistan's missile production capability is not as extensive as India's. So far, it has produced only a few Hatf-I SRBMs, which have a range of 80 kilometers and are regarded as inaccurate. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1762" task="">
  <question>
    What is the name of Pakistan's SRBM ballistic missile project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    So far, it has produced only a few Hatf-I SRBMs, which have a range of 80 kilometers and are regarded as inaccurate. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1763" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of Pakistan's Hatf-I missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    So far, it has produced only a few Hatf-I SRBMs, which have a range of 80 kilometers and are regarded as inaccurate. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1764" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan have a mobile SRBM ballistic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    ** Pakistan: Has two missile programs: - Hatf I - short range (80 km) - Mobile SRBM - approximately 300 km range 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1765" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of combat fighters would Pakistan use to deliver CBW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Similarly, combat aircraft are Pakistan's most viable delivery means for NBC weapons, with the most likely platforms being F-16 and Mirage III fighters. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodproli/south_as.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1766" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan accused India of storing CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 March 1999 In a meeting with the Director General for the OPCW, Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz accuses India of preparing and stockpiling chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1767" task="">
  <question>
    Has India seized stockpiles of Pakistani CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1999 The Indian Army claims it seized Pakistani document that indicates the presence of chemical weapons in the Kaksar area of Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1768" task="">
  <question>
    Has India declared its intention to destroy some of its CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 1999 India submits to the fifteenth session of the Council for OPCW agreed detailed plans for the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at Chemical Weapon Destruction Facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1769" task="">
  <question>
    Where does India plan to destroy its CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 1999 India submits to the fifteenth session of the Council for OPCW agreed detailed plans for the verification of the destruction of chemical weapons at Chemical Weapon Destruction Facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1770" task="">
  <question>
    What Chinese companies sold missile technology to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China made its first missile nonproliferation commitment to the United States in March 1992. This commitment was the direct result of the United States' imposition of sanctions in June 1991 on two Chinese entities - the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) - in connection with the sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. I 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/desutter_0724.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/desutter_0724.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1771" task="">
  <question>
    What Chinese missiles did China sell to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) - in connection with the sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. I 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/desutter_0724.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/desutter_0724.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1772" task="">
  <question>
    What type of missiles has China agreed not to send to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In return for the lifting of these 1993 sanctions, China agreed in October 1994 - in a Joint Statement with the United States - that it would not transfer ground-to-ground missiles &quot;inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kilograms.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/desutter_0724.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/desutter_0724.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1773" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that India and Pakistan are in a CBW arms race? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n 20 January 1992, a United States official expressed concern over the growing military competition between India and Pakistan saying, &quot;We see South Asia at the precipice of a nuclear weapons race. Within the next five years, both sides will have medium- range missiles. Each side will have to assume the worst of each other. And this is destabilizing because of the hair-trigger nature of these missiles in times of tension. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9201788.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9201788.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1774" task="">
  <question>
    What would be the impact of an NBC arms race between India and Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n 20 January 1992, a United States official expressed concern over the growing military competition between India and Pakistan saying, &quot;We see South Asia at the precipice of a nuclear weapons race. Within the next five years, both sides will have medium- range missiles. Each side will have to assume the worst of each other. And this is destabilizing because of the hair-trigger nature of these missiles in times of tension. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9201788.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9201788.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1775" task="">
  <question>
    Did China violate the MTCR when it shipped missile components to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to US government documents, China has transferred several types of military hardware to a variety of countries. China sold CSS-2 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia. China sold silkworm anti-ship missiles and chemical weapons components to Iran and Iraq. China delivered to Syria mobile launchers and chemicals for solid-fuel missiles. Furthermore, the Chinese sale of M- 11 missile technology to Pakistan violated the MTCR. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1993/m9303882.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1993/m9303882.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1776" task="">
  <question>
    Is India actively researching biological technology that could be used for BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    February 2001 The Indian Government decides to constitute a task force to study the opportunities and potential investments of biotechnology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Biological/2293_2631.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1777" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan expanding its nuclear weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan was very aggressive in seeking out equipment, material, and technology for its nuclear weapons program, with China as its principal supplier. Pakistan also sought a wide variety of nuclear-related goods from many Western nations, including the US. China was also a major supplier to Pakistan's ballistic missile program, providing technology and assistance. Of note, Pakistan has made strong efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile production technologies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1997/m9707191.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1997/m9707191.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1778" task="">
  <question>
    When did Pakistan first start its nuclear weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapon program in the early 1970s after its defeat and break up in the Indo-Bangladesh war of 1971. Islamabad regards nuclear weapons as essential to safeguard the South Asian balance of power and offset its conventional inferiority and lack of strategic depth against India. The technological complexity associated with nuclear weapons and their systems of delivery is also closely tied to Pakistan's post-colonial identity as the first Muslim nation to have acquired such a capability. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1779" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan possess uranium enrichment facilities for nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the mid-1970s, Pakistan embarked upon the uranium enrichment route to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility; and as early as 1989-1990, the United States concluded that Islamabad had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device. Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient amounts to build 30-50 fission bombs. In 1998, Pakistan commissioned the Khushab research reactor, which is capable of yielding 10-15 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually. According to the United States, China helped Pakistan by providing nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance. Islamabad conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, shortly after India conducted its own weapon tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1780" task="">
  <question>
    What is HEU? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient amounts to build 30-50 fission bombs 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1781" task="">
  <question>
    How many kg of HEU does Pakistan possess for making of nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility; and as early as 1989-1990, the United States concluded that Islamabad had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device. Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient amounts to build 30-50 fission bombs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1782" task="">
  <question>
    What is the production capacity of Pakistan's Khusab research reactor? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1998, Pakistan commissioned the Khushab research reactor, which is capable of yielding 10-15 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1783" task="">
  <question>
    Who helped Pakistan develop its nuclear weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the United States, China helped Pakistan by providing nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance. Islamabad conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, shortly after India conducted its own weapon tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1784" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan signed the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1785" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan possess biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While Pakistan is not known to possess biological weapons (BW), it has talented biomedical and biochemical scientists and well-equipped laboratories, which would allow it to quickly establish a sophisticated BW program, should the government so desire. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1786" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan possess the technological infrastructure to produce biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While Pakistan is not known to possess biological weapons (BW), it has talented biomedical and biochemical scientists and well-equipped laboratories, which would allow it to quickly establish a sophisticated BW program, should the government so desire. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1787" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Pakistan has been researching biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indeed, the United States reported in 1996 that Islamabad had been &quot;conducting research and development with potential biological warfare applications.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1788" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan accepted the BWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in April 1972 and ratified it in 1974. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1789" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and ratified the treaty in 1997 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1790" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan declared having chemical weapons under the terms of the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Islamabad has apparently made no admission in its treaty-mandated declarations of having possessed chemical weapons (CW). Further, there is no reliable information in publicly available literature asserting that Pakistan has ever possessed CW, although some analysts suspect that it supports an offensive program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1791" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan developing ballistic missile programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan is developing both solid- and liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, based extensively on foreign systems. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1792" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missiles has Pakistan bought from China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the early 1990s, Pakistan purchased a small number of 300 km-range M-11 ballistic missiles from China; Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi. By the late 1990s, China helped Pakistan develop the 750 km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile, which was last tested in October 2002. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1793" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missile assistance has China provided to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the early 1990s, Pakistan purchased a small number of 300 km-range M-11 ballistic missiles from China; Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi. By the late 1990s, China helped Pakistan develop the 750 km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile, which was last tested in October 2002. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1794" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Pakistan's Chinese-built missile production facility located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Beijing also built a turnkey ballistic missile manufacturing facility at Tarwanah, a suburb of Rawalpindi 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1795" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of Pakistan's Shaheen-1 ballistic missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    By the late 1990s, China helped Pakistan develop the 750 km-range, solid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile, which was last tested in October 2002 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1796" task="">
  <question>
    What is the range of the M-11 ballistic missiles that Pakistan purchased from China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the early 1990s, Pakistan purchased a small number of 300 km-range M-11 ballistic missiles from China; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Pakistan/overview/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1797" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the pro-Pakistan militant group Hizbul Mujahideen threaten to use chemical weapons against India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In May 1999, the pro-Pakistan militant group Hizbul Mujahideen claimed to be in possession of chemical weapons. The group said that its militants fighting in the regions of Kargil and Drass have the weapons and would use them if Indian troops attacked them with any napalm-like devices. [A]  The Hizbul Mujadeen threat was, apparently, a reaction to Pakistan?s accusations that India used chemical weapons against Pakistan. In response to the allegations, the Indian army stated that Pakistan has no need to fear a chemical attack because India does not use chemical weapons. [B] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1798" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence to support Hizbul Mujahideen's claim that they have chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Additional Information No verification of Hizbul Mujahideen?s claim to having chemical weapons has been reported. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/821.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1799" task="">
  <question>
    When did Pakistan reportedly first obtain chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980s India reaches final development and deployment of several chemical agents after Pakistan reportedly has acquired chemical agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1800" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries could launch a chemical weapons attack against India? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Indian Ministry of Defense sets up a special cell designed to prepare the Indian armed forces for a chemical attack by a neighboring country (i.e., Pakistan and/or China). The cell is tasked with looking at mainly defensive measures against a chemical attack. The cell is also to study the effect of chemical gases in different climate conditions and also the effectiveness of decontamination kits, chemical detectors, and protective gear. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1801" task="">
  <question>
    When did India first accuse Pakistan of using chemical weapons against Indian troops? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1987 India accuses Pakistan of using chemical weapons against its troops in Siachen. The weapon is apparently used in the constant border skirmishes between India and Pakistan for control of the Siachen Glacier region. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1802" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan expected to use chemical weapons against India in a potential conflict? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 March 1991 According to a statement by Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, India and Pakistan have postured their forces for the possible use of chemical weapons should a conflict erupt. The statement also contends that India most likely has a chemical weapons stockpile because of its large chemical industry infrastructure. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1803" task="">
  <question>
    What agreements have India and Pakistan reached over chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    31 October 1991 India and Pakistan both agree to consider issuing a joint declaration on chemical weapons. They also agree to a meeting of a panel of experts at a future date to exchange views on negotiating an accord banning production, deployment, and use of chemical weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695.">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2695. </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1804" task="">
  <question>
    Which Pakistani official accused India of stockpiling chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 March 1999 In a meeting with the Director General for the OPCW, Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz accuses India of preparing and stockpiling chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1805" task="">
  <question>
    Where has Pakistan reportedly deployed chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    May 1999 The Indian Army claims it seized Pakistani document that indicates the presence of chemical weapons in the Kaksar area of Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1806" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons did India reportedly release against pro-Pakistani militants? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    26 May 1999 Unidentified Pakistani sources state that India uses a &quot;nerve gas bomb&quot; against Kashmiri Mujahideen on the Pakistani side of Kashmir. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1807" task="">
  <question>
    Why does Pakistan believe that India would use chemical weapons against militants in Kashmir? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    7 June 1999 Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Chief of Markaz al Dawat al Irshad, accuses India of preparing to use chemical weapons against the Kashmiri Mujahideen. According to Saeed, India is preparing to use these weapons because it is disheartened after having been defeated by the Pakistani army and the Mujahideen. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1808" task="">
  <question>
    According to Pakistan, what Pakistani targets were attacked with Indian chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 June 1999 According to Pakistan Television, India uses chemical weapons against Pakistani position along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. According to reports shell are launched that exploded 400 meters above ground, releasing a gas that causes suffocation and skin irritation. India describes these reports as &quot;baseless&quot; and as part of &quot;Pakistani propaganda.&quot; 8 September 1999 An editorial in the Pakistani newspaper Jang, accuses India of using chemical weapons in the Neelum valley in Kashmir. The article uses the death of two uninjured children at a border village as evidence of the attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1809" task="">
  <question>
    What Pakistani areas were supposedly the target of an Indian chemical weapons attack? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 June 1999 According to Pakistan Television, India uses chemical weapons against Pakistani position along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. According to reports shell are launched that exploded 400 meters above ground, releasing a gas that causes suffocation and skin irritation. India describes these reports as &quot;baseless&quot; and as part of &quot;Pakistani propaganda.&quot; 8 September 1999 An editorial in the Pakistani newspaper Jang, accuses India of using chemical weapons in the Neelum valley in Kashmir. The article uses the death of two uninjured children at a border village as evidence of the attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1810" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries has India supposedly supplied chemical weapons to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    20 January 2000 The Pakistani English-language newspaper The News, reports that Pakistani defense officials are becoming increasing concerned about India's continued research in the field of chemical weapons. According to the unidentified officials India had supplied Iraq with phosgene before the Gulf War to test its effectiveness. They also accuse India of using chemical weapons during the Kargil crisis in 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1811" task="">
  <question>
    What does Pakistan call its version of the North Korean Nodong Missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Pakistani version of the Nodong, known as the Ghauri, was flight-tested in April 1998 and April 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1812" task="">
  <question>
    What Pakistani agencies are responsible for developing ballistic missile technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The ballistic missiles are being developed by two rival agencies, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the Khan Research Laboratories, which fall under the aegis of the National Development Complex. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_pakistan_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1813" task="">
  <question>
    What is the expected outcome of an India-Pakistan war? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The United States seeks to persuade India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in their nuclear and missile programs and to bring their programs into conformity with international standards. The consequences of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be catastrophic, both in terms of the loss of life and in lowering the threshold for nuclear use in other parts of the world, particularly the adjacent Middle East/North Africa region. Deployment of ballistic missiles would pose especially troubling security risks, given the relatively short distances between major population centers in South Asia and the brief time required for missiles to travel such distances. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1814" task="">
  <question>
    Have either India or Pakistan signed the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to the immediate risks to regional security, the development of NBC weapons in South Asia has the potential to undercut broader U.S. and international nonproliferation objectives. Both India and Pakistan, for different reasons, have refused to sign the NPT. Their nuclear programs, outside of this widely accepted international norm, serve as dangerous examples for nations in other regions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1815" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence to suspect that India or Pakistan have transferred missile technology to other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NBC weapons and missile infrastructures in South Asia also pose potential proliferation threats as possible sources of supply. India and Pakistan?s slowness to adopt export controls consistent with established international control regimes is reason for concern. Although neither country has transferred its NBC and ballistic missile technology or expertise to states outside the region to date, such transfers remain a dangerous possibility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1816" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence to suspect that India or Pakistan have transferred chemical weapons to other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The NBC weapons and missile infrastructures in South Asia also pose potential proliferation threats as possible sources of supply. India and Pakistan?s slowness to adopt export controls consistent with established international control regimes is reason for concern. Although neither country has transferred its NBC and ballistic missile technology or expertise to states outside the region to date, such transfers remain a dangerous possibility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1817" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated India and Pakistan to develop NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The long-standing Indo-Pakistani rivalry continues to drive the pursuit of NBC weapons and especially ballistic missiles on the Asian subcontinent. After 50 years of independence and three wars, territorial disputes and deep-seated mistrust continue to divide the two countries. Each maintains substantial forces along their common border. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1818" task="">
  <question>
    What type of relationship does India maintain with China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These forces frequently exchange small arms and artillery fire along the Line of Control in disputed Kashmir. Although China soundly defeated the Indian Army in a 1962 border war, New Delhi?s relations with Beijing have improved in recent years. Indian strategists cite Chinese nuclear and conventional capabilities when justifying Indian defense programs. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1819" task="">
  <question>
    What strategic role do nuclear weapons play in Pakistan's military arsenal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While denying nuclear weapons possession, both governments feel it is important to pursue nuclear weapons programs. Both Indian and Pakistani officials occasionally acknowledge that nuclear weapons could quickly be constructed if required. Strategists in both countries?particularly in Pakistan, with its smaller conventional forces?see their nuclear capabilities as an important deterrent to conflict. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1820" task="">
  <question>
    What is Pakistan's official position regarding its possession of nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While denying nuclear weapons possession, both governments feel it is important to pursue nuclear weapons programs. Both Indian and Pakistani officials occasionally acknowledge that nuclear weapons could quickly be constructed if required. Strategists in both countries?particularly in Pakistan, with its smaller conventional forces?see their nuclear capabilities as an important deterrent to conflict. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1821" task="">
  <question>
    Is Pakistan expected to sign the NPT or the MTCR? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Meanwhile, both countries, especially India, remain suspicious of?and opposed to?most nonproliferation regimes, which they perceive as attempts by countries possessing such capabilities to discriminate against those that do not. India and Pakistan have ratified the CWC. Neither has signed, nor is expected to sign, the NPT or adhere to, or become a member of, the MTCR. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1822" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Pakistan fail to sign the CTBT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan did not attempt to block the CTBT but refused to sign unless India signed the treaty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1823" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan have the ability to develop chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan has the ability to transition from research and development to chemical agent production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1824" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missiles does Pakistan currently possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    - Pakistan:  Hatf I - 80-kilometer range.     Mobile SRBM - 300-kilometer range. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1825" task="">
  <question>
    How could Pakistan deliver chemical weapons warheads to targets? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India has shipborne and airborne anti-ship cruise missiles; Pakistan has shipborne, submarine-launched, and airborne anti-ship cruise missiles; none have NBC warheads. Aircraft: both have fighter bombers.Ground systems: both have artillery and rockets. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1826" task="">
  <question>
    Why did Pakistan develop a nuclear weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan?s nuclear weapons program is driven by its need to counter India?s superiority in conventional forces. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1827" task="">
  <question>
    How extensive is Pakistan's nuclear weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It has a well-developed program, including the facilities for uranium conversion and enrichment and the infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons. In March 1996, Pakistan commissioned an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1828" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Pakistan obtain its weapons-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 1996, Pakistan commissioned an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1829" task="">
  <question>
    How quickly could Pakistan assemble a nuclear weapon? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan probably has enough fissile material and components for a few nuclear weapons. Like India, Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly and it has aircraft and possibly ballistic missiles that are believed capable of delivery. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1830" task="">
  <question>
    How many nuclear weapons is Pakistan expected to have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan probably has enough fissile material and components for a few nuclear weapons. Like India, Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly and it has aircraft and possibly ballistic missiles that are believed capable of delivery. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1831" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan ever tested a nuclear device? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Unlike India, Pakistan has never tested a nuclear device, although after the 1996 press reports of Indian test preparations, Pakistani government officials insinuated that Pakistan had the capability to conduct a nuclear test and would do so if India did. Pakistan has taken the public position that if India would sign the NPT, it would also. Like India, not all of Pakistan?s nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1832" task="">
  <question>
    What preparations has Pakistan made towards building a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan has imported a number of chemicals that can be used to make chemical agents and is moving slowly toward a commercial chemical industry capable of producing all precursor chemicals needed to support a chemical weapons stockpile. Pakistan has also ratified the CWC. Both India and Pakistan have a wide variety of delivery means available for chemical agents, including artillery, aerial bombs, and missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1833" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan have a domestic commercial chemical industry large enough to support the production of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan has imported a number of chemicals that can be used to make chemical agents and is moving slowly toward a commercial chemical industry capable of producing all precursor chemicals needed to support a chemical weapons stockpile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1834" task="">
  <question>
    Does Pakistan possess the infrastructure necessary to develop chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nonetheless, Pakistan is believed to have the resources and capabilities to support a limited biological warfare research and development effort. Both India and Pakistan have ratified the BWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1835" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Pakistan's principal supplier of missile-related technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, China remains Pakistan?s principal supplier of missile-related technology and assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1836" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the United States impose sanctions on China and Pakistan in the early 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1991 and 1993, the United States imposed economic sanctions, based on U.S. law, against both China and Pakistan for China?s transfer of M-11 missile-related equipment. The sanctions were lifted against China in 1992 and 1994, when China reaffirmed its 1992 commitment to adhere to the MTCR. The sanctions against Pakistan were not lifted until they expired in 1995. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1837" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missile programs has Pakistan discontinued? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Islamabad has two ballistic missile systems?the Pakistani-produced Hatf-1 with an 80-kilometer range and a 300-kilometer-range mobile SRBM. A third missile, the Hatf-2, was based on two Hatf-1 stages, but appears to have been discontinued. Pakistan received SRBMs and associated equipment from China during the early 1990s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1838" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missiles is Pakistan currently producing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan currently produces only the Hatf-1. For the future, Pakistan, like India, hopes to achieve independence from foreign sources and produce long range missiles. It has made strong efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile production technologies. For example, it is believed to be constructing a facility for the production of a 300 kilometer range ballistic missile. However, it likely will continue receiving significant foreign assistance in key technologies for several years. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1839" task="">
  <question>
    Will Pakistan become a self-sufficient producer of missile technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For the future, Pakistan, like India, hopes to achieve independence from foreign sources and produce long range missiles. It has made strong efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile production technologies. For example, it is believed to be constructing a facility for the production of a 300 kilometer range ballistic missile. However, it likely will continue receiving significant foreign assistance in key technologies for several years. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1840" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of cruise missiles does Pakistan possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan has sea- and submarine-launched short range anti-ship cruise missiles. Both have a variety of short range air-launched tactical missiles. All were purchased from foreign sources, including Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Both India and Pakistan also have fighter aircraft, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/so_asia.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1841" task="">
  <question>
    When did the US lift sanctions on China for selling missiles to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The US agreed to lift sanctions imposed on China (in August 1993) for missile exports to Pakistan. Once sanctions were lifted, China agreed not to export missiles &quot;featuring the primary parameters of the MTCR&quot;. This Chinese commitment, according to the statement, goes beyond the MTCR's &quot;strong presumption of denial&quot; language. China also agreed to the US formulation on &quot;inherent capability&quot;, that is, any missile capable of generating &quot;sufficient energy to deliver a 500 kg payload at least 300 km 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1842" task="">
  <question>
    What is the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INDIA-PAKISTAN NON-ATTACK AGREEMENT Signed: 1988. Entered into force: January, 1991. Provides for refraining from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing destruction or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in each country; description of a nuclear installation or facility; and for each party to inform the other of the precise locations (latitude and longitude) of installations and facilities by January 1, of each calendar year and whenever there is any change. The Agreement does not provide for detailed disclosures of nuclearrelated activities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1843" task="">
  <question>
    What is the India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INDIA-PAKISTAN AGREEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS Signed in 1992, the Agreement provides for &quot;the complete prohibition of chemical weapons&quot; and commits both governments to become regional signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, it does not commit India and Pakistan to ratify the CWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/fulltext/misc/invent.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1844" task="">
  <question>
    How does Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities affect US policy and actions in the region? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    I would like to make a short point regarding the NPT. I think that for the short term, in order to have a coalition or access to Afghan territory because it is landlocked, the action vis-a-vis Pakistan-- specificallytheremovalofsanctions--willhaveverynegative implications. I think we have already said very loudly that nuclear weapons matter, nuclear weapons are important, having them will change policy. Not using them, but even having one of them, will change the policy of the United States and the rest of the world vis-a-vis that country. So I think that a very wrong message for the longer term success of the NPT has been sent. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1845" task="">
  <question>
    Why did the US lift the nuclear sanctions it had imposed on Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As far as Pakistan is concerned, the lifting of all nuclear sanctions was triggered principally by the practical necessity of cooperating with Pakistan after September 11. I don't think that otherwise all nuclear sanctions would have been lifted. Right now the Bush administration has to court Pakistan, because the United States needs Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan.  One factual point: the decision to lift the sanctions was taken before September 11 and before the need to get Pakistan to work with us on this campaign. I know this for a fact. It was just a question of when to announce it and how to do it. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1846" task="">
  <question>
    Why is Pakistan of strategic importance to the US in a post 9/11-world? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Of course, there is enormous concern about what is going to happen in Pakistan. If U.S. goals are restricted to Osama bin Laden and the destruction of his terrorist network, this will have a lesser impact on Pakistan. But if U.S. goals expand to include the removal of the Taliban, it could lead to a crisis within Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, and at that point, questions about political instability will arise. In the medium and long term, the United States is going to be focused on ensuring that Pakistan remains a moderate Islamic state. Washington is likely to try and ensure political stability and the return to democracy in Pakistan. The United States will also exert strong pressure on Islamabad to continue its policy of strategic restraint. Finally, it will press Pakistan to reevaluate its support for the Taliban and to assess seriously the possible blowback from efforts to dislodge the Taliban in Afghanistan, that is, to recognize the danger that Pakistan might itself at some stage become the victim of &quot;Talibanization.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1847" task="">
  <question>
    What is Pakistan's official position towards nuclear weapons proliferation? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Moreover, the government of Pakistan continues to assert that nuclear risk reduction is an item of trade rather than something that is intrinsically necessary and essential for South Asia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1848" task="">
  <question>
    What pressures does the Pakistani army face in the light of the US invasion of Afghanistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    No one can confidently predict what strains will be placed on the army in Pakistan during this campaign against terrorist groups in Afghanistan. The Pakistani army leadership, I think, feels that it has the situation pretty well in hand and believes it has pretty good personnel reliability procedures in place. But Pakistan is a country where people have multiple allegiances. The army reflects the society more than ever before in its history. And the army will be under strain and the society will be under strain in the weeks and months to come. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1849" task="">
  <question>
    How is the United States' focus on terrorism expected to affect the Pakistan-India relationship? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    I think even though the dialogue between India and Pakistan has been placed on the back burner, and invariably we are focusing on terrorism, I think attention will focus on what the Pakistani government agencies have done in Afghanistan and what is really happening in Kashmir. If the United States were to broaden its focus on terrorism to include Pakistani state sponsorship of militant activities in Kashmir, and were to bring pressure on Pakistan to reduce state-sponsored violence at some level, then there might also be pressure on India to accept some sort of an international mediation effort to address the Kashmir issue. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1850" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Pakistan supported the Taliban government of Afghanistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Look at Pakistan. We had a UN Security Council resolution [condemning the Taliban]--three of them, in fact--the last one was resolution 1333 of December 2000. We had people like [former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs] Karl Inderfurth calling on Pakistan openly to stop their support of the Taliban. We have concurrent resolutions of the U.S. Congress from October 2000, House resolution 414 and Senate resolution 150, calling on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban. All of these declarations were made from 1998 up through 2000. But there was no action. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1851" task="">
  <question>
    How did Pakistan's nuclear capabilities shape US policy during the US invasion of Afghanistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    We had all these policies aimed at ending Pakistani support of the Taliban but no implementation. Now the United States is basically going [in a new direction], and Pakistan has become our main ally. The conclusion that many are drawing is that one reason we are so keen on allying with Pakistan--there are other possible allies like Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan--is because they are the ones that have nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol08/83/round83.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1852" task="">
  <question>
    How many nuclear facilities does Pakistan currently have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed, chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), said that Pakistan will not open its nuclear installations for inspection. Ahmed also said that Pakistan's nuclear installations &quot;have no connection with Pakistan's decision to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).&quot; Pakistan currently has 40 nuclear facilities. Of these, only two, KANUPP and CHASHNUPP, are inspected by the IAEA because equipment for the facilities was imported under mutual agreements with the exporting countries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1853" task="">
  <question>
    Which of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are open to IAEA inspections? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan currently has 40 nuclear facilities. Of these, only two, KANUPP and CHASHNUPP, are inspected by the IAEA because equipment for the facilities was imported under mutual agreements with the exporting countries. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1998/n9817530.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1854" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have received missile technology from China? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China also poses a threat to the U.S. as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and enabling technologies. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid-fueled ballistic missile program. It has supplied Pakistan with a design for a nuclear weapon and additional nuclear weapons assistance. It has even transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Saudi Arabia (the 3,100-km-range CSS-2) and Pakistan (the 350-km-range M-11). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1855" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have received missile technology from North Korea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and potentially to the United States itself, because it is a major proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses-missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and underground facility expertise-to other countries of missile proliferation concern. These countries include Iran, Pakistan and others. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1856" task="">
  <question>
    Has Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the Pakistani nuclear tests, India has announced its intention to increase its spending on missiles and nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1857" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated India to increase spending on its missile technology and nuclear weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the Pakistani nuclear tests, India has announced its intention to increase its spending on missiles and nuclear weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1858" task="">
  <question>
    How advanced is Pakistan's ballistic missile program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan's ballistic missile infrastructure is now more advanced than that of North Korea. It will support development of a missile of 2,500-km range, which we believe Pakistan will seek in order to put all of India within range of Pakistani missiles. The development of a 2,500-km missile will give Pakistan the technical base for developing a much longer range missile system. Through foreign acquisition, and beginning without an extensive domestic science and technology base, Pakistan has acquired these missile capabilities quite rapidly. China and North Korea are Pakistan's major sources of ballistic missiles, production facilities and technology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1859" task="">
  <question>
    What are Pakistan's primary sources for missile technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Through foreign acquisition, and beginning without an extensive domestic science and technology base, Pakistan has acquired these missile capabilities quite rapidly. China and North Korea are Pakistan's major sources of ballistic missiles, production facilities and technology. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1860" task="">
  <question>
    What is the maximum range of the longest of Pakistan's ballistic missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It will support development of a missile of 2,500-km range, which we believe Pakistan will seek in order to put all of India within range of Pakistani missiles. The development of a 2,500-km missile will give Pakistan the technical base for developing a much longer range missile system. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1861" task="">
  <question>
    What ballistic missiles has Pakistan tested? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan currently possesses nuclear-capable M-11 SRBMs acquired from China, and it may produce its own missile, the Tarmuk, based on the M-11. In 1998, Pakistan tested the 1300 km Ghauri MRBM, a version of the North Korean No Dong, and we believe Pakistan has acquired production facilities for this missile as well. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1862" task="">
  <question>
    What is Pakistan's Tarmuk missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Pakistan currently possesses nuclear-capable M-11 SRBMs acquired from China, and it may produce its own missile, the Tarmuk, based on the M-11. In 1998, Pakistan tested the 1300 km Ghauri MRBM, a version of the North Korean No Dong, and we believe Pakistan has acquired production facilities for this missile as well. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1863" task="">
  <question>
    How could India and Pakistan's NBC capabilities affect US policies in the region? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan are not hostile to the United States. The prospect of U.S. military confrontation with either seems at present to be slight. However, beyond the possibility of nuclear war on the subcontinent, their aggressive, competitive development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction poses three concerns in particular. First, it enables them to supply relevant technologies to other nations. Second, India and Pakistan may seek additional technical assistance through cooperation with their current major suppliers-India from North Korea, Iran and Russia; Pakistan from North Korea and China-because of the threats they perceive from one another and because of India's anxieties about China, combined with their mounting international isolation. Third, their growing missile and WMD capabilities have direct effects on U.S. policies, both regional and global, and could significantly affect U.S. capability to play a stabilizing role in Asia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1864" task="">
  <question>
    Are India or Pakistan openly hostile towards the United States? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    India and Pakistan are not hostile to the United States. The prospect of U.S. military confrontation with either seems at present to be slight. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1865" task="">
  <question>
    When did Pakistan test launch its Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, Pakistan's test launch in April 1998 of its Ghauri medium range ballistic missile (MRBM)-its version of the North Korean No Dong-could not be predicted on the basis of any known pattern of technical development either for MRBMs generally or Pakistan in particular. Similarly, North Korea's decision to deploy the No Dong after what is believed to be a single successful test flight is another example. Based on U.S. and Russian experience, the Intelligence Community had expected that a regular test series would be required to provide the confidence needed before any country would produce and deploy a ballistic missile system. Yet North Korea deployed the No Dong. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1866" task="">
  <question>
    What is a MRBM? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    For example, Pakistan's test launch in April 1998 of its Ghauri medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/rums0698.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1867" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries did not sign the NPT by 1991? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Egypt and other Arab countries indicated that placing Diamona under international safeguards could lead to reduction of their need for chemical weapons. South Africa, India, Pakistan and Israel have also not signed the NPT. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1868" task="">
  <question>
    What was the US response to China's sale of missiles to Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    China?s alleged sale of nuclear-related equipment to Pakistan jeopardizes $10 billion in loans and other financing awaiting approval by the Import- Export Bank, the chief US guarantor of credit for overseas sales. A 1994 nuclear non-proliferation law requires President Clinton to cut off the credit, and frantic efforts by administration officials have uncovered no alternatives. The dispute merely presages debates congressional debates in the summer of 1996 over China?s trade status  Reports that China provided nuclear aid to Pakistan have created tension between the US and China and may indirectly threaten the tenuous peace between China and Taiwan. The foreign ministers from China and Pakistan deny the reports that China provided machinery for concentrating uranium to Pakistan. If the reports are confirmed, the Clinton administration could levy strict economic sanctions against China for violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such sanctions, however, could jeopardize the US?s attempts to discourage China from attacking Taiwan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/eanpbib2.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/eanpbib2.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1869" task="">
  <question>
    How did Japan try to get India and Pakistan to sign the NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Japan is wielding its economic aid to cajole India and Pakistan into accepting the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to draw China into multilateral talks on security in South Asia. Japan hopes that its large contributions to the region, which amounted to $1.6 billion in 1991, will ensure the success of this new initiative. The Japanese government would like to bring all three countries together to discuss security issues including the nuclear question. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/eanpbib2.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/eanpbib2.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1870" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Pakistan's ballistic missile can carry chemical weapons warheads? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    22 September 1999 A report by the Air Force National Air Intelligence Center claims that Iran is building a missile that is expected to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. According to the report, most of the new medium- and intermediate-range missiles built by Iran, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan &quot;will be armed with non-conventional warheads.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2368.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1871" task="">
  <question>
    Who would be the primary intended target for Pakistan's chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Both India and Pakistan are capable of developing chemical weapons, and are striving to develop longer range missiles for deep strikes into each other's territory. Egypt and Israel are developing and producing missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1993/m9303170.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1993/m9303170.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1872" task="">
  <question>
    Have customs officials prevented Pakistan from importing equipment that could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In April 1996, equipment which could be used for manufacturing chemical and nuclear weapons was impounded by officials at the port of Naples, Italy before it could be shipped to Lahore, Pakistan. The equipment was found in five containers with paperwork indicating that the containers were components of a water boiler. Inside the containers, customs officers discovered a reactor with a cooling sheath, distilling equipment, pumps, and centrifuges. According to the exporting company, Smith Kline, the equipment was for manufacturing an antibiotic called cefadrin. The cargo, which originated in Rome, is being held for customs violations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1996/n9615122.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1996/n9615122.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1873" task="">
  <question>
    What steps are India and Pakistan taking to reduce regional tensions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Recognizing this potential for conflict, India and Pakistan have undertaken several steps to reduce regional tensions. The two countries have signed and ratified bilateral agreements on avoidance of airspace violations, notification of military exercises, and establishment of a hotline at the senior military level. We are concerned, however, that neither side is fully implementing these steps. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/acda1295.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/acda1295.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1874" task="">
  <question>
    What are the chances that talks between India and Pakistan will result in the reduction of each county's CBW arsenals? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, we remain concerned that neither side has fully implemented its bilateral agreements. Talks between Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries intended to address regional security concerns and consider confidence-building measures have not been held since January 1994. Noncompliance with existing agreements may actually be adding to regional tension. In bilateral meetings with both India and Pakistan, ACDA has encouraged establishment of a joint implementation body to oversee the monitoring of current confidence-building measures and address disputes that might arise. We stressed the value of continuing arms control/CBM discussions regardless of political differences. At the moment, however, the prospects that a CBM dialogue between India and Pakistan will resume are slim. With little success to date, and with lack of trust on both sides, many Indians and Pakistanis question the propriety and efficacy of strategic CBMs. Many argue that personal and economic ties need to be built and small steps taken before measures to address regional military tensions can be effective. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/acda1295.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/acda1295.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1875" task="">
  <question>
    What military assistance did the US provide to Pakistan in the early 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While in Pakistan, Dr. Perry made arrangements to reconvene the U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group. Its first meeting took place in Washington in May. During the visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister Bhutto in April, the President expressed his commitment to work with Congress to modify the Pressler Amendment (section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act). In January 1996, the President signed into law the Brown Amendment, which will permit economic and humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and IMET, and will allow a one-time release of $370 million in military equipment for which Pakistan had paid but not received due to implementation of the Pressler sanctions in 1990. The President decided that release of 28 F-16s, for which Pakistan had also paid, would be inconsistent with U.S. nonproliferation goals. Instead, the U.S. is seeking to help sell the aircraft to a third party and return the proceeds to Pakistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/acda1295.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/acda1295.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1876" task="">
  <question>
    What treaties is Pakistan a party to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    PAKISTAN TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS Nuclear:Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IAEA Safeguards Agreement 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1877" task="">
  <question>
    What international organizations is Pakistan a member of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL &amp; REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons2 (OPCW) South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC IAEA Additional Protocol Nuclear Safety Convention Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement Chemical&amp; Biological: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)3 Geneva Protocol WMD delivery systems: International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1878" task="">
  <question>
    What terrorism conventions is Pakistan party to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection Against the Taking of Hostages Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1879" task="">
  <question>
    Did Pakistan submit information about its chemical and biological weapons capabilities to the OPCW from 1997-2002? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Did not submit information on BWC CBMs from 1997-2002. By a note of 13 April 1960, Pakistan informed the depositary Government that it was a party to the Protocol by virtue of Paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Indian Independence Act of 1947. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/pakistan.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1880" task="">
  <question>
    When was the first chemical weapons facility established in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1930s The United Kingdom establishes a chemical weapons research facility in Rawalpindi. [Note: Rawalpindi is now part of the territory of Pakistan.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1881" task="">
  <question>
    When were the first chemical weapons tests conducted in Pakistan? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1930s and 1940s The United Kingdom carries out chemical weapon tests throughout different locations in India and Pakistan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1882" task="">
  <question>
    Did the British maintain chemical weapons facilities in Pakistan prior to Pakistani independence? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1944 The British move the Chemical Research Defense Establishment from Rawalpindi, Pakistan to Cannanore, India 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1883" task="">
  <question>
    Where did the British establish chemical weapons facilities in India prior to independence? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1944 The British move the Chemical Research Defense Establishment from Rawalpindi, Pakistan to Cannanore, India 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/India/Chemical/2324.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1884" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that India is not complying with the terms of the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    When India and Pakistan signed the Agreement, both countries declared that they did not possess chemical weapons' stockpiles. However, as part of its accession to the CWC, India declared a quantity of chemical munitions produced by its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that caused controversy with Pakistan in terms of India's commitment to and compliance with the bilateral agreement. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1885" task="">
  <question>
    Why does Pakistan suspect India's DRDO of continuing to produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    When India and Pakistan signed the Agreement, both countries declared that they did not possess chemical weapons' stockpiles. However, as part of its accession to the CWC, India declared a quantity of chemical munitions produced by its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that caused controversy with Pakistan in terms of India's commitment to and compliance with the bilateral agreement. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/indpakc.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1886" task="">
  <question>
    How many chemical weapons does Russia have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),1 Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, the largest stockpile in the world. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1887" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),2 the implementing agency of the CWC, conducts inspections at chemical weapons facilities and reports its findings to member states, including the United States. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1888" task="">
  <question>
    How are Russia's chemical weapons stored? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kizner and Shchuch'ye, pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1889" task="">
  <question>
    Which Russian CW facilities pose the greatest threat to the US? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kizner and Shchuch'ye, pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1890" task="">
  <question>
    Can Russia deliver CW via spray tanks or aerosols? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1891" task="">
  <question>
    What kinds of nerve gas CW munitions does Russia have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kizner and Shchuch'ye, pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1892" task="">
  <question>
    What nerve agents does Russia have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1893" task="">
  <question>
    Does Russia have VX? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1894" task="">
  <question>
    Does Russia have sarin? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1895" task="">
  <question>
    Does Russia have soman? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1896" task="">
  <question>
    What do nerve agents do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is lethal to a human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1897" task="">
  <question>
    Where are the Russian CW storage facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kizner Shchuch'ye Pochep Maradykovsky Leonidovka Kambarka Gorny 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1898" task="">
  <question>
    Which Russian facilities store nerve agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kizner Shchuch'ye Pochep Maradykovsky Leonidovka 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1899" task="">
  <question>
    Which Russian facilities store blister agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kambarka Gorny 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1900" task="">
  <question>
    Which blister agents does Russia have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's blister agent stockpile includes mustard gas, lewisite, and mustard-lewisite mixture. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1901" task="">
  <question>
    What do blister agents do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled but generally cause slow-to-heal burns on contact with skin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1902" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of CW are stored at Shchuch'ye? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Storage Site (Shchuch'ye) - Russia stores nearly 2 million artillery shells filled with nerve agent chemical weapons at Shchuch'ye. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1903" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of CW are stored at Kizner? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Kizner Chemical Weapons Storage Site (Kizner) - Russia stores nearly 2 million artillery shells filled with nerve agent chemical weapons at Kizner. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1904" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Russia's chemical weapons stored? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to official Russian statements, all former Soviet chemical weapons are stored at seven locations in Russia, mostly in the Volga/Ural section of the country. An extensive consolidation process of chemical warfare material, both from sites within Russia and from non-Russian locations, was carried out during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1905" task="">
  <question>
    How did Russia consolidate the storage of its CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    An extensive consolidation process of chemical warfare material, both from sites within Russia and from non-Russian locations, was carried out during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1906" task="">
  <question>
    Is Russia researching chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russian officials do not deny research has continued but assert that it is for the purpose of developing defenses against chemical weapons, a purpose that is not banned by the CWC. Many of the components for new binary agents developed by the former Soviet Union are not on the CWC's schedules of chemicals and have legitimate civil applications, clouding their association with chemical weapons use. However, under the CWC, all chemical weapons are banned, whether or not they are on the CWC schedules. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1907" task="">
  <question>
    When did Russia decide to destroy its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The outlook for timely Russian elimination of its chemical warfare stockpile appears unclear despite President Yeltsin's signing of the federal law on the destruction of chemical weapons in May 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1908" task="">
  <question>
    When did Russia ratify the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Moscow ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1909" task="">
  <question>
    How can Russia deploy chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia and Ukraine have a variety of land-, and sea, and air-launched cruise missiles. Many are designated as short range anti-ship weapons, although other tactical cruise missile systems have ranges of up to 500 kilometers. Kazakhstan and Belarus also have a variety of short range air-launched tactical missiles. All of these systems were produced by the former Soviet Union and many were exported to numerous countries worldwide. Only Russia has any long range land attack nuclear capable cruise missiles. All four states have a variety of fighter aircraft, helicopters, artillery, and rockets available as potential means of delivery for NBC weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1910" task="">
  <question>
    Is Russia selling NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Despite official statements by the governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus that they are opposed to proliferation of NBC weapons and missiles, some sales have and are taking place. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/fsu.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1911" task="">
  <question>
    When did Russia declare that it would stop producing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On April 10, 1987, President Mikhail Gorbachev declared that the Soviet Union would henceforth cease all development and production of CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1912" task="">
  <question>
    What are binary weapons (CW)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Binary weapons consist of two relatively nontoxic ingredients that when mixed together yield a lethal chemical agent. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1913" task="">
  <question>
    What evidence is there that Russia continued CW research after 1987? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In October 1991, Vil S. Mirzayanov, a chemist who had worked for more than 25 years in the Soviet CW program, published an article in the Russian press in which he alleged that Moscow had developed a series of new and extremely lethal &quot;third generation&quot; nerve agents under a secret program code-named Foliant. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1914" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On June 1, 1990, Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the &quot;Agreement on the Nonproduction and Destruction of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention,&quot; better known as the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1915" task="">
  <question>
    What is a CWPF? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    chemical weapon production facility 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1916" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The Convention, which entered into force on April 29, 1997, requires signatory states to destroy any stocks that they may have of such weapons over a 10-year period and provides for the possible granting of a 5-year extension. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/gaoapr99.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/gaoapr99.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1917" task="">
  <question>
    When will Russia's CW facility at Shchuch'ye start destroying chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Shchuch'ye project has fallen about 18 months behind schedule since October 1997 and now is not scheduled to begin operating until 2006. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/gaoapr99.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/gaoapr99.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1918" task="">
  <question>
    What are blister agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The blister agents, developed during World War I and produced in massive quantities during World War II, cause terrible, slow-to-heal burns on contact with skin. Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled and are also carcinogenic, often inducing skin cancer years after exposure. Russian blister agents include mustard gas and lewisite, an arsenic-containing chemical. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1919" task="">
  <question>
    What are nerve agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. Sarin, the &quot;nerve gas&quot; used in the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, is a volatile liquid whose vapor can be absorbed readily by the lungs. In contrast, VX has low volatility and persists on surfaces for long periods. It is readily absorbed through the skin and is highly toxic. As little as one drop may be lethal to a normal-sized human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1920" task="">
  <question>
    How is Sarin different from VX? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Sarin, the &quot;nerve gas&quot; used in the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, is a volatile liquid whose vapor can be absorbed readily by the lungs. In contrast, VX has low volatility and persists on surfaces for long periods. It is readily absorbed through the skin and is highly toxic. As little as one drop may be lethal to a normal-sized human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1921" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons does Russia have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    RUSSIA'S CW STOCKPILES Although generally known as &quot;poison gases,&quot; most CW agents are actually liquids. For use in warfare, they would be dispersed as an aerosol mist by spraying or explosive detonation. There are two major types of CW agents: blister agents, such as mustard gas, and nerve agents, including sarin, soman, and VX. A third class, choking gases like chlorine and phosgene, was used extensively from 19151918, but is not a major part of current CW stockpiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/krip64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1922" task="">
  <question>
    What is the biggest threat posed by Russia's chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is the threat, today or tomorrow, that Iran, Libya, or Hamas will purchase nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or delivery vehicles from some fragment of the current or former Russian military. Let us be clear: from the perspective of US national interests, Russia is still very important; it is the only nation capable of eliminating life in the United States. This threat lies in Russian nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals and infrastructures, and they are insecure and leaking. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/lugar63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/lugar63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1923" task="">
  <question>
    Does Russia's CW pose a threat to US citizens? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia is still very important; it is the only nation capable of eliminating life in the United States. This threat lies in Russian nuclear, chemical, and biological arsenals and infrastructures, and they are insecure and leaking. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/lugar63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/lugar63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1924" task="">
  <question>
    Could rogue states or terrorist organizations obtain CW from Russia's stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is the threat, today or tomorrow, that Iran, Libya, or Hamas will purchase nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or delivery vehicles from some fragment of the current or former Russian military. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/lugar63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/lugar63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1925" task="">
  <question>
    What happened to Russian CBW scientists after the fall of the Soviet Union? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia has been threatened with &quot;brain drain&quot; due to a 50-70 percent reduction in weapons research budgets over the past few years, which has left thousands of the estimated 150,000 Russian nuclear scientists near poverty level. Many Russian scientists have been motivated to collaborate with proliferating states in order to supplement their meager salaries. The US and Japan have moved 8,200 Russian nuclear and chemical weapons scientists to jobs in the civilian research sector as part of a European- funded, $60 million venture.[1] The project is designed to prevent nations seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction from recruiting Russian experts.[1] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1995/m9505253.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1995/m9505253.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1926" task="">
  <question>
    Is Russia helping Iran develop chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Issues John Wolf states that Iran is developing its WMD and missile programs with help from North Korea, China, and Russia. He also states that the United States is working to prevent Russian scientists that are assisting in the research and development efforts of CBW programs in countries like Iran. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1927" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons has Iran stockpiled? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford states that Iran has &quot;manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons -- including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1928" task="">
  <question>
    Does Iran want to be a self-sufficient producer of CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tehran continues to seek considerable production technology, training, expertise, equipment and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal [of] an indigenous nerve agent production capability.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1929" task="">
  <question>
    Who is helping Iran become a self-sufficient producer of CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Tehran continues to seek considerable production technology, training, expertise, equipment and chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal [of] an indigenous nerve agent production capability.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Chemical/2340_2965.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1930" task="">
  <question>
    What are Novichoks? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russian scientists familiar with Moscow's chemical warfare development program have been publicizing information on a new generation of agents, sometimes referred to as &quot;Novichoks.&quot; These scientists report that these compounds, some of which are binaries, were designed to circumvent the CWC and to defeat Western detection and protection measures. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1931" task="">
  <question>
    Is Russia producing chemical weapons that can be concealed easily? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russian scientists familiar with Moscow's chemical warfare development program have been publicizing information on a new generation of agents, sometimes referred to as &quot;Novichoks.&quot; These scientists report that these compounds, some of which are binaries, were designed to circumvent the CWC and to defeat Western detection and protection measures. Furthermore, it is claimed that their production can be hidden within commercial chemical plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1932" task="">
  <question>
    Has Russia disclosed all of its CW capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is concern that the technology to produce these compounds might be acquired by other countries. As a state party to the CWC, Russia is obligated to declare and destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and to forego the development, production, and possession of chemical weapons. However, we believe that the Russians probably have not divulged the full extent of their chemical agent and weapon inventory. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1933" task="">
  <question>
    How is Russia affecting Iran's NBC weapons development? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With help from Russia and North Korea, it has put particular emphasis in recent years on developing medium-range missiles. Iran is one of the countries most active in seeking to acquire NBC- and missile-related technologies. Iran's NBC and missile programs continued in the last several years notwithstanding President Khatemi's moderation of the regime's anti-Western rhetoric. To support their development, Iran has focused its acquisition efforts mainly on Russia, China, and North Korea, and these countries remain instrumental to Iran's efforts. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodpro01.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1934" task="">
  <question>
    How could Russian weapons scientists help nations acquire chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 January 1999 A New York Times editorial, entitled &quot;Reducing Russian Dangers,&quot; suggests that former Soviet weapons scientists might abet rogue nations in acquiring weapons of mass destruction: &quot;There is no longer any threat of Russia's deliberately attacking the United States. But Moscow's still-formidable stocks of nuclear bombs, nuclear ingredients and biological and chemical warfare agents pose a different kind of danger. Much of this material is inadequately secured, and the workers guarding it are paid poorly or not at all. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1935" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries are trying to obtain CBW from Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    That creates an unacceptably high risk that some material could be sold to potential aggressors like Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or Serbia. Many Russian weapons scientists are also unemployed or unpaid and vulnerable to foreign recruitment.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1936" task="">
  <question>
    Are Russian scientists helping other nations acquire chemical or biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    General Stalislav Petrov, head of Russian nuclear, biological and chemical protection forces, denies the New York Times editorial on 21 January 1999 that suggested Russian chemical weapons technology were proliferating to foreign countries, including Iraq, Libya, North Korea, or Serbia. ITAR-TASS news agency quoted General Stanislav Petrov, as saying: &quot;The escape or transfer of chemical weapons to third countries is out of the question.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/NK/Chemical/52_677.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1937" task="">
  <question>
    Are Russian companies are selling dual-use chemicals to countries with covert chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian industrial sector is expected to attempt to sell dual-use technologies, notably nuclear power and space launch vehicles, in attempt to gain hard currency. Glavkosmos is marketing a joint Russian-Kazak space launch service. The quest for hard currency, combined with borders now only under local guard, could mean that inhibitions to trade in weapons materials and equipment will weaken or disappear. Leakages may include sophisticated but uncontrolled conventional military technologies and weapons such as fuel-air explosives.  Gates speculated that it would take several years to develop technologies now under investigation for the destruction of chemical weapons. Russia does have a nuclear dismantlement facility theoretically capable of dismantling 1,500 warheads per year. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9201555.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9201555.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1938" task="">
  <question>
    What are the biggest challenges that Russia faces in dismantling its chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Regarding chemical demilitarization, participants detailed several problems in getting chemical weapons destruction underway, among them disagreements between the United States and Russia on the technical means of destroying chemical weapons stocks, disagreements over proposed work plans and contracting mechanisms to oversee destruction, and a lack of clear bureaucratic lines of responsibility for chemical weapons destruction in the Russian government. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1939" task="">
  <question>
    How do disagreements between the United States and Russia over the dismantling of chemical weapons stockpiles threaten the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These disagreements and delays also have broader implications for the success or failure of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As the two largest chemical weapon states, the United States and Russia must reach an agreement on the destruction issue or risk jeopardizing a global agreement on chemical weapons disarmament. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1940" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia plan to prevent its chemical weapons from being illegally exported to other countries with covert chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There was also general dissatisfaction with the level of progress in establishing more robust export control mechanisms over weapons-related equipment and materials from CIS states. Russia, by virtue of its size and its large number of defense industrial facilities, was thought to have the greatest need for a robust regime of export controls. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1941" task="">
  <question>
    What has Russia done in the past to prevent the export of illegal chemical weapons and chemical weapons precursors to terrorist organizations and other countries with covert chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, Russia also has relatively more expertise in this area, as a consequence of export controls established during the Soviet era. Russian representatives asserted that the country already had an effective set of export control measures in place, but other participants were unsure as to whether Russia has instituted clear bureaucratic lines of control over arms and technology exports. It is also unclear whether Russia possesses adequate support infrastructure (e.g., com-puters) for monitoring and controlling exports. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1942" task="">
  <question>
    Is the dismantling of Russia's chemical weapons stockpiles expected to go smoothly? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although there was disappointment in the lack of progress in these critical areas, participants also acknowledged that delays in chemical weapons demilitarization, MPC&amp;A, and export control were to be expected, given the complex nature of these issues and the difficulties that arise when unfamiliar partners are engaged in addressing a novel set of problems. There also was encouraging evidence that progress in these areas may be forthcoming 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1943" task="">
  <question>
    How has the United States assisted Russia in the destruction of its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    One U.S. participant offered as an example U.S.-Russian plans for chemical weapons destruction: despite a strong U.S. preference for destruction of air-delivered chemical munitions in western Russia first, using an incineration method, the U.S. bowed to Russian preferences for destroying artillery shells stored in eastern depots first, using a different method of destruction. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1944" task="">
  <question>
    Are Russian chemical weapons disarmament programs reasonably well-funded? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Rather than spread limited CTR resources across too many activities that were already well-financed in the CIS, this observer argued, the CTR program should instead be focused on a limited number of relatively underfunded projects (such as chemical weapons destruction), where it could make a greater contribution. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1945" task="">
  <question>
    If Russia fails to dismantle its chemical weapons program, what would be the likely impact on international treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Multilateral agreements, particularly the Chemical Weapons Convention, could be jeopardized by the failure of the United States and Russia to come to terms on destruction of their respective chemical weapons stockpiles. Likewise, other countries, it was argued, may reconsider their commitments to the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention, and other agreements if U.S.-CIS arms reductions are stalled. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/31/shield31.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1946" task="">
  <question>
    How large is Russia's chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since Russia possesses the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons (CW)--a declared total of 40,000 metric tons--Russian ratification and implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be critical to the success of the global chemicaldisarmamentandnonproliferation regime 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1947" task="">
  <question>
    What has delayed the Russian ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To date, however, Moscow's ratification has been delayed by political, economic, and environmental concerns associated with CW destruction and the conversion of former Soviet chemical weapon production facilities (CWPFs) to legitimate commercial activities.1 Whereas American CWPFs This essay lays out a brief history of the CWPF conversion issue and the contending U.S. and Russian positions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1948" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons products did the Soviet Union (Russia) produce prior to World War II? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Before, during, and after World War II, the Soviet Unionproducedmanytensof thousands of tons of chemical weapons (both blister and nerve agents) at multiple facilities, most of them in the Volga River basin. were all single-purpose military facilities that have lain dormant for years, former Soviet CWPFs are integrated into large civilian chemical production complexes and share the same industrial infrastructure. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1949" task="">
  <question>
    When did Russia declare that it would stop producing chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On April 10, 1987, President Mikhail Gorbachev declared that the Soviet Union would henceforth cease all development and production of CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1950" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Russia no longer produces chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Compelling evidence has since emerged, however, that Moscow secretly continued to produce CW agents into the early 1990s. In October 1991, Vil S. Mirzayanov, a chemist who had worked for more than 25 years in the Soviet CW program, published an article in the Russian press in which he alleged that Moscow had developed a series of new and extremely lethal &quot;third generation&quot; nerve agents under a secret program code-named Foliant.5 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1951" task="">
  <question>
    What was the Russian secret chemical weapons program known as Foliant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In October 1991, Vil S. Mirzayanov, a chemist who had worked for more than 25 years in the Soviet CW program, published an article in the Russian press in which he alleged that Moscow had developed a series of new and extremely lethal &quot;third generation&quot; nerve agents under a secret program code-named Foliant.5 According to Mirzayanov, this effort began in 1973-76 to match a U.S. research and development program on binary chemical weapons. (Binary weapons consist of two relatively nontoxic ingredients that when mixed together yield a lethal chemical agent.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1952" task="">
  <question>
    What are binary chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Binary weapons consist of two relatively nontoxic ingredients that when mixed together yield a lethal chemical agent. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/41/tucker41.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1953" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Russia's declared chemical weapons storage sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Table 1: Declared Russian Chemical Munitions Storage Sites SITE Maradikovsky Leonidovka Pochep Kizner Kambarka Shuchye Gorny 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1954" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries are paying to help Russia dismantle its chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden are supplying some $31 million for the destruction of Russian blister agents, and the European Union has agreed to provide the Russian program with an additional $15 million through 1999. The amounts of money available still fall well short of the billions that the Russian disposal program will require for completion, however. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1955" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of chemical weapons are included in Russia's chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The declared Soviet stockpile included approximately 32,200 tons of nerve agents (sarin, soman, and V-agents) and 7,700 tons of blister agents (lewisite, mustard, and mustard/lewisite mixtures) stored at seven sites 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1956" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of nerve agents does Russia have in its chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The declared Soviet stockpile included approximately 32,200 tons of nerve agents (sarin, soman, and V-agents) and 7,700 tons of blister agents (lewisite, mustard, and mustard/lewisite mixtures) stored at seven sites 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1957" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of blister agents does Russia have in its chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The declared Soviet stockpile included approximately 32,200 tons of nerve agents (sarin, soman, and V-agents) and 7,700 tons of blister agents (lewisite, mustard, and mustard/lewisite mixtures) stored at seven sites 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1958" task="">
  <question>
    Which chemical weapons does Russia have in its chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The declared Soviet stockpile included approximately 32,200 tons of nerve agents (sarin, soman, and V-agents) and 7,700 tons of blister agents (lewisite, mustard, and mustard/lewisite mixtures) stored at seven sites 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1959" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia store its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The agents exist in a variety of conditions and configurations, with the older blister agents mostly stored in bulk containers and the newer nerve agents stored in artillery and aviation munitions (Table 1). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1960" task="">
  <question>
    Are Russia's chemical weapons munitions stored with explosives? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Fortunately, Russian munitions are not loaded with explosives and propellants (known collectively as energetics), which eliminates some of the difficulties with weapons disposal experienced in the United States, where many munitions are fully configured with energetics. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1961" task="">
  <question>
    What environmental impact has Russia's chemical weapons program had? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Besides the tons of munitions that must now be destroyed, the Soviet chemical weapons production program produced a legacy of severe environmental and health problems 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1962" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Russia's chemical weapons programs have polluted Russia's environment? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At Chapayevsk in the Samara Province, where lewisite and mustard gas were produced, tests performed in 19931994 reportedly found arsenic concentrations in the soil around the former plant to be 8,500 times the permissible concentration (two milligrams per kilogram); in areas of the surrounding town, they were two to ten times the permissible concentration. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1963" task="">
  <question>
    Have Russian citizens experienced health problems as a result of Russia's chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mental deficiencies and diseases of the central nervous system are reportedly higher among children in Chapayevsk compared to children of other cities in the Samara province.8 The average arsenic concentration in soil from Leonidovka, where chemical munitions were reportedly buried in the early 1960s, was found to be some 15,000 times the permissible concentration 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1964" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons has Russia weaponized? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    AGENTS VX, Sarin, Soman, Mustard/Lewisite mixture VX. Sarin, Soman VX, Sarin, Soman VX, Sarin, Soman, Lewisite Lewisite VX, Sarin, Soman Mustard, Lewisite, Mustard/Lewisite mixture 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1965" task="">
  <question>
    Does Russia possess the infrastructure necessary to destroy chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia currently lacks the necessary capacity to dispose of its chemical munitions 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1966" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia generally dispose of its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In previous decades both the United States and the Soviet Union routinely disposed of chemical weapons by open-pit burning, land burial, and sea dumping. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1967" task="">
  <question>
    Has Russia built facilities for the disposal of chemical weapons in the past? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1986, the Soviet government constructed a demonstration destruction facility in Chapayevsk that utilized neutralization and incineration technology. The facility, which was designed to destroy 350 tons of nerve agent yearly utilizing hydrolysis followed by incineration, cost 50 million rubles and took more than three years to build 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1968" task="">
  <question>
    What was the purpose of the Russian chemical weapons destruction facilityat Chapayevsk? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This system was designed only for the destruction of damaged and deteriorating chemical munitions, not the general disposal of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1969" task="">
  <question>
    What difficulties does Russia face when dismantling its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russians have selected.Russian chemical weapons, unlike US weapons, are welded shut during assembly, prohibiting the &quot;reverse-assembly&quot; process used in the United States in its disposal program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1970" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia plan to dismantle its chemical weapons munitions? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The proposed destruction process for the Russian nerve munitions involves sending them through &quot;drill-and-drain&quot; machines to remove the nerve agent. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1971" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia plan to neutralize its sarin chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the first stage, the drained nerve agent will be chemically neutralized by adding a second chemical reagent that reacts with the nerve agent-- monoethanolamine for sarin and soman, and a mixture developed in Russia, called RD4M, for VX. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1972" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia plan to neutralize its VX chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the first stage, the drained nerve agent will be chemically neutralized by adding a second chemical reagent that reacts with the nerve agent-- monoethanolamine for sarin and soman, and a mixture developed in Russia, called RD4M, for VX. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1973" task="">
  <question>
    What does Russia plan to do with its neutralized chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After neutralization, the second stage involves the bituminization of the resulting solution. (In bituminization, the neutralized product is mixed with hot petroleum asphalt.) After solidification, the final product will be sealed in barrels and buried above groundwater level in concrete bunkers located next to the destruction facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1974" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons facility did Russia choose to dismantle first? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has chosen Shuchye as the location for the first facility designed for the destruction of nerve-agent-filled munitions. Shuchye, located 975 miles east of Moscow, stores 5,400 tons of nerve agent in nearly two million munitions, representing approximately 14 percent of the total Russian stockpile on an agent tonnage basis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1975" task="">
  <question>
    How large was the Russian chemical weapons facility at Shuchye? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense has chosen Shuchye as the location for the first facility designed for the destruction of nerve-agent-filled munitions. Shuchye, located 975 miles east of Moscow, stores 5,400 tons of nerve agent in nearly two million munitions, representing approximately 14 percent of the total Russian stockpile on an agent tonnage basis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1976" task="">
  <question>
    How much nerve agent chemical weapons were stored at the Russian chemical weapons facility at Shuchye? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shuchye, located 975 miles east of Moscow, stores 5,400 tons of nerve agent in nearly two million munitions, representing approximately 14 percent of the total Russian stockpile on an agent tonnage basis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1977" task="">
  <question>
    What percentage of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile were stored at the chemical weapons facility at Shuchye? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shuchye, located 975 miles east of Moscow, stores 5,400 tons of nerve agent in nearly two million munitions, representing approximately 14 percent of the total Russian stockpile on an agent tonnage basis. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1978" task="">
  <question>
    What is Lewisite? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Lewisite was first synthesized to provide a less persistent blister agent than mustard agents.15 Mustard agents, the most common blister agent used during the First World War, had the disadvantage of lingering in the environment, making attacked sites uninhabitable to defender and attacker alike. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1979" task="">
  <question>
    What is Mustard Gas / Mustard Agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mustard agents, the most common blister agent used during the First World War, had the disadvantage of lingering in the environment, making attacked sites uninhabitable to defender and attacker alike. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1980" task="">
  <question>
    How is Lewisite produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Lewisite is most commonly manufactured by reacting acetylene with a mixture of arsenic trichloride and aluminum chloride and fractionating the resulting product with hydrogen chloride gas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1981" task="">
  <question>
    How did the United States destroy its stockpiles of Lewisite? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The United States destroyed nearly all of its stockpile of lewisite by mixing it with sodium hypochlorite and dumping the resulting mixture into the Gulf of Mexico in 1946 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1982" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of Lewisite does Russia possess? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia, however, still retains some 8,000 tons of lewisite produced in the former Soviet Union. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1983" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Russia store its Lewisite stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Approximately 6,300 tons are stored at Kambarka in stonewalled, wooden-roofed buildings that each contain 16 steel tanks of 50 cubic meters, filled to various amounts.16 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1984" task="">
  <question>
    How could the arsenic in Russia's Lewisite stockpile be used to fund the dismantling of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia has claimed that as much as 2,300 metric tons of metallic arsenic can be obtained from their lewisite stockpile; with prices for semiconductor-grade arsenic between $1,000-2,000 per kilogram, this conversion would appear, on first glance, to provide a significant amount of money for the country's chemical weapons disposal program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1985" task="">
  <question>
    How much is the dismantling of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile expected to cost? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Safety Division, General Stanislav Petrov, puts the cost of the whole disposal program at $5.36 billion, and has already publicly stated that Russia will need the five extra years allowed by the CWC to complete their chemical weapons disposal program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1986" task="">
  <question>
    How long is the process of dismantling of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile exepected to last? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Even with the extra five years, Russia may not be able to meet its CWC requirements. It was recently reported that Russian experts say that it will take 25 to 30 years to deal with the CW problem. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1987" task="">
  <question>
    How much foreign assistance will Russia need to dismantle its chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The former chairman of the Presidential Committee for Chemical and Biological Weapons Matters, General Anatolii Kuntsevich, has claimed that to meet the requirements of the CWC, Russia will require foreign assistance of up to 80 percent of the total cost 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1988" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Russian general Anatolii Kuntsevich? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The former chairman of the Presidential Committee for Chemical and Biological Weapons Matters, General Anatolii Kuntsevich, has claimed that to meet the requirements of the CWC, Russia will require foreign assistance of up to 80 percent of the total cost 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1989" task="">
  <question>
    Who has been the biggest supporter of Russia's efforts to dismantle its chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The United States has become the biggest funder of the program, with $88.4 million appropriated under the CTR program for Russian chemical weapons disposal in 1999. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1990" task="">
  <question>
    Does the Russian chemical weapons stockpile pose a threat to the United States? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A House report stated, &quot;Unlike strategic nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, which pose a direct threat to US security, the Russian chemical weapons stockpile poses more of a local environmental threat than it does a security threat to Americans. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1991" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence to suspect that Russia has not declared all of its chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With so little money being provided by the Russian government and lingering questions about whether Russia has declared all information about its chemical weapons capabilities, especially with regard to binary weapons,34 it is not clear that this certification will be possible 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1992" task="">
  <question>
    Would the Russian program to dismantle its chemical weapons succeed if it had adequate financial support? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is important to remember that even if the Russian disposal program had adequate funding, this would not guarantee the success of the program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1993" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Russia is really committed to dismantling its chemical weapons in a safe manner? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    he current Russian government is doing little to convince the people that it is any more concerned about their well-being than past governments were. Promised infrastructure improvements are not being constructed at chemical weapons storage sites. In addition, the Russian government does not acknowledge that many sites around the country are contaminated because of past chemical weapons disposal decisions. The medical concerns of ex-chemical weapons workers and of people living near contaminated former production and disposal sites are not being adequately addressed. At present, the chosen two-stage disposal technology for Russian nerve agents is being challenged. Protesting villagers near the areas where the government has decided to bury the resulting waste products from weapons disposal at Leonidovka are trying to prevent this decision from ever being implemented. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1994" task="">
  <question>
    How likely is it that chemical weapons could be stolen from Russia's chemical weapons stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The nerve agents are loaded into individual munitions, so their theft is more likely. These agents also are much more deadly than the blister agents, and would be a more effective weapon 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1995" task="">
  <question>
    Could chemical weapons stolen from Russia's chemical weapons stockpiles be used immediately by terrorist organizations or rogue states? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    But the Russian munitions are not loaded with explosives or propellants, so anyone who acquired rounds would have to supply these (and the weapons for delivering the munitions) or, more likely, remove the nerve agent from the munitions and construct a delivery system. This could be done by a group or state with some technical expertise, but it would not be a simple task to perform. It is important to realize that fabricating an effective delivery system for a chemical weapon is often as challenging as producing the chemical agent itself. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1996" task="">
  <question>
    Why wouldn't a terrorist be able to deploy CW stolen from Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    But the Russian munitions are not loaded with explosives or propellants, so anyone who acquired rounds would have to supply these (and the weapons for delivering the munitions) or, more likely, remove the nerve agent from the munitions and construct a delivery system. This could be done by a group or state with some technical expertise, but it would not be a simple task to perform. It is important to realize that fabricating an effective delivery system for a chemical weapon is often as challenging as producing the chemical agent itself. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1997" task="">
  <question>
    How difficult would it be to explode a CW round stolen from Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    This could be done by a group or state with some technical expertise, but it would not be a simple task to perform. It is important to realize that fabricating an effective delivery system for a chemical weapon is often as challenging as producing the chemical agent itself. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1998" task="">
  <question>
    Why are Russia's chemical weapons so dangerous? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A further reason that Russia's stockpile of nerve agents might be attractive to a terrorist group is the high purity of the agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-1999" task="">
  <question>
    Have Russia's chemical weapons degraded over time? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    When originally produced, by contrast, the Russian nerve agents were undoubtedly of high purity. However, even the newest agents in the stockpile are now over ten years old, and likely have degraded somewhat. If a terrorist had to remove the agent from a munition and transfer it to a second delivery device, the highly reactive nerve agents would likely experience further degradation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2000" task="">
  <question>
    What is the physical status of Russia's chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The buildings in Shuchye where munitions containing nerve agents are stored are described as &quot;becoming decrepit,&quot; and there are concerns that hard rains in this region could lead to a disaster, as several storage facilities have flooded in the past 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2001" task="">
  <question>
    How stable are the storage containers used to hold Russia's chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some Russian blister agents have been stored in the same containers since the 1940s, and according to Radiation, Chemical and Biological Safety Division deputy, Lieutenant General Yuri Tarasevich, &quot;the walls of storage tanks are corroded. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2002" task="">
  <question>
    What is the greatest danger posed by Russia's aging chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Many of the chemical weapons storage facilities lack a basic automatic alarm system to warn of dangerous levels of agent in the air. Hence, the greatest danger posed by Russia's CW stockpile is that people living near the storage sites will be exposed to these agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2003" task="">
  <question>
    Do Russia's chemical weapons facilities have systems to detect the accidental release of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Many of the chemical weapons storage facilities lack a basic automatic alarm system to warn of dangerous levels of agent in the air. Hence, the greatest danger posed by Russia's CW stockpile is that people living near the storage sites will be exposed to these agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2004" task="">
  <question>
    How could Russia reduce the theft of chemical weapons from its chemical weapons facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Providing financial aid for such things as electronic monitors, better locks, and improved physical barriers, as has been suggested,42 might offer a way to reduce any possible threat of &quot;loose chemical weapons&quot; at a moderate cost to the United States. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2005" task="">
  <question>
    How likely is it that an unsophisticated terrorist group or rogue state could deploy chemical weapons stolen from Russia's chemical weapons stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The use of these weapons, even if stolen or bought, would not be simple, and reducing this threat by disposal could cost the United States billions of dollars. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2006" task="">
  <question>
    Is the dismantling of Russia's chemical weapons stockpiles a priority for the Russian government? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    With the Russian government struggling to assure that there is enough food to feed its citizens, chemical weapons disposal will likely remain a low priority. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2007" task="">
  <question>
    Will Russia meet the deadline for the destruction of its chemical weapons imposed by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The CWC disposal deadline will undoubtedly have to be extended to deal with the situation in Russia (and perhaps in the United States) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2008" task="">
  <question>
    If Russia does not destroy its chemical weapons by the CWC-mandated deadline, will Russia be expelled from the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Expelling the world's largest possessor of chemical weapons from the CWC is not an attractive option, and a financial penalty levied against Russia for not being able to afford to dispose of its chemical weapons makes little sense. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/63/black63.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2009" task="">
  <question>
    What is Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In order to assist Russia with its CW destruction effort, the US government has allocated funds from the Soviet Nuclear Threat Act, otherwise known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2010" task="">
  <question>
    How has the United States helped Russia dismantle its chemical weapons program under Cooperative Threat Reduction? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Under CTR, the Department of Defense (DOD) has committed to provide monetary and technical assistance for the design, planning, and construction of a pilot CW destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuchie, located in the Kurgan oblast 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2011" task="">
  <question>
    Have Russian citizens protested the construction of facilities to destroy Russia's chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The community of Chapayevsk, in the Samara oblast, serves as a key example of this rise in public protests against military activities.14 In 1985 the federal government began constructing a large CWDF in the city of Chapayevsk. The objective of this facility was to begin destroying old and outdated Soviet chemical munitions. Fifty million rubles and three years of construction went into this project.15 Unfortunately, the military conducted the construction effort in total secrecy with no public information about the nature of future materials to be processed at the new plant. When construction entered the final stages, Chapayevsk citizens learned of the CW processing plans and reacted with heated protests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2012" task="">
  <question>
    Has Russia made special efforts to protect its citizens from the dangers posed by its chemical weapons disposal facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In Shchuchie, the CW depot is located only about 100 yards from high-rise apartment buildings and day-care centers.24 However, in contrast to US CW communities, Shchuchie has no formalized emergency preparedness program. The only fire department service available in Shchuchie operates from an old and dilapidated truck.25 Additionally, since there is no public water system, it is unclear how large quantities of water would be obtained in the event of a large-scale fire at the depot. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/64/vogel64.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2013" task="">
  <question>
    What is contained at the Russian chemical weapon storage sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    VX Sarin Soman Lewisite  [a2_]Mustard Gas --Mustard/ Lewisite -Phosgene 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2014" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Russia's CW storage sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Storage Site Pochep Bryansk Oblast Maradikovsky Kirov Oblast Leonidovk Penza Oblast Shuchye Kurgan Oblast Kizner Udmurtia Republic Kambarka Udmurtia Republic Gorny Saratov Oblast 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2015" task="">
  <question>
    What is the size of the current Russian CW stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons agents in the Russian stockpile (excluding munitions weight). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2016" task="">
  <question>
    Where are the Russian CW stockpiles located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These agents are located at seven sites, mainly concentrated in western Russia, along the Volga River basin (see Figure 1): Pochep (Bryansk oblast), Maradikovsky (Kirov oblast), Leonidovka (Penza oblast), Shuchye (Kurgan oblast), Kizner (Udmurtia Republic), Kambarka (Udmurtia Republic), and Gorny (Saratov oblast). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2017" task="">
  <question>
    How evenly distributed are Russia's CW across its storage sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russian CW agents are distributed fairly uniformly across these stockpiles, with approximately 15 to 20 percent of the Russian total stored at each location, with the exception of Gorny, which holds only three percent (see Table 1) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2018" task="">
  <question>
    What is Russia's smallest CW storage facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    with the exception of Gorny, which holds only three percent (see Table 1) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2019" task="">
  <question>
    What does the Russian chemical weapon stockpile consist of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The composition of the stockpile consists primarily (80 percent of the total, or 32,300 metric tons) of organophosphorus nerve agents (VX, sarin, soman), with the remainder (20 percent, or 7,700 metric tons) composed of blister agents (mustard gas, lewisite, or a mustard/lewisite mixture) and phosgene. As shown in Table 1, most of the nerve agents are housed at five of the storage facilities. The bulk of lewisite and mustard gas, however, are stored in Kambarka, with lesser amounts in Kizner, Gorny, and Maradikovsky. The lewisite and mustard gas are primarily kept as bulk agents in storage tanks, whereas the nerve agents and phosgene are stored in munitions (see Table 2) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2020" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Russia store its Lewisite and Mustard Gas stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The bulk of lewisite and mustard gas, however, are stored in Kambarka, with lesser amounts in Kizner, Gorny, and Maradikovsky. The lewisite and mustard gas are primarily kept as bulk agents in storage tanks, whereas the nerve agents and phosgene are stored in munitions (see Table 2) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2021" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia store mustard gas? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The lewisite and mustard gas are primarily kept as bulk agents in storage tanks, whereas the nerve agents and phosgene are stored in munitions (see Table 2) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2022" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia store nerve agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The lewisite and mustard gas are primarily kept as bulk agents in storage tanks, whereas the nerve agents and phosgene are stored in munitions (see Table 2) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2023" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Stanislav Petrov? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, commander of Russia's chemical and biological defense forces, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2024" task="">
  <question>
    How secure are Russia's CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    his stems from the inadequate protection of Russian CW stocks. Poor physical obstacles, the absence of electronic security devices, and rudimentary inventory practices make the Russian CW storage facilities susceptible to theft. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2025" task="">
  <question>
    Does Russia have adequate security for its CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Even Russia's own military officers have described the security measures at these facilities as &quot;inadequate,&quot; pointing out that the chemical arsenal is &quot;more vulnerable to theft&quot; since the locations of Russia's seven storage facilities have become a matter of public record. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2026" task="">
  <question>
    How accessible are Russia's CW storage facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    20 In 1995, Dr. Amy Smithson published a Stimson Center report, &quot;Improving the Security of Russia's Chemical Weapons Stockpile,&quot; based on interviews with visitors to the CW facilities. The report offers disturbing insights into the condition and accessibility of the Russian CW storage facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2027" task="">
  <question>
    How could a terrorist organization obtain CW from Russia's stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 To emphasize the current danger of CW theft, a potential terrorist scenario will be outlined in the following paragraphs. The conditions described at the sample facility reflect those depicted in Dr. Smithson's report (See Table 3). Under the cover of night, a terrorist unit makes its move. Upon entering the storage compound, the unit encounters chain-link or barbed wire fences surrounding the perimeter of the facility (some either rusted or with holes). The terrorists pass directly through the worn fences or perhaps through one of the poorly secured side entrances. Only the main gates are consistently guarded; side entrances provide several alternative routes for entry and escape. Perimeter lights are scant and in poor condition, providing camouflage for potential theft. The absence of intruder alarms at the multiple entryways makes entrance easy. Once inside the compound, the terrorist team moves easily to the individual CW storage buildings. There they find run-down buildings constructed of cement or wood, with either steel or wooden doors. Entry can be obtained by slipping through holes in the roofing, or by picking the single-key padlocks on the doors. No guards are present outside the storage units to deter the assailants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2028" task="">
  <question>
    Do Russian CW facilities have advanced electronic security systems? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The absence of tamper-detection seals, electronic intruder sensors, or video cameras at the individual storage buildings allows the terrorist unit to enter undetected. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2029" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia store its CW munitions in its CW storage facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Inside the storage buildings, the terrorists find munitions and missile warheads stacked in &quot;wine-rack&quot; type storage units, with only production lot numbers (not serial numbers) tracking their existence. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2030" task="">
  <question>
    Are Russia's CW storage drums sealed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Containers for the missile warheads and bulk CW storage drums are typically unsealed. The terrorists need simply remove a few munitions or warheads and place them into a backpack before escaping into the night. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2031" task="">
  <question>
    Are Russia's CW marked with identification numbers? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Inside the storage buildings, the terrorists find munitions and missile warheads stacked in &quot;wine-rack&quot; type storage units, with only production lot numbers (not serial numbers) tracking their existence. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2032" task="">
  <question>
    How easy would it be to track CW stolen from Russia's stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Inside the storage buildings, the terrorists find munitions and missile warheads stacked in &quot;wine-rack&quot; type storage units, with only production lot numbers (not serial numbers) tracking their existence. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2033" task="">
  <question>
    How long would it take for Russian authorities to detect stolen CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It might take days for the missing CW weapons to be noticed, leaving ample time for the terrorists to threaten a civilian target. The frightening potential for CW theft by terrorists is summarized by one of Smithson's interviewees, who warned, &quot;You could really walk into that place without any problem. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2034" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia manage its CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the Russian system, individual officers are personally responsible for keeping track of hundreds of chemical weapons, typically stored throughout several buildings. Although written records are kept, no computers have been installed to log and inventory the massive quantities of munitions. It is also unclear whether inventory records are updated to reflect the periodic removal of leaking munitions. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2035" task="">
  <question>
    Are Russia's CW protected from sabotage? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Further, although the officers are held personally responsible for CW whereabouts, it is actually enlisted soldiers who conduct the inventory. At present, there is no established method for cross-checking inventories on a routine basis. Since tamper-detection seals on the weapons are rare, this could result in one or more soldiers and/or officers removing small quantities of CW munitions over time without detection. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2036" task="">
  <question>
    Could Russian Army personnel steal CW without being detected? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Further, although the officers are held personally responsible for CW whereabouts, it is actually enlisted soldiers who conduct the inventory. At present, there is no established method for cross-checking inventories on a routine basis. Since tamper-detection seals on the weapons are rare, this could result in one or more soldiers and/or officers removing small quantities of CW munitions over time without detection. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2037" task="">
  <question>
    Are thefts from Russia's CW stockpiles likely to occur? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Further, although the officers are held personally responsible for CW whereabouts, it is actually enlisted soldiers who conduct the inventory. At present, there is no established method for cross-checking inventories on a routine basis. Since tamper-detection seals on the weapons are rare, this could result in one or more soldiers and/or officers removing small quantities of CW munitions over time without detection. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2038" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Anatoliy Kuntsevich? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Former Chemical Troops General Anatoliy Kuntsevich was charged by the Russian Federal Security Service with delivering 800 kilograms of CW precursors to Syrian buyers in 1993 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2039" task="">
  <question>
    Why would Russian soldiers steal CW from Russian stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Dr. Smithson's report states that the soldiers interviewed at the CW facilities did not appear to be discontented, these soldiers probably suffer from erratic and paltry pay, as has been reported for soldiers at nuclear weapons facilities. Massive Russian CW stockpiles, lack of inventory practices, poor security measures at storage facilities, depressed economic conditions, and widespread military and government corruption create a climate ripe for CW theft from within. One of Dr. Smithson's sources offers a sobering prediction: &quot;Sooner or later, someone will make the soldiers at these sites a better offer than Moscow does. If something was missing, it is likely to be an inside job. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2040" task="">
  <question>
    Who is most likely to steal CW from Russia's stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Massive Russian CW stockpiles, lack of inventory practices, poor security measures at storage facilities, depressed economic conditions, and widespread military and government corruption create a climate ripe for CW theft from within. One of Dr. Smithson's sources offers a sobering prediction: &quot;Sooner or later, someone will make the soldiers at these sites a better offer than Moscow does. If something was missing, it is likely to be an inside job. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2041" task="">
  <question>
    What factors affect the security of Russia's CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Massive Russian CW stockpiles, lack of inventory practices, poor security measures at storage facilities, depressed economic conditions, and widespread military and government corruption create a climate ripe for CW theft from within. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2042" task="">
  <question>
    How can the chemical weapons be used? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Once chemical weapons are in the hands of a terrorist group, carrying out a CW attack on an unsuspecting civilian population could prove to be simple. There are a variety of chemical munitions that are relatively small in size, making them easy to conceal and transport. Protective clothing and gas masks are commercially available. Compared to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons would be much more straightforward to employ. Chemical weapons are not protected by the Permissive Action Links (PALs) that are often placed on individual nuclear weapons.33 Stolen chemical munitions could be delivered using many existing conventional systems, or in homemade reconfigured designs. Although such use would require some effort and coordination, the Aum example suggests that it would be possible for an organization with sufficient resources and technological infrastructure. Terrorist groups such as Aum need only show their capability and willingness to acquire and use WMD to threaten US national security, since &quot;backpack-sized chemical or biological weapons, too small, improvised, and fragile to have an impact on a battlefield or against soldiers equipped for chemical and biological defense, could nonetheless be devastating against some civilian targets. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2043" task="">
  <question>
    Is it easy to transport and use Russian CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Once chemical weapons are in the hands of a terrorist group, carrying out a CW attack on an unsuspecting civilian population could prove to be simple. There are a variety of chemical munitions that are relatively small in size, making them easy to conceal and transport. Protective clothing and gas masks are commercially available. Compared to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons would be much more straightforward to employ. Chemical weapons are not protected by the Permissive Action Links (PALs) that are often placed on individual nuclear weapons.33 Stolen chemical munitions could be delivered using many existing conventional systems, or in homemade reconfigured designs. Although such use would require some effort and coordination, the Aum example suggests that it would be possible for an organization with sufficient resources and technological infrastructure. Terrorist groups such as Aum need only show their capability and willingness to acquire and use WMD to threaten US national security, since &quot;backpack-sized chemical or biological weapons, too small, improvised, and fragile to have an impact on a battlefield or against soldiers equipped for chemical and biological defense, could nonetheless be devastating against some civilian targets. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2044" task="">
  <question>
    What is General Stanislav Petrov's attitude towards Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hemical weapons General Stanislav Petrov's attitude towards CTR funding can be observed in his following remarks: The Americans attached all sort of strings to this aid, which essentially boils down to extracting the maximum information about Russia's military-chemical potential in exchange for American money. It is very difficult to work with them. Much easier to work with the Germans, for instance. They do not attach any conditions. They make money available and only ask us to provide precise reports on where the money is going...this is all real, with no strings attached--political or otherwise 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2045" task="">
  <question>
    What does Stanislav think about working with the Germans in regards Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hemical weapons General Stanislav Petrov's attitude towards CTR funding can be observed in his following remarks: The Americans attached all sort of strings to this aid, which essentially boils down to extracting the maximum information about Russia's military-chemical potential in exchange for American money. It is very difficult to work with them. Much easier to work with the Germans, for instance. They do not attach any conditions. They make money available and only ask us to provide precise reports on where the money is going...this is all real, with no strings attached--political or otherwise 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2046" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    complements the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). CFE jurisdiction is limited to west of the Ural Mountains, while the OST allows unrestricted territorial coverage of participating countries. The OST also is an intelligence supplement for many states, especially helping those with 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2047" task="">
  <question>
    How many countries currently possess chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At least 20 countries currently possess chemical weapons (CW) or are attempting to produce them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2048" task="">
  <question>
    What is the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Chemical Weapons Convention The CWC is the most comprehensive and intrusive multilateral treaty ever signed. The CWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of CW.10 The CWC calls for the destruction of any CW stockpiles and production facilities. The CWC even prevents assistance to other states in acquiring a CW capability. It involves the monitoring of both government and commercial sectors of chemical production, requiring extensive reporting by each. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2049" task="">
  <question>
    Who admittedly has chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Only three states have admitted CW programs, the United States, Russia, and Iraq; however, many more states are suspected of having CW or attempting to acquire them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2050" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries could hide chemical weapon production? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The production methods for chemical weapons are harder to detect than those for nuclear weapons. The feed chemicals used for production of CW have myriad commercial uses such as production of pesticides, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, and even pen ink. Much of the equipment and processes are also used in commercial enterprises.13 Developed countries with many diverse commercial chemical production plants could hide illicit production. Underdeveloped countries would attract more attention in their procurement processes through the types of raw materials they purchase or produce domestically. The types of plant facilities they import and assemble, such as high-quality, corrosion-resistant reactors, piping, and valves or sophisticated filtration systems may also attract attention. Still, supply-side nonproliferation is extremely difficult because of the dual uses of chemicals and equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2051" task="">
  <question>
    Why are developed countries more likely to have a secret CW program than underdeveloped countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Developed countries with many diverse commercial chemical production plants could hide illicit production. Underdeveloped countries would attract more attention in their procurement processes through the types of raw materials they purchase or produce domestically. The types of plant facilities they import and assemble, such as high-quality, corrosion-resistant reactors, piping, and valves or sophisticated filtration systems may also attract attention. Still, supply-side nonproliferation is extremely difficult because of the dual uses of chemicals and equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2052" task="">
  <question>
    What is the difference between unitary or binary weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chemical weapons may be unitary or binary in design. Unitary weapons are ready to use, but can be less stable and may have a shorter shelf life. Binary weapons have two separate component chemicals that are mixed just prior to launch to form a lethal agent. In advanced binary munitions, the two chemicals combine while the shell or warhead is en route to the target. Binary precursors are listed under Schedule 2 of the CWC, but the component chemicals of some binary chemical weapons may not be on any CWC schedule. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2053" task="">
  <question>
    Has Russia made any recent chemical weapon developments? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Bailey, the Soviets developed a new binary agent purportedly more toxic than the most deadly form of the highly-lethal nerve agent VX after they declared unilaterally in 1987 that they would cease development and production of CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2054" task="">
  <question>
    How can one find a chemical plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the process of detecting CW production, there are two types of effluents released from a chemical plant: controlled smokestack emissions and &quot;fugitive&quot; emissions.15 Smokestack emissions are planned emissions from the production facility and would be filtered. Fugitive emissions are stray emissions in either production, testing, or storage and would be unintended. Chemical weapons production would be easier to detect through the unintended or accidental release of effluents since they would not be filtered or disguised and probably would be in greater concentration than planned emissions. However, essentially perfect timing would be required to catch fugitive emissions; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2055" task="">
  <question>
    What is Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Using a technique known as LIDAR (Light Detection And Ranging), a laser beam is directed into an effluent plume and the reflected coherent light used to identify chemical constituents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2056" task="">
  <question>
    What is Differential Absorption LIDAR (DIAL)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Using other optical detection techniques such as infrared DIAL (Differential Absorption LIDAR), real-time analysis can be done on smokestack or fugitive emissions released from a facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2057" task="">
  <question>
    What does the CALIOPE project (Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents) do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are currently two programs to develop infrared DIAL technology. The first, CALIOPE (Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents), is sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE), and is being studied by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2058" task="">
  <question>
    What is Project Nable? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A spin-off of CALIOPE is the Project Nable, which is a joint effort by the DOE, the U.S. Army, and the U.S. Air Force 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2059" task="">
  <question>
    Who has laser remote sensing for CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian military has the world's only fielded CW laser remotesensing system; the Hungarian military has developed a helicopter-mounted system; the Czech Republic has developed a truck-mounted system; and the Slovak military has developed a man-portable system for battlefield use 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2060" task="">
  <question>
    What is OPCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1997, marked the beginning of the operation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the Netherlands. This organization consists of three major bodies: the Conference of State Parties (CSP), the primary policymaking forum comprising all member-states; the 41-country ExecutiveCouncil,responsibleforoverseeing the day-to-day activities of the organization; and the Technical Secretariat, including the professional staff and inspectorate. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2061" task="">
  <question>
    What countries have CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Four states have declared possession of CW stockpiles (the United States, Russia, India, and South Korea). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2062" task="">
  <question>
    How many CW storage facilities does Russia have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Four states have declared possession of CW stockpiles (the United States, Russia, India, and South Korea). These weapons are stored at 26 declared storage facilities in three of the four countries (excluding Russia, which has not yet made public the number of its CW storage facilities). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2063" task="">
  <question>
    Who has current or past CW production facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Four states have declared possession of CW stockpiles (the United States, Russia, India, and South Korea). These weapons are stored at 26 declared storage facilities in three of the four countries (excluding Russia, which has not yet made public the number of its CW storage facilities). An additional five states parties have declared current or past CW productionfacilities(theUnitedKingdom, China, France, Japan, and a fifth unnamed state). The number of production facilities declared by nine states parties amounts to 42. In addition, seven states parties have declared old and/or abandoned CW (Belgium, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2064" task="">
  <question>
    What does the DOD plan to do to secure Russia's CW stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on helping Russia build a facility to destroy its extensive nerve agent stockpile rather than securing the sites where its nerve agent is stored. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2065" task="">
  <question>
    When will Russia's first CW destruction facility be completed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, the destruction facility will not be completed until 2006, and it could be another 40 years before Russia's stockpile would be completely destroyed. In 2001, DOD began helping Russia secure two sites that store nerve agent against external threats, which it estimates will be complete in fall 2003. DOD selected these two sites because they store nerve agent munitions that are small and easily portable. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2066" task="">
  <question>
    Does the US Department of Defense (DOD) plan to secure all of Russia's CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, DOD has no plans to help secure three other Russian nerve agent storage sites that store 65 percent of Russia's declared nerve agent stockpile. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2067" task="">
  <question>
    How many of Russia's CW facilities did the US Department of Defense try to secure? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DOD's decision to limit its work to two nerve agent sites leaves the issue of site security over the majority of Russia's nerve agent stockpile unresolved. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2068" task="">
  <question>
    How does Russia plan to move CW from its storage facilities to its CW destruction facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, even though Russia plans to move its nerve agent munitions by rail, in some cases hundreds of miles, to the destruction facility, Russia and DOD have not developed plans to secure the nerve agent while it is being transported. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2069" task="">
  <question>
    What measures has Russia taken to secure its CW while they are being transported to a CW destruction facility? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, even though Russia plans to move its nerve agent munitions by rail, in some cases hundreds of miles, to the destruction facility, Russia and DOD have not developed plans to secure the nerve agent while it is being transported. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2070" task="">
  <question>
    What challenges does Russia face in trying to destroy all of its CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense reassess the need for improved security at chemical weapons sites and work with Russian officials to develop a plan to secure Russian chemical weapons during transit. GAO also suggests that Congress consider funding security improvements at the three remaining chemical weapons sites that have not received U.S. security assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2071" task="">
  <question>
    What Russian branch is responsible for warhead security and maintenance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the branch of the Russian military specifically responsible for warhead security and maintenance 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2072" task="">
  <question>
    What threat does Russia's CW pose to U.S. national security interests? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian government would also prefer to focus on destroying chemical weapons rather than securing chemical weapons sites. Although Russia has publicly stated it plans to destroy its declared chemical weapons stockpile by 2012, it will likely take much longer. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion and pose a potential threat to U.S. national security interests. In addition, Russia will have to move most of its nerve agent several hundred miles by rail from current storage sites to the planned chemical weapons destruction facility. However, DOD and Russia have not begun discussions on the security that will be required for chemical munitions, as they are moved hundreds of miles from current storage sites to the planned chemical weapons destruction facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2073" task="">
  <question>
    What is Russia planning to do to minimize the security risks posed by its CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian government would also prefer to focus on destroying chemical weapons rather than securing chemical weapons sites. Although Russia has publicly stated it plans to destroy its declared chemical weapons stockpile by 2012, it will likely take much longer. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2074" task="">
  <question>
    How long will it take for Russia to destroy its CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Russia has publicly stated it plans to destroy its declared chemical weapons stockpile by 2012, it will likely take much longer. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2075" task="">
  <question>
    How large is Russia's arsenal of NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world. Unclassified U.S. estimates of the current number of Russia's nuclear warheads range from 18,000 to 25,000, and Russia inherited an estimated 600 metric tons of the uranium and plutonium that could be used to build nuclear devices. Russia also assumed control of more than 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons and an extensive complex of sites used in research on dangerous biological pathogens, such as smallpox and anthrax, and the development of those pathogens as biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2076" task="">
  <question>
    Is Russia eliminating its stockpiles of CBW as scheduled? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In April 1999, we reported that DOD's efforts to help Russia destroy its chemical weapons stockpile was behind schedule. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 1999). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2077" task="">
  <question>
    What information does DOD have regarding Russian CW site locations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DOD has limited information on the location and security of Russian sites with dangerous biological pathogens because the Russian government has provided limited access to and information about these sites. While DOD plans to address internal and external security threats at biological sites in Russia, it has no time frames for completing this work, and it has not determined how many biological sites in Russia should receive security improvements. After more than 4 years of effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security concerns at these sites. As of December 2002, DOD had installed security equipment at two sites to protect against external security threats but had not addressed insider threats by increasing controls over access to materials or improving physical security within labs. U.S. efforts to secure biological sites in Russia have faced significant challenges. For example, the Russian government has closed many sites to U.S. security assistance programs, and the United States has been unable to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would expedite DOD's ability to provide security assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2078" task="">
  <question>
    What are biological pathogens? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological pathogens are viruses such as smallpox, bacteria such as anthrax, and toxins such as botulinum toxin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2079" task="">
  <question>
    How can biological pathogens be dispersed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dangerous biological pathogens can be genetically engineered and combined with dispersion technology, such as bombs or artillery shells to create weapons of mass destruction that cause illness or death in humans, animals, or plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2080" task="">
  <question>
    What do biological pathogens do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dangerous biological pathogens can be genetically engineered and combined with dispersion technology, such as bombs or artillery shells to create weapons of mass destruction that cause illness or death in humans, animals, or plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2081" task="">
  <question>
    Where are BW produced in Russia?? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    biological pathogens are small and difficult to detect, making them easy to steal. Once stolen, they can be grown almost anywhere. Russian biological sites have weak internal controls over access to pathogen collections. For example, as shown in figure 5, a lock and a seal of string pressed into wax secure an area at a former biological weapons site where dangerous pathogens are stored. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2082" task="">
  <question>
    How secure are Russia's BW and biological pathogens? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    biological pathogens are small and difficult to detect, making them easy to steal. Once stolen, they can be grown almost anywhere. Russian biological sites have weak internal controls over access to pathogen collections. For example, as shown in figure 5, a lock and a seal of string pressed into wax secure an area at a former biological weapons site where dangerous pathogens are stored. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2083" task="">
  <question>
    What is the level of security at most of Russia's BW sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    biological pathogens are small and difficult to detect, making them easy to steal. Once stolen, they can be grown almost anywhere. Russian biological sites have weak internal controls over access to pathogen collections. For example, as shown in figure 5, a lock and a seal of string pressed into wax secure an area at a former biological weapons site where dangerous pathogens are stored. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2084" task="">
  <question>
    Why hasn't the US received full access to Russian BW sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian government has not provided DOD with a complete inventory of all the sites in Russia that store dangerous pathogens. The United States and Russia have collaborative research projects at 49 Russian biological sites, a number that includes many former biological weapons facilities. These sites have provided participating U.S. agencies with opportunities to observe the security needs at these sites.3 However, DOD has projects under way and thus direct knowledge of the security needs at only 14 of the 49 sites. DOD's information on the other sites is limited because DOD officials have to rely on other U.S. agencies to notify the department if they observe dangerous pathogen collections or have biosecurity concerns at the facilities where they operate. However, U.S. agencies have not received full access to information at the biological sites because the managers of these facilities are concerned about Russian national security and want to conceal former participation in the Soviet biological weapons program, according to a DOD official. To help focus its assistance, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2085" task="">
  <question>
    What are the internal security threats to Russia's biological sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological sites have unique characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to internal security threats, however. Experts have stated that there is a greater threat of potential proliferation of dangerous pathogens from insiders than from an outside attack because biological pathogens are small and can be smuggled out of a site without detection. According to a U.S. biosecurity expert, managers at Russian biological sites have been slow to acknowledge the potential of internal security threats. For example, officials at the Russian biological sites we visited stated that they knew their staff well and would notice if an individual posed a security threat because laboratory staff live and work in close quarters. These officials recognized the potential for insider security threats and said they would consider measures to mitigate these threats. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2086" task="">
  <question>
    What were the largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DOD has upgraded security at the two largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2087" task="">
  <question>
    Where are Russia's largest CW facilities located? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    wo largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). Also, in 2002, DOD began assessments for physical security improvements at two additional centers: the Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2088" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Russian State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    wo largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). Also, in 2002, DOD began assessments for physical security improvements at two additional centers: the Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2089" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Russian State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    wo largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). Also, in 2002, DOD began assessments for physical security improvements at two additional centers: the Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2090" task="">
  <question>
    What does Russia store at its BW sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Vector, one of the world's two declared sites of smallpox storage, contains a large collection of viral pathogens. Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that includes genetically engineered anthrax. Golitsino and Pokrov were part of the Soviet Union's extensive bioweapons program that was directed toward the development of plant and animal pathogens. Other sites, including Russia's system of antiplague sites, which are believed to store various strains of the plague and other pathogens, may have more dangerous pathogens than Golitsino and Pokrov, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2091" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Russia's store smallpox? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Vector, one of the world's two declared sites of smallpox storage, contains a large collection of viral pathogens. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2092" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Russia store its plague? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Other sites, including Russia's system of antiplague sites, which are believed to store various strains of the plague and other pathogens, may have more dangerous pathogens than Golitsino and Pokrov, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2093" task="">
  <question>
    What are the names of some of Russia's BW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Golitsino and Pokrov were part of the Soviet Union's extensive bioweapons program that was directed toward the development of plant and animal pathogens. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2094" task="">
  <question>
    Where does Russia store anthrax? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that includes genetically engineered anthrax. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2095" task="">
  <question>
    Does Russia have genetically modified BW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that includes genetically engineered anthrax. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2096" task="">
  <question>
    Who oversees Russia's BW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Multiple Russian organizations and ministries have jurisdiction over the military and civilian centers that were part of the former biological weapons complex in Russia. Jurisdiction resides in nine Russian government organizations: The Ministries of Defense, Health, Science, Agriculture, and Education; the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences; the Russian Academy of Agricultural Science; the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences; and Biopreparat, an organization that now develops pharmaceuticals but previously controlled the Soviet Union's biological weapons technology centers. In addition, the Ministry of Health has five antiplague institutes and numerous regional field stations that maintain pathogen collections and had a lead role in the Soviet Union's bioweapons program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2097" task="">
  <question>
    Who maintains the antiplague institutes in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hile DOD has identified several former biological weapons sites in Russia where it would like to provide biological security assistance, the Russian government has consistently refused to grant DOD access to certain facilities managed by the ministries of Health, Defense, and Agriculture. For example, the Russian Ministry of Health maintains five antiplague institutes and a network of numerous antiplague field stations. These institutes and stations were part of the former Soviet system of medical facilities housing dangerous pathogen collections for research and are completely closed to U.S. assistance programs. Bioweapons experts have 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2098" task="">
  <question>
    Which Russian BW facilities specialize in animal diseases communicable to man? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    reported that, as part of the Soviet bioweapons program, the anti-plague network helped identify new virulent strains of pathogens and participated in research on defensive measures. These facilities specialized in animal diseases that are communicable to man, such as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and cholera. According to DOD officials, the ministry was concerned that participation in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs would be an admission that the antiplague centers had taken part in the Soviet biological weapons program. DOD also lacks access to four former Ministry of Defense biological weapons sites. These laboratories were involved in pathogen- and toxin-related research and maintained large pathogen collections. A major animal pathogen institute of the Ministry of Agriculture also remains closed to biosecurity assistance. DOD has made some progress in gaining access to one of the four Ministry of Defense facilities. In August 2002, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar was instrumental in initiating discussions with the management of the former Ministry of Defense facility, Kirov-200 (Strizhi), about potential collaborative research projects, according to a DOD official. The Russian government has nearly completed a transfer of ownership of the facility from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education. This institute's new civilian status is expected to enable future security projects with DOD. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2099" task="">
  <question>
    What BW research into diseases was conducted by Russian BW facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These facilities specialized in animal diseases that are communicable to man, such as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and cholera. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2100" task="">
  <question>
    How is Russia transferring its former BW facilities to industrial use? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian government has nearly completed a transfer of ownership of the facility from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education. This institute's new civilian status is expected to enable future security projects with DOD. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2101" task="">
  <question>
    What has been the DOD's focus since the early 1990's with regards Russia's chemical weapon stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the early 1990s, DOD has focused its nonproliferation efforts on the construction of a facility to destroy Russia's 40,000 metric ton stockpile of chemical weapons. Because construction of the facility was taking longer than expected, in fiscal year 2000, Congress directed DOD to develop additional plans to protect Russia's chemical weapons storage sites. DOD has since developed plans to address external threats at two chemical weapons sites that store nerve agent in small portable munitions. DOD plans to complete this work in fall 2003 but has no plans to extend the program to the five other sites, three of which store nerve agent and two that store blister agent. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2102" task="">
  <question>
    How many of Russia's sites store nerve agent? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),1 Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, the largest stockpile in the world. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),2 the implementing agency of the CWC, conducts inspections at chemical weapons facilities and reports its findings to member states, including the United States. OPCW regularly inspects Russia's chemical weapons stockpile. DOD has information concerning the quantity, location, and physical security conditions at Russia's declared chemical weapons storage sites and has plans to address external security at two sites. However, chemical weapons are stored at seven sites in Russia (see table 2). Five of these sites store nerve agent, which is considered the most dangerous form of chemical weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2103" task="">
  <question>
    How many tons of CW has Russia admitted to having? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),1 Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, the largest stockpile in the world 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2104" task="">
  <question>
    How large is Russia's CW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),1 Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, the largest stockpile in the world. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2105" task="">
  <question>
    What is considered to be the most dangerous form of chemical weapon? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Five of these sites store nerve agent, which is considered the most dangerous form of chemical weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2106" task="">
  <question>
    What does Russia's nerve agent stockpile consist of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is lethal to a human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2107" task="">
  <question>
    What does nerve agent do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is lethal to a human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2108" task="">
  <question>
    What is a lethal dose of nerve agent? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is lethal to a human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2109" task="">
  <question>
    Why is Shchuch'ye a greater threat to U.S.? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shchuch'ye, pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests.4 Further, a destruction facility for blister agents funded mainly by Germany began operation in December 2002. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2110" task="">
  <question>
    How can nerve agent be transported or delivered? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2111" task="">
  <question>
    What does Russia's blister agent stockpile include? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's blister agent stockpile includes mustard gas, lewisite, and mustard-lewisite mixture. Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled but generally cause slow-to-heal burns on contact with skin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2112" task="">
  <question>
    Are blister agents lethal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's blister agent stockpile includes mustard gas, lewisite, and mustard-lewisite mixture. Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled but generally cause slow-to-heal burns on contact with skin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2113" task="">
  <question>
    Who is responsible for Russia's chemical weapons stockpile and destruction? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The head of the Russian Munitions Agency, the agency charged with the safe storage and destruction of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile, stated that his preference is that the United States fund the completion of the planned chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye rather than improve the security around Russia's chemical weapons storage sites. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2114" task="">
  <question>
    How many nerve agent chemical weapons are there at Shchuch'ye? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Storage Site (Shchuch'ye) - Russia stores nearly 2 million artillery shells filled with nerve agent chemical weapons at Shchuch'ye. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2115" task="">
  <question>
    What is the size of the current Russian CW stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons agents in the Russian stockpile (excluding munitions weight). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2116" task="">
  <question>
    Where is the Russian CW stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    These agents are located at seven sites, mainly concentrated in western Russia, along the Volga River basin (see Figure 1): Pochep (Bryansk oblast), Maradikovsky (Kirov oblast), Leonidovka (Penza oblast), Shuchye (Kurgan oblast), Kizner (Udmurtia Republic), Kambarka (Udmurtia Republic), and Gorny (Saratov oblast). Russian CW agents are distributed fairly uniformly across these stockpiles, with approximately 15 to 20 percent of the Russian total stored at each location, with the exception of Gorny, which holds only three percent (see Table 1) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2117" task="">
  <question>
    What does the Russian chemical weapon stockpile consist of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The composition of the stockpile consists primarily (80 percent of the total, or 32,300 metric tons) of organophosphorus nerve agents (VX, sarin, soman), with the remainder (20 percent, or 7,700 metric tons) composed of blister agents (mustard gas, lewisite, or a mustard/lewisite mixture) and phosgene. As shown in Table 1, most of the nerve agents are housed at five of the storage facilities. The bulk of lewisite and mustard gas, however, are stored in Kambarka, with lesser amounts in Kizner, Gorny, and Maradikovsky. The lewisite and mustard gas are primarily kept as bulk agents in storage tanks, whereas the nerve agents and phosgene are stored in munitions (see Table 2) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2118" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Stanislav Petrov? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As Colonel General Stanislav Petrov, commander of Russia's chemical and biological defense forces, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2119" task="">
  <question>
    Is it easy to obtain Russian CWs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    his stems from the inadequate protection of Russian CW stocks. Poor physical obstacles, the absence of electronic security devices, and rudimentary inventory practices make the Russian CW storage facilities susceptible to theft. Even Russia's own military officers have described the security measures at these facilities as &quot;inadequate,&quot; pointing out that the chemical arsenal is &quot;more vulnerable to theft&quot; since the locations of Russia's seven storage facilities have become a matter of public record.20 In 1995, Dr. Amy Smithson published a Stimson Center report, &quot;Improving the Security of Russia's Chemical Weapons Stockpile,&quot; based on interviews with visitors to the CW facilities. The report offers disturbing insights into the condition and accessibility of the Russian CW storage facilities.21 To emphasize the current danger of CW theft, a potential terrorist scenario will be outlined in the following paragraphs. The conditions described at the sample facility reflect those depicted in Dr. Smithson's report (See Table 3). Under the cover of night, a terrorist unit makes its move. Upon entering the storage compound, the unit encounters chain-link or barbed wire fences surrounding the perimeter of the facility (some either rusted or with holes). The terrorists pass directly through the worn fences or perhaps through one of the poorly secured side entrances. Only the main gates are consistently guarded; side entrances provide several alternative routes for entry and escape. Perimeter lights are scant and in poor condition, providing camouflage for potential theft. The absence of intruder alarms at the multiple entryways makes entrance easy. Once inside the compound, the terrorist team moves easily to the individual CW storage buildings. There they find run-down buildings constructed of cement or wood, with either steel or wooden doors. Entry can be obtained by slipping through holes in the roofing, or by picking the single-key padlocks on the doors. No guards are present outside the storage units to deter the assailants. The absence of tamper-detection seals, electronic intruder sensors, or video cameras at the individual storage buildings allows the terrorist unit to enter undetected. Inside the storage buildings, the terrorists find munitions and missile warheads stacked in &quot;wine-rack&quot; type storage units, with only production lot numbers (not serial numbers) tracking their existence. Containers for the missile warheads and bulk CW storage drums are typically unsealed. The terrorists need simply remove a few munitions or warheads and place them into a backpack before escaping into the night. It might take days for the missing CW weapons to be noticed, leaving ample time for the terrorists to threaten a civilian target. The frightening potential for CW theft by terrorists is summarized by one of Smithson's interviewees, who warned, &quot;You could really walk into that place without any problem. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2120" task="">
  <question>
    Who is responsible for tracking Russian CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the Russian system, individual officers are personally responsible for keeping track of hundreds of chemical weapons, typically stored throughout several buildings. Although written records are kept, no computers have been installed to log and inventory the massive quantities of munitions. It is also unclear whether inventory records are updated to reflect the periodic removal of leaking munitions. Further, although the officers are held personally responsible for CW whereabouts, it is actually enlisted soldiers who conduct the inventory. At present, there is no established method for cross-checking inventories on a routine basis. Since tamper-detection seals on the weapons are rare, this could result in one or more soldiers and/or officers removing small quantities of CW munitions over time without detection. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2121" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Anatoliy Kuntsevich? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Former Chemical Troops General Anatoliy Kuntsevich was charged by the Russian Federal Security Service with delivering 800 kilograms of CW precursors to Syrian buyers in 1993 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2122" task="">
  <question>
    Who should one suspect if Russian CWs are missing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although Dr. Smithson's report states that the soldiers interviewed at the CW facilities did not appear to be discontented, these soldiers probably suffer from erratic and paltry pay, as has been reported for soldiers at nuclear weapons facilities. Massive Russian CW stockpiles, lack of inventory practices, poor security measures at storage facilities, depressed economic conditions, and widespread military and government corruption create a climate ripe for CW theft from within. One of Dr. Smithson's sources offers a sobering prediction: &quot;Sooner or later, someone will make the soldiers at these sites a better offer than Moscow does. If something was missing, it is likely to be an inside job. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2123" task="">
  <question>
    How can the chemical weapons be used? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Once chemical weapons are in the hands of a terrorist group, carrying out a CW attack on an unsuspecting civilian population could prove to be simple. There are a variety of chemical munitions that are relatively small in size, making them easy to conceal and transport. Protective clothing and gas masks are commercially available. Compared to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons would be much more straightforward to employ. Chemical weapons are not protected by the Permissive Action Links (PALs) that are often placed on individual nuclear weapons.33 Stolen chemical munitions could be delivered using many existing conventional systems, or in homemade reconfigured designs. Although such use would require some effort and coordination, the Aum example suggests that it would be possible for an organization with sufficient resources and technological infrastructure. Terrorist groups such as Aum need only show their capability and willingness to acquire and use WMD to threaten US national security, since &quot;backpack-sized chemical or biological weapons, too small, improvised, and fragile to have an impact on a battlefield or against soldiers equipped for chemical and biological defense, could nonetheless be devastating against some civilian targets. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2124" task="">
  <question>
    Is it easy to transport and use Russian CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Once chemical weapons are in the hands of a terrorist group, carrying out a CW attack on an unsuspecting civilian population could prove to be simple. There are a variety of chemical munitions that are relatively small in size, making them easy to conceal and transport. Protective clothing and gas masks are commercially available. Compared to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons would be much more straightforward to employ. Chemical weapons are not protected by the Permissive Action Links (PALs) that are often placed on individual nuclear weapons.33 Stolen chemical munitions could be delivered using many existing conventional systems, or in homemade reconfigured designs. Although such use would require some effort and coordination, the Aum example suggests that it would be possible for an organization with sufficient resources and technological infrastructure. Terrorist groups such as Aum need only show their capability and willingness to acquire and use WMD to threaten US national security, since &quot;backpack-sized chemical or biological weapons, too small, improvised, and fragile to have an impact on a battlefield or against soldiers equipped for chemical and biological defense, could nonetheless be devastating against some civilian targets. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2125" task="">
  <question>
    What is General Stanislav Petrov's attitude towards CTR funding? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hemical weapons General Stanislav Petrov's attitude towards CTR funding can be observed in his following remarks: The Americans attached all sort of strings to this aid, which essentially boils down to extracting the maximum information about Russia's military-chemical potential in exchange for American money. It is very difficult to work with them. Much easier to work with the Germans, for instance. They do not attach any conditions. They make money available and only ask us to provide precise reports on where the money is going...this is all real, with no strings attached--political or otherwise 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2126" task="">
  <question>
    What does Stanislav think about working with the Germans in regards CTR funding? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hemical weapons General Stanislav Petrov's attitude towards CTR funding can be observed in his following remarks: The Americans attached all sort of strings to this aid, which essentially boils down to extracting the maximum information about Russia's military-chemical potential in exchange for American money. It is very difficult to work with them. Much easier to work with the Germans, for instance. They do not attach any conditions. They make money available and only ask us to provide precise reports on where the money is going...this is all real, with no strings attached--political or otherwise 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2127" task="">
  <question>
    What is the CFE? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    complements the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). CFE jurisdiction is limited to west of the Ural Mountains, while the OST allows unrestricted territorial coverage of participating countries. The OST also is an intelligence supplement for many states, especially helping those with 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2128" task="">
  <question>
    How many countries currently possess chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At least 20 countries currently possess chemical weapons (CW) or are attempting to produce them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2129" task="">
  <question>
    What is the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Chemical Weapons Convention The CWC is the most comprehensive and intrusive multilateral treaty ever signed. The CWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of CW.10 The CWC calls for the destruction of any CW stockpiles and production facilities. The CWC even prevents assistance to other states in acquiring a CW capability. It involves the monitoring of both government and commercial sectors of chemical production, requiring extensive reporting by each. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2130" task="">
  <question>
    Who admittedly has chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Only three states have admitted CW programs, the United States, Russia, and Iraq; however, many more states are suspected of having CW or attempting to acquire them. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2131" task="">
  <question>
    Who could hide chemical weapon production? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The production methods for chemical weapons are harder to detect than those for nuclear weapons. The feed chemicals used for production of CW have myriad commercial uses such as production of pesticides, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, and even pen ink. Much of the equipment and processes are also used in commercial enterprises.13 Developed countries with many diverse commercial chemical production plants could hide illicit production. Underdeveloped countries would attract more attention in their procurement processes through the types of raw materials they purchase or produce domestically. The types of plant facilities they import and assemble, such as high-quality, corrosion-resistant reactors, piping, and valves or sophisticated filtration systems may also attract attention. Still, supply-side nonproliferation is extremely difficult because of the dual uses of chemicals and equipment. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2132" task="">
  <question>
    What is the difference between unitary or binary weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Chemical weapons may be unitary or binary in design. Unitary weapons are ready to use, but can be less stable and may have a shorter shelf life. Binary weapons have two separate component chemicals that are mixed just prior to launch to form a lethal agent. In advanced binary munitions, the two chemicals combine while the shell or warhead is en route to the target. Binary precursors are listed under Schedule 2 of the CWC, but the component chemicals of some binary chemical weapons may not be on any CWC schedule. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2133" task="">
  <question>
    Are there any recent chemical weapon developments? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Bailey, the Soviets developed a new binary agent purportedly more toxic than the most deadly form of the highly-lethal nerve agent VX after they declared unilaterally in 1987 that they would cease development and production of CW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2134" task="">
  <question>
    How can one find a chemical plant? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the process of detecting CW production, there are two types of effluents released from a chemical plant: controlled smokestack emissions and &quot;fugitive&quot; emissions.15 Smokestack emissions are planned emissions from the production facility and would be filtered. Fugitive emissions are stray emissions in either production, testing, or storage and would be unintended. Chemical weapons production would be easier to detect through the unintended or accidental release of effluents since they would not be filtered or disguised and probably would be in greater concentration than planned emissions. However, essentially perfect timing would be required to catch fugitive emissions; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2135" task="">
  <question>
    What is LIDAR? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Using a technique known as LIDAR (Light Detection And Ranging), a laser beam is directed into an effluent plume and the reflected coherent light used to identify chemical constituents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2136" task="">
  <question>
    What is DIAL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Using other optical detection techniques such as infrared DIAL (Differential Absorption LIDAR), real-time analysis can be done on smokestack or fugitive emissions released from a facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2137" task="">
  <question>
    What does CALIOPE do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are currently two programs to develop infrared DIAL technology. The first, CALIOPE (Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents), is sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE), and is being studied by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2138" task="">
  <question>
    What is Project Nable? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A spin-off of CALIOPE is the Project Nable, which is a joint effort by the DOE, the U.S. Army, and the U.S. Air Force 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2139" task="">
  <question>
    Who has CW laser remotesensing? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian military has the world's only fielded CW laser remotesensing system; the Hungarian military has developed a helicopter-mounted system; the Czech Republic has developed a truck-mounted system; and the Slovak military has developed a man-portable system for battlefield use 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/33/rowe33.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2140" task="">
  <question>
    Who has reportedly used Russian chemical weapons recently? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Security measures around Russian weapons facilities are poorly maintained, making insider theft or terrorist attack possible. The vulnerability of Russia's CW has been made plain in recent news headlines. In 1996, through an undercover sting operation, the Istanbul Security Directorate seized Russian-made mustard gas and sarin.10 According to the Istanbul newspaper, Hurriyet, detectives agreed to buy 20 tubes of CW agents from seller Emin Ekinci for $1 million. Ekinci arrived at the exchange carrying the tubes of nerve and blister agents in a plastic bag and was promptly arrested after the transaction. In his subsequent interrogation by police, Ekinci disclosed that he had acquired the mustard gas from a former KGB officer in Russia. Ekinci's deposition states that he was prepared to sell the containers to anyone who would pay for them. In 1997, Chechnyen terrorist leader Salman Raduyev declared his acquisition of Russian chemical weapons and made public threats to use them.11 More recently, the London Times has alleged that Hezbollah guerillas have attempted to purchase chemical and biological weapons from Eastern Europe.12 These purported cases of acquisition or diversion reinforce the chilling reality that terrorists have expressed a keen interest in securing chemical weaponry from the former Soviet Union, posing a real threat to US and international security. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol06/62/vogel62.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2141" task="">
  <question>
    What is OPCW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1997, marked the beginning of the operation of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the Netherlands. This organization consists of three major bodies: the Conference of State Parties (CSP), the primary policymaking forum comprising all member-states; the 41-country ExecutiveCouncil,responsibleforoverseeing the day-to-day activities of the organization; and the Technical Secretariat, including the professional staff and inspectorate. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2142" task="">
  <question>
    What states have CW stockpiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Four states have declared possession of CW stockpiles (the United States, Russia, India, and South Korea). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2143" task="">
  <question>
    How many CW storage facilities does Russia have? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Four states have declared possession of CW stockpiles (the United States, Russia, India, and South Korea). These weapons are stored at 26 declared storage facilities in three of the four countries (excluding Russia, which has not yet made public the number of its CW storage facilities). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2144" task="">
  <question>
    Who has current or past cw production facilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Four states have declared possession of CW stockpiles (the United States, Russia, India, and South Korea). These weapons are stored at 26 declared storage facilities in three of the four countries (excluding Russia, which has not yet made public the number of its CW storage facilities). An additional five states parties have declared current or past CW productionfacilities(theUnitedKingdom, China, France, Japan, and a fifth unnamed state). The number of production facilities declared by nine states parties amounts to 42. In addition, seven states parties have declared old and/or abandoned CW (Belgium, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/kelle53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2145" task="">
  <question>
    What does the DOD plan to do to secure Russia's cw stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on helping Russia build a facility to destroy its extensive nerve agent stockpile rather than securing the sites where its nerve agent is stored. However, the destruction facility will not be completed until 2006, and it could be another 40 years before Russia's stockpile would be completely destroyed. In 2001, DOD began helping Russia secure two sites that store nerve agent against external threats, which it estimates will be complete in fall 2003. DOD selected these two sites because they store nerve agent munitions that are small and easily portable. However, DOD has no plans to help secure three other Russian nerve agent storage sites that store 65 percent of Russia's declared nerve agent stockpile. DOD's decision to limit its work to two nerve agent sites leaves the issue of site security over the majority of Russia's nerve agent stockpile unresolved. In addition, even though Russia plans to move its nerve agent munitions by rail, in some cases hundreds of miles, to the destruction facility, Russia and DOD have not developed plans to secure the nerve agent while it is being transported. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense reassess the need for improved security at chemical weapons sites and work with Russian officials to develop a plan to secure Russian chemical weapons during transit. GAO also suggests that Congress consider funding security improvements at the three remaining chemical weapons sites that have not received U.S. security assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2146" task="">
  <question>
    What Russian branch is responsible for warhead security and maintenance? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the branch of the Russian military specifically responsible for warhead security and maintenance 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2147" task="">
  <question>
    What is the threat to U.S. national security interests? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian government would also prefer to focus on destroying chemical weapons rather than securing chemical weapons sites. Although Russia has publicly stated it plans to destroy its declared chemical weapons stockpile by 2012, it will likely take much longer. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion and pose a potential threat to U.S. national security interests. In addition, Russia will have to move most of its nerve agent several hundred miles by rail from current storage sites to the planned chemical weapons destruction facility. However, DOD and Russia have not begun discussions on the security that will be required for chemical munitions, as they are moved hundreds of miles from current storage sites to the planned chemical weapons destruction facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2148" task="">
  <question>
    What are the US estimates of WMD in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world. Unclassified U.S. estimates of the current number of Russia's nuclear warheads range from 18,000 to 25,000, and Russia inherited an estimated 600 metric tons of the uranium and plutonium that could be used to build nuclear devices. Russia also assumed control of more than 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons and an extensive complex of sites used in research on dangerous biological pathogens, such as smallpox and anthrax, and the development of those pathogens as biological weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2149" task="">
  <question>
    Is Russia eliminating its stockpiles of WMD as scheduled? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In April 1999, we reported that DOD's efforts to help Russia destroy its chemical weapons stockpile was behind schedule. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 1999). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2150" task="">
  <question>
    What information does DOD have regarding Russian CW site locations? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DOD has limited information on the location and security of Russian sites with dangerous biological pathogens because the Russian government has provided limited access to and information about these sites. While DOD plans to address internal and external security threats at biological sites in Russia, it has no time frames for completing this work, and it has not determined how many biological sites in Russia should receive security improvements. After more than 4 years of effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security concerns at these sites. As of December 2002, DOD had installed security equipment at two sites to protect against external security threats but had not addressed insider threats by increasing controls over access to materials or improving physical security within labs. U.S. efforts to secure biological sites in Russia have faced significant challenges. For example, the Russian government has closed many sites to U.S. security assistance programs, and the United States has been unable to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would expedite DOD's ability to provide security assistance. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2151" task="">
  <question>
    What are biological pathogens? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological pathogens are viruses such as smallpox, bacteria such as anthrax, and toxins such as botulinum toxin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2152" task="">
  <question>
    How can biological pathogens be dispersed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dangerous biological pathogens can be genetically engineered and combined with dispersion technology, such as bombs or artillery shells to create weapons of mass destruction that cause illness or death in humans, animals, or plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2153" task="">
  <question>
    What do biological pathogens do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dangerous biological pathogens can be genetically engineered and combined with dispersion technology, such as bombs or artillery shells to create weapons of mass destruction that cause illness or death in humans, animals, or plants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2154" task="">
  <question>
    Where can biological pathogens be produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    biological pathogens are small and difficult to detect, making them easy to steal. Once stolen, they can be grown almost anywhere. Russian biological sites have weak internal controls over access to pathogen collections. For example, as shown in figure 5, a lock and a seal of string pressed into wax secure an area at a former biological weapons site where dangerous pathogens are stored. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2155" task="">
  <question>
    Why hasn't the US received full access to information at Russian biological sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Russian government has not provided DOD with a complete inventory of all the sites in Russia that store dangerous pathogens. The United States and Russia have collaborative research projects at 49 Russian biological sites, a number that includes many former biological weapons facilities. These sites have provided participating U.S. agencies with opportunities to observe the security needs at these sites.3 However, DOD has projects under way and thus direct knowledge of the security needs at only 14 of the 49 sites. DOD's information on the other sites is limited because DOD officials have to rely on other U.S. agencies to notify the department if they observe dangerous pathogen collections or have biosecurity concerns at the facilities where they operate. However, U.S. agencies have not received full access to information at the biological sites because the managers of these facilities are concerned about Russian national security and want to conceal former participation in the Soviet biological weapons program, according to a DOD official. To help focus its assistance, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2156" task="">
  <question>
    What are the internal security threats to Russia's biological sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Biological sites have unique characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to internal security threats, however. Experts have stated that there is a greater threat of potential proliferation of dangerous pathogens from insiders than from an outside attack because biological pathogens are small and can be smuggled out of a site without detection. According to a U.S. biosecurity expert, managers at Russian biological sites have been slow to acknowledge the potential of internal security threats. For example, officials at the Russian biological sites we visited stated that they knew their staff well and would notice if an individual posed a security threat because laboratory staff live and work in close quarters. These officials recognized the potential for insider security threats and said they would consider measures to mitigate these threats. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2157" task="">
  <question>
    What were the largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    DOD has upgraded security at the two largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2158" task="">
  <question>
    What are known cw facilities in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    wo largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). Also, in 2002, DOD began assessments for physical security improvements at two additional centers: the Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2159" task="">
  <question>
    What is contained in Russia's biological weapons sites? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Vector, one of the world's two declared sites of smallpox storage, contains a large collection of viral pathogens. Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that includes genetically engineered anthrax. Golitsino and Pokrov were part of the Soviet Union's extensive bioweapons program that was directed toward the development of plant and animal pathogens. Other sites, including Russia's system of antiplague sites, which are believed to store various strains of the plague and other pathogens, may have more dangerous pathogens than Golitsino and Pokrov, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2160" task="">
  <question>
    Where is Russia's smallpox storage? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Vector, one of the world's two declared sites of smallpox storage, contains a large collection of viral pathogens. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2161" task="">
  <question>
    Where is antranx in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that includes genetically engineered anthrax. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2162" task="">
  <question>
    Who has jurisdiction of the former biological weapons complex in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Multiple Russian organizations and ministries have jurisdiction over the military and civilian centers that were part of the former biological weapons complex in Russia. Jurisdiction resides in nine Russian government organizations: The Ministries of Defense, Health, Science, Agriculture, and Education; the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences; the Russian Academy of Agricultural Science; the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences; and Biopreparat, an organization that now develops pharmaceuticals but previously controlled the Soviet Union's biological weapons technology centers. In addition, the Ministry of Health has five antiplague institutes and numerous regional field stations that maintain pathogen collections and had a lead role in the Soviet Union's bioweapons program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2163" task="">
  <question>
    Who maintains the antiplague institutes in Russia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    hile DOD has identified several former biological weapons sites in Russia where it would like to provide biological security assistance, the Russian government has consistently refused to grant DOD access to certain facilities managed by the ministries of Health, Defense, and Agriculture. For example, the Russian Ministry of Health maintains five antiplague institutes and a network of numerous antiplague field stations. These institutes and stations were part of the former Soviet system of medical facilities housing dangerous pathogen collections for research and are completely closed to U.S. assistance programs. Bioweapons experts have 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2164" task="">
  <question>
    Which facilities specialize in animal diseases communicable to man? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    reported that, as part of the Soviet bioweapons program, the anti-plague network helped identify new virulent strains of pathogens and participated in research on defensive measures. These facilities specialized in animal diseases that are communicable to man, such as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and cholera. According to DOD officials, the ministry was concerned that participation in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs would be an admission that the antiplague centers had taken part in the Soviet biological weapons program. DOD also lacks access to four former Ministry of Defense biological weapons sites. These laboratories were involved in pathogen- and toxin-related research and maintained large pathogen collections. A major animal pathogen institute of the Ministry of Agriculture also remains closed to biosecurity assistance. DOD has made some progress in gaining access to one of the four Ministry of Defense facilities. In August 2002, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar was instrumental in initiating discussions with the management of the former Ministry of Defense facility, Kirov-200 (Strizhi), about potential collaborative research projects, according to a DOD official. The Russian government has nearly completed a transfer of ownership of the facility from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education. This institute's new civilian status is expected to enable future security projects with DOD. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2165" task="">
  <question>
    What has been the DOD's focus since the early 1990's with regards Russia's chemical weapon stockpile? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the early 1990s, DOD has focused its nonproliferation efforts on the construction of a facility to destroy Russia's 40,000 metric ton stockpile of chemical weapons. Because construction of the facility was taking longer than expected, in fiscal year 2000, Congress directed DOD to develop additional plans to protect Russia's chemical weapons storage sites. DOD has since developed plans to address external threats at two chemical weapons sites that store nerve agent in small portable munitions. DOD plans to complete this work in fall 2003 but has no plans to extend the program to the five other sites, three of which store nerve agent and two that store blister agent. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2166" task="">
  <question>
    How many of Russia's sites store nerve agent? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    n 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),1 Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, the largest stockpile in the world. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),2 the implementing agency of the CWC, conducts inspections at chemical weapons facilities and reports its findings to member states, including the United States. OPCW regularly inspects Russia's chemical weapons stockpile. DOD has information concerning the quantity, location, and physical security conditions at Russia's declared chemical weapons storage sites and has plans to address external security at two sites. However, chemical weapons are stored at seven sites in Russia (see table 2). Five of these sites store nerve agent, which is considered the most dangerous form of chemical weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2167" task="">
  <question>
    What is considered to be the most dangerous form of chemical weapon? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Five of these sites store nerve agent, which is considered the most dangerous form of chemical weapon. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2168" task="">
  <question>
    What does Russia's nerve agent stockpile consist of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is lethal to a human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2169" task="">
  <question>
    What does nerve agent do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is lethal to a human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2170" task="">
  <question>
    What is a lethal dose of nerve agent? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's nerve agent stockpile includes VX, sarin, and soman. Nerve agents cause rapid death through the disruption of nerve-impulse transmission in the central nervous system. As little as one drop is lethal to a human. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2171" task="">
  <question>
    Why is Shchuch'ye a greater threat to U.S.? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shchuch'ye, pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests.4 Further, a destruction facility for blister agents funded mainly by Germany began operation in December 2002. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2172" task="">
  <question>
    How can nerve agent be transported or delivered? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2173" task="">
  <question>
    What does Russia's blister agent stockpile include? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's blister agent stockpile includes mustard gas, lewisite, and mustard-lewisite mixture. Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled but generally cause slow-to-heal burns on contact with skin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2174" task="">
  <question>
    Are blister agents lethal? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Russia's blister agent stockpile includes mustard gas, lewisite, and mustard-lewisite mixture. Blister agents can be lethal if inhaled but generally cause slow-to-heal burns on contact with skin. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2175" task="">
  <question>
    Who is responsible for Russia's chemical weapons stockpile and destruction? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The head of the Russian Munitions Agency, the agency charged with the safe storage and destruction of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile, stated that his preference is that the United States fund the completion of the planned chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye rather than improve the security around Russia's chemical weapons storage sites. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2176" task="">
  <question>
    How many nerve agent chemical weapons are there at Shchuch'ye? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Storage Site (Shchuch'ye) - Russia stores nearly 2 million artillery shells filled with nerve agent chemical weapons at Shchuch'ye. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/gaorpts/d03482.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2177" task="">
  <question>
    How strong is South Africa's BW and CW capability ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although somewhat constrained in the past by a lack of large funding sources and a limited number of scientists, South Africa's small but very active and highly skilled research community, together with years of experience with industrial processes such as fermentation, provide a solid foundation for future growth in the country's biotechnology capability. Recent government and private moves towards increasing support for this sector will enable South Africa to make further advances. The end of Apartheid and the installation of a new political dispensation also enabled more international collaboration. The most important factor in assessing South Africa's dual-use BW capability is the BW R&amp;D precedent set by Project Coast, which succeeded in sophisticated pathogen research and limited production. The above factors all combine to indicate that on a purely technical level, South Africa has the know-how, the equipment, and the raw materials to produce all that would be ! needed for at least a small-scale BW program. However, under current political conditions there is little or no will to do so -- indeed, the present government is vocal and active in its support of nonproliferation efforts 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_2429.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_2429.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2178" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of threat Canada had from South Africa in the mid 80's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In July 1986, a letter was delivered to the Canadian Parliament in Ottawa, Canada, claiming that beginning 10 July 1986, all fruit imported from South Africa would be injected with a toxic chemical &quot;before the contraband reaches the shops.&quot;[A,C,D,E] A group calling itself the Azanian People's Liberation Front signed the letter; Azania being the proposed name for South Africa under a majority black government. Two of Canada's leading food chains, Steinberg Inc. and Provigo Inc., announced after the poisoning threat that they would stop selling all South African imported fruit. Steinberg Inc. issued a statement saying, &quot;All existing stocks of South African apples and oranges have been submitted to rigorous testing as of last week In spite of the precautionary steps instituted, the decision not to replenish such products for an indefinite period of time was arrived at given the current situation.&quot;[D] Andre Sicotte -- a spokesperson for Provigo Inc. -- affirmed that only a small amount of fruit, mainly apples and oranges, would be affected by the decision to halt South African fruit imports.[B] In 1984, Canada imported 65.7 million dollars worth of food and tobacco products from South Africa.[B] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/335.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/335.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2179" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa start taking defensive measures against chemical weapons ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1939-1945 The Director General of War, H. J. van der Bijl, oversees the production of chemical weapons and the taking of defensive measures to protect South African troops against chemical and biological attack.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 2-3. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2180" task="">
  <question>
    What did South Africa do about its CBW program after World War II ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1946 South Africa dumps large quantities of munitions containing mustard agent into the sea, but does not roll back its CBW program entirely. The literature from its World War II CBW program is retained, and the South African Defense Force (SADF) maintains a small military program related to CBW R&amp;D. The government continues to outsource a number of basic research projects to Afrikaans-speaking universities and other government-supported institutions. These projects are usually carried out under the umbrella of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 3-4. Compare Chandre Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 31-32. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2181" task="">
  <question>
    What are the evidences that racism was practiced in South Africa ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    March 1960 The police fire into a crowd of 5,000 anti-apartheid activists who had gathered around the police station in Sharpeville to protest the discriminatory Pass Laws, killing 67 and wounding 186. Many are shot in the back as they flee. The scale of this &quot;Sharpeville Massacre&quot; has a profound effect on South African blacks, and precipitates a series of mass protests and boycotts. The government declares a state of emergency, arrests African leaders, and bans the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Soon afterwards, these two organizations form clandestine armed wings -- respectively, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) and Poqo (&quot;Pure&quot;) -- in order to continue waging their struggles.  -- James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History -- In Search of a Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 165-166. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2182" task="">
  <question>
    What techniques did the Portuguese use to against the guerilla warfare ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1960s SADF personnel sent to gain counterinsurgency experience in Angola observe firsthand how the Portuguese military employs chemical agents to make defoliants and napalm. These are used, as counter guerrilla measures, to mine trails as well as poison wells and waterholes. Portuguese forces also drug prisoners and throw them out of airplanes. [Note: In this and several subsequent entries, there are references to unspecified poisons or toxic materials. Although these substances are most likely chemical agents, they are listed in the BW chronology as well since it is possible that some actually refer to biological toxins, chemical substances produced from living organisms, or biological agents.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 7. Compare John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, pp. 116-118. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2183" task="">
  <question>
    What experience did SADF personnel gain from Portuguese in the early 60's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1960s SADF personnel sent to gain counterinsurgency experience in Angola observe firsthand how the Portuguese military employs chemical agents to make defoliants and napalm. These are used, as counter guerrilla measures, to mine trails as well as poison wells and waterholes. Portuguese forces also drug prisoners and throw them out of airplanes. [Note: In this and several subsequent entries, there are references to unspecified poisons or toxic materials. Although these substances are most likely chemical agents, they are listed in the BW chronology as well since it is possible that some actually refer to biological toxins, chemical substances produced from living organisms, or biological agents.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 7. Compare John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978, pp. 116-118. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2184" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between Geneva Gas Protocol and South Africa ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1963 South Africa becomes a party to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol banning the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 4. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2185" task="">
  <question>
    What is the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol about ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa becomes a party to the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol banning the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 4. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2186" task="">
  <question>
    What compelled South Africa to develop its CW program ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1960s Due to Egyptian use of CW in Yemen (1962-67) and concern that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir may have provided CW to the ANC, South Africa realizes the importance of updating its CBW program. CSIR &quot;works on&quot; developing protective masks to replace the WWII-era masks still used by the SADF and on mustard gas production.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 4. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2187" task="">
  <question>
    Which company worked for SADF to produce CW in the 60's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1960s-1970s The Elektroniks, Meganies, Landbou en Chemies (EMLC: Electrical, Mechanical, Agricultural, and Chemical) company, operating under the aegis of the SADF Special Forces (SF), works on and &quot;innovate[s]&quot; weapons, including chemical and biological agents that may be used in weapon systems. [Note: Other sources provide no indications that EMLC actually worked on biological agents. See, e.g., Chandre Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 35-6; and the EMLC description in the CW Facilities section.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 4. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2188" task="">
  <question>
    What was the cooperation between Israel and South Africa in the early 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Late 1960s and Early 1970s Israel and South Africa increasingly cooperate with each other in the development of armaments during this period. This cooperation is focused mainly on nuclear weapons and missile programs, but may also have included collaborative efforts in CBW R&amp;D. [Note: The study cited below provides no corroborating evidence concerning cooperation between the two countries in the CBW field, although there are clear indications of growing Israeli-South African cooperation in other weapons fields.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 5-6. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2189" task="">
  <question>
    When did Israel and South Africa work together on development of arms ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Late 1960s and Early 1970s Israel and South Africa increasingly cooperate with each other in the development of armaments during this period. This cooperation is focused mainly on nuclear weapons and missile programs, but may also have included collaborative efforts in CBW R&amp;D. [Note: The study cited below provides no corroborating evidence concerning cooperation between the two countries in the CBW field, although there are clear indications of growing Israeli-South African cooperation in other weapons fields.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 5-6. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2190" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa recognise the importance of CW program ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1960s Due to Egyptian use of CW in Yemen (1962-67) and concern that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir may have provided CW to the ANC, South Africa realizes the importance of updating its CBW program. CSIR &quot;works on&quot; developing protective masks to replace the WWII-era masks still used by the SADF and on mustard gas production.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 4. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2191" task="">
  <question>
    What were the differences between the SADF personnel during the early 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1970s Certain SADF generals ask the CSIR for &quot;aggressive&quot; CBW agents and express a growing interest in starting a new CBW industry, but the head of CSIR's Chemical Defence Unit (CDU), J. P. de Villiers, initially responds that such a program is unsuitable for Africa and too complex and expensive to develop. [Note: Burgess and Purkitt list De Villiers' first name as Wim, but in other sources he is identified as J. P.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 5. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2192" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of help did South Africa provide to Portugal in the 70's and 80's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1970s and 1980s South African [special operations] units fighting against guerrillas in Namibia and Angola, such as the 5th Reconnaissance commandos, the Koevoet (&quot;Crowbar&quot;) unit, and the SF's D[elta]40 unit [composed largely of Rhodesians], employ unconventional counterinsurgency tactics, including the use of chemical and biological agents. [Note: See several entries below for details concerning the CW and BW agents employed.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 9. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2193" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa join the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 April 1972 South Africa becomes a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 15. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2194" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa aid Portugal for fighting against guerrillas ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1970s and 1980s South African [special operations] units fighting against guerrillas in Namibia and Angola, such as the 5th Reconnaissance commandos, the Koevoet (&quot;Crowbar&quot;) unit, and the SF's D[elta]40 unit [composed largely of Rhodesians], employ unconventional counterinsurgency tactics, including the use of chemical and biological agents. [Note: See several entries below for details concerning the CW and BW agents employed.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 9. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2195" task="">
  <question>
    When was Rhodesian Selous Scouts formed in South Africa ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1973 on The recently-formed Rhodesian Selous Scouts adopt and adapt British counterinsurgency techniques used in Kenya and Malaya by experimenting with new types of weapons, including biological and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2196" task="">
  <question>
    What were the activities performed by Rhodesian Selous Scouts after it was formed ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1973 on The recently-formed Rhodesian Selous Scouts adopt and adapt British counterinsurgency techniques used in Kenya and Malaya by experimenting with new types of weapons, including biological and chemical weapons. They seek to develop poisons to impregnate blue jeans used by guerrillas with toxins, as well as poison pens to assassinate guerrilla leaders. They also make efforts to contaminate rivers and water supplies with chemical and biological agents. [Note: See the second Mid-1970s, 1975-1 October 1978, and 1976 entries below for more details.] Rhodesia has one &quot;rudimentary&quot; CBW plant that receives outside aid from South Africa. [Note: The &quot;rudimentary&quot; CBW plant mentioned here may be an allusion to the laboratory later set up in the Selous Scouts barracks, on which see the 1975-1 September 1978 entry below, but it might possibly indicate that another, unnamed facility existed.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 8-9. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2197" task="">
  <question>
    What was the estimated cost of the CBW program proposed in South Africa ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1974-1977 In 1974 De Villiers prepares a 10-page report, which estimates that building a CBW program would cost 5 million rand and concludes that the Soviet Union is too well armed with CBW and would thus retaliate against any CBW attack. The SADF postpones its plans to develop an offensive CBW program, but supports the establishment of a minimal CBW R&amp;D program, one which is not well-developed. By 1977, De Villiers changes his tune and displays far more interest in the possibility of offensive CW use, but says little about using BW.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 5; and Chandre Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 32-34. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2198" task="">
  <question>
    Why and when did South Africa postpone to develop CBW program ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1974-1977 In 1974 De Villiers prepares a 10-page report, which estimates that building a CBW program would cost 5 million rand and concludes that the Soviet Union is too well armed with CBW and would thus retaliate against any CBW attack. The SADF postpones its plans to develop an offensive CBW program, but supports the establishment of a minimal CBW R&amp;D program, one which is not well-developed. By 1977, De Villiers changes his tune and displays far more interest in the possibility of offensive CW use, but says little about using BW.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 5; and Chandre Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 32-34. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2199" task="">
  <question>
    How did South Africa went about from postponing the CBW program and starting it ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1974-1977 In 1974 De Villiers prepares a 10-page report, which estimates that building a CBW program would cost 5 million rand and concludes that the Soviet Union is too well armed with CBW and would thus retaliate against any CBW attack. The SADF postpones its plans to develop an offensive CBW program, but supports the establishment of a minimal CBW R&amp;D program, one which is not well-developed. By 1977, De Villiers changes his tune and displays far more interest in the possibility of offensive CW use, but says little about using BW.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 5; and Chandre Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 32-34. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2200" task="">
  <question>
    What were the changes in the South African CBW program in the mid 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1970s The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) asks doctors and chemists from the University of Rhodesia to identify and test a range of chemical and biological agents that can be used as a &quot;fear factor&quot; in the war against nationalist guerrillas. Anatomy [Department] professor Dr. Robert Symington, head of the clinical program, recruits several colleagues and students to carry out the research. SADF Forensic Department experts and intelligence personnel have access to the most secret Rhodesian camps and likely play some part in the development of CBW agents, which include organophosphate poisons, thallium, warfarin [an anticoagulant rodenticide], anthrax bacteria, and other unspecified bacteriological agents. Symington later moves to South Africa and reportedly collaborates in the founding of a top secret South African CBW program (codenamed &quot;Red Mountain&quot;) prior to his death. [Note: This codename is not mentioned in any other source. Also, Brickhill was an ANC activi! st who was targeted for assassination and was severely injured in a bombing attempt.]  -- Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp, 7-10. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2201" task="">
  <question>
    What is the evidence that South Africa used humans as &quot;guinea pigs&quot; in its CBW program ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1975-1 September 1978 The Selous Scouts set up a secret laboratory at the Andre Rabie barracks, to which three medical doctors from the regular Rhodesian Army are seconded. Large consignments of the denim clothing favored by guerrillas are purchased from middlemen and soaked in &quot;steel vats containing a solution of odourless and colourless poisons&quot; (probably organophosphates). Several prisoners are forcibly brought to the Mount Darwin Fort and apparently used as &quot;human guinea pigs&quot; to test the effects of the poison. The contaminated clothes are then supplied to guerrillas with the help of Reverend Arthur Kanodareki, a paid CIO agent, and somewhere between 67 and &quot;many hundreds&quot; of guerrillas then die after absorbing the poison through their skin. The program is terminated after the Special Branch (SB) commander learns of the deaths of innocent rural villagers to whom some of the poisoned clothes had been sold by unscrupulous local agents, agents who had been recruited by the Scouts and the Special! Branch and had been paid a Z1000 dollar bonus for each confirmed &quot;guerrilla&quot; death. Symptoms of intoxication are that after seven days, the victims develop a fever and start to bleed from the nose and mouth. [Note: These symptoms are not consistent with most toxic organophosphate compounds, but could be due to warfarin. Fever is also sometimes present in thallium poisoning.]  -- Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), pp. 109-12; see also Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), p. 8; Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 137. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2202" task="">
  <question>
    How did South Africa use Chemical Weapons against guerrillas in the late 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1975-1 September 1978 The Selous Scouts set up a secret laboratory at the Andre Rabie barracks, to which three medical doctors from the regular Rhodesian Army are seconded. Large consignments of the denim clothing favored by guerrillas are purchased from middlemen and soaked in &quot;steel vats containing a solution of odourless and colourless poisons&quot; (probably organophosphates). Several prisoners are forcibly brought to the Mount Darwin Fort and apparently used as &quot;human guinea pigs&quot; to test the effects of the poison. The contaminated clothes are then supplied to guerrillas with the help of Reverend Arthur Kanodareki, a paid CIO agent, and somewhere between 67 and &quot;many hundreds&quot; of guerrillas then die after absorbing the poison through their skin. The program is terminated after the Special Branch (SB) commander learns of the deaths of innocent rural villagers to whom some of the poisoned clothes had been sold by unscrupulous local agents, agents who had been recruited by the Scouts and the Special! Branch and had been paid a Z1000 dollar bonus for each confirmed &quot;guerrilla&quot; death. Symptoms of intoxication are that after seven days, the victims develop a fever and start to bleed from the nose and mouth. [Note: These symptoms are not consistent with most toxic organophosphate compounds, but could be due to warfarin. Fever is also sometimes present in thallium poisoning.]  -- Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), pp. 109-12; see also Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), p. 8; Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 137. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2203" task="">
  <question>
    What were the symptoms caused by the chemical weapons used by South Africa on the guerrillas in late 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1975-1 September 1978 The Selous Scouts set up a secret laboratory at the Andre Rabie barracks, to which three medical doctors from the regular Rhodesian Army are seconded. Large consignments of the denim clothing favored by guerrillas are purchased from middlemen and soaked in &quot;steel vats containing a solution of odourless and colourless poisons&quot; (probably organophosphates). Several prisoners are forcibly brought to the Mount Darwin Fort and apparently used as &quot;human guinea pigs&quot; to test the effects of the poison. The contaminated clothes are then supplied to guerrillas with the help of Reverend Arthur Kanodareki, a paid CIO agent, and somewhere between 67 and &quot;many hundreds&quot; of guerrillas then die after absorbing the poison through their skin. The program is terminated after the Special Branch (SB) commander learns of the deaths of innocent rural villagers to whom some of the poisoned clothes had been sold by unscrupulous local agents, agents who had been recruited by the Scouts and the Special! Branch and had been paid a Z1000 dollar bonus for each confirmed &quot;guerrilla&quot; death. Symptoms of intoxication are that after seven days, the victims develop a fever and start to bleed from the nose and mouth. [Note: These symptoms are not consistent with most toxic organophosphate compounds, but could be due to warfarin. Fever is also sometimes present in thallium poisoning.]  -- Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), pp. 109-12; see also Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), p. 8; Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 137. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2204" task="">
  <question>
    Why was the CW program used by South Africa against the guerrillas in the late 70's terminated ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1975-1 September 1978 The Selous Scouts set up a secret laboratory at the Andre Rabie barracks, to which three medical doctors from the regular Rhodesian Army are seconded. Large consignments of the denim clothing favored by guerrillas are purchased from middlemen and soaked in &quot;steel vats containing a solution of odourless and colourless poisons&quot; (probably organophosphates). Several prisoners are forcibly brought to the Mount Darwin Fort and apparently used as &quot;human guinea pigs&quot; to test the effects of the poison. The contaminated clothes are then supplied to guerrillas with the help of Reverend Arthur Kanodareki, a paid CIO agent, and somewhere between 67 and &quot;many hundreds&quot; of guerrillas then die after absorbing the poison through their skin. The program is terminated after the Special Branch (SB) commander learns of the deaths of innocent rural villagers to whom some of the poisoned clothes had been sold by unscrupulous local agents, agents who had been recruited by the Scouts and the Special! Branch and had been paid a Z1000 dollar bonus for each confirmed &quot;guerrilla&quot; death. Symptoms of intoxication are that after seven days, the victims develop a fever and start to bleed from the nose and mouth. [Note: These symptoms are not consistent with most toxic organophosphate compounds, but could be due to warfarin. Fever is also sometimes present in thallium poisoning.]  -- Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), pp. 109-12; see also Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), p. 8; Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 137. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2205" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of chemical and biological agents were used by South Africa in its CBW program ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1975-1980 The Rhodesian CIO and Selous Scouts use Bacillus anthracis, Vibrio cholerae, and thallium-contaminated foodstuffs, as well as organophosphate-impregnated clothing [see entry immediately above], to contaminate enemy guerrillas, according to former Rhodesian army contractors. [Note: Several of the claims regarding anthrax bacteria use remain unverified. See 1979-1980 entry below.]  -- Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Doctors of Death,&quot; Horizon [Harare] (March 1992), pp. 14-17, cited by Meryl Nass, &quot;Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread?,&quot; The PSR Quarterly 24:2 (December 1992), pp. 206 and 209, note 73. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2206" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa approve BWC ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 1975 The South African government ratifies the BWC.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 12; Gen. Niel Knobel, testimony at TRC hearings, 12 June 1998, &lt;http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw14/html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2207" task="">
  <question>
    What were the adverse effects of the BW Program by South Africa in late 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1976 Selous Scouts introduce &quot;measured quantities of bacteriological cultures&quot; at several points along the Ruya River in the wildlife area near the Mozambique border. This action corresponds with, and may have resulted in, a reported epidemic of deaths among people living on the river's banks. However, the cause of the epidemic was officially attributed to cholera. [Note: see also 1975-1980 entry above.]  -- Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), p. 112. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2208" task="">
  <question>
    Which deaths were attributed to Selous Scouts of South Africa in the late 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1976 Selous Scouts introduce &quot;measured quantities of bacteriological cultures&quot; at several points along the Ruya River in the wildlife area near the Mozambique border. This action corresponds with, and may have resulted in, a reported epidemic of deaths among people living on the river's banks. However, the cause of the epidemic was officially attributed to cholera. [Note: see also 1975-1980 entry above.]  -- Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), p. 112. 1976 During a reconnaissance mission against guerrillas operating near the Cochemane administrative center in the Tete province, Selous Scouts observe that the town draws its water from a single reservoir and pour a &quot;lethal dose of poison&quot; into it. Rhodesian CIO intercepts confirm that 200 people suddenly die. [Note: The &quot;poison&quot; in question may be a reference to Vibrio cholerae, not a chemical agent. See 1975-1980 entry above.]  -- Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2209" task="">
  <question>
    What issue attracted international attention in South Africa in the late 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1976 The SAP's use of firearms against Soweto protesters, and the resulting international outcry, causes SADF head General Constand Viljoen to recommend the development of &quot;alternative crowd control methods.&quot;  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2210" task="">
  <question>
    What did South Africa's defense minister argue in 1977 ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1977 In a Defense White Paper, Defense Minister P. W. Botha argues that a &quot;total strategy&quot; is required to resist the enemy's &quot;total onslaught&quot; on South Africa. This must involve &quot;all the means available to the state...&quot;  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2211" task="">
  <question>
    How were African National Congress figthers affected by the CBW program in South Africa ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1977 500 ANC fighters are fed poisoned food in the Catengue camp in Angola, but are saved from harm due to timely treatment by a doctor. In 1981 the ANC claims to have uncovered the perpetrators, including Kenneth Mahamba, the commander of the ANC's Pango camp who had allegedly been recruited by the Security Branch of the SAP.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 159, citing the ANC's submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2212" task="">
  <question>
    What incedent left a huge impact on black South Africans in late 70's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 September 1977 African anti-apartheid leader Steve Biko dies in prison after being cruelly abused by his jailers. In the official government investigation that follows, no one is found to be responsible for his death. This callous series of events has a traumatic impact on both black South Africans and the international community. [Note: According to Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, Laboratory Services Director of Roodeplaat Research Labs, Dr. Wouter Basson later claimed that Biko had been poisoned with thallium, which precipitated the activist's outburst of irrational behavior while in police custody. See Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, testimony at TRC hearings, 9 June 1998, &lt;http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw4/html&gt;.]  -- James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History -- In Search of a Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 196. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2213" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa ever openly admit the use of BW and CW ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1978 A member of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts admits that &quot;they&quot; had tried both chemical and biological warfare techniques to kill terrorists. [Note: the Defense Intelligence Agency report listed as a source for this claim is incorrectly cited, according to Burgess and Purkitt.]  -- Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 218 and 442, note 8; compare Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 99, note 27. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2214" task="">
  <question>
    When was the National Security Management System (NSMS) formed ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1978 P. W. Botha replaces B. J. Vorster as Prime Minister. He quickly creates a new National Security Management System (NSMS) to coordinate all the activities of state departments related to the new &quot;total strategy.&quot; Security forces are instructed to deal with [future] conflicts in a more efficient manner.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2215" task="">
  <question>
    Who formed the National Security Management System (NSMS) ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1978 P. W. Botha replaces B. J. Vorster as Prime Minister. He quickly creates a new National Security Management System (NSMS) to coordinate all the activities of state departments related to the new &quot;total strategy.&quot; Security forces are instructed to deal with [future] conflicts in a more efficient manner.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2216" task="">
  <question>
    Why was the National Security Management System (NSMS) formed ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1978 P. W. Botha replaces B. J. Vorster as Prime Minister. He quickly creates a new National Security Management System (NSMS) to coordinate all the activities of state departments related to the new &quot;total strategy.&quot; Security forces are instructed to deal with [future] conflicts in a more efficient manner.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2217" task="">
  <question>
    Who planned attack on Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader Robert Mugabe or Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) leader Joshua Nkomo ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979 The Rhodesian CIO reportedly activates a plan to assassinate either Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader Robert Mugabe or Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) leader Joshua Nkomo (then living in London). An expatriate former British Special Air Service (SAS) member, &quot;Taffy&quot;, is recruited by the CIO for this task. After performing successful tests on dogs, he opts to use a rifle to shoot Mugabe with a dum dum bullet into which ricin is inserted, but the operation is aborted at the last minute. The ricin had been prepared as an agent of assassination, along with thallium and parathion, by Professor Symington of the University of Rhodesia. [Note: There is no external verification of &quot;Taffy's&quot; claims.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2218" task="">
  <question>
    How did the Rhodesian CIO plan to attack ZANU or ZAPU leaders ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979 The Rhodesian CIO reportedly activates a plan to assassinate either Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader Robert Mugabe or Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) leader Joshua Nkomo (then living in London). An expatriate former British Special Air Service (SAS) member, &quot;Taffy&quot;, is recruited by the CIO for this task. After performing successful tests on dogs, he opts to use a rifle to shoot Mugabe with a dum dum bullet into which ricin is inserted, but the operation is aborted at the last minute. The ricin had been prepared as an agent of assassination, along with thallium and parathion, by Professor Symington of the University of Rhodesia. [Note: There is no external verification of &quot;Taffy's&quot; claims.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2219" task="">
  <question>
    What happened to the plans of the Rhodesian CIO to attack ZANU or ZAPU leaders ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979 The Rhodesian CIO reportedly activates a plan to assassinate either Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader Robert Mugabe or Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) leader Joshua Nkomo (then living in London). An expatriate former British Special Air Service (SAS) member, &quot;Taffy&quot;, is recruited by the CIO for this task. After performing successful tests on dogs, he opts to use a rifle to shoot Mugabe with a dum dum bullet into which ricin is inserted, but the operation is aborted at the last minute. The ricin had been prepared as an agent of assassination, along with thallium and parathion, by Professor Symington of the University of Rhodesia. [Note: There is no external verification of &quot;Taffy's&quot; claims.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2220" task="">
  <question>
    What defence strategies were decided by South Africa for the 80's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979 At a meeting between senior South African security force commanders and &quot;securocrats&quot; at Fort Klapperdorf, it is decided to enhance the effectiveness of the security forces by reorganizing them into units that would be more capable of disrupting ANC bases in neighboring countries. In a document entitled &quot;Institutions and Functions of the Special Forces,&quot; the State Security Council (SSC) concludes that SADF and SAP special operations units should be established that would &quot;not need to answer to Parliament, but only to the SSC.&quot; These were to be financed by secret funds, develop autonomous intelligence-gathering capabilities, and recruit their operatives from all ranks of the government. These decisions result in the establishment of the SAP's Koevoet unit and the reorganization of the Bureau of State Security's (BOSS) covert Z-Squads into the Delta 40 unit, which is tasked with &quot;monitoring certain external opponents of the regime with a view to their possible extinction.&quot; [No! te: The SADF's D40 unit soon after evolved into the Barnacle unit and eventually into the Civil Co-operation Bureau, whereas personnel from the SAP's Koevoet unit were later incorporated into the C(ounterinsurgency)1 section at the Vlakplaas base.]  -- Stephen Ellis, &quot;The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,&quot; Journal of Southern African Studies 24:2 (June 1998), p. 271; Kevin A. O'Brien, &quot;Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990,&quot; Terrorism and Political Violence 16:3 (Autumn 2001), p. 34. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2221" task="">
  <question>
    What caused sudden anhtrax outbreak between 1978 to 1980 in Rhodesia  ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979-1980 The number of [mainly cutaneous] anthrax cases in Rhodesia dramatically increases, from an average of 13 per year before 1978 to 10,738. This sudden increase -- and the 182 resulting deaths among the black population -- is attributed by some insiders and observers to the intentional dissemination of anthrax bacterial spores, via either the aerial dispersal of spores or infected cattle cakes, by Rhodesian security forces. Some allege that South African medical and intelligence personnel are also involved in this purported operation. International investigators are subsequently unable to determine whether this particular outbreak of disease was natural or man-made.  -- Meryl Nass, &quot;Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread?,&quot; The PSR Quarterly 24:2 (December 1992), pp. 198-209; Meryl Nass, &quot;Zimbabwe's Anthrax Epizootic,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 12-18, 61; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 214-23; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 10-11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2222" task="">
  <question>
    How many deaths occured due to anthrax outbreak between 1978 and 1990 in Rhodesia ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979-1980 The number of [mainly cutaneous] anthrax cases in Rhodesia dramatically increases, from an average of 13 per year before 1978 to 10,738. This sudden increase -- and the 182 resulting deaths among the black population -- is attributed by some insiders and observers to the intentional dissemination of anthrax bacterial spores, via either the aerial dispersal of spores or infected cattle cakes, by Rhodesian security forces. Some allege that South African medical and intelligence personnel are also involved in this purported operation. International investigators are subsequently unable to determine whether this particular outbreak of disease was natural or man-made.  -- Meryl Nass, &quot;Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread?,&quot; The PSR Quarterly 24:2 (December 1992), pp. 198-209; Meryl Nass, &quot;Zimbabwe's Anthrax Epizootic,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 12-18, 61; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 214-23; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 10-11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2223" task="">
  <question>
    Who was responsible for anthrax outbreak between 1978 and 1990 in Rhodesia ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1979-1980 The number of [mainly cutaneous] anthrax cases in Rhodesia dramatically increases, from an average of 13 per year before 1978 to 10,738. This sudden increase -- and the 182 resulting deaths among the black population -- is attributed by some insiders and observers to the intentional dissemination of anthrax bacterial spores, via either the aerial dispersal of spores or infected cattle cakes, by Rhodesian security forces. Some allege that South African medical and intelligence personnel are also involved in this purported operation. International investigators are subsequently unable to determine whether this particular outbreak of disease was natural or man-made.  -- Meryl Nass, &quot;Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread?,&quot; The PSR Quarterly 24:2 (December 1992), pp. 198-209; Meryl Nass, &quot;Zimbabwe's Anthrax Epizootic,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 12-18, 61; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 214-23; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 10-11. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2224" task="">
  <question>
    When was South African Medical Service (SAMS) established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1979 The South African Medical Service (SAMS) is established as a fourth arm of the SADF, alongside the South African Army, the South African Navy, and the South African Air Force. Seven medical battalion groups eventually constitute SAMS. Previously, SADF medical units were subordinated to the command hierarchies of the three armed services to which they were attached.  -- 21 August 2002 email from Chandre Gould; Klaas de Jonge, &quot;The Chemical Warfare Case,&quot; The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, p. 5, &lt;http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2225" task="">
  <question>
    What did the Rhodesian government link the guerrillas to in 1979 ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 1979 The Rhodesian government publicly accuses nationalist guerrillas of spreading anthrax bacteria in twelve districts, causing the deaths of 20 people and numerous heads of cattle. This claim has not been confirmed, however, and as such it may well be an example of Rhodesian disinformation or propaganda.  -- RAND-St. Andrews Terrorist Chronology; W. Seth Carus, Working Paper on Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents since 1900 (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 2001), p. 83. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2226" task="">
  <question>
    What is the evidence that Rhodesian government tried to propagate incorrect information ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November 1979 The Rhodesian government publicly accuses nationalist guerrillas of spreading anthrax bacteria in twelve districts, causing the deaths of 20 people and numerous heads of cattle. This claim has not been confirmed, however, and as such it may well be an example of Rhodesian disinformation or propaganda.  -- RAND-St. Andrews Terrorist Chronology; W. Seth Carus, Working Paper on Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents since 1900 (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 2001), p. 83. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2227" task="">
  <question>
    Where does the BW facilities exists in South Africa ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Late 1970s-Early 1980s? BW capabilities reportedly exist at two SADF facilities [prior to the establishment of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL)], the [National] Institute for Virology in Johannesburg and the Veterinary Station at Onderstepoort near Pretoria. Although there are allegedly discussions held about the deployment of BW agents, no action is taken [at these facilities?] as of 1983.  -- Klaas de Jonge, &quot;The Chemical Warfare Case,&quot; The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, p. 4, &lt;http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html&gt;, citing an 11 November 1997 letter from former SADF officer and ANC agent Dieter Felix Gerhardt. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2228" task="">
  <question>
    How did the AWB plan to use Biological Weapons in the early 80's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1980s The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB: Afrikaner Resistance Movement), a South African right-wing paramilitary group, develops plans to infest the Sun City hotel complex in Bophuthatswana with syphilis germs and to blow up several racially desegregated hotels.  -- Arthur Kemp, Victory or Violence: The Story of the AWB (Pretoria: Forma, 1990), p. 47. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2229" task="">
  <question>
    Where were the Rhodesian special operations assets where transfered to in 1980 ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1980 As part of &quot;Operation Winter,&quot; with the collusion of British government monitors in Rhodesia, Rhodesian special operations assets are reportedly transferred covertly to South Africa. These assets supposedly include the Rhodesian SAS, the CIO and its agents, and the Selous Scouts, as well as black &quot;mercenaries&quot; and &quot;the poisoners and their poisons,&quot; which are then incorporated into the appropriate South African military departments. British and American planes may have taken part in the transfer of men and equipment.  -- Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 58-60. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2230" task="">
  <question>
    What were the actions performed in &quot;Operation Winter&quot;, 1980 ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1980 As part of &quot;Operation Winter,&quot; with the collusion of British government monitors in Rhodesia, Rhodesian special operations assets are reportedly transferred covertly to South Africa. These assets supposedly include the Rhodesian SAS, the CIO and its agents, and the Selous Scouts, as well as black &quot;mercenaries&quot; and &quot;the poisoners and their poisons,&quot; which are then incorporated into the appropriate South African military departments. British and American planes may have taken part in the transfer of men and equipment.  -- Jeremy Brickhill, &quot;Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,&quot; Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 58-60. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2231" task="">
  <question>
    Who planned to assassinate Joe Slovo, head of the South African Communist Party ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1981 Dirk Coetzee, commander of the South African Police (SAP) Security Branch base at Vlakplaas, from which the C[ounterinsurgency]1 &quot;hit teams&quot; operate, asks one of his operatives to poison Joe Slovo, head of the South African Communist Party, who is then residing in London. The plan is for this individual to smuggle the poison into Britain, arrange to meet with Slovo, and then slip the substance into his drink. [Note: No further information is provided about whether this plan was later aborted or otherwise foiled.]  -- Jacques Pauw, In the Heart of the Whore: The Story of Apartheid's Death Squads (Johannesburg: Halfway House, 1991), p. 187. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2232" task="">
  <question>
    How did the commander of SAP plan to murder plan to assissinate the head of the South African Communist Party ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1981 Dirk Coetzee, commander of the South African Police (SAP) Security Branch base at Vlakplaas, from which the C[ounterinsurgency]1 &quot;hit teams&quot; operate, asks one of his operatives to poison Joe Slovo, head of the South African Communist Party, who is then residing in London. The plan is for this individual to smuggle the poison into Britain, arrange to meet with Slovo, and then slip the substance into his drink. [Note: No further information is provided about whether this plan was later aborted or otherwise foiled.]  -- Jacques Pauw, In the Heart of the Whore: The Story of Apartheid's Death Squads (Johannesburg: Halfway House, 1991), p. 187. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2233" task="">
  <question>
    How did the CBW program proceed in other countries according to the evaluation done by SADF ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    January 1981 After SADF chief and Defence Council members meet with the Defense Minister to discuss security problems, the Defence Council orders military doctor Wouter Basson to travel abroad and secretly collect information about Western CBW programs that could be used as possible models for a South African CBW program. He is also instructed to make contacts with organizations that might provide information about the CBW capabilities of East Bloc countries. Upon his return, Basson reports that CBW programs in other countries are structured in such a way that &quot;offensive&quot; R&amp;D is conducted by civilian fronts up to the point of weaponization, after which actual weaponization takes place in top secret military laboratories. [Note: Basson's description of the structure of foreign CBW programs is not entirely correct.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 11-12; and idem, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 43-4. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2234" task="">
  <question>
    What did SADF discover during &quot;Operation Protea&quot; ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1981 During the course of &quot;Operation Protea&quot; in Angola, the SADF claims to discover evidence that the Cubans were preparing to use chemical weapons. Although these claims cannot be confirmed by outside investigators, Defence Minister Magnus Malan uses the resulting concern as a pretext to take SADF generals to Angola to study CBW protective suits in terms of clarifying the effects that wearing them will have on combat operations. Malan insists that the SADF take measures to force the Cubans to don protective suits [in order to inhibit their operational effectiveness], causing the SADF to adopt the deceptive tactic of using smoke [projectiles] to achieve this result. The SADF also claims to have evidence that some members of the ANC's military wing received training in CBW techniques in the Soviet Union.  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 20 and 102, note 48, citing an interview with Malan. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2235" task="">
  <question>
    How were some of ANC guerrillas assassinated by South African Police ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    11 October 1981 Brigadier Willem Schoon orders Vlakplaas-based Security Branch operative Dirk Coetzee to get rid of recently released ANC guerrilla Vuyani Mavuso and incompetent South African askari Nkosinathi Peter Dhlamini. Coetzee kidnaps them and takes them to a Security Police post on a farm at Kopfontein near the Botswana border. He obtains poison from General Neethling, head of the SAP Forensic Sciences Laboratory, and administers it in cans of cold beverages to the victims; Mavuso acts incoherently overnight but does not die. Two more attempts to administer poison to the two men are made at Groblersdal and Komatipoort, again without success. Finally, the men are sedated with soporifics administered in cold drinks, executed with a pistol by Captain Koos Vermeulen, and cremated.  -- Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), pp. 153-54; South Africa, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders, Report [of the Honourable Mr. Justice L.T.C. Harms] (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1990), pp. 112-15; Klaas de Jonge, &quot;The Chemical Warfare Case,&quot; The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, p. 19, &lt;http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2236" task="">
  <question>
    Who approved the establishment of Project Coast ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2237" task="">
  <question>
    When was Project Coast established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. It is originally envisaged that the state-owned arms manufacturer ARMSCOR [Armaments Development and Production Corporation] will assist in the development of the program, but ARMSCOR officials advise Army Surgeon-General Nico J. Nieuwoudt that this task is &quot;too sensitive&quot; for the company. It is then decided that the SADF will have sole responsibility for the project, after which Malan and a &quot;kitchen cabinet&quot; consisting of SADF chief Viljoen, SF head General A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg, SAP commissioner Van der Merwe, and the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) approve the appointment of Basson as Project Officer. They also authorize the creation of a supervisory body, the Coordinating Management Committee (CMC), which consists of the SADF chief, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Staff for Finance, the Chief of Staff for I! ntelligence, ARMSCOR officials and, at times, representatives of the Auditor-General. Basson acts as the CMC secretary, and in that capacity is &quot;responsible for all the documentation&quot; dealing with the CMC. [Note: According to Knobel, this authorization occurred in April 1982, not at the end of 1981. See TRC document 8, Knobel's 11 January 1993 response to an 8 December 1992 OSEO questionnaire, pp. 2-3.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 12, 15; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 20. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2238" task="">
  <question>
    When was Project Coast established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. It is originally envisaged that the state-owned arms manufacturer ARMSCOR [Armaments Development and Production Corporation] will assist in the development of the program, but ARMSCOR officials advise Army Surgeon-General Nico J. Nieuwoudt that this task is &quot;too sensitive&quot; for the company. It is then decided that the SADF will have sole responsibility for the project, after which Malan and a &quot;kitchen cabinet&quot; consisting of SADF chief Viljoen, SF head General A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg, SAP commissioner Van der Merwe, and the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) approve the appointment of Basson as Project Officer. They also authorize the creation of a supervisory body, the Coordinating Management Committee (CMC), which consists of the SADF chief, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Staff for Finance, the Chief of Staff for I! ntelligence, ARMSCOR officials and, at times, representatives of the Auditor-General. Basson acts as the CMC secretary, and in that capacity is &quot;responsible for all the documentation&quot; dealing with the CMC. [Note: According to Knobel, this authorization occurred in April 1982, not at the end of 1981. See TRC document 8, Knobel's 11 January 1993 response to an 8 December 1992 OSEO questionnaire, pp. 2-3.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 12, 15; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 20. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2239" task="">
  <question>
    Who was responsible for the development of Project Coast ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. It is originally envisaged that the state-owned arms manufacturer ARMSCOR [Armaments Development and Production Corporation] will assist in the development of the program, but ARMSCOR officials advise Army Surgeon-General Nico J. Nieuwoudt that this task is &quot;too sensitive&quot; for the company. It is then decided that the SADF will have sole responsibility for the project, after which Malan and a &quot;kitchen cabinet&quot; consisting of SADF chief Viljoen, SF head General A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg, SAP commissioner Van der Merwe, and the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) approve the appointment of Basson as Project Officer. They also authorize the creation of a supervisory body, the Coordinating Management Committee (CMC), which consists of the SADF chief, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Staff for Finance, the Chief of Staff for I! ntelligence, ARMSCOR officials and, at times, representatives of the Auditor-General. Basson acts as the CMC secretary, and in that capacity is &quot;responsible for all the documentation&quot; dealing with the CMC. [Note: According to Knobel, this authorization occurred in April 1982, not at the end of 1981. See TRC document 8, Knobel's 11 January 1993 response to an 8 December 1992 OSEO questionnaire, pp. 2-3.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 12, 15; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 20. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2240" task="">
  <question>
    Who was project office for Project Coast ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. It is originally envisaged that the state-owned arms manufacturer ARMSCOR [Armaments Development and Production Corporation] will assist in the development of the program, but ARMSCOR officials advise Army Surgeon-General Nico J. Nieuwoudt that this task is &quot;too sensitive&quot; for the company. It is then decided that the SADF will have sole responsibility for the project, after which Malan and a &quot;kitchen cabinet&quot; consisting of SADF chief Viljoen, SF head General A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg, SAP commissioner Van der Merwe, and the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) approve the appointment of Basson as Project Officer. They also authorize the creation of a supervisory body, the Coordinating Management Committee (CMC), which consists of the SADF chief, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Staff for Finance, the Chief of Staff for I! ntelligence, ARMSCOR officials and, at times, representatives of the Auditor-General. Basson acts as the CMC secretary, and in that capacity is &quot;responsible for all the documentation&quot; dealing with the CMC. [Note: According to Knobel, this authorization occurred in April 1982, not at the end of 1981. See TRC document 8, Knobel's 11 January 1993 response to an 8 December 1992 OSEO questionnaire, pp. 2-3.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 12, 15; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 20. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2241" task="">
  <question>
    Who were the members of Coordinating Management Committee (CMC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. It is originally envisaged that the state-owned arms manufacturer ARMSCOR [Armaments Development and Production Corporation] will assist in the development of the program, but ARMSCOR officials advise Army Surgeon-General Nico J. Nieuwoudt that this task is &quot;too sensitive&quot; for the company. It is then decided that the SADF will have sole responsibility for the project, after which Malan and a &quot;kitchen cabinet&quot; consisting of SADF chief Viljoen, SF head General A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg, SAP commissioner Van der Merwe, and the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) approve the appointment of Basson as Project Officer. They also authorize the creation of a supervisory body, the Coordinating Management Committee (CMC), which consists of the SADF chief, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Staff for Finance, the Chief of Staff for I! ntelligence, ARMSCOR officials and, at times, representatives of the Auditor-General. Basson acts as the CMC secretary, and in that capacity is &quot;responsible for all the documentation&quot; dealing with the CMC. [Note: According to Knobel, this authorization occurred in April 1982, not at the end of 1981. See TRC document 8, Knobel's 11 January 1993 response to an 8 December 1992 OSEO questionnaire, pp. 2-3.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 12, 15; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 20. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2242" task="">
  <question>
    What is CMC ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. It is originally envisaged that the state-owned arms manufacturer ARMSCOR [Armaments Development and Production Corporation] will assist in the development of the program, but ARMSCOR officials advise Army Surgeon-General Nico J. Nieuwoudt that this task is &quot;too sensitive&quot; for the company. It is then decided that the SADF will have sole responsibility for the project, after which Malan and a &quot;kitchen cabinet&quot; consisting of SADF chief Viljoen, SF head General A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg, SAP commissioner Van der Merwe, and the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) approve the appointment of Basson as Project Officer. They also authorize the creation of a supervisory body, the Coordinating Management Committee (CMC), which consists of the SADF chief, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Staff for Finance, the Chief of Staff for I! ntelligence, ARMSCOR officials and, at times, representatives of the Auditor-General. Basson acts as the CMC secretary, and in that capacity is &quot;responsible for all the documentation&quot; dealing with the CMC. [Note: According to Knobel, this authorization occurred in April 1982, not at the end of 1981. See TRC document 8, Knobel's 11 January 1993 response to an 8 December 1992 OSEO questionnaire, pp. 2-3.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 12, 15; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 20. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2243" task="">
  <question>
    Who appointed Basson as Project Officer for Project Coast ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    End of 1981 Defence Minister Malan officially approves the establishment of a CBW program, codenamed Project Coast, and makes funds available for that purpose. It is originally envisaged that the state-owned arms manufacturer ARMSCOR [Armaments Development and Production Corporation] will assist in the development of the program, but ARMSCOR officials advise Army Surgeon-General Nico J. Nieuwoudt that this task is &quot;too sensitive&quot; for the company. It is then decided that the SADF will have sole responsibility for the project, after which Malan and a &quot;kitchen cabinet&quot; consisting of SADF chief Viljoen, SF head General A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg, SAP commissioner Van der Merwe, and the head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) approve the appointment of Basson as Project Officer. They also authorize the creation of a supervisory body, the Coordinating Management Committee (CMC), which consists of the SADF chief, the Surgeon-General, the Chief of Staff for Finance, the Chief of Staff for I! ntelligence, ARMSCOR officials and, at times, representatives of the Auditor-General. Basson acts as the CMC secretary, and in that capacity is &quot;responsible for all the documentation&quot; dealing with the CMC. [Note: According to Knobel, this authorization occurred in April 1982, not at the end of 1981. See TRC document 8, Knobel's 11 January 1993 response to an 8 December 1992 OSEO questionnaire, pp. 2-3.]  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), pp. 12, 15; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 20. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2244" task="">
  <question>
    When was RRL established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), a biological research, development and production facility and Project Coast front company, is established on a farm north of Pretoria near the Roodeplaat dam. In addition to testing BW weapons, it also tests the biological effects of CW weapons [which are produced at Delta G and other facilities].  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 22. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2245" task="">
  <question>
    Where was RRL established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), a biological research, development and production facility and Project Coast front company, is established on a farm north of Pretoria near the Roodeplaat dam. In addition to testing BW weapons, it also tests the biological effects of CW weapons [which are produced at Delta G and other facilities].  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 22. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2246" task="">
  <question>
    What was RRL responsible for ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), a biological research, development and production facility and Project Coast front company, is established on a farm north of Pretoria near the Roodeplaat dam. In addition to testing BW weapons, it also tests the biological effects of CW weapons [which are produced at Delta G and other facilities].  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), p. 22. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2247" task="">
  <question>
    Who became the first managing director of RRL ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 Basson asks Dr. Daan Goosen, a scientist at the H. A. Grove Veterinary Centre who was soon to become the first managing director of RRL, to provide him with a biological toxin whose action would resemble naturally-caused food poisoning and that would be lethal. Goosen supplies Basson with Clostridium perfringens toxin, which he had obtained from Dr. Mike Odendaal.  -- Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), p. 249; Dr. Daan Goosen, testimony at TRC hearing, &lt;http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw9.html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2248" task="">
  <question>
    What the primary aim of the scientists at RRL ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 Basson asks Dr. Daan Goosen, a scientist at the H. A. Grove Veterinary Centre who was soon to become the first managing director of RRL, to provide him with a biological toxin whose action would resemble naturally-caused food poisoning and that would be lethal. Goosen supplies Basson with Clostridium perfringens toxin, which he had obtained from Dr. Mike Odendaal.  -- Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), p. 249; Dr. Daan Goosen, testimony at TRC hearing, &lt;http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw9.html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2249" task="">
  <question>
    Which toxin developed at RRL naturally-caused food poisoning and fatal ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 Basson asks Dr. Daan Goosen, a scientist at the H. A. Grove Veterinary Centre who was soon to become the first managing director of RRL, to provide him with a biological toxin whose action would resemble naturally-caused food poisoning and that would be lethal. Goosen supplies Basson with Clostridium perfringens toxin, which he had obtained from Dr. Mike Odendaal.  -- Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), p. 249; Dr. Daan Goosen, testimony at TRC hearing, &lt;http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/special/cbw/cbw9.html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2250" task="">
  <question>
    How were toxins developed at RRL tested ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1983 Basson allegedly provides Danie J. Phaal with a small bottle filled with a toxic substance at Waterkloof Air Base, and shows him how to administer it. Phaal then flies to Southwest Africa, adds the substance to a soft drink, and gives it to a SWAPO prisoner in a cell in Ondangwa. The following day, the man becomes extremely sick, and is flown to 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria. Basson later tells Phaal that the man died, but the latter suspects that this may have been a result of the administration of toxic substances by Basson himself.  -- Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), pp. 190, 228-29. 2-4 November 1983 Theron and Dr. J. S. (&quot;Kobus&quot;) Bothma test a toxic jelly-like salve allegedly given to them by Basson on three black people in an area near the 5th [Reconnaissance] Regiment's military base in Dukuduku. Beforehand, Bothma gives the prisoners Medazolam [a sedative whose trade name is Dormicum] mixed in cold sodas. The victims are then tied to a tree and smeared with the jellied substance. When it fails to kill them, Bothma provides Ketamine to Theron to give to the prisoners, then injects all three with Tubarine and Scoline.  -- Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), pp. 189, 227-28; Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, week 25, testimony of Kobus Bothma. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2251" task="">
  <question>
    Who conspired to kill the Directorate of Special Tasks in the early 80's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November-December 1983 Basson allegedly conspires with Dr. Philip Mijburgh and Goosen to murder Roland M. Hunter, a Directorate of Special Tasks (DST) operative who opposed SADF attempts to destabilize Mozambique and had allegedly become a &quot;double agent&quot; for the ANC. Hunter's superior, Van Niekerk, asks Basson to devise a way to make Hunter's death look like an accident. Basson decides to make it look like Hunter was bitten by a poisonous snake, and upon his request Goosen provides him with a live mamba snake and 2 ml of mamba toxin. However, Hunter is arrested as a spy on 8 December, before Basson can attempt to assassinate him.  -- Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), pp. 188, 226-27. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2252" task="">
  <question>
    How the assassination of Directorate of Special Tasks planned in the early 80's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    November-December 1983 Basson allegedly conspires with Dr. Philip Mijburgh and Goosen to murder Roland M. Hunter, a Directorate of Special Tasks (DST) operative who opposed SADF attempts to destabilize Mozambique and had allegedly become a &quot;double agent&quot; for the ANC. Hunter's superior, Van Niekerk, asks Basson to devise a way to make Hunter's death look like an accident. Basson decides to make it look like Hunter was bitten by a poisonous snake, and upon his request Goosen provides him with a live mamba snake and 2 ml of mamba toxin. However, Hunter is arrested as a spy on 8 December, before Basson can attempt to assassinate him.  -- Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), pp. 188, 226-27. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2253" task="">
  <question>
    What is Infladel ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 1984 Infladel, an administrative and financial management front company for Project Coast, is established. Its task is to channel funds from secret [Defence Ministry] accounts to the chemical and biological front companies.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 14. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2254" task="">
  <question>
    When was Infladel established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 1984 Infladel, an administrative and financial management front company for Project Coast, is established. Its task is to channel funds from secret [Defence Ministry] accounts to the chemical and biological front companies.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 14. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2255" task="">
  <question>
    What task did Infladel perform ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    June 1984 Infladel, an administrative and financial management front company for Project Coast, is established. Its task is to channel funds from secret [Defence Ministry] accounts to the chemical and biological front companies.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2000), p. 14. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2256" task="">
  <question>
    Who became the President of South Africa in 1984 ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1984 P. W. Botha is unanimously elected as President of South Africa.  -- James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History -- In Search of a Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell. 1999), p. 243. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2257" task="">
  <question>
    Who post did P.W. Both in 1984 in the South African government ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    September 1984 P. W. Botha is unanimously elected as President of South Africa.  -- James Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century: A Political History -- In Search of a Nation State (Oxford: Blackwell. 1999), p. 243. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2258" task="">
  <question>
    What is TREWITS ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980s A new and extremely secretive committee, the Teen-Rewolusion re Inligting Taakspan (TREWITS: Counterrevolutionary Intelligence Task Force), is created in part to &quot;identify human targets for removal.&quot; Representatives from the SAP's Security Branch, the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI), the SF, and the NIS meet once a month to discuss possible targets. Reports from these meetings are then sent to the [cabinet-level] State Security Council (SSC), which provides the highest level approval for certain suggested assassinations. TREWITS is known to have authorized 82 extrajudicial killings and 7 attempted killings. [Note: The precise date of TREWITS' establishment is unclear. O'Brien says that it was founded in 1986, whereas Gottschalk claims that it wasn't established until 1987.]  -- Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), p. 195; Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002), pp. 74-5; Keith Gottschalk, &quot;The Rise and Fall of Apartheid's Death Squads,&quot; in Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability, ed. by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 241-2; Kevin A. O'Brien, &quot;Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990,&quot; Terrorism and Political Violence 16:3 (Autumn 2001), p. 36. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2259" task="">
  <question>
    When was TREWITS established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980s A new and extremely secretive committee, the Teen-Rewolusion re Inligting Taakspan (TREWITS: Counterrevolutionary Intelligence Task Force), is created in part to &quot;identify human targets for removal.&quot; Representatives from the SAP's Security Branch, the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI), the SF, and the NIS meet once a month to discuss possible targets. Reports from these meetings are then sent to the [cabinet-level] State Security Council (SSC), which provides the highest level approval for certain suggested assassinations. TREWITS is known to have authorized 82 extrajudicial killings and 7 attempted killings. [Note: The precise date of TREWITS' establishment is unclear. O'Brien says that it was founded in 1986, whereas Gottschalk claims that it wasn't established until 1987.]  -- Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), p. 195; Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002), pp. 74-5; Keith Gottschalk, &quot;The Rise and Fall of Apartheid's Death Squads,&quot; in Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability, ed. by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 241-2; Kevin A. O'Brien, &quot;Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990,&quot; Terrorism and Political Violence 16:3 (Autumn 2001), p. 36. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2260" task="">
  <question>
    What was TREWITS responisble for ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980s A new and extremely secretive committee, the Teen-Rewolusion re Inligting Taakspan (TREWITS: Counterrevolutionary Intelligence Task Force), is created in part to &quot;identify human targets for removal.&quot; Representatives from the SAP's Security Branch, the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI), the SF, and the NIS meet once a month to discuss possible targets. Reports from these meetings are then sent to the [cabinet-level] State Security Council (SSC), which provides the highest level approval for certain suggested assassinations. TREWITS is known to have authorized 82 extrajudicial killings and 7 attempted killings. [Note: The precise date of TREWITS' establishment is unclear. O'Brien says that it was founded in 1986, whereas Gottschalk claims that it wasn't established until 1987.]  -- Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), p. 195; Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002), pp. 74-5; Keith Gottschalk, &quot;The Rise and Fall of Apartheid's Death Squads,&quot; in Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability, ed. by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 241-2; Kevin A. O'Brien, &quot;Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990,&quot; Terrorism and Political Violence 16:3 (Autumn 2001), p. 36. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2261" task="">
  <question>
    How many killings are attributed to TREWITS in the mid-80's ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980s A new and extremely secretive committee, the Teen-Rewolusion re Inligting Taakspan (TREWITS: Counterrevolutionary Intelligence Task Force), is created in part to &quot;identify human targets for removal.&quot; Representatives from the SAP's Security Branch, the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI), the SF, and the NIS meet once a month to discuss possible targets. Reports from these meetings are then sent to the [cabinet-level] State Security Council (SSC), which provides the highest level approval for certain suggested assassinations. TREWITS is known to have authorized 82 extrajudicial killings and 7 attempted killings. [Note: The precise date of TREWITS' establishment is unclear. O'Brien says that it was founded in 1986, whereas Gottschalk claims that it wasn't established until 1987.]  -- Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), p. 195; Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002), pp. 74-5; Keith Gottschalk, &quot;The Rise and Fall of Apartheid's Death Squads,&quot; in Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability, ed. by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 241-2; Kevin A. O'Brien, &quot;Counter-Intelligence for Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch, 1979-1990,&quot; Terrorism and Political Violence 16:3 (Autumn 2001), p. 36. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2262" task="">
  <question>
    Who was Dr. Larry Ford and what was his work related to South African BWC program ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Mid-1980s Dr. Larry Ford, an American infectious disease specialist and CBW expert who had worked for the US government after graduating from high school, makes several trips to South Africa. In some cases he accompanies his American surgeon friend, Dr. Jerry Nilsson, an avowed white supremacist who had previously fought with the SAS during the Rhodesian civil war. Other trips are undertaken at the invitation of South African Army Surgeon-General Niel Knobel, who had befriended Ford due to their mutual interests in fertility drugs, AIDS prevention, and CBW. Ford later boasts on several occasions that he helped wiped out an entire village in Angola [presumably with BW or CW agents]. He also claims that he parachuted into southern Africa to take blood samples from dead guerrilla fighters in order to help the US government determine which BW agents the Soviets had vaccinated them against. [Note: It remains to be determined whether these last two claims are true.]  -- Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 35-6; Edward Humes, &quot;The Medicine Man,&quot; Los Angeles Magazine (July 2001), p. 167. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2263" task="">
  <question>
    Which unit was create to operate on secret external operations in 1986 ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    SF commanders decide to create a &quot;civilian&quot; special operations unit to carry out covert external (and later internal) operations. The unit is activated in 1988, organized into eight geographical regions and two organizational sections, and referred to by senior staff as the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB). It is made up of an &quot;inner core&quot; or &quot;aware strata&quot; of 100 recently &quot;resigned&quot; personnel from the SF, SADF, and SAP, including a second Wouter Basson (alias &quot;Christo Britz&quot;) not to be confused with Dr. Basson, as well as 150 &quot;unaware&quot; persons plus ad hoc criminal elements recruited by the core members. The CCB is able to tap the resources of EMLC for specialized weapons, SAMS [Project Coast] for CBW agents, and intelligence gathered by DMI's Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC).  -- South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report (London: MacMillan, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 134-44; Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), pp. 223-25; Eugene de Kock (with Jeremy Gordin), A Long Night's Damage: Working for the Apartheid State (Saxonwold, RSA: Contra Press, 1998), p. 93. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2264" task="">
  <question>
    Who were the members of Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    SF commanders decide to create a &quot;civilian&quot; special operations unit to carry out covert external (and later internal) operations. The unit is activated in 1988, organized into eight geographical regions and two organizational sections, and referred to by senior staff as the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB). It is made up of an &quot;inner core&quot; or &quot;aware strata&quot; of 100 recently &quot;resigned&quot; personnel from the SF, SADF, and SAP, including a second Wouter Basson (alias &quot;Christo Britz&quot;) not to be confused with Dr. Basson, as well as 150 &quot;unaware&quot; persons plus ad hoc criminal elements recruited by the core members. The CCB is able to tap the resources of EMLC for specialized weapons, SAMS [Project Coast] for CBW agents, and intelligence gathered by DMI's Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC).  -- South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report (London: MacMillan, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 134-44; Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), pp. 223-25; Eugene de Kock (with Jeremy Gordin), A Long Night's Damage: Working for the Apartheid State (Saxonwold, RSA: Contra Press, 1998), p. 93. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2265" task="">
  <question>
    What was the prime activity of CCB ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    SF commanders decide to create a &quot;civilian&quot; special operations unit to carry out covert external (and later internal) operations. The unit is activated in 1988, organized into eight geographical regions and two organizational sections, and referred to by senior staff as the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB). It is made up of an &quot;inner core&quot; or &quot;aware strata&quot; of 100 recently &quot;resigned&quot; personnel from the SF, SADF, and SAP, including a second Wouter Basson (alias &quot;Christo Britz&quot;) not to be confused with Dr. Basson, as well as 150 &quot;unaware&quot; persons plus ad hoc criminal elements recruited by the core members. The CCB is able to tap the resources of EMLC for specialized weapons, SAMS [Project Coast] for CBW agents, and intelligence gathered by DMI's Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC).  -- South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report (London: MacMillan, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 134-44; Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), pp. 223-25; Eugene de Kock (with Jeremy Gordin), A Long Night's Damage: Working for the Apartheid State (Saxonwold, RSA: Contra Press, 1998), p. 93. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2266" task="">
  <question>
    When did the South African government pass the law of annually renewable &quot;state of emergency.&quot; 
  </question>
  <passage>
    12 June 1986 The South African government passes legislation authorizing the imposition of an annually renewable &quot;state of emergency.&quot; This legislation provides the security forces with extraordinary powers of investigation, arrest, interrogation, detention, and censorship.  -- Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University, 2000), p. 235. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2267" task="">
  <question>
    What happened when Infladel was dissolved ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1989 Infladel is dissolved and its former responsibilities are divided between two separate companies. Sefmed Information Services will henceforth be responsible for the administration of Project Coast, and D. John Truter Financial Consultants will handle the project's financial management.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2268" task="">
  <question>
    When was Infladel dissolved ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1989 Infladel is dissolved and its former responsibilities are divided between two separate companies. Sefmed Information Services will henceforth be responsible for the administration of Project Coast, and D. John Truter Financial Consultants will handle the project's financial management.  -- Chandre Gould and Peter I. Folb, &quot;The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview,&quot; The Nonproliferation Review (Fall/Winter 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2269" task="">
  <question>
    Who succeeded P. W. Botha as President of South Africa ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1989 Frederik Willem de Klerk succeeds P. W. Botha as President of South Africa after a &quot;revolt&quot; against Botha by members of his own cabinet. Although he is a conservative who initially hopes to reform but preserve apartheid, De Klerk nonetheless begins initiating serious negotiations with the political opposition.  -- Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University, 2000), p. 246. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2270" task="">
  <question>
    When did President P. W. Botha loose his presidency ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    July 1989 Frederik Willem de Klerk succeeds P. W. Botha as President of South Africa after a &quot;revolt&quot; against Botha by members of his own cabinet. Although he is a conservative who initially hopes to reform but preserve apartheid, De Klerk nonetheless begins initiating serious negotiations with the political opposition.  -- Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University, 2000), p. 246. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2271" task="">
  <question>
    When was Lifestyle Management established ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1990 A company called Lifestyle Management is established at Lyttleton. It allegedly functions as an SADF front company, specializes in biogenetics (including genetic engineering), and does secret research for ARMSCOR/Denel (a large South African defense firm). Among the company's directors are Dr. Philip Mijburgh, clinical psychologist Johannes Jacobus Koortzen, and Dr. Brian Davey, all former SF members.  -- Klaas de Jonge, &quot;The Chemical Warfare Case,&quot; The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, pp. 14-15, &lt;http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2272" task="">
  <question>
    What was the company Lifestyle Management responsible for ? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1990 A company called Lifestyle Management is established at Lyttleton. It allegedly functions as an SADF front company, specializes in biogenetics (including genetic engineering), and does secret research for ARMSCOR/Denel (a large South African defense firm). Among the company's directors are Dr. Philip Mijburgh, clinical psychologist Johannes Jacobus Koortzen, and Dr. Brian Davey, all former SF members.  -- Klaas de Jonge, &quot;The Chemical Warfare Case,&quot; The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, pp. 14-15, &lt;http://www.contrast.org/truth/html/chemical__biological_weapons.html&gt;. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2273" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa , India, Pakistan and Israel have also not signed the NPT. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1991/n9106159.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2274" task="">
  <question>
    What is Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The biological component of South Africa's secret CBW program, Project Coast, was involved in several distinct but interrelated activities: the development and testing of lethal biological agents and their subsequent utilization as assassination weapons, the genetic engineering of certain biological agents, the carrying out of research projects on both African fertility and HIV transmission, and the cultivation and freeze-drying of larger than normal quantities of standard BW agents. Although there was never any large-scale attempt to weaponize such agents for battlefield use, at least two of them were allegedly deployed against segments of the population in neighboring states. All of these activities were undertaken by the apartheid-era regime, and have since been discontinued in conformity with the BTWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2275" task="">
  <question>
    What was the name of South Africa's secret bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The biological component of South Africa's secret CBW program, Project Coast, was involved in several distinct but interrelated activities: the development and testing of lethal biological agents and their subsequent utilization as assassination weapons, the genetic engineering of certain biological agents, the carrying out of research projects on both African fertility and HIV transmission, and the cultivation and freeze-drying of larger than normal quantities of standard BW agents. Although there was never any large-scale attempt to weaponize such agents for battlefield use, at least two of them were allegedly deployed against segments of the population in neighboring states. All of these activities were undertaken by the apartheid-era regime, and have since been discontinued in conformity with the BTWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2276" task="">
  <question>
    What was the overall goal of South Africa's bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The most characteristic feature of the South African BW program was undoubtedly the development and utilization of a wide array of toxic agents to assassinate &quot;enemies of the state.&quot; There were two key precedents for this. One was the testing of lethal chemical agents on prisoners used as human guinea pigs by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts at their main barracks, and the subsequent use of those agents to contaminate denim clothing sold to nationalist guerrillas by various middlemen. This particular poisoning operation carried out during the Rhodesian civil war resulted in hundreds of deaths. The other was &quot;Operation Dual,&quot; a covert program whose purpose was to murder captured guerrillas that were uncooperative and South African military and police personnel that were considered security risks. This operation was initiated in 1979, two years before Project Coast was formally established. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2277" task="">
  <question>
    Where were South Africa bioweapons made? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The biological substances used in these assassination operations were manufactured and tested at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), the principal South African BW facility. Scientists at RRL, in particular Dr. Mike Odendaal and Dr. James Davies, then prepared freeze-dried stocks of many of these toxic pathogens, including Bacillus anthracis, brucella bacteria, botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae, E-coli, HIV-infected blood, and salmonella bacteria. Snake venoms such as mamba toxin were also extracted and stockpiled. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2278" task="">
  <question>
    How did South African agents plan to assassinate individuals using bioweapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Scientists at RRL, in particular Dr. Mike Odendaal and Dr. James Davies, then prepared freeze-dried stocks of many of these toxic pathogens, including Bacillus anthracis, brucella bacteria, botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae, E-coli, HIV-infected blood, and salmonella bacteria. Snake venoms such as mamba toxin were also extracted and stockpiled. There were two types of potential &quot;delivery systems&quot; for these agents. First, Odendaal, Davies, and other RRL laboratory personnel purposely contaminated a considerable variety of foodstuffs and household items with them, such as soft-centered chocolates, lip balm, envelope flaps, deodorant, and cigarettes. According to both testimony and the notorious 1989 &quot;sales list&quot; (TRC document 52), several of these items were later passed on by RRL R&amp;D director Andre Immelman to members of SADF or SAP covert paramilitary units involved in assassination operations, whose operatives then delivered them to selected targets. After consuming or using them, the targeted individuals typically became very ill or died. Second, beginning in 1987 some of these substances may have also been intended for use with &quot;special applicators,&quot; arcane assassination devices designed by bioengineer Jan Lourens and prepared by his assistant Philip Morgan, a former Selous Scout and self-taught armorer, in the QB Lab at Systems Research and Development (SRD). Among these devices were rings, screwdrivers, walking sticks, and umbrellas that had been transformed into weapons by means of the addition of poison compartments and injectors or firing mechanisms for poisoned pellets. Although Basson later claimed that these devices were manufactured so that the SADF could develop defensive measures against them, on more than one occasion assassination plots seem to have been hatched that involved their projected use. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2279" task="">
  <question>
    What is RRL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The biological substances used in these assassination operations were manufactured and tested at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), the principal South African BW facility. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2280" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that South Africa genetically engineered biologcal agents? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    One of the most worrisome aspects of the South African BW program was the efforts by RRL scientists to genetically engineer various biological agents. Alas, very few details about the specifics of this research have emerged so far, and it is therefore unclear just how many of these agents were actually produced. Such work was apparently carried out primarily by Odendaal, who among other things admitted that he had tried to develop antibiotic-resistant strains of anthrax bacteria. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2281" task="">
  <question>
    What standard biological warfare agents has South Africa produced? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition, an array of standard biological warfare agents were produced and tested at RRL. These included all of the 45 local strains of anthrax bacteria, Brucella maletensis, all four types of Clostridium botulinum, cholera bacteria, and Yersinia enterocolitica or Y. pestis. Dr. Stiaan Wandrag of RRL later testified that his principal task was to develop CBW antidotes, ostensibly for the protection of VIPs, security force members, and South African agents who might be exposed to CW and BW agents, and that this work was carried out in the basement Compression Lab at RRL.  In the summer of 2002 Goosen, who was by then engaged in monitoring BW for South Africa's revamped National Intelligence Agency, was twice asked to provide Coast-related biological materials that had supposedly been destroyed to foreign parties. In the first such instance, he willingly provided a 5ml sample of goat serum used as an anthrax diagnostic agent for livestock and a 2ml sample of freeze-dried E. coli that had been genetically modified with the gene coding for Clostridium perfringens toxin to a shadowy American named Robert A. Zlokie, who was a US intelligence operative. Goosen later admitted that the reason he supplied Zlokie with this latter item was that he wanted to make the Americans, with whom he wished to collaborate, aware of just how sophisticated the genetic engineering potential of Project Coast had been. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2282" task="">
  <question>
    How did South African agents plan to use HIV/AIDS as a bioweapon? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to Basson, an AIDS research project had been authorized by Coast's Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC) as part of a study to determine &quot;whether AIDS alone would allow the SADF to win the war.&quot; One of the doctors under his command, Graeme Gibson, was thus instructed to take secret blood samples from members of various guerrilla and military forces in Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique so that their blood could be tested for HIV and the rate of infection could then be extrapolated. Their hope appears to have been that the rapid spread of HIV might seriously erode the numerical strength of hostile African armies and, by extension, slow the growth of the entire black population. In this connection it should be mentioned that American doctor Larry Ford also claimed to have collected blood samples from dead guerrillas in southern Africa. He was also working to develop a vaginal suppository called &quot;Inner Confidence&quot; that he hoped would protect women against HIV infection, a microbicide that he apparently tested on unwitting black prostitutes in southern Africa. Army Surgeon-General Niel Knobel, head of the CMC, seems to have made this possible by helping his friend and contract CBW advisor Ford obtain official approval to use the products made by Ford's company, Biofem, in South Africa. Unfortunately, many central aspects of Coast's AIDS project still remain to be clarified. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2283" task="">
  <question>
    When was Project Coast terminated? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1990 President F. W. De Klerk prohibited the carrying out of any further work on lethal CBW agents, and in 1993 Project Coast was officially terminated. The stocks of BW agents produced by South Africa were supposedly destroyed in conformity with international agreements, despite the fact that the actual destruction process was never independently verified and there is evidence that some of the substances were removed and retained by Coast scientists. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2284" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa terminate its bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1990 President F. W. De Klerk prohibited the carrying out of any further work on lethal CBW agents, and in 1993 Project Coast was officially terminated. The stocks of BW agents produced by South Africa were supposedly destroyed in conformity with international agreements, despite the fact that the actual destruction process was never independently verified and there is evidence that some of the substances were removed and retained by Coast scientists. Although several laboratories there continue to produce certain dangerous pathogens for normal industrial, veterinary, and agricultural research, none of these pathogens appear to be intended for deployment as lethal anti-personnel agents. The current government still has access to the type of technical expertise and the sort of sophisticated R&amp;D facilities that would enable it to initiate a new BW program, but there is little reason to suppose that it has any interest in doing so. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2285" task="">
  <question>
    Does South Africa have still have the facilities and expertise to produce bioweapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although several laboratories there continue to produce certain dangerous pathogens for normal industrial, veterinary, and agricultural research, none of these pathogens appear to be intended for deployment as lethal anti-personnel agents. The current government still has access to the type of technical expertise and the sort of sophisticated R&amp;D facilities that would enable it to initiate a new BW program, but there is little reason to suppose that it has any interest in doing so.  The most important factor in assessing South Africa's dual-use BW capability is the BW R&amp;D precedent set by Project Coast, which succeeded in sophisticated pathogen research and limited production. The above factors all combine to indicate that on a purely technical level, South Africa has the know-how, the equipment, and the raw materials to produce all that would be needed for at least a small-scale BW program. However, under current political conditions there is little or no will to do so?indeed, the present government is vocal and active in its support of nonproliferation efforts. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2286" task="">
  <question>
    Are South Africa's biological weapons facilities still operational? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Unlike the remnants of its chemical weapons program, South Africa's primary biological weapons facility, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, was dismantled when the program came to an end.[3] However, several peripheral Project Coast facilities (mainly educational institutes that were used only partially for BW research) are still operating. Examples are the Pretoria Biomedical Center (formerly the H. A. Grove Laboratory) and the aforementioned Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute (which has divisions such as bacteriology, applied biotechnology and toxicology). While these facilities have only participated in legitimate research since the termination of Project Coast, it can be assumed that they retain the latent capabilities that made them useful for Project Coast's purposes in the first place. Other South African organizations with a strong capability in biotechnology include the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the South African Medical Research Council, the National Institute for Communicable Diseases, and various universities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2287" task="">
  <question>
    Does South Africa's current government support the continued development of bioweapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The most important factor in assessing South Africa's dual-use BW capability is the BW R&amp;D precedent set by Project Coast, which succeeded in sophisticated pathogen research and limited production. The above factors all combine to indicate that on a purely technical level, South Africa has the know-how, the equipment, and the raw materials to produce all that would be needed for at least a small-scale BW program. However, under current political conditions there is little or no will to do so?indeed, the present government is vocal and active in its support of nonproliferation efforts. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2288" task="">
  <question>
    What was the extent of South Africa's bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The biological component of South Africa's secret CBW program, Project Coast, was involved in several distinct but interrelated activities: the development and testing of lethal biological agents and their subsequent utilization as assassination weapons, the genetic engineering of certain biological agents, the carrying out of research projects on both African fertility and HIV transmission, and the cultivation and freeze-drying of larger than normal quantities of standard BW agents. Although there was never any large-scale attempt to weaponize such agents for battlefield use, at least two of them were allegedly deployed against segments of the population in neighboring states. All of these activities were undertaken by the apartheid-era regime, and have since been discontinued in conformity with the BTWC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_2429.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_2429.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2289" task="">
  <question>
    What international and regional organizations is South Africa a member of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    INTERNATIONAL &amp; REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS United Nations (UN) Conference on Disarmament (CD) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons2 (OPCW) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2290" task="">
  <question>
    What treaties has South Africa signed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS Nuclear: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IAEA Safeguards Agreement IAEA Additional Protocol Nuclear Safety Convention Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) Chemical&amp; Biological: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)4 Geneva Protocol WMD delivery systems: International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2291" task="">
  <question>
    Has South Africa ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS Nuclear: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IAEA Safeguards Agreement IAEA Additional Protocol Nuclear Safety Convention Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) Chemical&amp; Biological: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)4 Geneva Protocol WMD delivery systems: International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2292" task="">
  <question>
    Has South Africa accepted the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS Nuclear: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IAEA Safeguards Agreement IAEA Additional Protocol Nuclear Safety Convention Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) Chemical&amp; Biological: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)4 Geneva Protocol WMD delivery systems: International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2293" task="">
  <question>
    Has South Africa accepted the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    TREATIES &amp; AGREEMENTS Nuclear: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) IAEA Safeguards Agreement IAEA Additional Protocol Nuclear Safety Convention Joint Spent Fuel Management Convention Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty) Chemical&amp; Biological: Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) BTWC Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)4 Geneva Protocol WMD delivery systems: International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2294" task="">
  <question>
    What anti-terrorism conventions is South Africa a party to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES Zangger Committee Nuclear Suppliers Group Australia Group Missile Technology Control Regime Wassenaar Arrangement TERRORISM CONVENTIONS Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Suppression of Terrorist Bombings Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection Against the Taking of Hostages Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/safrica.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2295" task="">
  <question>
    When was non-proliferation first considered by the South African parliament? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A draft bill on Non-proliferation was released in late 1992 and is due to be tabled in Parliament in 1993. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1993/m9302766.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1993/m9302766.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2296" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa supply Libya with chemicals to make chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    To make the plant even more difficult to attack, Libya reportedly obtained blueprints used by the former Soviet Union to build underground bomb shelters.42 Apparently, only a direct hit on the top of the mountain with a nuclear warhead would be capable of destroying the facility. Libya purchased 60-ton rotary boring machines used to tunnel into the mountain from the German company Westfalia-Becorit. Subsequently, the Kohl government ordered the company to cease supplying spare parts for the boring machines, so as to render them useless.52 But Libya has managed to circumvent the embargo by obtaining spare parts from other companies in China, India, and Southeast Asia.53 The Belgian company Hassco, based in Ostend, supplied CW precursor chemicals to Jowfe. Among them were ethylene oxide, used for manufacturing mustard gas and incendiary bombs, and dimethylamine, a component of tabun nerve gas.54 South Africa may have supplied additional chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2297" task="">
  <question>
    Did Libya recruit South African scientists to assist with its bioweapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is possible that like Rabta, the Tarhunah CW plant could also manufacture biological agents in the near future. In early 1995, U.S. intelligence sources claimed that Qadhafi was attempting to recruit South African scientists to Tripoli to assist Libya's development of biological weapons.71 These scientists had secretly developed biological weapons that were allegedly used to assassinate opponents of South Africa's apartheid regime.72 Despite such foreign assistance, however, it may be several years before Libya is capable of weaponizing BW agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2298" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa sell chemical weapons to Libya? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa may have supplied additional chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons. On February 11, 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela promised to investigate claims that members of the South African Defense Force had sold chemical precursors or expertise to Libya after the 1994 election. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/43/sinai43.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2299" task="">
  <question>
    Where did South Africa purchase chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 September 1989 The London branch of Pennsylvania-based International Signal and Control (ISC) is alleged to have manufactured chemical weapons and sold electronic equipment to South Africa in violation of UN sanctions. The US Defense Department placed a $1.085 million order for binary nerve gas shell and missile casings with the Marquardt Corporation, ISC's rocket and armaments division, in 1988. The order was allegedly part of the US government?s top secret Big-Eye chemical weapon project. Jacq Van Der Heyden, who worked for ESI, (a London marketing operation controlled by ISC, until 1986) confirms that ESI sold ISC products to South Africa and elsewhere but said that the South African sales were &quot;mainly electronic equipment.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1653.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1653.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2300" task="">
  <question>
    How did South Africa historically try to roll back its involvement chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1946 - South Africa dumps large quantities of munitions containing mustard agent into the sea, but does not roll back its CBW program entirely. The literature from its World War II CBW program is retained, and the South African Defense Force (SADF) maintains a small military program related to CBW R&amp;D. The government continues to outsource a number of basic research projects to Afrikaans-speaking universities and other government-supported institutions. These projects are usually carried out under the umbrella of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2301" task="">
  <question>
    What caused South Africa to restart its chemical weapons program in the 1960s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Due to Egyptian use of CW in Yemen (1962-67) and concern that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir may have provided CW to the ANC, South Africa realizes the importance of updating its CBW program. CSIR &quot;works on&quot; developing protective masks to replace the WWII-era masks still used by the SADF and on mustard gas production. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2302" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa sign the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC?) 
  </question>
  <passage>
    10 April 1972 - South Africa becomes a signatory of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2303" task="">
  <question>
    When did South African forces first start using chemical weapons in Rhodesia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Early 1973 on - The recently-formed Rhodesian Selous Scouts adopt and adapt British counterinsurgency techniques used in Kenya and Malaya by experimenting with new types of weapons, including biological and chemical weapons. They seek to develop poisons to impregnate blue jeans used by guerrillas with toxins, as well as poison pens to assassinate guerrilla leaders. They also make efforts to contaminate rivers and water supplies with chemical and biological agents. [Note: See the second Mid-1970s, 1975-1 October 1978, and 1976 entries below for more details.] Rhodesia has one &quot;rudimentary&quot; CBW plant that receives outside aid from South Africa. [Note: The &quot;rudimentary&quot; CBW plant mentioned here may be an allusion to the laboratory later set up in the Selous Scouts barracks, on which see the 1975-1 September 1978 entry below, but it might possibly indicate that another, unnamed facility existed.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2304" task="">
  <question>
    Have South African forces attempted to use chemical weapons to assassinate leaders? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Rhodesian CIO reportedly activates a plan to assassinate either Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) leader Robert Mugabe or Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) leader Joshua Nkomo (then living in London). An expatriate former British Special Air Service (SAS) member, &quot;Taffy&quot;, is recruited by the CIO for this task. After performing successful tests on dogs, he opts to use a rifle to shoot Mugabe with a dum dum bullet into which ricin is inserted, but the operation is aborted at the last minute. The ricin had been prepared as an agent of assassination, along with thallium and parathion, by Professor Symington of the University of Rhodesia. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2305" task="">
  <question>
    When did the South African Defence Forces (SADF) begin to study the feasibility of building a chemical and biological weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    August 1981 - SADF chief Viljoen allocates funds for a feasibility study concerning the establishment of a South African CBW program. [Note: this is very likely a response to the &quot;discovery&quot; mentioned in the previous entry.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2306" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa abandon its program to deliver chemical weapons by missiles? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South African President F.W. de Klerk issues a statement announcing South Africa's termination of its SLV program, the result of an investigation into the commercial viability of the South African commercial space industry by Denel. Foreign Minister Roelof Botha refuses to divulge the total amount spent on the project and claims that Denel's missile test site at Hangklip could be offered to foreign weapons manufacturers. Foreign Minister Pik Botha states that the decision has been made for commercial reasons. However, &quot;Western diplomats&quot; say heavy pressure from the United States was the deciding factor. Washington does not want the technology to fall under the control of a future African National Congress (ANC) government. A Western diplomatic source says, &quot;The bottom line is that the ANC has historically maintained close friendships with countries such as Libya, Cuba, and various Islamic revolutionary and fundamentalist Middle East states?[t]hese are regarded by Washington as unstable sponsors of terrorism who must not get access to South African missile technology.&quot; The envoys says South Africa was only about 12 months away from perfecting a rocket capable of propelling nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads more than 1,200 miles. ?Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, &quot;Space Industry in South Africa,&quot; 30 June 1993; &quot;South Africa abandons Independent Program,&quot; Reuters, 30 June 1993; &quot;South Africa to abandon missile launching programme,&quot; Agence France Presse, 30 June 1993, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1654.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1654.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2307" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa enact the Act on the Control of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    16 August 1993 - South Africa proclaims the Act on the Control of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The legislation creates the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation (NPC) of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is charged with export control authority for all nuclear dual-use items. The Act makes any involvement by South African citizens in the development of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile systems to deliver such weapons, a criminal offense. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1654.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1654.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2308" task="">
  <question>
    What is the South African Act on the Control of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    16 August 1993 - South Africa proclaims the Act on the Control of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The legislation creates the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation (NPC) of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is charged with export control authority for all nuclear dual-use items. The Act makes any involvement by South African citizens in the development of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile systems to deliver such weapons, a criminal offense. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1654.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Missile/1622_1654.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2309" task="">
  <question>
    Why did South Africa start the chemical weapons program known as Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa's biological weapons program was one of the two principal components of its covert state-sponsored CBW program, codenamed Project Coast (later Project Jota). Personnel associated with Coast have characterized it as the most sophisticated program of its type outside of the former Soviet Union, but international CBW experts generally consider it to have been considerably less advanced from a scientific standpoint. Although ostensibly created entirely for defensive purposes, since government and Cuban military forces in Angola were reportedly equipped for and planning to use?if not already using - CW agents against the South African Defence Force (SADF), from the outset the program also had offensive features and capabilities. The apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a &quot;total onslaught&quot; by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing &quot;red-black danger&quot; it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal to defend itself. It was in this highly charged political and military context, which precipitated a &quot;bunker&quot; or &quot;laager&quot; mentality, that Coast was secretly initiated in 1981 under the aegis of the SADF Special Forces. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2310" task="">
  <question>
    Who was Dr. Wouter Basson? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 11 April 2002, approximately seven months after the devastating terrorist attack launched by al-Q?`ida operatives on United States soil, a South African judge acquitted Dr. Wouter Basson, the Project Officer for the secret South African chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program, Project Coast, of all that remained of the 46 criminal charges originally filed against him by state prosecutors. Several years' worth of controversial, high-profile hearings and judicial inquiries thereby ended with a whimper rather than a bang, to the astonishment of most observers.[1] Unfortunately, the judge's decision not only ignored masses of evidence that appeared to link Basson to kidnappings and assassinations of so-called &quot;enemies of the state,&quot; but it also left many crucial questions about the possible proliferation of dangerous Project Coast materials and know-how to various unsavory regimes and non-state actors unanswered. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2311" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical weapons were produced in South Africa before Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is no evidence that South Africa developed or produced BW agents of any type prior to the establishment of Project Coast, but by the early 1980s advanced research on many virulent biological pathogens had already been carried out for decades at several of the nation's leading medical, veterinary, and agricultural facilities.[2] This is hardly surprising, given the large number of diseases endemic to the country and the substantial role played by diverse animals and plants in South Africa's economy. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2312" task="">
  <question>
    What was the purpose of the South African Chemical Defence Unit (CDU)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In addition to the legitimate research conducted in South Africa to manage natural outbreaks of diseases caused by biological agents, in 1960 a company named Mechem was established as the Chemical Defence Unit (CDU) of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). It operated under the direction of Dr. J. P. De Villiers and the bureaucratic aegis of the Department of Trade and Industry, but was contracted solely by the SADF. Although the CDU was primarily responsible for investigating chemical compounds and coping with future CW dangers, it was also charged with monitoring the BW threat to South Africa. There are no indications that the CDU carried out research on BW agents, but De Villiers was apparently one of the first government scientists to cultivate a keen interest in the offensive potential of CW agents.[5] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2313" task="">
  <question>
    How were chemical weapons used by South African forces against insurgents in Rhodesia in the 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to former Officer Commanding Counter Terrorist Operations M. J. McGuinness, the most senior Special Branch officer seconded to the CIO and the man who oversaw the CW program and other covert operations launched from the Selous Scouts fort at Bindura, 25-gallon drums of foul-smelling liquid were delivered to the base a dozen or so times in 1977. The chemicals were then poured into large sheets of tin and dried in the sun. When the liquid had dried, the leftover flakes were scooped up and pounded in a mortar with a pestle. The resulting powder was then brushed onto stocks of denim clothing favored by the guerrillas, mixed into processed meat such as bully beef before being repacked in new cans, or injected into bottles of alcohol with a micro-needle.[11] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2314" task="">
  <question>
    What was the public reaction to use of chemical weapons by South African forces against Rhodesian insurgents in the 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indeed, the CW program was terminated by police commissioner Peter Allum after the Special Branch commander learned of the deaths of innocent rural villagers to whom some of the poisoned clothes had been sold by unscrupulous local agents, agents who had been recruited by the Selous Scouts and Special Branch and been paid a 1000 Zimbabwean dollar bonus for each &quot;confirmed&quot; guerrilla death.[14] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2315" task="">
  <question>
    What was the South African chemical weapons program known as Operation Alcora? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    A Dutch anti-apartheid activist named Klaas de Jonge claimed that various &quot;dirty tricks&quot; poisoning operations were carried out in Rhodesia in the mid- to late 1970s under the rubric of &quot;Operation Alcora,&quot; a joint Portuguese, Rhodesian, and South African effort. In the course of this operation, &quot;sophisticated&quot; chemical weapons developed at the SAP Forensic Sciences Laboratory on Visagie Street, which was at that time headed by Major-General Lothar Neethling, were allegedly deployed.[20] Also, a former Rhodesian Army colonel named Lionel Dyck insisted that members of South African military intelligence were directly involved in the contamination of rivers with cholera bacteria during the Rhodesian civil war.[21] Although these specific statements have not yet been substantiated, a secret August 1977 Special Branch report may lend them some credence 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2316" task="">
  <question>
    Which organization was responsible for the development of the South African CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The SADF originally asked ARMSCOR to assist them in developing the South African CBW program, but ARMSCOR officials?who already had exclusive control over the country's nuclear program?refused to do so unless they were given full control. In the end the authorities decided to place the program solely under the control of the SADF. After returning from his travels overseas Basson had informed members of the Defence Command Council that foreign CBW programs utilized ostensibly &quot;civilian&quot; front companies to conduct all offensive R&amp;D up to the point of actual weaponization. Although this claim was not entirely accurate, the SADF nonetheless decided to create new front companies rather than use its own components or the existing structures under its control.[34] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2317" task="">
  <question>
    Who led South Africa's chemical weapons programs under Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In theory, the apex of the official chain of command for both the CW and BW components of Project Coast was the President of the Republic himself (P. W. Botha), who under the militarized National Security Management System (NSMS) established in August 1979 exercised his authority primarily through the State Security Council (SSC) rather than the Cabinet. Within this elaborate security-oriented and largely covert power structure, the SADF coordinated the activities of the various armed services (Army, Air Force, Navy, and ? later?both SAMS and the SF) through the Defence Command Council.[36]Indeed, Project Coast may well have had some sort of parallel, unofficial command structure that operated alongside the official CMC chain of command. Former Army Surgeon-General Niel Knobel claimed that Basson was often either doing things on his own initiative or, as Basson himself later acknowledged, being given operational instructions directly by other parties, including the Defence Minister, the head of the SADF, the Commanding Officer of the SF, the COS Intelligence, the Director-General of the NIS, the Commissioner of the SAP, and possibly also members of the SSC or Cabinet who he treated medically. After receiving at least some of his orders from these powerful figures, above all SADF generals A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg and Magnus Malan, Basson then passed instructions on?always verbally?to Project Coast scientists and select members of covert SADF or SAP units with a &quot;need to know,&quot; frequently without informing his nominal superiors on the CMC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2318" task="">
  <question>
    Who was Wouter Basson? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Wouter Basson was a brilliant young SADF medical officer specializing in internal medicine who was working at 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria. In March 1981 he was appointed as a specialist advisor at SADF headquarters and as Project Officer for Special Projects of the Surgeon-General, but was also seconded to SF headquarters. There he worked under the operational command of the Commanding Officer SF, who henceforth oversaw all of his military activities. One of his appointed tasks there was to head the Special Operations (SO) unit of the South African Medical Services (SAMS), an elite medical team that provided health-related logistical support and hands-on medical treatment to SF, Parabat, SAP, and NIS elements operating clandestinely in the field. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2319" task="">
  <question>
    How was Project Coast financed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The SADF provided funding to the Project Coast front companies through various &quot;private&quot; bank accounts that had been set up explicitly for such purposes. The COS Finance was primarily responsible for arranging the details of the transfer of funds after the requested amounts were approved by the CMC. Most of the funds were transferred from the SADF's Secret Defence Fund directly to Infladel, another SADF front company that in addition to disbursing funds was responsible for the technical information system, the operational coordination of the program, and the security and safety systems of Delta G and RRL. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2320" task="">
  <question>
    Who did South African forces assassinate using chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Among the most prominent reported targets of these poison assassination plots, most of whom apparently became actual victims, were Dutch ANC operatives such as Conny Braam and Klaas de Jonge; SACP military leader Joe Slovo; &quot;unreliable&quot; security force members such as Victor M. de Fonseca, Mack (&quot;Fernando&quot;) Anderson, Roland M. Hunter, and Garth Bailey; anti-apartheid activists such as United Democratic Front regional secretary Abdullah Mohamed Omar; and key ANC figures such as Vuyani Mavuso, Sipiwo Mtimkulu, Mandla Msibi, Gibson Mondlane, Gibson Ncube, Pallo Jordan, Ronnie Kasrils, Kwenza Mlaba, the Reverend Frank Chicane, Knox (&quot;Enoch&quot;) Dhlamini, and perhaps, if certain insider scientists can be believed, Nelson Mandela.[55] If one excludes the hundreds of drugged and secretly disposed of guerrillas mentioned above, the total number of poisoned victims appears to have been in the dozens 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2321" task="">
  <question>
    What led to the dismantling of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Later, in the course of the extraordinary political transition of the early 1990s, during which the apartheid regime reluctantly but peacefully ceded power to a new ANC-led government, the activities of Project Coast were gradually phased out and exposed. The actual dismantling process was initiated by the apartheid regime and completed by the post-apartheid government, but marked by irregularities throughout. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2322" task="">
  <question>
    Did South African forces continue to use chemical weapons after 1989? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After succeeding P. W. Botha as President in July 1989 and being briefed on Project Coast by Surgeon-General Knobel and others in March 1990, Frederik de Klerk ordered that no more lethal chemical agents should be produced. Even so, he authorized the continued production of irritating and incapacitating agents, the CCB and SB carried on with their violence and covert poisoning efforts, and the SADF may have tested a chemical agent by bombing FRELIMO forces in Mozambique.[56] Moreover, the military?with or without the knowledge and authorization of De Klerk's government?appears to have accelerated its illegal international procurement activities in anticipation of the January 1993 signing of the new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) treaty.[57] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2323" task="">
  <question>
    Is there any proof that South Africa actually destroyed the chemical weapons used in Project Coast after signing the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Unfortunately, there is no proof that the project's toxic materials and documents were all actually destroyed. Basson's reported destruction of Coast's CW and BW agents was never independently verified. On 29 January 1993 Basson told the CMC that he had disposed of several drums of the project's chemicals by flying them out over the ocean off Cape Agulhas in an Air Force plane and dumping them overboard, but it was not until 30 March 1993 that Commandant J. G. de Bruyn of the DMI prepared a report certifying this destruction or that Basson actually handed over the first samples that had supposedly been taken from the drums for chemical analysis by the SAP, as required. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2324" task="">
  <question>
    Has South Africa released all the necessary information surrounding the dismantling of its chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Nevertheless, from the point of view of transparency regarding prior South African CBW activities, it has unfortunately not been as forthcoming in releasing information as it might have been. First, both the American and British governments protested in 1994 and 1995 that South Africa's declarations in its Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Confidence Building Measure were not credible because they downplayed the offensive features of the program. Second, the Form F portion of South Africa's 1995-2000 BTWC submissions, which specifically dealt with information about its past offensive and defensive R&amp;D programs, contained statements that Gould and Folb have characterized as &quot;incomplete&quot; and &quot;misleading&quot; insofar as they &quot;deliberately concealed relevant information about the programme.&quot;[62] Third, in May 1998 TRC commissioners were summoned to high-level meetings at the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Surgeon-General's office, and the NIS's successor, the revamped National Intelligence Agency (NIA), where they were pressured to prevent the public exposure of Project Coast on the grounds that embarrassing revelations might well interfere with South Africa's foreign relations. The TRC commissioners refused, but agreed to a process whereby sensitive documents could be identified by the authorities so that their dissemination could be restricted. Fourth, on 8 June 1998 the government unsuccessfully sought to persuade the TRC not to open its CBW hearings to the public.[63] Many of these actions were no doubt undertaken in good faith to prevent the release of sensitive scientific information that might lead to further proliferation or to facilitate the overall process of societal reconciliation, but in certain instances the new government seems to have sought to conceal portions of the historical record in order to forestall embarrassing revelations and/or protect various compromised but influential individuals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2325" task="">
  <question>
    What did South Africa hope to gain by advising Iraq on how to dismantle its CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In February 2003, towards the end of a long period of bitter international diplomatic wrangling over the best way to disarm the Ba`th regime of Sadd?m Husayn in Iraq, the South African government sent a delegation to Baghdad with great fanfare to advise the Iraqis on how best to proceed with a verifiable process of WMD disarmament. In doing so, the South Africans were seeking greater world recognition and presenting their own disarmament process as a model for future Iraqi disarmament. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2326" task="">
  <question>
    What is the biggest challenge to verifying the status of South Africa's chemical weapons programs today? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Not only did many irregularities mark South Africa's rather convoluted CBW disarmament process, not the least of which was the lack of any independent verification of the alleged destruction of its remaining stocks of chemical and biological agents, but there are indications that certain key personnel associated with Project Coast may have subsequently facilitated CBW proliferation, intentionally or otherwise. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2327" task="">
  <question>
    Are South African chemical weapons experts now working for other regimes? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the context of WMD proliferation, the most worrisome aspect of the now defunct Project Coast is that Basson, in connection with his overseas procurement activities, had established close contacts with foreign intelligence operatives and officials from &quot;rogue regimes&quot; such as Libya, with whom he is suspected of sharing information concerning CBW techniques or products.[66] Among his many alleged foreign interlocutors or collaborators were North American, European, and Taiwanese CBW experts he claims to have met at conferences; former British Army intelligence and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer Roger Buffham; Swiss military intelligence chief Peter Regli and one of his operatives, J?rgen Jacomet; former Iranian government official, secret agent, and apparent con man Mohammed Ali Hashemi (the brother of Cyrus Hashemi of Iran-Contra Affair notoriety); senior Libyan intelligence officers Yusuf Murgham and `Abd al-Razaq; unscrupulous Croatian police and intelligence officials; Danish intelligence officer Hendrik Thomsen; and a Russian named Vorabyov. In addition, Basson spent several months in Libya supposedly working on designing a transportation system, claims to have traveled to Iraq to oversee the effects of CW attacks, claims to have gone to Iran to help the government deal with one or more outbreaks of disease, and visited Germany and Eastern Europe to consult with businessmen reputedly associated with the so-called &quot;CBW mafia,&quot; such as Hubert Bl?cher.[67] Other Project Coast scientists may also have made their way to countries with dictatorial regimes?on one occasion Immelman met in Johannesburg with an alleged Syrian military officer about CBW matters, but despite rumors to the contrary he never actually traveled to Syria.[68] Alas, even after more than ten years of investigations, various South African government agencies have been unable to clarify exactly what it was that Basson and his associates were up to overseas. Many knowledgeable observers fear, however, that he may have provided valuable technical information or perhaps even toxic materials generated by Project Coast to individuals and regimes with dubious credentials or unsavory agendas. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2328" task="">
  <question>
    Have South African chemical weapons experts been selling chemical weapons or chemical weapons technology to other regimes? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Moreover, as recently as the summer of 2002, other Coast-linked personnel were approached by various foreign parties seeking to obtain CBW materials. On two occasions Dr. Daan Goosen, a former RRL scientist now engaged in monitoring BW for the NIA in South Africa, was asked to provide Coast-related biological materials that had supposedly been destroyed to foreign parties. In the first instance, he willingly provided a 5 ml sample of goat serum used as an anthrax diagnostic agent for livestock and a 2 ml sample of freeze-dried E. coli genetically modified with the gene coding for Clostridium perfringens toxin to a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer named Robert A. Zlokie and his handler Donald G. Mayes, an ex-US intelligence contract operative who spent years functioning as an &quot;independent&quot; arms dealer. The precise nature of the second prospective deal is less clear. According to some witnesses, Goosen was asked to provide anthrax and other BW agents to a group of &quot;Germans&quot; in exchange for 20 million dollars. He then became suspicious, and as soon as he learned that the &quot;Germans&quot; were really Arabs, including a Qatari who worked at the Saudi embassy, he opted out of the deal and told his NIA superiors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2329" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Daan Goosen? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Though ostensibly a private company that did commercial contract work for industry, a &quot;cover&quot; which facilitated its recruitment of top scientists and its acquisition of materials overseas, RRL was in fact an SADF front company that worked primarily on &quot;hard&quot; (military) projects and only rarely (on average, about 10% of the time) on &quot;soft&quot; (commercial) or &quot;in-house&quot; (researcher-generated) projects. At its height RRL's staff numbered around 70, including 40 scientists and technicians, and was divided into several scientific departments?Toxicology, Molecular Biology, Organic Chemistry, Physiology, Microbiology, an Animal Unit, etc.?that were supported logistically by administrative, financial, and security departments. Its managing director was Dr. Daan Goosen (who was replaced in 1986 by Wynand Swanepoel), its R&amp;D director was Dr. Andre Immelman, its Animal Laboratory Services director was Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, and its administrative director was David Sparmer. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2330" task="">
  <question>
    Have chemical weapons been transferred to elements within South Africa? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Perhaps even more troubling is the possibility that Basson or other Coast personnel may have transferred dangerous CBW materials or know-how to elements of a loose international network of right-wing extremists. Some civilian Afrikaner paramilitary groups, whose pro-apartheid members remain violently opposed to black majority rule, have publicly threatened to attack their enemies with chemical and biological agents. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2331" task="">
  <question>
    Have South African chemical weapons experts been linked to US-based terrorists? 
  </question>
  <passage>
     If an organization of this sort actually exists, which remains to be substantiated, it may turn out that the American doctors Larry Ford and Jerry Nilsson, an outspoken white supremacist, were among its members. According to a pair of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) informants, in the mid-1980s Dr. Ford transferred a suitcase full of dangerous &quot;kaffir-killing&quot; pathogens to Surgeon-General Knobel at the Los Angeles residence of the South African trade attache, Gideon Bouwer.[75] It has also emerged that Nilsson fought as a volunteer against nationalist guerrillas during the Rhodesian civil war, that Ford and Nilsson repeatedly visited South Africa, that Knobel consulted with Ford on CBW matters and personally introduced Ford to Basson, that Basson arranged to have secret accounts opened in Ford's name, and that at Knobel's request Ford lectured Coast scientists about the contamination of household items with biological agents.[76] In the wake of Ford's March 2000 suicide, which transpired just as he was beginning to be implicated in the attempted assassination of his Irvine business partner James Patrick Riley, the police discovered an arsenal of small arms and explosives, Christian Identity militia literature, and over 260 containers of biological materials on his various properties. (For unknown reasons, the FBI has yet to divulge the contents of all but 20 or so of those containers.) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2332" task="">
  <question>
    What impact has South Africa's Project Coast had on the proliferation of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Unfortunately, the extent to which the activities undertaken by Project Coast may have resulted, inadvertently or intentionally, in the proliferation of WMD to other regions has yet to be determined. Since a large amount of documentation is already available concerning the development, nature, and extent of the South African CBW program, it serves to highlight the difficulties involved in assessing the potential proliferation threat posed by WMD programs, even years after they have been officially terminated and dismantled. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2333" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa export chemical weapons to Libya for oil? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The &quot;Sunday Telegraph&quot; alleged that South Africa would supply Libya with weapons, spare parts, and possibly biological and chemical weapons information in exchange for Libyan oil. According to the &quot;Sunday Telegraph,&quot; the deal was negotiated by Libya's foreign security and intelligence chief, Musa Kusa, and will also include advanced equipment such as surface-to-air missiles. South Africa has previously agreed to provide Libya with spare parts for its attack helicopters and Mirage fighter aircraft. South Africa has also considered selling its Rooivalk combat helicopter to Libya. According to Coughlin, South African officials are very concerned with preserving the country's defense industry. One South African official said &quot;we will do business with any country that will reciprocate.&quot;[1] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2334" task="">
  <question>
    What is ARMSCOR? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 22 June 1998 Ron Haywood, chairman of South Africa's procurement agency Armscor, said that he had no knowledge of the alleged arms for oil deal, and that during his two years as Armscor chairman, &quot;there has never been a whisper of us doing business with Libya.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1998/m9808482.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2335" task="">
  <question>
    What was the impact of apartheid on South Africa's development of a chemical weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa's nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs reflected perceptions of internal and external threats stemming from its former government's policy of apartheid, as well as the country's advanced state of technical development. Pretoria developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles but relinquished these armaments in the early 1990s. The apartheid government also undertook a chemical and biological weapons (CBW) defense program, which reportedly also included offensive research and use of CBW agents against opponents of that government. While the proliferation legacies of South Africa's nuclear and missile programs were effectively resolved through verified disarmament measures that won international acclaim, dismantlement of the country's CBW capabilities was not verified to a comparable degree of certainty. The post-apartheid government of South Africa implemented its nonproliferation and disarmament policy through the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (No. 87 of 1993) to control the transfer of sensitive items and technologies. South Africa is the first and, to date, only country to build a nuclear arsenal, and then voluntarily dismantle its entire nuclear weapons program. The South African experience demonstrates that at least under some conditions, unilateral disarmament is not only possible but can improve a nation?s security. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2336" task="">
  <question>
    Why was South Africa's dismantling of its nuclear program unique? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa is the first and, to date, only country to build a nuclear arsenal, and then voluntarily dismantle its entire nuclear weapons program. The South African experience demonstrates that at least under some conditions, unilateral disarmament is not only possible but can improve a nation?s security. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2337" task="">
  <question>
    Do officials have proof that South Africa has completely dismantled its chemical and bioweapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    While the proliferation legacies of South Africa's nuclear and missile programs were effectively resolved through verified disarmament measures that won international acclaim, dismantlement of the country's CBW capabilities was not verified to a comparable degree of certainty. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2338" task="">
  <question>
    What chemical agents were produced by South Africa as part of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1982, Pretoria established the Delta G Scientific facility within Project Coast, which researched lethal, incapacitating, and irritating agents including sarin, VX, paraoxon, thallium, teargas, and an analog of BZ. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2339" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa Ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, ratified the treaty in 1995, and is a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2340" task="">
  <question>
    Has South Africa submitted to inspections as part of the Chemical Weapons Convention? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Upon signing the CWC, South African declared that all CW munitions from Project Coast had been destroyed, but nongovernmental sources question whether the government had successfully disposed of all CW agents. South Africa has submitted several declarations to the OPCW, which has conducted several inspections in South Africa. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2341" task="">
  <question>
    What is South Africa's official stance on the disposal of its chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Upon signing the CWC, South African declared that all CW munitions from Project Coast had been destroyed, but nongovernmental sources question whether the government had successfully disposed of all CW agents. South Africa has submitted several declarations to the OPCW, which has conducted several inspections in South Africa. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2342" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa receive weapons technology from Israel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    . US sources say that export licensing policy to Israel will be dictated by Israel's fulfillment of multilateral arms control agreements such as the MTCR and Chemical Weapons Convention; the US must be convinced that Israel will no longer export sensitive technologies to the PRC, South Africa and several Central and South American nations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Missile&#32;Abstracts/1992/m9203127.htm">cns2004/data/Missile%20Abstracts/1992/m9203127.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2343" task="">
  <question>
    What is the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague, the Netherlands, came into being at the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The OPCW Technical Secretariat has a staff of approximately 500, nearly 200 of which are inspectors. Principal Organs: Conference of the States Parties -- The Conference is the OPCW's principal organ, composed of representatives of all States Parties. A regular session of the Conference is to be held annually unless otherwise decided, and special sessions convened when necessary. The Conference can make decisions on any matters brought to its attention by the Executive Council or any of the States Parties. It elects members of the Executive Council and appoints the Director-General. The Conference is responsible for taking measures necessary to ensure compliance and for redressing situations of non-compliance. It has the power to suspend the rights and privileges of States Parties in non-compliance upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, and may recommend collective measures if a State Party engages in activities prohibited by the Convention. In cases of particular gravity, the Conference is to inform the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. The first session of the Conference of States Parties was held in The Hague, 6-23 May 1997, with the participation of 80 States Parties, 3 contracting States, and 34 signatory States. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/opcw.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/opcw.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2344" task="">
  <question>
    What was Wouter Basson's role in the development of chemical weapons in South Africa? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    CBS News reports that it has uncovered documents that show that Wouter Basson had been in contact with Iran. Basson had previously headed South Africa's germ warfare program called &quot;Project Coast&quot; during the 1980s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2345" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa's Project Coast develop biological weapons as well as chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Project Coast, like the foreign CBW programs upon which it was said to have been modeled, included both a biological weapons component and a chemical weapons component. In contrast to their counterparts in certain other countries, however, the chemical and biological components were not completely separate in South Africa. Not only did they both have the same official chain of command, the same Project Officer, and integrated secret funding mechanisms, but the actual testing of certain chemical agents was sometimes carried out at the primary BW facility rather than at the facilities responsible for CW. Both the BW and CW programs in South Africa consisted of one principal production facility and a variety of other facilities that, for administrative, security, or technical reasons, carried out specialized research, testing, or production tasks. The BW program was centered at one large research, development, and production facility, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), but it also apparently tapped the resources of several commercial firms, university laboratories, and even zoos in order to effectuate supplementary research and testing. After being privatized for a brief period in the early 1990s, the company was sold by its shareholders back to the government and then liquidated. A handful of key RRL personnel profited enormously from this privatization scheme, and several eventually found jobs at other biological or veterinary research facilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2346" task="">
  <question>
    What role did Dr. Larry Ford play in the development of the South African CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Investigators suspect that Ford?s possession of the toxic material may have been linked to his involvement in the South African biological weapons program. The South African Defense Force confirmed that Ford indeed served as an &quot;informal consultant.&quot;[F] Ford was introduced to the South African program in the 1980s through Dr. Neil Knobel, who at the time oversaw a portion of &quot;Project Coast,&quot; South Africa?s covert biological weapons program. The program was directed by Dr. Wouter Basson, nicknamed &quot;Dr. Death,&quot; who is currently on trial for his illegal production of biological and chemical weapons.[G] Unconfirmed allegations also connect Ford to the U.S. government?s chemical weapons program.[F] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2347" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that South Africa may have transferred weapons technology to Iraq? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    book published in the U.S. titled Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network, the author, Israeli secret service defector Ari Ben-Menashe, claims that during the 1980's South Africa's Armscor supplied Iraq with artillery and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/mis12.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/12/mis12.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2348" task="">
  <question>
    What happened to South African weapons experts after the closure of South Africa's nuclear and CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    21 December 1997 - The Sunday Times of London reports that, according to Israeli intelligence sources, Iran is recruiting nuclear scientists employed during the apartheid era in South Africa. An unidentified South African government spokesman says that &quot;there may well be nuclear experts who have been made redundant in South Africa and who are willing to give their skills to any country prepared to pay.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2349" task="">
  <question>
    What was Operation Protea? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the course of &quot;Operation Protea&quot; in Angola, the SADF claims to discover evidence that the Cubans were preparing to use chemical weapons. Although these claims cannot be confirmed by outside investigators, Defence Minister Magnus Malan uses the resulting concern as a pretext to take SADF generals to Angola to study CBW protective suits in terms of clarifying the effects that wearing them will have on combat operations. Malan insists that the SADF take measures to force the Cubans to don protective suits [in order to inhibit their operational effectiveness], causing the SADF to adopt the deceptive tactic of using smoke [projectiles] to achieve this result. The SADF also claims to have evidence that some members of the ANC's military wing received training in CBW techniques in the Soviet Union. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435_2436.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435_2436.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2350" task="">
  <question>
    What military action inspired South Africa to develop protective technology for chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During the course of &quot;Operation Protea&quot; in Angola, the SADF claims to discover evidence that the Cubans were preparing to use chemical weapons. Although these claims cannot be confirmed by outside investigators, Defence Minister Magnus Malan uses the resulting concern as a pretext to take SADF generals to Angola to study CBW protective suits in terms of clarifying the effects that wearing them will have on combat operations. Malan insists that the SADF take measures to force the Cubans to don protective suits [in order to inhibit their operational effectiveness], causing the SADF to adopt the deceptive tactic of using smoke [projectiles] to achieve this result. The SADF also claims to have evidence that some members of the ANC's military wing received training in CBW techniques in the Soviet Union. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435_2436.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435_2436.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2351" task="">
  <question>
    What is the SADF? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South African Defence Force (SADF) 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2352" task="">
  <question>
    What is Project Jota? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa's biological weapons program was one of the two principal components of its covert state-sponsored CBW program, codenamed Project Coast (later Project Jota). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2353" task="">
  <question>
    How technologically &quot;sophisticated&quot; was Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Personnel associated with Coast have characterized it as the most sophisticated program of its type outside of the former Soviet Union, but international CBW experts generally consider it to have been considerably less advanced from a scientific standpoint. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2354" task="">
  <question>
    What was the chief facility for research for South Africa's Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The chief facility for researching, producing, and testing BW agents and lethal toxic chemicals was a military front company called Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, located north of Pretoria, and other facilities were established to develop protective clothing and manufacture exotic assassination devices. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2355" task="">
  <question>
    When was Project Coast started? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It was in this highly charged political and military context, which precipitated a &quot;bunker&quot; or &quot;laager&quot; mentality, that Coast was secretly initiated in 1981 under the aegis of the SADF Special Forces. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2356" task="">
  <question>
    Was Project Coast designed as an offensive or a defensive weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although ostensibly created entirely for defensive purposes, since government and Cuban military forces in Angola were reportedly equipped for and planning to use?if not already using - CW agents against the South African Defence Force (SADF), from the outset the program also had offensive features and capabilities. The apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a &quot;total onslaught&quot; by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing &quot;red-black danger&quot; it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal to defend itself. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2357" task="">
  <question>
    What bioweapons agents were tested as part of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    During its existence Coast scientists tested or developed a wide range of harmful BW agents, including Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae, Clostridium perfringens, plague bacteria, and salmonella bacteria. Some of these pathogens were probably used to assassinate individual &quot;enemies of the state,&quot; and it is alleged that both anthrax bacteria and V. cholerae were each employed on at least one occasion to infect larger populations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2358" task="">
  <question>
    Is there evidence that Project Coast personnel have provided chemical weapons assistance to other countries or regimes? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are indications, however, that certain personnel who were intimately involved in the program, including Basson, may have provided technical knowledge, equipment, or materials to &quot;rogue regimes&quot; such as Libya, to foreign intelligence personnel, to unscrupulous black marketers trafficking in dangerous weapons, and perhaps also ? if certain journalists can be believed?to elements of a shadowy international network of right-wing extremists. These claims have yet to be fully investigated, much less verified. The extent to which various foreign governments, military establishments, and intelligence agencies secretly monitored or covertly assisted in the development of the program likewise remains an open question. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2359" task="">
  <question>
    When was Project Coast officially ended? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The CBW program was officially dismantled in 1993, in the midst of a liberalizing transformation of the regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2360" task="">
  <question>
    What is the connection between the use of chemical weapons in Rhodesia and the development of South Africa's chemical weapons capabilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Second, on the eve of Zimbabwe's independence, many frustrated and soon-to-be-unemployed Rhodesian special operations personnel left their former homeland and moved to South Africa to continue their fight against &quot;terrorists.&quot; Under the rubric of &quot;Operation Winter,&quot; Rhodesian special force assets may have been covertly transferred en masse across the border. This operation was allegedly carried out with the connivance of British government ministers in Rhodesia, and effectuated in part by British and American transport planes. Among these assets were members of the Selous Scouts, the SAS, and the CIO, as well as their black collaborators and &quot;the poisoners and their poisons.&quot;[23] Whether or not such a mass covert transfer of assets took place, there is no doubt that many former Rhodesian special operators or scientists?e.g., Fritz Loots, Philip Morgan, and perhaps even Robert Symington?were subsequently incorporated directly into compatible South African units or institutions.[24] Hence there seem to have been various intimate, organic links between the Rhodesian and South African CBW programs, even though the precise role that Rhodesians may have played in the scientific or operational orientation of Project Coast remains to be clarified. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2361" task="">
  <question>
    How did Wouter Basson justify the creation of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although it is likely that the looming collapse of Rhodesia and the escalation of the Angolan conflict between 1978 and 1980 altered SADF threat perceptions, most of the reports concerning this subject were prepared much later by Wouter Basson and his associates in order to justify the program's initiation retrospectively. The official line was that the program was created entirely for defensive purposes, since Marxist Movimento Popular de Liberta ao de Angola (MPLA: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and Cuban forces in Angola were reportedly equipped for and perhaps planning to use?if they were not already using?chemical agents against the SADF.[25] It is true that Soviet-made vehicles used by Cuban forces that were captured in Angola were outfitted with chemical air filters, CW antidotes, and gas masks, and that rumors abounded about supposed MPLA use of CW agents against the troops of South Africa's allies, the Uniao Nacional para a Independ ncia Total de Angola (UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), but this equipment was standard issue and the allegations about communist CW usage were never actually confirmed. Nevertheless, this provided the rationale, whether militarily justifiable or merely convenient, for the establishment of Coast. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2362" task="">
  <question>
    Did UNITA receive chemical weapons from communist countries (i.e. Soviet Union, Cuba) for use in the Angola conflict? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is true that Soviet-made vehicles used by Cuban forces that were captured in Angola were outfitted with chemical air filters, CW antidotes, and gas masks, and that rumors abounded about supposed MPLA use of CW agents against the troops of South Africa's allies, the Uniao Nacional para a Independ ncia Total de Angola (UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), but this equipment was standard issue and the allegations about communist CW usage were never actually confirmed. Nevertheless, this provided the rationale, whether militarily justifiable or merely convenient, for the establishment of Coast. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2363" task="">
  <question>
    How did the threat of communist-supplied chemical weapons in Angola contribute to the creation of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    It is true that Soviet-made vehicles used by Cuban forces that were captured in Angola were outfitted with chemical air filters, CW antidotes, and gas masks, and that rumors abounded about supposed MPLA use of CW agents against the troops of South Africa's allies, the Uniao Nacional para a Independ ncia Total de Angola (UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), but this equipment was standard issue and the allegations about communist CW usage were never actually confirmed. Nevertheless, this provided the rationale, whether militarily justifiable or merely convenient, for the establishment of Coast. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2364" task="">
  <question>
    When were South African forces first trained in defensive measures against chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    If Project Coast had really been initiated primarily in order to provide defensive CBW protection to SADF troops and their allies, all along its primary focus should have been on the purchase or manufacture of protective clothing and on the training of fighting troops to defend against CBW attacks. Yet this was never the case. According to Dr. Brian Davey, the scientist responsible for developing these defensive measures, even these most basic steps only began to be taken in 1986, and it was not until 1988 that the actual training of SADF troops to respond to CW commenced. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2365" task="">
  <question>
    Did Project Coast contribute to the widescale implementation of counter-chemical weapons techniques in the South African Defence Forces? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the time of &quot;Operation Modular&quot; in Angola in 1987, he said there were no NBC suits available to SADF troops in the field. Instead, the troops were told that in the event of a CW attack they should dig a foxhole, crawl in, and cover themselves with their ponchos, a wholly inadequate response. Even specialized medical units only had a total of 10-20 NBC suits at their disposal.[26] This is all the more astonishing given that a succession of companies owned by bioengineer Jan Lourens had by then succeeded in designing and manufacturing some of the world's best protective CBW equipment and clothing, stocks of which were already in great demand overseas. This gear had been successfully tested in the field using actual CBW agents rather than simulants, yet virtually none of it was being supplied to South African troops or their allies operating in neighboring states.[27] As Chandre Gould and Peter Folb rightly emphasize, such a lackluster reaction suggests that the SADF did not take the purported communist CBW threat all that seriously. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2366" task="">
  <question>
    What offensive capabilities were developed under Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Moreover, from the outset the South African CBW program also had offensive features and capabilities. This should come as no real surprise. The apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a &quot;total onslaught&quot; by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing &quot;red-black danger&quot; it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal to defend itself.[28] It was in this highly-charged political and military context, which precipitated a &quot;bunker&quot; or &quot;laager&quot; mentality, that Project Coast was secretly initiated in 1981 under the aegis of the SADF Special Forces (SF). In a top secret November 1989 military report prepared by Basson on the privatization of Project Coast, he explicitly acknowledged the many offensive dimensions of the program. Among other things, he said that it was designed &quot;To conduct research with regard to basic aspects of chemical warfare (offensive)...To conduct research with regard to basic aspects of biological warfare (offensive)...To conduct research with regard to covert as well as conventional [delivery] systems...To establish an industrial capacity with regard to the production of offensive and defensive CBW equipment...[and] To give operational and technical CBW support (offensive and defensive)...&quot;[29] Note that these particular statements directly contradict his public testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and at his trial, during which he repeatedly stated that the project was defensive in orientation and denied that it had sponsored any offensive CBW actions. They also confirm the testimony of the many scientists who actually carried out research, testing, and production activities at the CW and BW facilities. Even though most of them had been recruited with the understanding that Coast was a defensive program, it soon became clear to them that it was in large part offensive. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2367" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated South Africa to research CBW programs in the early 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In early 1981 Defence Minister Constand Viljoen, who was reportedly very concerned about the threat posed by potential Cuban use of CW, ordered Basson to travel abroad and covertly collect information about Western CBW programs that might be used as a model for South Africa's own program. Basson was also instructed to make contact with people who could provide him with information on East Bloc programs. To this end he embarked on an international fact-finding mission, and in May 1981 attended an international CBW conference in San Antonio, Texas, and visited the Army Chemical School in Taiwan. In August 1981, after Basson had reported back to the Defence Command Council, Viljoen allocated funds for the completion of a feasibility study on the establishment of a South African CBW program. Toward the end of 1981, Defence Minister Magnus Malan approved the idea and authorized the release of funding for such a program.[31] Thus was born Project Coast, for which Basson was at once appointed Project Officer. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2368" task="">
  <question>
    Who was responsible for conducting the research that led to the development of Project Coast in the early 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Basson to travel abroad and covertly collect information about Western CBW programs that might be used as a model for South Africa's own program. Basson was also instructed to make contact with people who could provide him with information on East Bloc programs. To this end he embarked on an international fact-finding mission, and in May 1981 attended an international CBW conference in San Antonio, Texas, and visited the Army Chemical School in Taiwan. In August 1981, after Basson had reported back to the Defence Command Council, Viljoen allocated funds for the completion of a feasibility study on the establishment of a South African CBW program. Toward the end of 1981, Defence Minister Magnus Malan approved the idea and authorized the release of funding for such a program.[31] Thus was born Project Coast, for which Basson was at once appointed Project Officer. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2369" task="">
  <question>
    What were Basson's duties as Project Officer of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As Project Officer, his appointed task was to act as an intermediary between the CMC and the directors and scientists at the various CBW facilities. Although Basson modestly claimed that his function was to deal with the practical aspects of the project in accordance with the &quot;strategic guidelines&quot; provided by the CMC and its &quot;work groups,&quot; and always insisted that he did not have a &quot;free hand,&quot; his nominal superiors all concur that he personally supervised or managed the day-to-day affairs of the project, operated with a very high degree of autonomy and independence, and provided the CMC with the bulk of the crucial scientific and operational information that its members needed to make important managerial decisions, including the authorization of requested project expenditures.[38] In effect, the CMC seems to have become dependent upon Basson for its functioning, rather than the other way around. By the mid-1990s, when it became apparent that some portion of the funds requested by Basson had been used for his own personal gain rather than legitimate project needs, several of Basson's erstwhile supervisors complained that all along he had misled them or kept them in the dark about what he was really doing. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2370" task="">
  <question>
    What is the CMC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    However, although administratively subordinate to this latter body, the entity that officially managed Project Coast was known as the Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC), which typically met two to four times per year and normally comprised the Army Surgeon-General (who served as its titular chair and was also the head of SAMS), the SADF chief, the Chief of Staff (COS) Intelligence, the COS Finance, representatives from ARMSCOR, personnel from the Auditor-General's office, and Project Officer Basson, who served as CMC secretary. Directly under the auspices of the CMC, three &quot;work groups&quot; were supposedly formed to deal with specialized matters on a regular basis. The Technical Work Group, which was headed by Basson and included a rotating group of directors and leading scientists from the front companies, 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2371" task="">
  <question>
    How did the SADF arrange for financing for Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The SADF provided funding to the Project Coast front companies through various &quot;private&quot; bank accounts that had been set up explicitly for such purposes. The COS Finance was primarily responsible for arranging the details of the transfer of funds after the requested amounts were approved by the CMC. Most of the funds were transferred from the SADF's Secret Defence Fund directly to Infladel, another SADF front company that in addition to disbursing funds was responsible for the technical information system, the operational coordination of the program, and the security and safety systems of Delta G and RRL. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2372" task="">
  <question>
    What is Infladel? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Most of the funds were transferred from the SADF's Secret Defence Fund directly to Infladel, another SADF front company that in addition to disbursing funds was responsible for the technical information system, the operational coordination of the program, and the security and safety systems of Delta G and RRL. In 1990 Infladel was dissolved and its functions were transferred to two new companies, Sefmed Information Services and D. John Truter Financial Consultants. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2373" task="">
  <question>
    How much did Project Coast cost during its existence? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    All in all, Project Coast cost the SADF a total of 418,226,509 rand, of which 98,432,657 were expended on RRL and 127,467,406 were expended on Delta G. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2374" task="">
  <question>
    What was Delta G? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Likewise the primary CW facility, Delta G Scientific (Delta G), sometimes provided assistance with RRL's biochemistry projects.[35] Both the CW and BW programs in South Africa consisted of one principal production facility and a variety of other facilities that, for administrative, security, or technical reasons, carried out specialized research, testing, or production tasks. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2375" task="">
  <question>
    How were South Africa's chemical weapons reportedly disposed of? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Unfortunately, there is no proof that the project's toxic materials and documents were all actually destroyed. Basson's reported destruction of Coast's CW and BW agents was never independently verified. On 29 January 1993 Basson told the CMC that he had disposed of several drums of the project's chemicals by flying them out over the ocean off Cape Agulhas in an Air Force plane and dumping them overboard, but it was not until 30 March 1993 that Commandant J. G. de Bruyn of the DMI prepared a report certifying this destruction or that Basson actually handed over the first samples that had supposedly been taken from the drums for chemical analysis by the SAP, as required. Indeed, during his cross-examination, Knobel admitted that he had simply taken Basson's word that these dangerous materials were destroyed.[59] Basson's claims to have overseen the burning up of Coast's biological agents in an oven at RRL were likewise never independently corroborated, and samples of some of the lethal agents produced at RRL or Delta G may have been removed from the former facility by certain scientists who worked there.[60] However that may be, there is no doubt whatsoever that hard copies of thousands of Delta G and RRL documents which had supposedly been recorded and destroyed were instead retained and stored in trunks by Basson. Nor was he alone in not handing over all of his Coast documentation for destruction. Scientists at RRL later admitted that they too had not turned over all their project reports, as instructed by RRL's management.[61] If nothing else, this demonstrates that the apartheid regime did not take adequate steps to ensure that its CBW program was dismantled in such a way as to prevent potential future proliferation. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2376" task="">
  <question>
    Who was entrusted with the destruction of Project Coast chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Despite this decision, in January 1993 Basson was entrusted with personally supervising the destruction of various Coast-related chemical stores, and earlier that same month he and other high-ranking SADF officers authorized the copying of all of the project's CBW technical and scientific information onto CD-ROMs, along with the subsequent destruction of the copied documents. This year-long task was carried out by Delta G chemist Klaus Psotta and Dr. Kobus Bothma at Data Images Information Systems, a company owned by Delta G's managing director Mijburgh (and previously known as Medchem Technologies). After the project documents were copied, thirteen discs full of classified data were placed in a succession of safes to which only De Klerk, Knobel, and the new Coast Project Officer, Colonel Ben Steyn, had keys. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2377" task="">
  <question>
    How did the South African government attempt to prevent Basson from assisting other regimes in developing chemical weapons after the dismantling of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the end of March 1993, the date he was to have been cashiered, Basson was re-employed by the government for one year to tie up other loose ends on the project. After this temporary extension of his work for Coast and a brief subsequent period of retirement from the SADF, in 1995 he was rehired as a physician at 1 Military Hospital in the hopes of forestalling his continued collaboration with unscrupulous foreign parties. In the meantime, the &quot;privatization&quot; of the project's military front companies and the reassignment of some of Coast's scientific personnel proceeded apace. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2378" task="">
  <question>
    Where was the technical information related to Project Coast stored? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Despite this decision, in January 1993 Basson was entrusted with personally supervising the destruction of various Coast-related chemical stores, and earlier that same month he and other high-ranking SADF officers authorized the copying of all of the project's CBW technical and scientific information onto CD-ROMs, along with the subsequent destruction of the copied documents. This year-long task was carried out by Delta G chemist Klaus Psotta and Dr. Kobus Bothma at Data Images Information Systems, a company owned by Delta G's managing director Mijburgh (and previously known as Medchem Technologies). After the project documents were copied, thirteen discs full of classified data were placed in a succession of safes to which only De Klerk, Knobel, and the new Coast Project Officer, Colonel Ben Steyn, had keys.[58] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2379" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Ben Steyn? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After the project documents were copied, thirteen discs full of classified data were placed in a succession of safes to which only De Klerk, Knobel, and the new Coast Project Officer, Colonel Ben Steyn, had keys.[58] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2380" task="">
  <question>
    How did the South African military react to the January 1993 signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Moreover, the military?with or without the knowledge and authorization of De Klerk's government?appears to have accelerated its illegal international procurement activities in anticipation of the January 1993 signing of the new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) treaty.[57] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2381" task="">
  <question>
    How were chemical weapons used against opponents of the South African apartheid government? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On the verbal instructions of Basson, Andre Immelman secretly transferred a host of highly toxic chemicals and freeze-dried pathogens that had been produced either at Delta G or RRL?and thereafter stored in a refrigerator inside a fireproof and bombproof walk-in safe in his own office?to military and police personnel through various channels. The specific recipients of these lethal substances and contaminated items were Dr. R. F. Botha (alternately known as &quot;Koos&quot;, &quot;Mr. R&quot;, and &quot;Frans Brink&quot;) and Vernon Lange (otherwise known as &quot;Mr. T&quot; and &quot;Theo Otto&quot;), both of whom were operatives of the CCB; Chris Smit, Gert Otto, and Manie van Staden, three SB officers who either deployed some of them personally or later distributed them to C1/C10 &quot;hit team&quot; members; Johnny Koortzen, an ex-SO psychologist who in 1988 assumed control over Systems Research and Development, a company that bioengineer Jan Lourens had set up in part to manufacture special &quot;applicators,&quot; i.e., arcane assassination devices such as rings, screwdrivers, walking sticks, and umbrellas that had been transformed into weapons by means of the addition of poison compartments and injectors or firing mechanisms for poisoned pellets; and Basson himself. The actual substances included potentially lethal chemicals such as aldicarb, brodifacum, cantharidin, colchamine, cyanide, digoxin, methanol, monensin, paraoxon, paraquat, phencyclidine, phosphide, silatrane, sodium azide, thallium, and Vitamin D3, biological agents such as anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, brucella bacteria, salmonella bacteria, mamba venom, and bottles of cholera bacteria, and a wide variety of foodstuffs, beverages, household items, and cigarettes that had been contaminated with these poisons.[54] There can be little doubt that several of these toxic materials, items, or devices were subsequently used to murder or sicken opponents of the apartheid regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2382" task="">
  <question>
    How did South African police personnel gain access to chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On the verbal instructions of Basson, Andre Immelman secretly transferred a host of highly toxic chemicals and freeze-dried pathogens that had been produced either at Delta G or RRL?and thereafter stored in a refrigerator inside a fireproof and bombproof walk-in safe in his own office?to military and police personnel through various channels. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2383" task="">
  <question>
    Which regimes is Wouter Basson suspected of having transferred chemical weapons to? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the context of WMD proliferation, the most worrisome aspect of the now defunct Project Coast is that Basson, in connection with his overseas procurement activities, had established close contacts with foreign intelligence operatives and officials from &quot;rogue regimes&quot; such as Libya, with whom he is suspected of sharing information concerning CBW techniques or products.[66] Among his many alleged foreign interlocutors or collaborators were North American, European, and Taiwanese CBW experts he claims to have met at conferences; former British Army intelligence and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer Roger Buffham; Swiss military intelligence chief Peter Regli and one of his operatives, J?rgen Jacomet; former Iranian government official, secret agent, and apparent con man Mohammed Ali Hashemi (the brother of Cyrus Hashemi of Iran-Contra Affair notoriety); senior Libyan intelligence officers Yusuf Murgham and `Abd al-Razaq; unscrupulous Croatian police and intelligence officials; Danish intelligence officer Hendrik Thomsen; and a Russian named Vorabyov. In addition, Basson spent several months in Libya supposedly working on designing a transportation system, claims to have traveled to Iraq to oversee the effects of CW attacks, claims to have gone to Iran to help the government deal with one or more outbreaks of disease, and visited Germany and Eastern Europe to consult with businessmen reputedly associated with the so-called &quot;CBW mafia,&quot; such as Hubert Bl?cher. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2384" task="">
  <question>
    Who is suspected of helping Daan Goosen sell CBW on the black market? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In both deals the middleman between Goosen and the &quot;foreigners&quot; was a right-winger and retired SADF Major-General associated with the CCB named Tai Minnaar, who in 1989 established a private company called Military Technical Services (MTS) that had links with the powerful South African mercenary recruitment agency Executive Outcomes (EO).[70] Shortly after the collapse of the second deal Minnaar suddenly died, officially of a heart attack. According to his girlfriend, however, his peculiar discoloration and bloating symptoms prior to death suggested that he may have been assassinated with some sort of poison, but this cannot be confirmed since relatives asked that his body be cremated and no autopsy was performed.[71] These two examples may represent only the tip of a much larger iceberg of secret efforts by foreigners to acquire South African CBW materials. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2385" task="">
  <question>
    Why was Wouter Basson placed on trial? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The program was directed by Dr. Wouter Basson, nicknamed &quot;Dr. Death,&quot; who is currently on trial for his illegal production of biological and chemical weapons.[G] Unconfirmed allegations also connect Ford to the U.S. government?s chemical weapons program.[F] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2386" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have tried to recruit South African scientists to develop their chemical weapons programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    U.S. intelligence agencies have alleged that Libya?s leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, has attempted to recruit South African scientists to assist in the acquisition of BW, and that Libya has started to develop pathogens and toxins for weapons use. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/e1_libya_1.html">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/e1_libya_1.html </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2387" task="">
  <question>
    How many days does the IAEA spend  inspecting South African nuclear siteseach year? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Safeguarding previously secret fuel-cycle facilities in South Africa will require 200 inspector days per year, while applying safeguards to nuclear projects in the former Soviet Union will require an additional 800 inspector days per year. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Nuclear&#32;Abstracts/1994/n9411267.htm">cns2004/data/Nuclear%20Abstracts/1994/n9411267.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2388" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries were brought into the Missile Technology Control Regime by the US in the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Administration reached agreements with Russia, Ukraine and South Africa to control missile-related technology, brought Russia, Brazil and South Africa into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and secured China?s commitment not to transfer MTCR-controlled, ground-to-ground missiles. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/stra0296.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/stra0296.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2389" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries were the focus of the IAEA's non-proliferation efforts in the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The collapse of the Soviet Union and dramatic recent progress towards a universal nonproliferation regime have required the IAEA to apply safeguards for the first time in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the other non-Russian republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as the Baltic states. It must also deploy additional safeguards in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/32/fische32.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol03/32/fische32.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2390" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries have been recognized for their efforts in dismantling their nuclear and CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Several other countries, however, no longer stand out as potential proliferators--not least, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa , all of whom have become examples of proliferation &quot;rollback.&quot; Two other countries of high proliferation concern in the mid-1970s--Taiwan and South Korea--have receded from attention, not without 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2391" task="">
  <question>
    What progress has the South African government made towards dismantling its nuclear and CBW programs? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On the other hand, there is good news that would not have been possible without the East-West rapprochement: South Africa has scrapped its small nuclear arsenal, has opened the country for full International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, and will be a party to the African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (as soon as the Pelindaba Treaty enters into force). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2392" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa, South Korea, and Brazil (and Argentina, which has left the non-aligned group) are already members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); South Africa and Argentina have also joined the Missile Technology Control Regime; the stipulations of the CWC make it mandatory for quite a number of developing countries to establish their own export control systems; the same applies for a smaller number obliged to observe Article III, 2 of the NPT (on nuclear exports). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol04/42/muller42.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2393" task="">
  <question>
    Which countries dismantled their nuclear programs during the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Since the beginning of the decade, six countries that might have been nuclear powers?Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, North Korea, South Africa , and Iraq?have been turned away from that path. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/secii.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/secii.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2394" task="">
  <question>
    How many countries have developed both nuclear/biological/chemical weapons and the ability to deliver them? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    More than 25 countries have?or may be developing?NBC weapons and the means to deliver them; a larger number are capable of producing such weapons, potentially on short notice. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/secii.htm%20">cns2004/data/china/engdocs/dodprol2/secii.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2395" task="">
  <question>
    How did Wouter Basson convince the SADF to help create &quot;front&quot; companies to support Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    After returning from his travels overseas Basson had informed members of the Defence Command Council that foreign CBW programs utilized ostensibly &quot;civilian&quot; front companies to conduct all offensive R&amp;amp;D up to the point of actual weaponization. Although this claim was not entirely accurate, the SADF nonetheless decided to create new front companies rather than use its own components or the existing structures under its control.&lt;A href=&quot;#fn35&quot; name=fnB35&gt;[34]&lt;/A&gt; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2396" task="">
  <question>
    Is South Africa's acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty threatened by the emergence of India and Pakistan as overt nuclear states? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At the same time, officials from a number of critical NPT parties, including, for example, Japan, Egypt, and  South Africa, have stressed that their adherence to the treaty was based on the assumption that there would be no additional nuclear weapon states after the five acknowledged nuclear powers. For these countries, not making significant efforts to reverse the decisions by India and Pakistan to escalate their nuclear competition--let alone openly welcoming them into the nuclear club--would be viewed as breaking a fundamental condition for their own NPT adherence. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2397" task="">
  <question>
    Was Iran successful in buying nuclear weapons technologies from South Africa? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The South African Press Association (SAPA) reports that Dr. Waldo Stumpf, South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) chief, has denied that Iran attempted to buy nuclear weapons technologies from South Africa last year. He further denies the report made by Jane's Defense Weekly that claims he and Reza Amrollahi, Iran's Deputy Minister for Atomic Affairs, met to discuss nuclear technology issues. 24 November 1997 - The Jerusalem Report reports that Iran wants to buy portable uranium-enrichment facilities from South Africa for use in building nuclear weapons. A deal would be worth hundreds of millions of dollars.4 December 1997- US State Department spokesman James Rubin &quot;expressed confidence&quot; that South Africa would not assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons. Rubin said the United States was aware that Iran was actively seeking nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. However, he said &quot;The United States has high confidence in South Africa's commitment to its obligations under the (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty not to assist efforts of any other countries, including Iran, to acquire nuclear weapons.&quot; 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2398" task="">
  <question>
    Why is it believed that foreign countries are approaching South Africa about purchasing nuclear / chemical / biological weapons technology? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    11 December 1997 - The Jerusalem Times reports that Iran is trying to purchase nuclear technological information and parts from South Africa's now defunct nuclear weapons program. The Times reports Kamal Kharazi, Iran's Foreign Minister, has traveled to South Africa three times in the last several months to procure items necessary to enhance Iran's growing nuclear program. It is believed that Iran, which did not support South Africa during apartheid, will be embraced by the money-starved South African government. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2399" task="">
  <question>
    As of 1995, which countries are members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), Geneva, 1969-78. As originally constituted, the CD had 40 members, however, following the unification of Germany and the break up of the former Yugoslavia, only 38 countries participated in the work of the Conference until 1995. On 17 June 1995, the CD unanimously decided to admit 23 members: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, US, Venezuela, Viet Nam,Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/shared/intorgs/inven2k.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/shared/intorgs/inven2k.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2400" task="">
  <question>
    How many nuclear weapons did South Africa claim it had built in the 1990s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa stated in the  early 1990s that it had produced six nuclear weapons but had dismantled its program. By contrast, if frequent public allegations are to be believed, Israel's nuclear program may well have advanced considerably in size, complexity, and technical sophistication since its inception. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2401" task="">
  <question>
    What did South Africa feel it had to do to reintegrate itself back into the international community after apartheid? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa was trying to completely change course and reintegrate itself into international society. There were three things they realized they had to do: abolish apartheid, grant independence to Namibia, and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So as far as our nuclear strategy goes, everything just sort of fell into our lap after a decade of quiet -- and not so quiet -- influence. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2402" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa attend its first meeting of the MTCR? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The MTCR held its 10th  plenary session in Bonn, Germany, on October 10-12, 1995. The meeting was attended by 27 member states, including Russia and  South Africa for the first time. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/nisprofs/shared/intorgs/inven2k.tx%2574">cns2004/data/nisprofs/shared/intorgs/inven2k.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2403" task="">
  <question>
    What efforts has South Africa taken in the UN to guard against the proliferation of nuclear / chemical and biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    &quot;Relationship between disarmament and development&quot; (South Africa, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, 57/65) requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts in 2003 to present a report to the 59th session of the GA with recommendations for a reappraisal of the relationship between disarmament and development in the current international context, as well as the future role of the organization in this connection. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/un.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Inventory/un.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2404" task="">
  <question>
    What were some of the dominant factors influencing the US-South African relationship during the 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In South Africa this meant building a quiet alliance with the government and providing anti-Soviet military support. We softened up on our anti-apartheid stance. In the nuclear area, I believe we facilitated and even encouraged European suppliers to provide the Koeberg reactors with fuel which we couldn't supply under American law. Throughout the 1980s the dominant factor in US-South African relations was East-West, American-Soviet issues.  Throughout the 1980s the dominant factor in US-South African relations was East-West, American-Soviet issues. The Reagan Administration's regional strategy was called &quot;constructive engagement,&quot; which was mainly a military strategy against the Soviet threat. Eventually, by the end of the Reagan Administration, this strategy had actually worked. The Soviets had become over-extended and were pulling back, compromising in Afghanistan and southern Africa. Simultaneous with the Reagan pro-South African policy was a congressionally-mandated anti-South Africa, anti-apartheid policy that led to the imposition of increasingly tough sanctions in the late 1980s. Eventually, the pinch of sanctions and the end of the Soviet threat after 1989 led to a major change in South Africa. The South Africans themselves had gotten fed up with being isolated. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2405" task="">
  <question>
    How does the South African government's policy towards disarmament differ from that employed by other states? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The South Africans claim to have taken such steps, but the situation is less reassuring in Brazil, since the civilian government's control over all aspects of the military's activities is not solid. (It was the Brazilian military that conduced the nuclear weapons program.) In fact, it seems that in Brazil all the specialists that were running the nuclear program are still there. In Argentina I don't see any problem. In Kazakhstan the new state is taking over the old Soviet Semipalatinsk test site and nuclear research center. This probably won't be a problem, but it does put all those assets in the hands of nuclear scientists who could potentially use them to some illicit purpose. South Africa also remains a concern, but at least the government recognizes its obligation to reassure outsiders that its nuclear teams have been reassigned. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2406" task="">
  <question>
    How could South Africa demonstrate to outsiders that its nuclear program is really defunct? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    if  South Africa dilutes the material to low-enriched uranium, this could help to reassure outsiders that the weapons program is really dead. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol01/11/specto11.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2407" task="">
  <question>
    What were some of the factors which led to South Africa's decision to rollback its efforts in developing NBC weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Similarly, the decision of the government of South African President de Klerk to end apartheid and hold free elections was accompanied by a rethinking of that country's decision to build nuclear weapons. The result has been the rollback of the South African bomb. In addition, export controls still can help to contain theeventualscopeandsophisticationofexistingprograms, even in cases in which countries have crossed the NBC or missile threshold 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol05/53/dunn53.tx%2574</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2408" task="">
  <question>
    According to South Africa's Mineral and Energy Minister, why did South African officials meet with Iran in 1996? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Penuell Maduna, Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister of South Africa, says previous allegations of  South Africa's collaboration with Iran over the latter's development of nuclear weapons technology are erroneous. He further asserts that the only meeting Dr. Waldo Stumpf, head of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), or any other AEC official had took place in a public restaurant in 1996 in Cape Town with Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, Iran's then petroleum minister. The meeting he reports, was part of a plan to set up a possible oil storage agreement at Saldanha. [Note: Aqazadeh was appointed head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran on 3 September 1997. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_1874.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2409" task="">
  <question>
    How did the Rhodesian Selous Scouts use chemical weapons in Rhodesia? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The recently-formed Rhodesian Selous Scouts adopt and adapt British counterinsurgency techniques used in Kenya and Malaya by experimenting with new types of weapons, including biological and chemical weapons. They seek to develop poisons to impregnate blue jeans used by guerrillas with toxins, as well as poison pens to assassinate guerrilla leaders. They also make efforts to contaminate rivers and water supplies with chemical and biological agents. [Note: See the second Mid-1970s, 1975-1 October 1978, and 1976 entries below for more details.] Rhodesia has one &quot;rudimentary&quot; CBW plant that receives outside aid from South Africa. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2410" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa first produce chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1939-1945 - The Director General of War, H. J. van der Bijl, oversees the production of chemical weapons and the taking of defensive measures to protect South African troops against chemical and biological attack. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2411" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa first start collaborating with Israel towards the development of chemical weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Late 1960s and Early 1970s- Israel and South Africa increasingly cooperate with each other in the development of armaments during this period. This cooperation is focused mainly on nuclear weapons and missile programs, but may also have included collaborative efforts in CBW R&amp;D. [Note: The study cited below provides no corroborating evidence concerning cooperation between the two countries in the CBW field, although there are clear indications of growing Israeli-South African cooperation in other weapons fields. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2412" task="">
  <question>
    When did South African Special Forces units start using chemical weapons in the field? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1970s and 1980s - South African [special operations] units fighting against guerrillas in Namibia and Angola, such as the 5th Reconnaissance commandos, the Koevoet (&quot;Crowbar&quot;) unit, and the SF's D[elta]40 unit [composed largely of Rhodesians], employ unconventional counterinsurgency tactics, including the use of chemical and biological agents. [Note: See several entries below for details concerning the CW and BW agents employed.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2413" task="">
  <question>
    How did the Soviet support of insurgents in Rhodesia motivate South Africa to start a chemical weapons program in the 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1974-1977 - In 1974 De Villiers prepares a 10-page report, which estimates that building a CBW program would cost 5 million rand and concludes that the Soviet Union is too well armed with CBW and would thus retaliate against any CBW attack. The SADF postpones its plans to develop an offensive CBW program, but supports the establishment of a minimal CBW R&amp;D program, one which is not well-developed. By 1977, De Villiers changes his tune and displays far more interest in the possibility of offensive CW use, but says little about using BW. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2414" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa fear that the Soviet Union would use chemical weapons against South African interests in the 1970s and 1980s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1974-1977 - In 1974 De Villiers prepares a 10-page report, which estimates that building a CBW program would cost 5 million rand and concludes that the Soviet Union is too well armed with CBW and would thus retaliate against any CBW attack. The SADF postpones its plans to develop an offensive CBW program, but supports the establishment of a minimal CBW R&amp;D program, one which is not well-developed. By 1977, De Villiers changes his tune and displays far more interest in the possibility of offensive CW use, but says little about using BW. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2415" task="">
  <question>
    How did the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation influence the development of chemical weapons in South Africa? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) asks doctors and chemists from the University of Rhodesia to identify and test a range of chemical and biological agents that can be used as a &quot;fear factor&quot; in the war against nationalist guerrillas. Anatomy [Department] professor Dr. Robert Symington, head of the clinical program, recruits several colleagues and students to carry out the research. SADF Forensic Department experts and intelligence personnel have access to the most secret Rhodesian camps and likely play some part in the development of CBW agents, which include organophosphate poisons, thallium, warfarin [an anticoagulant rodenticide], anthrax bacteria, and other unspecified bacteriological agents. Symington later moves to South Africa and reportedly collaborates in the founding of a top secret South African CBW program (codenamed &quot;Red Mountain&quot;) prior to his death. [Note: This codename is not mentioned in any other source. Also, Brickhill was an ANC activist who was targeted for assassination and was severely injured in a bombing attempt.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2416" task="">
  <question>
    Where did the Selous Scouts set up their first chemical and bioweapons test facility in the late 1970s? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The Selous Scouts set up a secret laboratory at the Andre Rabie barracks, to which three medical doctors from the regular Rhodesian Army are seconded. Large consignments of the denim clothing favored by guerrillas are purchased from middlemen and soaked in &quot;steel vats containing a solution of odourless and colourless poisons&quot; (probably organophosphates). Several prisoners are forcibly brought to the Mount Darwin Fort and apparently used as &quot;human guinea pigs&quot; to test the effects of the poison. Selous Scouts introduce &quot;measured quantities of bacteriological cultures&quot; at several points along the Ruya River in the wildlife area near the Mozambique border. This action corresponds with, and may have resulted in, a reported epidemic of deaths among people living on the river's banks. However, the cause of the epidemic was officially attributed to cholera. [Note: see also 1975-1980 entry above.] During a reconnaissance mission against guerrillas operating near the Cochemane administrative center in the Tete province, Selous Scouts observe that the town draws its water from a single reservoir and pour a &quot;lethal dose of poison&quot; into it. Rhodesian CIO intercepts confirm that 200 people suddenly die. [Note: The &quot;poison&quot; in question may be a reference to Vibrio cholerae, not a chemical agent. See 1975-1980 entry above.] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2417" task="">
  <question>
    Who were the Selous Scouts? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The recently-formed Rhodesian Selous Scouts adopt and adapt British counterinsurgency techniques used in Kenya and Malaya by experimenting with new types of weapons, including biological and chemical weapons. They seek to develop poisons to impregnate blue jeans used by guerrillas with toxins, as well as poison pens to assassinate guerrilla leaders. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2435.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2418" task="">
  <question>
    What is Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa's biological weapons program was one of the two principal components of its covert state-sponsored CBW program, codenamed Project Coast (later Project Jota). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2419" task="">
  <question>
    What were the activities of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The chief facility for researching, producing, and testing BW agents and lethal toxic chemicals was a military front company called Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, located north of Pretoria, and other facilities were established to develop protective clothing and manufacture exotic assassination devices. Project Officer Dr. Wouter Basson also set up an elaborate network of procurement and financial front companies overseas. During its existence Coast scientists tested or developed a wide range of harmful BW agents, including Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae, Clostridium perfringens, plague bacteria, and salmonella bacteria. Some of these pathogens were probably used to assassinate individual &quot;enemies of the state,&quot; and it is alleged that both anthrax bacteria and V. cholerae were each employed on at least one occasion to infect larger populations. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2420" task="">
  <question>
    Who was incharge of the project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    a South African judge acquitted Dr. Wouter Basson, the Project Officer for the secret South African chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program, Project Coast, of all that remained of the 46 criminal charges originally filed against him by state prosecutors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2421" task="">
  <question>
    When was he acquitted of the charges? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 11 April 2002, approximately seven months after the devastating terrorist attack launched by al-Qa`ida operatives on United States soil 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2422" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of research was going on in South Africa before this project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is no evidence that South Africa developed or produced BW agents of any type prior to the establishment of Project Coast, but by the early 1980s advanced research on many virulent biological pathogens had already been carried out for decades at several of the nation's leading medical, veterinary, and agricultural facilities.[2] This is hardly surprising, given the large number of diseases endemic to the country and the substantial role played by diverse animals and plants in South Africa's economy. Apart from clinical work performed at hospitals and animal facilities to treat or quarantine disease-stricken persons and animals, research on various lethal bacteria was carried out at the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute and the H. A. Grove Research Centre at the University of Pretoria, whereas dangerous viruses were studied at the National Institute for Virology, the only facility in South Africa that contained a P-4 safety level biological laboratory.[3] Some of the scientists who worked at these facilities were later recruited to work at the principal Coast BW facility, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), and a couple of these later testified that they had earlier done contract research for the South African Defence Force (SADF). Perhaps the most noteworthy case is that of Dr. Daan Goosen, who was working on a snake venom project for the South African Army at the H. A. Grove Centre when he was approached by Basson in 1983 and asked to turn over some mamba toxin so that a security threat could be eliminated.[4] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2423" task="">
  <question>
    When was Project Coast dismantled? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The CBW program was officially dismantled in 1993, in the midst of a liberalizing transformation of the regime. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2424" task="">
  <question>
    Did other countries gain from this project? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There are indications, however, that certain personnel who were intimately involved in the program, including Basson, may have provided technical knowledge, equipment, or materials to &quot;rogue regimes&quot; such as Libya, to foreign intelligence personnel, to unscrupulous black marketers trafficking in dangerous weapons, and perhaps also -- if certain journalists can be believed -- to elements of a shadowy international network of right-wing extremists. These claims have yet to be fully investigated, much less verified. The extent to which various foreign governments, military establishments, and intelligence agencies secretly monitored or covertly assisted in the development of the program likewise remains an open question. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2425" task="">
  <question>
    Was Basson personally involved in interaction with other countries? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    CBS News reports that it has uncovered documents that show that Wouter Basson had been in contact with Iran. Basson had previously headed South Africa's germ warfare program called &quot;Project Coast&quot; during the 1980s. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/Iran/Biological/2308_2369.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2426" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of activities were going on at RRL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Small quantities of Bacillus anthracis -- the bacterium that causes the disease anthrax -- were produced at the principal South African BW research, testing, and production facility, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), under the auspices of Project Coast. Portions of these bacteria were then added to a variety of common items, including foodstuffs, some of which were reportedly consumed by targeted enemies. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_3527.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_3527.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2427" task="">
  <question>
    To whom were the chemical substances distributed? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On the purported instructions of Project Officer Wouter Basson, Immelman later secretly transferred anthrax bacteria and other highly toxic substances to military and police personnel through various channels. Some of these dangerous materials were provided to Dr. R. F. Botha (alternately known as &quot;Koos&quot;, &quot;Mr. R&quot;, and &quot;Frans Brink&quot;) and thence to Vernon Lange (otherwise known as &quot;Mr. T&quot; and &quot;Theo&quot;), both of whom were operatives of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), a covert assassination unit operating under the aegis of the Special Forces (SF). Others were provided directly to Chris Smit, Gert Otto, and Manie van Staden, three Security Branch (SB) officers from the South African Police (SAP). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_3527.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_3527.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2428" task="">
  <question>
    What did the 1989 &quot;sales list&quot; state? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to the 1989 &quot;sales list&quot; (TRC document 52), as well as firsthand testimony at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings or Basson's criminal trial, Immelman passed such items on, either to the aforementioned persons in innocuous public places like restaurants, or to Basson himself in the latter's office at South African Medical Services (SAMS) headquarters in Centurion. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_3527.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2428_3527.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2429" task="">
  <question>
    What were Basson's responsibilities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Operating under the control and direction of these &quot;work groups,&quot; at least in theory, was Project Officer Wouter Basson, who in January 1985 also began serving as the commander of 7 Medical Battalion Group, an elite SAMS team that provided medical support for SF units operating in the bush. As Project Officer, his appointed task was to act as an intermediary between the CMC and the directors and scientists at the various CBW facilities. Although Basson modestly claimed that his function was to deal with the practical aspects of the project in accordance with the &quot;strategic guidelines&quot; provided by the CMC and its &quot;work groups,&quot; and always insisted that he did not have a &quot;free hand,&quot; his nominal superiors all concur that he personally supervised or managed the day-to-day affairs of the project, operated with a very high degree of autonomy and independence, and provided the CMC with the bulk of the crucial scientific and operational information that its members needed to make important managerial decisions, including the authorization of requested project expenditures. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2430" task="">
  <question>
    Did Basson gain anything from Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In effect, the CMC seems to have become dependent upon Basson for its functioning, rather than the other way around. By the mid-1990s, when it became apparent that some portion of the funds requested by Basson had been used for his own personal gain rather than legitimate project needs, several of Basson's erstwhile supervisors complained that all along he had misled them or kept them in the dark about what he was really doing. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2431" task="">
  <question>
    Did Basson receive instructions from other officials? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Indeed, Project Coast may well have had some sort of parallel, unofficial command structure that operated alongside the official CMC chain of command. Former Army Surgeon-General Niel Knobel claimed that Basson was often either doing things on his own initiative or, as Basson himself later acknowledged, being given operational instructions directly by other parties, including the Defence Minister, the head of the SADF, the Commanding Officer of the SF, the COS Intelligence, the Director-General of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Commissioner of the South African Police (SAP), and possibly also members of the SSC or Cabinet who he treated medically. After receiving at least some of his orders from these powerful figures, above all SADF generals A. J. &quot;Kat&quot; Liebenberg and Magnus Malan, Basson then passed instructions on -- always verbally -- to Project Coast scientists and select members of covert SADF or SAP units with a &quot;need to know,&quot; frequently without informing his nominal superiors on the CMC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2432" task="">
  <question>
    Who sponsored Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The SADF provided funding to the Project Coast front companies through various &quot;private&quot; bank accounts that had been set up explicitly for such purposes. The COS Finance was primarily responsible for arranging the details of the transfer of funds after the requested amounts were approved by the CMC. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2433" task="">
  <question>
    How much funds did the project receive? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    According to government auditors, a total of 418,226 million rand were allocated to the CBW program in the period between 1 April 1983 and 28 February 1992. From 1 March 1987 to 28 February 1993, the period covered by the Basson indictment, the project had access to 340.9 million rand, of which 37 million were allegedly misappropriated by Basson and his collaborators. During this same period the expenditures for the military front company RRL amounted to 98.4 million rand. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2434" task="">
  <question>
    What is RRL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    RRL was a large, sophisticated BW research, testing, and production facility that cost approximately 40 million rand to build and equip and 10 million rand per annum to operate. It was built specifically for this purpose on a farm 12-15 km north of Pretoria, near the Roodeplaat Dam, beginning in November 1983. By 1985 it consisted of a farmhouse, a small 3- or 4-room lab complex, and some animal cages, but it was thereafter expanded in phases to include a restricted P3-level basement Compression Lab and a security dog-breeding subsidiary (Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises). 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2435" task="">
  <question>
    How many people worked at RRL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At its height RRL's staff numbered around 70, including 40 scientists and technicians 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2436" task="">
  <question>
    What departments were there at RRL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    At its height RRL's staff numbered around 70, including 40 scientists and technicians, and was divided into several scientific departments -- Toxicology, Molecular Biology, Organic Chemistry, Physiology, Microbiology, an Animal Unit, etc. -- that were supported logistically by administrative, financial, and security departments. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2437" task="">
  <question>
    Who were the directors at RRL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Its managing director was Dr. Daan Goosen (who was replaced in 1986 by Wynand Swanepoel), its R&amp;D director was Dr. Andre Immelman, its Animal Laboratory Services director was Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, and its administrative director was David Sparmer. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2438" task="">
  <question>
    What projects were going on at RRL? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although RRL also did beneficial work on bovine vaccines, its efforts were focused on three types of military projects: 1) a toxin R&amp;D program headed by Immelman, whose purpose was to develop and test lethal BW and CW agents that were untraceable; 2) a fertility program, headed by Dr. Riana Borman, whose purpose may have been -- though this is bitterly debated, even by insiders -- to limit the growth of the black population; and 3) a BW program linked to new developments in the genetic engineering field, headed by Dr. Mike Odendaal, whose aim was to research and develop antibiotic-resistant strains of pathogens by combining different agents. Although there was no large-scale weaponization of offensive BW agents at RRL, a plethora of toxic substances were acquired, tested, and/or prepared by scientists working for Immelman, whose own instructions came directly from Basson. Among these were BW agents like Bacillus anthracis, botulinum toxin, brucella bacterium, Clostridium perfringens, Escheria coli, Yersinia pestis and/or Y. enterocolitica, salmonella bacterium, Vibrio cholerae, HIV-infected blood, and snake venom, as well as CW agents like mustard, sarin, tabun, VX, and a wide array of other highly toxic chemicals. Some of RRL's products were then tested at the pyrotechnic labs at SF headquarters, the SAP's Forensic Sciences Laboratory, or other facilities at various state companies, semi-state companies, private companies, and universities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2439" task="">
  <question>
    Are other institutes doing any research on biological weapons? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Some supplemental BW research may also have been carried out at private companies and academic institutions, such as the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute and the H. A. Grove Research Centre, both of which were affiliated with the University of Pretoria, or the National Institute for Virology, the only South African facility with a P4 laboratory. If so, the scientists at these facilities were probably not all aware that the research they were contracted to do had been initiated and was being subsidized under the auspices of Project Coast. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/2432.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2440" task="">
  <question>
    What was the covert &quot;Poison Assassination&quot; program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The most characteristic feature of the South African CBW program was undoubtedly the development, testing, and utilization of a wide array of hard-to-trace toxic agents to assassinate &quot;enemies of the state.&quot;[49] As insider testimony and the notorious RRL &quot;sales list&quot; of 1989 (TRC document 52) indicate, several of the highly toxic substances produced at both Delta G and RRL were actually deployed by clandestine SADF and SAP &quot;death squads,&quot; above all the SF's CCB and the SAP Security Branch's C[ounterinsurgency]1 section (later renamed C10) housed at the Vlakplaas base, in covert assassination operations.[50] In this context it should again be pointed out that members of various elite Rhodesian counterinsurgency units that had previously deployed toxic chemicals or biological agents against guerrillas during the Rhodesian civil war had thereafter been incorporated into SADF special operations units (like the SF and its D[elta]40 and Barnacle &quot;hit teams,&quot; the predecessors of the CCB) or the SAP's counterinsurgency forces (like the Koevoet [&quot;Crowbar&quot;] unit).[51] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2441" task="">
  <question>
    What was &quot;Operation Dual&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    As early as 1969, a special unit known as the Z Squad had been set up within BOSS, a secret service that had been created by General H. J. van den Bergh and staffed largely with personnel from the SAP Security Branch, to eliminate both enemies of the state and security risks. As for the SADF, it was under the rubric of a plan initiated in 1979 and codenamed &quot;Operation Dual&quot; that a large number of targeted individuals -- guerrillas in neighboring countries, troublesome prisoners, untrustworthy members of the security forces, or activists in the African National Congress (ANC) and other South African opposition groups -- first began to be murdered in this fashion, and those who did not actually die sometimes suffered terrible illnesses or injuries. The primary SADF formation that carried out these &quot;Dual&quot; actions was the aforementioned Barnacle unit. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2442" task="">
  <question>
    What operation took over the &quot;Operation Dual&quot;? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the mid-1980s, &quot;Operation Dual&quot; was replaced by a higher-level and more formalized assassination program when the Teen-Rewolusion re Inligting Taakspan (TREWITS: Counter-Revolutionary Intelligence Task Force) was created. Consisting of representatives from the SAP's SB, the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI), the SF, and the NIS, one of its primary purposes was to &quot;identify human targets for removal&quot; in a series of monthly reports that were forwarded to the SSC. During the period it was operating, TREWITS authorized a total of 82 extra-judicial killings and 7 attempted killings.[53] The specific groups entrusted with carrying out these &quot;hits&quot; were the covert CCB and C1/C10 paramilitary units. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2443" task="">
  <question>
    Why did America and Britain oppose BWTC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    First, both the American and British governments protested in 1994 and 1995 that South Africa's declarations in its Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Confidence Building Measure were not credible because they downplayed the offensive features of the program. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2444" task="">
  <question>
    Why was Basson arrested in 1997? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In January 1997 Basson was arrested in a &quot;sting operation&quot; for possessing 3,158 capsules of the illegal drug MDMA (&quot;Ecstasy&quot;) that had apparently been manufactured at Delta G, ostensibly for use as a potential &quot;calmative.&quot; Following his arrest, the police discovered several trunks full of Coast documents that he had secretly whisked away and stashed with friends or in storage facilities, a small but important portion of the corpus of documents that was supposed to have been physically destroyed after being copied onto CD-ROMs.[64] He was then indicted by the state for murder and a host of other crimes that he allegedly committed during the period he served as Project Officer for Coast. During the course of this trial, as well as at the hearings held by the TRC, a wealth of detailed information emerged regarding the true scope and nature of South Africa's CBW program. In April 2002 Basson was acquitted of all the charges filed against him, and disillusioned government prosecutors now appear to have abandoned their plans to file an appeal for a new trial. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2445" task="">
  <question>
    What were the worrisome aspects of the dismantled Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In the context of WMD proliferation, the most worrisome aspect of the now defunct Project Coast is that Basson, in connection with his overseas procurement activities, had established close contacts with foreign intelligence operatives and officials from &quot;rogue regimes&quot; such as Libya, with whom he is suspected of sharing information concerning CBW techniques or products.[66] Among his many alleged foreign interlocutors or collaborators were North American, European, and Taiwanese CBW experts he claims to have met at conferences; former British Army intelligence and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officer Roger Buffham; Swiss military intelligence chief Peter Regli and one of his operatives, J?rgen Jacomet; former Iranian government official, secret agent, and apparent con man Mohammed Ali Hashemi (the brother of Cyrus Hashemi of Iran-Contra Affair notoriety); senior Libyan intelligence officers Yusuf Murgham and `Abd al-Razaq; unscrupulous Croatian police and intelligence officials; Danish intelligence officer Hendrik Thomsen; and a Russian named Vorabyov. In addition, Basson spent several months in Libya supposedly working on designing a transportation system, claims to have traveled to Iraq to oversee the effects of CW attacks, claims to have gone to Iran to help the government deal with one or more outbreaks of disease, and visited Germany and Eastern Europe to consult with businessmen reputedly associated with the so-called &quot;CBW mafia,&quot; such as Hubert Bl?cher. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2446" task="">
  <question>
    Was any American involved in South African activities? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    There is also some evidence indicating that Stephen J. Hatfill, an American biological warfare expert who the FBI has designated as a &quot;person of interest&quot; in its investigation of the 2001 anthrax letter mailings in the United States, was involved in various Rhodesian intelligence or counterinsurgency operations. Although Hatfill's activities in southern Africa have yet to be fully clarified, it is known that he worked for the Rhodesian police's Special Branch and that he later obtained his medical degree from the University of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.[78] Some have hinted that he operated out of the Selous Scouts base at the Bindura Fort, from whence McGuinness facilitated the launching of &quot;black operations,&quot; including CW actions. At present, however, intimations that Hatfill may have been personally involved in the covert dissemination of CW or BW agents in southern Africa can only be characterized as unsubstantiated. Be that as it may, in 2002 the South African media reported that Hatfill had earlier helped to train the Aquila Brigade shock troops of Eugene Terre'Blanche's right-wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB: Afrikaner Resistance Movement).[79] During this period, he also claims to have received advanced medical training from various SAMS components, as well as to have been assigned to its 2 Medical Battalion Group. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2447" task="">
  <question>
    How did the apartheid government affect the South African CBW program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa's nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programs reflected perceptions of internal and external threats stemming from its former government's policy of apartheid, as well as the country's advanced state of technical development. Pretoria developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles but relinquished these armaments in the early 1990s. The apartheid government also undertook a chemical and biological weapons (CBW) defense program, which reportedly also included offensive research and use of CBW agents against opponents of that government. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2448" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa sign NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2449" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa join the Zagger Committee? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa joined the Zangger Committee in 1994 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2450" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa join the NSG? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa joined the Zangger Committee in 1994 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2451" task="">
  <question>
    What was South Africa's role in NPT? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa was instrumental in winning indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and played a leading role in successful conclusion of the 2000 NPT Review Conference as a member of the &quot;New Agenda Coalition&quot; that also included Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2452" task="">
  <question>
    What was South Africa's contribution in WW II? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On Britain's request, South Africa produced mustard agent during WW II for use by allied forces in Europe. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2453" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, ratified the treaty in 1995, and is a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council. Grenades, artillery rounds, and mortar shells filled with tear gas by the apartheid government were subsequently destroyed prior to the 1997 entry-into-force of the CWC, and declared to the OPCW. Upon signing the CWC, South African declared that all CW munitions from Project Coast had been destroyed, but nongovernmental sources question whether the government had successfully disposed of all CW agents. South Africa has submitted several declarations to the OPCW, which has conducted several inspections in South Africa. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2454" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa join MTCR? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2455" task="">
  <question>
    What activities were part of the Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although officially proclaimed a strictly defensive program, Project Coast produced irritant gases for crowd control, addictive drugs, and chemical and biological substances for the purposes of killing individuals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2456" task="">
  <question>
    How was Larry Ford connected to the South African weapons program? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Investigators suspect that Ford's possession of the toxic material may have been linked to his involvement in the South African biological weapons program. The South African Defense Force confirmed that Ford indeed served as an &quot;informal consultant.&quot;[F] Ford was introduced to the South African program in the 1980s through Dr. Neil Knobel, who at the time oversaw a portion of &quot;Project Coast,&quot; South Africa's covert biological weapons program. The program was directed by Dr. Wouter Basson, nicknamed &quot;Dr. Death,&quot; who is currently on trial for his illegal production of biological and chemical weapons.[G] Unconfirmed allegations also connect Ford to the U.S. government's chemical weapons program.[F] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2457" task="">
  <question>
    What kind of relationship did Ford have with Basson? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Investigations into Ford's relationship with Dr. Wouter Basson, the director of Project Coast, the former South African covert biological warfare program, suggest that Ford's AIDS research in South Africa was a ruse for work with this program.[D,E] In the late 1990's Ford was working on an anti-balding agent called silatrane, which was mentioned in the trial of Dr. Wouter Basson as a possible toxic agent.[G] Ford purchased farming enterprises for what Basson called the &quot;principals&quot; of the &quot;CBW mafia&quot; group, Abdul Razak, Dieter Dreier, and Vorobyov. These enterprises gave the principals access to chemicals, cultures, conferences, and diseases.[H] Ford demonstrated to scientists from Project Coast how to plant poisons in teabags and doilies. He allegedly sent scientists 5 bags of material which could be cultivated into organisms that could be used to kill anti-apartheid activitsts or those in anti-apartheid organizations, such as the African National Congress (ANC).[I] Ford may have illegally tested Biofem products, such as the female contraceptive, on South African prostitutes.[J] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/perpetrators/15.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/perpetrators/15.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2458" task="">
  <question>
    What materials were found at Ford's residence during a raid in 2000? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In March 2000, police discovered 2.5 pounds of C-4 explosives, numerous guns (including fully-automatic and semi-automatic weapons) and military ammunition, samples of S. typhi, V. choleraie, and Potassium cyanide in Ford's home, yard, and a rented storage locker. Police allege that Ford threatened one patient, with whom he was having an affair, with &quot;something that would ruin her life&quot; if she discontinued their relationship.[D] 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/perpetrators/15.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/perpetrators/15.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2459" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Dr. Death? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Dr. Wouter Basson 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2460" task="">
  <question>
    Who is Basson? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    &quot;Project Coast,&quot; South Africa's covert biological weapons program. The program was directed by Dr. Wouter Basson, nicknamed &quot;Dr. Death,&quot; who is currently on trial for his illegal production of biological and chemical weapons. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2461" task="">
  <question>
    What is Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    South Africa's covert biological weapons program 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20">cns2004/data/WMD-Terrorism/incidents/1087.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2462" task="">
  <question>
    Who was responsible for Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The authors conclude that while Project Coast ostensibly fell under the control and supervision of the military, in reality it was largely designed and executed by Dr. Basson. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/73/abs73.htm%20">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/73/abs73.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2463" task="">
  <question>
    What was the justification for Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    They cover the official justification for Project Coast: the need to counter a perceived threat that chemical weapons might be used against South African soldiers. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/73/abs73.htm%20">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/73/abs73.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2464" task="">
  <question>
    What was the threat against South African soldiers? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although ostensibly created entirely for defensive purposes, since government and Cuban military forces in Angola were reportedly equipped for and planning to use -- if not already using - CW agents against the South African Defence Force (SADF), from the outset the program also had offensive features and capabilities. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2465" task="">
  <question>
    What motivated the creation of Project Coast? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    The apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a &quot;total onslaught&quot; by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing &quot;red-black danger&quot; it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal to defend itself. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2466" task="">
  <question>
    What did Project Coast do? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Although officially proclaimed a strictly defensive program, Project Coast produced irritant gases for crowd control, addictive drugs, and chemical and biological substances for the purposes of killing individuals. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="http://stanford:2004sCNS@www.hlt.utdallas.edu/QA/cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/73/abs73.htm%20">cns2004/data/NP_Review/vol07/73/abs73.htm%20</a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2467" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa sign the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1993 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2468" task="">
  <question>
    When did South Africa ratify the CWC? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    1995 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2469" task="">
  <question>
    What agents did Project Coast research? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    In 1982, Pretoria established the Delta G Scientific facility within Project Coast, which researched lethal, incapacitating, and irritating agents including sarin, VX, paraoxon, thallium, teargas, and an analog of BZ. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2470" task="">
  <question>
    Did South Africa destroy its CW? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    Grenades, artillery rounds, and mortar shells filled with tear gas by the apartheid government were subsequently destroyed prior to the 1997 entry-into-force of the CWC, and declared to the OPCW. Upon signing the CWC, South African declared that all CW munitions from Project Coast had been destroyed, but nongovernmental sources question whether the government had successfully disposed of all CW agents. South Africa has submitted several declarations to the OPCW, which has conducted several inspections in South Africa. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm">cns2004/data/Country%20Profiles/SAfrica/index.htm </a>
  </source>
  <answer id="1" polarity="true" force="plausible" source="world">
    <response>yes</response>
  </answer>
</inference>

<inference id="cns-2471" task="">
  <question>
    Was Basson convicted? 
  </question>
  <passage>
    On 11 April 2002, approximately seven months after the devastating terrorist attack launched by al-Qa`ida operatives on United States soil, a South African judge acquitted Dr. Wouter Basson, the Project Officer for the secret South African chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program, Project Coast, of all that remained of the 46 criminal charges originally filed against him by state prosecutors. 
  </passage>
  <source>
     <a href="cns2004/data/Country&#32;Profiles/SAfrica/Biological/index_2424.htm">cns
